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Abstract 
This study analyses the effects of banking regulation and supervision on the performance and 
stability of Nigerian deposit money banks (DMBs) over the period of 2000 – 2013. Research 
in the area of banking regulation and supervision has gained considerable attention since the 
episode of the global financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007. It is against the 
background that both international and national regulators are continuously introducing new 
rules and guidelines for banking institutions to ensure sound banking systems that this study 
analyses the Nigerian experience. On that account, the Nigerian banking sector went through 
two banking reforms in 2005 and 2009 and this study employs a mixed methods approach to 
ascertain the effects of the reforms on the performance of Nigerian deposit money banks. 
This thesis adopts the use of content analysis of interview responses to examine the initiatives 
employed by both Nigerian regulators and bank managements towards ensuring healthy 
banking practices. More so, the DEA window analysis is employed in this thesis to trace the 
efficiency level of individual deposit money banks through the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms and the global financial crisis. While multiple regression estimations are adopted to 
ascertain the effects of capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning ability, 
liquidity, sensitivity to risk, bank size, and GDP on bank efficiency, bank performance, and 
financial stability. The results suggest that the two Nigerian reforms led to a general increase 
in the performance and efficiency of Nigerian DMBs. However, the 2005 banking reforms 
was unable to shield the Nigerian banking sector from the adverse effect of the global 
financial crisis. Additionally, evidence suggests that Nigerian DMBs recovered in the post-
global financial crisis period in reaction to regulatory initiatives. The results also show that 
resolution techniques adopted by Nigerian regulators prevented the failure of several 
Nigerian DMBs during the global financial crisis. This also found that DMBs fortified their 
internal control practices in line with the 2009 banking to reduce the build-up of non-
performing loans as it was the case after the 2005 banking reforms when there was excess 
liquidity. However, even as the reforms led to increased efficiency scores and performance, 
the results show that capital injections whether in the form of capital requirement increase or 
bailouts do not guarantee sustained efficiency and stability. To that end, this study 
recommended increased surveillance of DMBs and adoption of qualitative and statistical 
assessments of bank performance.   
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Rationale for Study 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 
The financial turmoil that started in the second half of 2007 has stirred discussions 
concerning the performance of banks and in general the regulation and supervision of 
banking systems. The financial turmoil put banks in the spotlight, as banks were accused of 
either creating or fuelling the financial crisis, and thus their performance has been under 
intense scrutiny (Nguyen, Roca, & Sharma, 2014). To that end, the global financial crisis 
brought to light the fact that banks do not always act in ways that spur economic growth and 
development. 
Banks are not just institutions that facilitate payments; they play significant roles in 
channelling funds to vital sections of the economy and as such, contribute towards economic 
growth. They play important roles in fostering economic development and growth which 
makes them unique. The banking sector is the nerve centre of any modern economy because a 
well-functioning banking system has the potential of absorbing major financial shocks that 
lead to financial crisis, while also providing a platform for strengthening economic systems 
of countries (Shah & Jan 2014).   
Given that a sound and well-functioning banking sector is a powerful apparatus for economic 
growth. The banking sector has been the focus of policy makers due to its invaluable 
significance (Wu, Ting, Lu, Nourani & Kweh, 2016). Therefore, the importance of banks in 
the economy and the need to maintain financial stability makes a case for their heavy 
regulation and supervision. To this end, the banking sector is one of the most regulated 
sectors in the world (Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri, 2012). 
However, banking systems do not always function in beneficial ways that foster the growth 
of the economy. The preceding statement is true because banking institutions are subject to 
market failures. The recent episode of the global financial crisis highlighted the vulnerability 
of banking institutions and the need to review regulations that guide the operations of banks 
(Milne, 2014). These inherent risks attached to banking make a case for their regulation and 
supervision. On that account, policy makers and regulators reconfigured regulatory 
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structures, while new regulations are being created as responses to the global financial crisis 
(Wyneersch, Hopt, & Ferrarin, 2012). In spite of the fact that most jurisdictions and 
international committees of regulators have been engaging in some form of regulatory 
revisions, even in periods leading to the global financial crisis. Numerous studies have 
fingered weaknesses in financial regulation and supervision as one of the factors that led to 
the episode of the global financial crisis (Levine, 2010; Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2012; 
Manlagnit, 2015). Therefore, regulatory change does not inevitably guarantee the efficiency 
and stability of financial institutions.  
Consequent on the specialness of banking institutions to economic development and the 
inability of regulation to protect them from the adverse effects of the recent global financial 
crisis; it is crucial to understand the failures of the past regulatory initiatives to chart a course 
for future banking and financial stability. To be specific, the Nigerian banking sector went 
through two noteworthy regulatory reforms (2005 banking reforms and 2009 banking 
reforms) that transformed the Nigerian banking landscape. On that account, this study 
embarks on the evaluation of the efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian deposit 
money banks from the period of 2000 – 2013 to ascertain the extent to which these reforms 
improved or derailed the Nigerian banking sector.  
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a major reform agenda for the Nigerian 
banking sector on 6 July 2004. CBN assessments of the Nigerian banking sector in the pre-
2005 banking reforms period suggested summarised the major problems in the industry as: 
weak corporate governance, late or non-publication of annual reports, gross insider abuses, 
insolvency caused by negative capital adequacy ratios and low levels of shareholders’ funds 
that had been completely eroded by operating losses, weak capital base, and over-dependence 
on public sector deposits and neglect of small and medium class savers. Hence, the issues and 
weaknesses informed the decision of Nigerian regulators to consolidate and strengthen the 
Nigerian banking sector to meaningfully protect deposits, play significant developmental 
roles in the economy and become an efficient and active player in the African and global 
financial system. Elaborate presentation of all the elements of the 2005 banking reforms is 
done in the next chapter. However, two main elements of the reforms were the requirement 
that money deposit banks (DMBs) have a minimum regulatory capital of N25 billion before 
the end of December 2005, and consolidation of banking institutions through mergers and 
acquisitions. The 2005 banking reforms led to the reduction in the number of Nigerian DMBs 
3 
 
to 25 from 89 and later to 24. The 89 DMBs were relatively small with a capital base of N2bn 
in the pre-2005 banking reforms period (NDIC, 2004; CBN, 2006).    
Regulatory reports after the 2005 reforms indicate that apart from the huge capital base of 
DMBs that survived, other benefits accrued to the Nigerian banking sector. The increase in 
branch network, unshackling of Nigerian DMBs from reliance on public sector funds, and 
increased liquidity and total assets levels which equipped DMBs to finance bigger projects 
within the oil, gas, telecommunication and real estate sectors (CBN, 2007, NDIC, 2007). 
Although the above indicates the positives of the 2005 reforms, the bailout of eight DMBs in 
2009 and the decision to embark on another set of reforms in 2009 suggest that the 2005 
reforms may not have eliminated the issues that motivated regulators to engage in the 
reforms. More so, the episode of the global financial crisis or lack of adequate supervision 
could also be responsible for the resolution to further reform DMBs. The uncertainty that 
surrounds the deep issues that influenced the initiative to engage in the 2009 banking reforms 
and the role played by the global financial crisis, therefore, is the focus of this study.         
The 2005 banking reforms was not a reaction to any economic or financial crisis but were 
undertaken to make the Nigerian banking sector more efficient (Sanusi, 2012). Nonetheless, 
Nigerian regulators initiated the 2009 reforms largely because of the weaknesses identified 
during the periodic stress tests of DMBs that include depreciating capital levels, high levels 
of non-performing loans, and weak corporate governance practices (CBN, 2008; NDIC, 
2008). To be specific, Sanusi, (2012) and the Oxford Business Group (2013) opined that the 
2009 banking reforms were initiated in response to the global financial crisis and the inability 
of the 2005 banking reforms to adequately shield the Nigerian banking sector from the 
adverse effect of the crisis. Moreover, the broad objectives of the 2009 reform include: 
enhancing the quality of DMBs; establishing financial stability; enabling healthy financial 
sector evolution; and ensuring the financial sector contributes to the real economy. The 2009 
reforms also jettisoned the universal banking model and mandated DMBs to hold regulatory 
capital based on the type of business they operate and the locations they covered. On that 
account, the regulatory capital of DMBs with international operations was set at N100bn, 
N25bn for national DMBs and N10bn for regional DMBs. Additionally, supervision was to 
be risk-focused, and strict enforcements of corporate governance principles were among the 
main elements of the reforms (CBN, 2009; NDIC, 2009).  On account of the above, an 
examination of the events that led to the initiation of the 2009 banking reforms and the extent 
to which it has been able to reverse the effects of the global financial crisis is necessary. To 
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that end, investigating the extent to which these reforms strengthened the Nigerian banking 
sector and impacted efficiency, performance and financial stability is the focus of this 
research. 
Furthermore, in the two years to 2006, the assets of the banking sector more than doubled 
from N3.2trn ($20.16bn) to N6.56trn ($41.33bn). However, following the episode of the 
global financial crisis, the Nigerian Stock Exchange plummeted by 70% in 2008 and 2009, 
and Nigerian DMBs disclosed a massive increase in the ratio of non-performing loans from 
6.3% to 27.6% in the year ending 2009. Notwithstanding the immediate cause of the drop in 
the value of stocks on the NSE can be linked to global factors (global financial crisis). Home-
Grown faults in the areas of corporate governance and risk management aggregated the effect 
on banks, as a result of “widespread insider abuse and improper related party lending (IMF, 
2013; Oxford Business Group, 2013).            
To be specific, the Nigerian banking sector is an important part of the Nigerian economy. The 
combined assets of Nigerian deposit money banks as it 2013 stood at N21.3trn ($134.19bn), 
or 57% of GDP. However, the reach of deposit money banks remains shallow, and financial 
intermediation to the real economy is inhibited with penetration as loans to GDP is at a mere 
32% as at 2012, compared to 90% in South Africa. More so, only about 20% of the 
population of nearly 170 million Nigerians are banked, with roughly 25 million active 
accounts that include duplicate account-holders (Oxford Business Group, 2013). This 
indicates the potential of the Nigerian banking sector and why it should be nurtured with 
well-defined regulations and legislation to eliminate problems caused by market 
imperfections. Hence, the Nigerian banking sector and the events that transpired should be 
studied with the goal of understanding past mistakes and failures.  
This study dwells only on Nigerian DMBs because they operate under the same conditions 
and they are regulated and supervised by the same agencies/authorities. Nigerian DMBs also 
operate the same accounting framework, experience the same technological changes, are 
patronised by the same type of customers and are exposed to the same opportunities. On 
account of the above, the Nigerian banking sector is a unique case, and a study centred on the 
reforms initiated by Nigerian regulators in quick succession is worth investigating. Three 
different techniques have been adopted in this study to extensively ascertain if Nigerian 
regulatory initiatives (2005 and 2009 banking reforms) improved or derailed the efficiency, 
performance and stability of Nigerian deposit money banks.  
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Given the importance of the Nigerian banking sector, it is reasonable to project that an 
efficient and profitable banking sector may aid ensure an effective financial system which 
will translate to economic growth and development. In this light, Levine (1998) and Sufian, 
Kamarudin, & Nassir (2016) are of the notion that the efficiency of financial intermediaries 
affects the economic growth of countries, while bank (financial intermediation) insolvencies 
could lead to systemic crisis and consequently negative implications on the economy. So, 
efficiency is fundamental for successful long-term business operations on all levels in all 
business operations (Geisslar, Mew, Weber, & Steiner, 2015). The basic concept of 
efficiency is that it measures how well organisations transform their inputs into outputs. An 
organisation is said to be efficient if it can achieve set goals and inefficient if it fails to 
achieve such goals. Accordingly, an organisation’s goal is assumed to be cost minimization 
of production. Therefore, any waste of input is avoided, so there is no idleness in the 
utilisation of resources. More so, efficient organisations are able to effectively allocate 
resources in efficient ways relative to the constraints imposed by the structure of input and 
output markets, relative to whatever goals attributed to the products (Fare, Grosskopf, Lovell, 
1985; Fare, Grosskopf, Norris, & Zhang, 1994; Fadzlan, Sufian & Kamarudin, 2014).       
A wide variety of models and techniques have been utilised to investigate the spectrum of 
efficiency related issues in a wide range of locations. However, as already intimated, this 
study only focuses on the Nigerian banking sector with the view of ascertaining whether 
regulatory initiatives have improved or impeded efficiency. The efficiency estimation of 
banking institutions is suited for ascertaining the best and worst practice institutions (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). Over the last three decades, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has 
emerged as a capable mathematical and analytical tool. It is used to measure and gauge the 
performance of a set of similar peers (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011). DEA has been 
extensively and efficaciously applied to a broad array of fields such as banking, hospital 
management, military, education, universities, and country studies (Emrouznejad, Parker, & 
Tavares, 2008; Cooper et al., 2011). To that end, this study adopts an extended version of the 
DEA approach called DEA windows analysis to examine the Nigerian banking sector as it 
went through the 2005 banking reforms, 2009 banking reforms, and the global financial 
crisis. The window analysis approach treats the same organisation in a different time as 
another unit and compares the performance of one unit not only against the performance of 
other organisations in the same time but also against that of the same unit in other times. This 
approach is useful when different organisations perform otherwise and at the same time, the 
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organisations perform differently depending on the period (Itoh, 2002). The DEA window 
approach is therefore utilised in this study because of the different methods (consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions, and public and private offers) used by DMBs to raise 
capital during the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, and the event of the global financial crisis 
which affected DMBs differently. More so, Charnes et al. (1985) suggested that the 
estimation of efficiency using the window approach provides robust results by repeatedly 
moving the window term.  
Likewise, understanding the underlying factors that influence the efficiency, performance, 
and stability of banking sectors is essential for bank executives, central banks, bankers 
association, and other financial/regulatory authorities to help them forge policies that improve 
the banking sector (Sufian et al., 2016). Regression analysis is a main tool of econometrics, 
and it is widely used in banking studies to estimate or predict the factors that influence the 
behaviour of banking institutions. Regression analysis is concerned with the study of the 
dependence of one variable (dependent variable), on one or more other variables (explanatory 
variables), with a view of estimating and or/predicting the (population) mean or average 
value of the former in terms of the known or fixed (in repeated sampling) values of the latter 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The empirical literature has shown that there are several 
determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and stability. Capital levels, liquidity, asset 
management, operating efficiency, size of bank, overheads, leverage ratio, credit risk, non-
performing loans, earnings, concentration, solvency risk, deposits, operating expenses, 
interest rate, exchange rate, GDP, and inflation have all been utilised in banking empirical 
studies with varying and contradicting results depending on the time period, business type of 
institutions, and jurisdiction.  Given the divergent and conflicting effects of the chosen 
variables in the estimation of efficiency, performance, and financial stability, this study aligns 
with the CAMELS approach to select proxies that show how the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian 
reforms, and the episode of the global financial crisis influenced the Nigerian banking sector. 
To that end, panel data multiple regression estimation techniques (fixed effects and random 
effects) are used in this study to ascertain the extent to which capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earning capacity, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk, size and GDP 
determined the efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian deposit money banks.  
Additionally, a qualitative dimension which is barely explored in banking literature is utilised 
in this study. Content analysis adopted in this study dwells mainly on the analyses of 
interview submissions from Nigerian bank regulators (CBN and NDIC) and bank executives 
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of DMBs to ascertain patterns and structures to derive meaning. This technique is utilised 
foremost to obtain first-hand information from the designers of Nigerian regulatory initiatives 
and bank executives which witnessed and participated in the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms. 
More so, this technique can shed light on the ‘what, how and why’ further regulatory 
initiatives like the bailout of eight DMBs and the bridge banking model had to be relied upon. 
In a nutshell, content analysis explores the dimensions which quantitative techniques that 
utilise financial statements and figures are unlikely to examine.  
Finally, this study provides a robust assessment of Nigerian regulatory initiatives (2005 and 
2009 banking reforms, the bailout of eight DMBs and the nationalisation of three DMBs into 
bridge banks) by using three different techniques (DEA window analysis, regression analysis, 
and content analysis). In line with the arguments presented above and the summary of the 
events that transpired in the Nigerian banking sector and the financial world in general, the 
rationale for embarking on this research is the next focus of this thesis.            
 
1.2 Rationale for Research  
 
Banks are the central financial intermediaries in the financial system of any country, and they 
carry out various vital roles through financial intermediation. The banking sector of any 
economy is the mechanism for sustainable economic growth and macroeconomic stability 
because it influences economic activities (Alper & Onis, 2011; Barth, James, Caprio, & 
Levine, 2006, 2007; Levine, 2005). This shows that banks matter for the welfare of the 
general populace, and as such, they should be monitored and adequately regulated. On this 
account, the Nigerian banking sector is regulated by the CBN and NDIC to ensure that 
deposit money banks (DMBs) continue to perform their important roles of intermediation, 
maturity transformation, maintaining financial discipline among borrowers, credit allocation, 
and facilitation of payments flows. Therefore, centred on the importance of the Nigerian 
banking sector to the Nigerian economy this study investigates the actions taken by Nigerian 
regulators towards ensuring safe and sound banking practices.     
Several motivations for investigations on banking regulation and supervision exist. The 
global financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, highlighted that global regulation and supervision was 
far from adequate. With greater reason, more than 100 systemic banking crises have 
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devastated countries around the globe since the 1970s (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2013). All 
these banking crises at least reflect some defect in bank regulation and supervision. Several 
studies hold the view that the failure of a single bank has the potential of becoming systemic, 
therefore leading to a system-wide banking crisis (Acharya, 2009; Maghyereh & Awartani, 
2014; Milne, 2014; Rajan & Ramcharan, 2016). For instance, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, one of America’s biggest investment banks is believed to have triggered a chain 
reaction of economic, financial and psychological crisis (Global financial crisis) that engulfed 
the entire globe (Gupta, 2010). Therefore, investigations into the performance of banking 
institutions will assist in the mitigation of bank failures. To that end, the examination of the 
performance of Nigerian deposit money banks will provide directions and recommendations 
to policy makers and bank regulators.   
More so, due to the episode of the global financial crisis, the international financial world 
recognised that repairing the financial system remains a major priority. Rescue measures in 
the form of individual country reforms and global measures like Basel III were introduced. 
However, Basel III has just been introduced, and its implication on financial stability has not 
yet been ascertained. For this reason, the limited scope of the application of Basel III 
encourages researchers to observe as countries implement the recommendations of the 
framework. Evidently, most developing countries and countries in Africa are not adequately 
represented on the Basel Committee apart from the BRIC countries and South Africa. Hence 
it is important that independent studies are carried out, in countries like Nigeria. Additionally, 
the 2009 banking reforms was also a reaction to the perceived adverse effect of the global 
financial crisis on the Nigerian banking sector, which makes a case for an investigation to 
ascertain the extent to which the reforms were able to spur banking performance and establish 
financial stability.    
Furthermore, the study is of the view that the Nigerian banking system represents a unique 
case study, due to the two banking reforms it went through within a span of five years (i.e. 
2005 – 2009). Additionally, various mergers and acquisitions were sanctioned by the reforms, 
and banks that were unable to attract additional capital after the recapitalization exercise of 
the 2005 banking reforms were absorbed through the purchase and assumption agreement or 
liquidated in line with CBN and NDIC guidelines. Equally, Nigerian regulators had to bailout 
eight deposit money banks in 2009 due to the build-up of non-performing loans. This move 
led to the sacking of eight bank chief executives and their boards. More so, three troubled 
banks were nationalised into bridge banks in 2011 by Nigerian regulators. This measure was 
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novel to the banking sector. Therefore, the effects of the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking 
reforms, and the various regulatory strategies adopted by Nigerian regulators are worth 
investigating. Consequently, the examination of the performance and efficiency of Nigerian 
deposit money banks will shed light on the impact of the two banking reforms and the 
strategies embarked by regulatory and supervisory authorities to resolve troubled banking 
institutions.   
 
1.3 Contributions to knowledge  
 
This research contributes to theory, practice and methodology. To the best of the knowledge 
of the researcher, there is no Nigerian study that employed the DEA window analysis 
technique to ascertain the performance and efficiency of Nigerian DMBs with particular 
reference to the banking reforms of 2005 and 2009. On this account, this study will contribute 
to the growing literature on bank efficiency and performance studies. More so, the DEA 
window analysis employed in this study can be used as an alternative approach by regulators.  
Numerous studies have attempted to predict banking failures by using methodologies like 
logit models, probit models, discriminant analysis, neural networks, and hazard rate models 
(Cleary & Hebb, 2016). Few studies have however relied on the DEA and by extension the 
DEA window approach to predict financial distress. Pille & Paradi (2002) and Avkiran & Lin 
(2012) suggested that the DEA is an adequate technique for predicting financial distress, 
while Kwon & Lee (2015) and Premachandra, Chen, & Watson (2011) opined it lacked 
predictive capacity. On that account, this study contributes to argument and literature on the 
use of DEA and DEA window analysis as a methodology for predicting financial distress.  
The factors that determine efficiency, performance and stability vary depending on the 
period, economic situation, or jurisdiction. To that end, this study contributes to the existing 
literature on the empirical determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and stability on 
several grounds. In contrast to most studies, this study relied on bank-specific CAMELS 
measures as variables, instead of depending on the discretion of the researcher in making 
variable choices. Moreover, this study does not only examine the effects of bank-specific 
CAMELS (internal factors). External factors such as GDP and inflation adjusted bank size 
are also examined.   
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In furtherance of the investigation into the effects of Nigerian regulatory initiatives from the 
period of 2000 – 2013, this study contributes to literature and methodology by employing 
content analysis to evaluate interview responses from regulatory authorities and bank 
executives. Content analysis can be used as a stand-alone technique (Tangpong, 2011); 
however, it is used in tandem with DEA windows analysis and regression analysis to enhance 
the validity of this research finding. More so, the content analysis of is hardly used in banking 
studies. Therefore, its application in this study serves as a methodological recommendation 
for regulators and other bank stakeholders.     
This study contributes to the growing literature on the recent global financial crisis. 
Academics and practitioners in various institutions and jurisdictions have sought to 
understand the deep issues that led to the crisis to devise means to prevent future similar 
occurrences. To that end, this study examines the effects of the global financial crisis on 
Nigerian DMBs to shed light on the Nigerian perspective.   
Nigerian regulators relied on financial safety net strategies (bailouts and bridge banking 
model) to prevent the collapse of some DMBs. This study, therefore, contributes to the 
literature on financial safety nets as regulators struggle to design strategies that do not 
encourage moral hazard.   
Finally, this study is of the view that the use of three different analysis techniques (DEA 
window analysis, regression analysis and content analysis) offers a robust approach to 
analysing complex, multifaceted, and dynamic phenomena such as banking regulation and 
supervision. Hence, this research shows how three different methods/techniques can be 
successfully applied to banking studies.    
 
1.4 Research Aim 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian 
deposit money banks (DMBs) with particular reference to the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms. The study focuses on the extent to which Nigerian banking reforms have enhanced 
or impeded the performance and efficiency of deposit money banks (DMBs). In broad terms, 
the study also aims to examine the strategies and initiatives adopted by Nigerian bank 
regulators in enhancing efficiency and promoting financial stability. 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
 
Therefore, to achieve the aim of this research, the research objectives are as follows: 
1. To examine the Nigerian banking sector prior and after the 2005 banking reforms and 
ascertain the extent to which the reforms impacted on the efficiency and performance 
of Nigerian deposit money banks.    
2. To ascertain how statistical models can be used to predict bank distress in the 
Nigerian banking sector. 
3. Investigate if the combination of statistical models will unearth, complement and 
provide deeper insight in the estimation of bank efficiency, performance and financial 
stability.    
4. Determine the extent to which the global financial crisis impacted the performance of 
individual deposit money banks and the Nigerian banking sector in the whole.  
5. Examine the role of financial safety nets in resolving distressed and troubled deposit 
money banks. 
6. Explore whether changes in banking regulation and supervision (2009 banking 
reforms) in reaction to the global financial crisis enhanced efficiency, performance 
and stability of the Nigerian banking sector. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
 
Hence, to achieve the aims and objectives of the study, the questions below are tested.  
1. To what extent have the Nigerian banking reforms of 2005 and 2009 improved the 
efficiency, performance and stability of Nigerian deposit money banks? 
2. How have financial safety nets been able to mitigate the occurrence of bank failures 
and financial crisis in Nigeria? 
3. To what magnitude did the global financial crisis affect the efficiency, performance, 
and stability of Nigerian deposit money banks? 
4. How have regulatory responses to the episode of the global financial crisis changed 
banking regulatory practices and internal control in the Nigerian banking sector?  
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5. How have the adopted statistical models been able to detect and predict troubled 
deposit money banks in the Nigerian banking sector? 
6. What are the determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and stability in the 
Nigerian banking sector?  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure   
 
This thesis is composed of nine chapters including the current introduction chapter. Chapter 
two provides a background and history of banking regulation in the Nigerian banking sector. 
Chapter three is a review of theoretical concepts and empirical studies on banking regulation 
and supervision, bank performance, bank efficiency, and financial stability. Chapter four 
focuses on the discussion of the methodologies employed to provide answers to the research 
questions. Chapter five dwells on the DEA window analysis of Nigerian deposit money 
banks. Chapter six is a presentation of the regression results. Chapter seven is the content 
analysis of interview responses of bank regulators and senior bank managers. Chapter eight 
harmonises and discusses the findings of the DEA window analysis, regression analysis, and 
content analysis. Finally, chapter nine provides the conclusions and recommendations of the 
thesis.    
The contents of each chapter are summarised as follows: 
Chapter one has set the stage by highlighting the importance of banking institutions to 
economic development, while also stating why they should be regulated. It also briefly 
indicates that regulatory initiatives were unable to protect banking institutions from the global 
financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007. This chapter set out the rationale 
underlying the study and stated the contributions of the study to banking literature. It also 
delineated the relevance of the study and outlined the aims and objectives of the study from 
which the research questions were derived.  
Chapter two examines the 2005 Nigerian banking reforms and the 2009 Nigerian banking 
reforms which were initiated to correct the shortcomings of the 2005 reforms and cushion the 
adverse effect of the global financial crisis on Nigerian DMBs. The chapter serves as a 
background to that study as it dwells on the specific elements of both the 2005 and 2009 
Nigerian banking reforms.  
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Chapter three is a review of the literature and theoretical concepts related to banking 
regulation and supervision, financial safety nets, financial crises, and private monitoring. The 
techniques used to measure bank performance are discussed. Also, the related empirical 
literature on DEA and CAMELS are provided in this chapter. Additionally, the chapter 
rounds up with a review of Nigerian studies that focus on banking regulation and bank 
performance.     
Chapter four focuses on the research methodology that presents the systematic framework 
that this research followed to achieve the aims and objectives of the study. The scope of the 
study and the justification for adopting the pragmatic philosophy in this research is presented, 
before the research approach that rationalises the adoption of both the deductive and 
inductive approach (abduction) is discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of the mixed 
methods research strategy are also presented, alongside the justification for its adoption. 
Additionally, the sources of data utilised and the three analysis techniques (content analysis, 
DEA window analysis, and regression analysis) employed are extensively examined in this 
chapter. Finally, the last section of this chapter outlines the validity and reliability of the 
study. 
Chapter Five is the first of the three chapters dedicated to the analysis of the data obtained to 
examine the effects of Nigerian regulatory initiatives and the global financial crisis on the 
performance of Nigerian DMBs. The efficiency of individual Nigerian DMBs and the 
aggregate performance of the entire Nigerian banking sector is presented in this chapter. 
Using the DEA window technique and relying on a three-year window span and twelve 
windows in total, the efficiency of DMBs are traced through the periods the Nigerian banking 
sector went through the 2005 banking reforms, the global financial crisis, and the 2009 
banking reforms. The chapter concludes with discussions on the efficiency of DMBs in the 
pre-2005 banking reforms periods, the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms periods, the effect of 
the global financial crisis on DMBs, and the efficiency of bailed-out DMBs and bride banks.  
Chapter Six dwells on the multiple regression analysis of Nigerian DMBs using panel data 
from 2000 – 2013. The determinants of efficiency (BCC efficiency scores), bank 
performance (ROA) and stability (Z-Score) are assessed in this chapter. Hence, the evaluated  
determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and stability for the whole study period (2000 
– 2013), the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004),  2005 banking reforms & GFC 
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period (2005 – 2008); 2009 banking reforms and post-GFC period (2009 – 2013) are 
presented in this chapter.  
Chapter seven provides the content analysis of qualitative data, which was predominately 
obtained through the interview process. Responses from the staff of the two main regulatory 
agencies (CBN and NDIC) and senior bank managers from Nigerian DMBs are analysed in 
this chapter. The reactions obtained dwell on regulatory initiatives and the effects of the 2005 
and 2009 banking reforms, and the global financial crisis on Nigerian DMBs. The challenges 
faced by DMBs and internal control practices put in place to mitigate against the adverse 
effect of risky practices and operations are also examined in this chapter. This chapter also 
briefly dwells on the private monitoring of Nigerian DMBs and the confidence of banking 
customers in the Nigerian banking sector. More so, the influences of international regulation 
on Nigerian regulatory initiatives are also explored in this chapter.  The views of interview 
participants regarding the financial stability and prospects of the Nigerian banking sector are 
presented to round up the chapter. 
Chapter eight harmonises and discusses the findings obtained from the three analysis 
techniques (content analysis, DEA window analysis, and regression analysis) employed in 
this study. The findings of this study are also reviewed and contrasted against related 
studies/literature with the intention of drawing valid and reliable conclusions in this chapter. 
Hence, the results of this study are reassessed alongside related findings in this chapter.     
Chapter nine provides a summary of the key findings and conclusions from drawn from the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques employed in this study. Recommendations to 
improve banking regulation and supervision are also outlined within this chapter. More so, 
the contributions of this study to literature and practice are presented. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by delineating the limitations and constraints of the study and proposing 
suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter Two: Banking Reforms in Nigeria  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Reforms are a constant feature in most banking systems. Banking reforms are usually 
initiated in response to challenges presented by factors and developments ranging from 
systemic crises, deregulation, technological innovations, globalisation, and proactive 
measures to strengthen the banking system (Lessambo, 2013). 
The Nigerian banking sector went through two major reforms (2005 banking reforms and 
2009 banking reforms) within the period under review. More so, Nigerian regulators engaged 
in the bailout of eight DMBs in 2009, while they nationalised three DMBs into bridge banks 
in 2011 to prevent their collapse. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC) are the two main authorities saddled with the responsibility of 
regulating and supervising Nigerian DMBs. This chapter, therefore, dwells on the elaborate 
presentation of the rationale and objectives of the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms. 
The Nigerian banking sector went through several reforms since the establishment of the 
Bank for British West Africa in 1894. This study focuses only on the two most recent reforms 
in the Nigerian banking sector, hence only the 2005 and 2009 reforms are discussed in this 
chapter.   
 
2.2 Rationale for the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
A sound banking system provides a platform for carrying out economic transactions and 
monetary policy, and aid in the efficient channelling of savings into investment, which 
supports economic growth (IMF, 2014). More so, the IMF suggested that unsound banking 
systems do not only interrupt financial intermediation, but also: erode the efficacy of 
monetary policies; intensify economic downturns; give rise to capital flight; engineer 
exchange rate pressures; and result in fiscal costs related to resolving troubled banking 
institutions. Hence, due to the negativities enshrined in unsound banking systems, regulatory 
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authorities should ensure policies and guidelines available to banking institutions are always 
in tuned with best global practices. 
Before the 2005 banking reforms, the Nigerian banking sector was diagnosed to consist of 
structural and operational inadequacies. The inadequacies as presented by the CBN include 
low capital base; large numbers of small banks with rather few branches; poor rating of some 
of the banks; weak corporate governance; declining ethics; inaccurate reporting/disclosure; 
non-compliance with regulatory requirements; huge non-performing credits; and over-
dependence on public sector deposits. The inclination to correct these inadequacies provided 
the motivation for the 2005 banking reforms (CBN, 2004, 2005). 
 
2.3 Nature of the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
The objectives of the banking sector reforms include the following: 
 Banks should have a minimum capital base of N25 billion on or before year end 31 
December 2005; 
 Consolidation of banks by the use of mergers and acquisitions; 
 The adoption of  risk-focused and rule-based regulatory framework; 
 Adoption of zero-tolerance in the regulation of banking institution, particularly about 
data/information rendition, reporting and disclosure;  
 Automation of the procedure for making returns by banks and other financial 
institutions through the electronic financial analysis and surveillance system (e-
FASS); 
 Implementation of the contingency planning framework for systemic banking distress 
(CBN, 2004, 2005). 
In furtherance of the reform programme, the actions taken by Nigerian regulatory authorities 
to achieve the objectives of the reforms include(CBN, 2004, 2005):  
 The provision of guidelines and incentives to banks to encourage implementation; 
 The establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee on Banking Sector 
Consolidation; 
 The establishment of a help desk at the Central Bank of Nigeria; 
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 The formation of a Banking Consolidation Implementation Committee; 
 The promotion of collaborations between the CBN and NDIC with other institutions 
like the Federal Inland Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the Corporate Affairs Commission; 
 The issuance of circulars and procedure manuals on consolidation timeframe and 
returns; 
 Debt forbearance for a few banks to make them attractive to potential investors for 
mergers/acquisitions; 
 The verification of capital to ensure that borrowed or illicit funds from the banking 
sector were not utilised to finance the purchase of bank shares; 
 Technical assistance from the IMF; 
 Periodic interactive meetings with banks to determine the level of progress made; 
 The procedure for the establishment of an Asset Management Corporation that would 
purchase the non-performing loans plaguing the banking system was put in motion. 
Furthermore, regulators and banks encountered various challenges during the consolidation 
exercise (CBN, 2005; NDIC, 2005). As revealed by the CBN and NDIC, the challenges 
encountered include the following: 
 The lack of experience and technical knowledge by regulators and banks in the 
management of such a sensitive initiative which involved high-level consolidations 
and mergers/acquisitions; 
 The presence of delinquent assets and large amounts of non-performing loans that 
were capable of distorting the balance sheet of the emergent banks; 
 The high cost of consolidation; 
 The likelihood of inflow of laundered forms into the system and the inability to 
regulators to verify the sources of funds used in the recapitalisation of banks; 
 A high percentage of government ownership in some banks and its implication for 
corporate governance in emerging banks. 
2.4 Outcome of the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
At the conclusion of the consolidation exercise, twenty-five banks emerged through mergers 
and acquisition. While fourteen banks that neither met the N25 billion minimum capital 
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requirement nor found suitable merger partners had their licences revoked. And as mandated, 
the NDIC was directed to obtain court orders to embark on the liquidation of the affected 
banks (CBN, 2006; NDIC, 2006). 
In a bid to comply with the minimum capital requirement mandated by the reform, the banks 
that emerged raised N404.4 billion from the Nigerian capital market through private 
placements and public offers. Of the total amount raised, the CBN verified and accepted 
N360 billion as at the end of the consolidation exercise (Kama, 2006). More so, the banking 
sector also enjoyed an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) of $652 billion and £162,000 
(Kama, 2006; Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). 
Other benefits of the 2005 banking reforms include(CBN, 2006; NDIC, 2006): 
 The astronomical increase in the combined capitalization of the emergent banks from 
N327 before the consolidation exercise, to N755 billion post-consolidation.  
 The reforms gave rise to fewer but bigger banks (large capital base). 
 The reforms led to the reduction of family owned and controlled banks. It resulted in 
the dilution of ownership and broadened the spread of shareholders. 
 The consolidation exercise led to the listing of virtually all the banks on the Nigerian 
stock exchange, owing to the reliance on the capital market to raise funds. This move 
ushered in wider regulatory oversight, as the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) joined the regulatory team.  
 Additionally, with fewer banks in the banking industry, regulation and supervision 
became more streamlined, focused and less cumbersome.  
Finally, the decision to embark on the consolidation exercise was a genius move that saved 
the Nigerian banking sector. The banks that emerged were adequately capitalised, bigger and 
financially stable. The increase in capitalization meant that the banks were positioned to 
finance other sectors of the economy. However, the excess liquidity in the hands of bank 
executives was not utilised as envisaged.  
Mismanagement became the order of the day, and the industry was again plunged into 
trouble, which led to the 2009 banking reforms. The section below presents the problems that 
persisted in the Nigerian banking industry post-consolidation, which forms the rationale for 
the 2009 banking reforms. 
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2.5 Rationale for the 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
The right question to ask at this junction is “what went wrong after the success of the banking 
consolidation exercise that culminated in December 2005?” In answering the above question, 
(Sanusi, 2010) suggested that the Nigerian banking industry experienced tremendous growth 
post-consolidation. On the contrary, stakeholders in the banking industry (banks and 
regulators) were not adequately equipped to monitor and sustain the explosive growth 
witnessed in the sector. He further opined that in addition to the global financial crisis, the 
following eight (8) interdependent factors paved the way for an extremely fragile financial 
system: 
 Macro-economic disequilibrium created by large and sudden capital inflows - The 
Nigerian economy depends largely on the oil sector for revenue. Equally, global oil 
prices steadily increased between 2004 and 2008, and the lack of sophistication of 
revenue streams in the Nigerian economy led to volatility. As most banks benefited 
from inflows from the oil sector, a fall in oil prices during the global financial crisis 
affected both government and bank revenues. Coupled with the excess liquidity in the 
banking system post-consolidation and increase in global oil prices, Nigerian DMBs 
started lending to non-priority sectors of the economy and the capital market. The 
repercussion of such lending and dependence on the oil sector became the bane of the 
Nigerian economy during the global financial crisis and periods leading to the 2009 
banking reforms.    
 Inadequate corporate governance structures in banks - Sanusi also revealed that the 
huge heave of capital available to banks happened at a time when the corporate 
governance standards in banks were extremely inadequate and weak. Corporate 
governance weakness that existed pre-consolidation were not addressed during the 
consolidation reforms and these metamorphosed to widespread governance 
malpractices by bank executives. Board members neglected their functions of 
providing guidance and monitoring the activities of bank executives. While bank 
executives also misled board members. Additionally, bank examinations found out 
that some board members and bank executives were not qualified enough to run the 
activities of banks. Thus, board executives were either ineffective or dormant.      
 Lack of consumer and investor sophistication - A lack of consumer and investor 
sophistication also contributed to the crisis that enveloped the Nigerian banking 
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system. Investors and bank customers did not engage in any form of monitoring, 
further contributing to the lack of supervision in the post-consolidation era.  
 Inadequate financial information disclosure and transparency- The CBN found out 
that financial reports made available by banks were most at times inaccurate and 
incomplete. Therefore, misleading regulators in their supervisions, while also feeding 
investors with wrong information on which to make investments decisions. More so, 
banks did not make timely disclosures and disclosed information was doctored. 
 Severe gaps in regulatory frameworks - There was little or no corporation among 
various regulators in the banking industry. Consolidated coordination was lacking. 
The FSRCC, the coordinating body of regulators in the Nigerian financial industry, 
also did not meet for two years (2006-2008). Additionally, the Security and Exchange 
Commission did not make available to the CBN the examination reports of bank 
subsidiaries, and there was no framework for consolidated bank examinations.      
 Uneven supervision and enforcement - Inadequate enforcement of regulations and 
uneven supervision played a pivotal role in aggravating the crisis that befell the 
banking industry. Regulators were ineffective in their role as supervisors, and they 
failed to foresee irregularities in the operations of banking institutions. Additionally, 
supervision did not detect or proffer solutions to the gross corporate governance 
failures that existed in the banking system. Regulators did not embark on critical 
examination processes like the coordinated pre-examination planning and training of 
supervisors. The view that the banking sector was healthy because of the success of 
the consolidation exercise encouraged a culture of tolerance and acceptance of status 
quo without questioning inefficiencies in the behaviour of banks. These lapses 
compromised the importance of supervision in financial systems.           
 Disorderly governance and management processes at the Central Bank of Nigeria - As 
the regulation of banking institutions is not the only crucial duty of the CBN. The 
approach to supervision, in general, was laissez-faire. Issues relating to the stability of 
the financial sector and banking regulation was not made a priority at CBN board 
meetings. Sanusi further opined that the CBN was not properly organised and 
equipped to analyse macroeconomic issues and systematic risks inherent in the 
banking system. As a result, regulators were unable to handle the impact of cross-
border capital flow, oil price volatility, weak corporate governance, and asset price 
bubbles in the capital market.    
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 Weaknesses in the business environment - In the same line, underdeveloped business 
structures hurt the banking industry. The absence of reliable local credit rating 
agencies, credit bureaux, unified national database, and an unattractive legal system 
paved the way for unethical and non-standard banking practices.              
The above issues as presented by Sanusi (2010) showed that the Nigerian banking industry 
required attention, hence the banking reforms that followed. 
 
2.6 Nature and Objectives of the 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
As a follow-up to correct the issues plaguing the Nigerian banking system, the CBN 
presented a blueprint for revamping the sector (CBN, 2009; Sanusi, 2011, 2012). According 
to Sanusi, the CBN Governor as at the time of this reform, the blueprint is centred on four 
pillars: 
Pillar One: Enhancing the quality of banks 
Pillar Two: Establishing financial stability 
Pillar Three: Enabling healthy financial sector evolution 
Pillar Four: Ensuring the financial sector contributes to the real economy 
Pillar One: Enhancing the Quality of Banks 
This pillar is made up of five parts aimed at enhancing the operations and quality of banking 
institutions. These include implementation of risk-based supervision; reforms to regulations 
and regulatory guidelines/practices; enhanced consumer protection; and internal 
transformation of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The five parts of this pillar are aimed at fixing 
issues in the banking industry such as supervision and enforcement, data quality, risk 
management, governance and financial crime. In line with the provisions of this pillar, 
regulatory authorities (CBN and NDIC) are to ensure that they embark on risk-based 
supervision (RBS) to make sure that governance best practices are entrenched in the banking 
system. Additionally, high-level communication processes between banking institutions and 
regulators will encourage data quality and the implementation of regulations. A systematic 
22 
 
review of regulations and guidelines surrounding the issues that affected the banking industry 
will also enhance the quality of banks(Sanusi, 2011, 2012).  
Furthermore, this pillar is also aimed at making sure that consumers in the banking industry 
are adequately protected. Standards for customer service will be set to ensure that bank 
customers are always treated fairly and justly. The activities of the Consumer Protection Unit, 
a unit in the Financial Policy and Regulation Department of the CBN were enhanced to 
ensure that banks apply the appropriate rules and regulations(CBN, 2009). 
The CBN will be transformed under this reform to position it in good stead to ensure best 
corporate governance practices, people development, stronger information management 
systems and enhanced disclosure practices(Sanusi, 2010). 
Pillar Two: Establishing Financial Stability 
The main trust of this pillar centres on the CBN providing leadership through bolstering the 
Financial Stability Committee; establishment of micro-prudential rules; counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies by the government via development of directional economic policies; and the 
development of the capital market as an alternative to bank funding. The CBN sought to 
achieve the aim of this reform by designing a macro-prudential framework geared towards 
ensuring that monetary policies are not only shaped by systemic risk trends but are in line 
with expanded goals for product and asset quality. More so, the CBN planned to drive the 
development of the capital market by improving its depth and accessibility to provide an 
alternative to bank funding. Additionally, the CBN will seek to stimulate the implementation 
of directional economic policy and in particular counter-cyclical fiscal policies that will help 
stir the economy from dependence on oil and its inherent volatility (Sanusi, 2010, 2011, 
2012).          
Pillar Three: Enabling Healthy Financial Sector Evolution 
The emphasis here is on stirring the banking industry into becoming globally competitive. 
This is to be achieved by the provision of the necessary financial system infrastructure like 
credit bureau and registrars; improvements in the cost structure of banking institution via 
business process outsourcing and cost control; reduction of the informal sector synonymous 
to emerging economies; and greater financial inclusion. Likewise, this reform will seek to 
encourage the participation of foreign banks in the banking industry as long as their 
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participation does not impede the development of the local banking system(Sanusi, 2010, 
2011).  
In a bid to ensure the aim of this pillar is achieved, regulatory authorities encouraged market-
based merger and acquisitions activities to create bigger and stronger banks. Central to this 
reform, the universal banking model, which was introduced in 2004, was abolished. And in a 
bid to deviate from the basic one-size-fits-all banking model, a four-tier banking licence was 
introduced. The guidelines for the new banking model places the minimum capital 
requirements for (Oxford Business Group., 2013):  
 National commercial banks -N25bn ($157.50m)  
 International banks - N100bn ($630m) 
 Merchant banks - N15bn ($94.5m)           
 Specialised and Development Regional banks - N10bn ($63.5m) 
 Nationwide Microfinance banks - N5bn ($31.5m) 
 National Non-Interest (Sharia-Compliant) banks - N10bn ($63m) 
 Regional Non-Interest (Sharia-Compliant) banks - N5bn ($31.5m)                                     
Finally, three private credit bureaux were licenced, and the CBN in collaboration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) started working towards creating an acceptable 
number of registrars for securities in the country to boost financial system 
infrastructure(CBN, 2009).  
Pillar Four: Ensuring the Financial Sector Contributes to the Real Economy 
This final pillar is geared towards ensuring that the Nigerian financial sector advances the 
development of the real economy. In this line, the CBN will embark on the following: 
 The continuous evaluation of existing development finance institutions and initiatives 
in import-export credits, manufacturing and agriculture; 
 Initiatives that will lead to the examination of issues that are critical for economic 
development and infrastructural development, for instance, power, port and railway; 
 Promote studies on potentials of public-private partnerships and venture capital 
initiatives; and 
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 Collaborations with state governments in the administration of pilot programmes that 
are directed towards the financial sector’s contribution to socio-economic 
development (CBN, 2009; Sanusi, 2011, 2012).   
In summary, the above submit that the 2009 reforms and the four pillars, in particular, are 
positioned to improve the general efficiency and profitability of Nigerian DMBs, and the 
stability of the Nigerian banking system. On account of that, this study dwells on ascertaining 
the extent to which the objectives of the reforms have been achieved.   
Furthermore, Sanusi (2012) has suggested that the 2009 reforms have yielded some results. 
The positive impact of the reforms includes: 
 Nigerian DMBs have adopted best practices in the areas of corporate governance and 
risk management because of the reforms. On that account, transparency and public 
disclosure of transactions/operations have significantly improved.  
 Some DMBs have become profitable and improved their balance sheet positions, as 
shown by the recent results of financial statements.  
 DMBs have resumed lending to the private sector with additional liquidity of more 
than N1.7trn injected into the banking sector through the issuance of AMCON bonds, 
and noteworthy progress in redirecting credit to SMEs and the power sector at single 
digit interest rates.  
 The CBN has issued a new and revised code of corporate governance. DMB CEOs 
can only serve a maximum tenure of ten years. To that end, CEOs who would have 
served for ten years on July 31, 2010, ceased to function in that capacity. 
 Nigerian DMBs are now major players in the global financial market with many 
falling within the Top 20 banks in Africa and among Top 1000 banking institutions in 
the world. 
 Increased widespread use of e-payment and technology driven payment services has 
been recorded. 
 Prior volatility in the exchange rates witnessed in the foreign exchange market has 
been brought under control. On that account, the premium is within the international 
standard of 5%. 
 Cooperation between regulatory authorities and DMBs has increased through regular 
meetings and collaboration on policy issues.  
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 The reforms have translated into greater confidence in the banking system with the 
elimination of distress DMBs and the adoption of a strict code of corporate 
governance.       
However, despite the efforts of regulators, the new four pillars of the 2009 reforms, and the 
impact of the reforms on the banking sector and the Nigerian economy, three DMBs were 
nationalised into bridge banks in 2011. Two years after the commencement of the 2009 
banking reforms, the CBN and NDIC mandated DMBs with eroded capital levels to 
recapitalise in line with the provisions of the reforms by the end of September 2011. 
However, three DMBs (Afribank Plc, Bank PHB, and Spring Bank) were unable to meet this 
deadline. On that account, the NDIC in line with the provisions of the NDIC Act, after due 
consultations with the CBN and the Federal Ministry of Finance resolved the three DMBs 
through the ‘Bridge Bank Mechanism’. The NDIC suggested that they resorted to adopt the 
bridge banking mechanism in the interest of depositors and to avoid liquidation which could 
have dire consequences for depositors and undermine public confidence in the banking sector 
(NDIC, 2011). The above therefore suggests that the 2009 reforms might not have adequately 
erased the problems and issues in the Nigerian banking sector. To that end, this study probes 
to understand what transpired during the period under review.        
 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter concentrated largely on the two reforms (2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking 
reforms) which the Nigerian banking sector went through within the period under review. 
Additionally, other regulatory initiatives like the bailout of eight DMBs in 2009 and the 
nationalisation of three DMBs into bridge banks in 2011 are also mentioned.  
Given the rationale of both reforms, there is no doubt that the Nigerian banking sector needed 
to go through the reforms. The 2005 reforms changed the landscape of the Nigerian banking 
sector and set the pace for growth and further reforms. Moreover, even though the 2009 
reforms was embarked upon to correct the ills plaguing the banking sector, it is likely that the 
episode of the global financial crisis might have led to the collapse of many DMBs if the 
2005 reforms were not carried out.  
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More so, the 2009 banking reforms suggest that banking institutions should be regularly 
monitored to ensure they do not engage in activities that derail the good intentions of 
regulatory initiatives (like the 2005 banking reforms). Also, the decision to embark on the 
2009 banking reforms and the episode global financial crisis show that regulation and 
supervision of banking institutions should transcend beyond capital regulation and 
recapitalisation. Having adequate capital translates to having the liquidity to operate and 
invest. However, if sound management, risk management, and supervisory practices are not 
put in place, the probability of mismanagement in periods of abundance (recapitalisation) will 
be high. Therefore, various factors apart from capital have the potential of determining 
efficiency, performance, and stability. It is based on this assertion that this study explores and 
unearths all that transpired in the Nigerian banking sector within the period of 2000 – 2013 
with particular focus on the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, the global financial crisis, the 
bailout of eight Nigerian DMBs in 2009, and the adoption of the bridge banking mechanism. 
Finally, in addition to serving as a background to this study, this chapter elaborates on the 
rationale for the research.        
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first chapter of this study introduced the focus of this study, and presented the rationale 
for this research, alongside the aims and objectives of the study, and the research questions 
this study seeks to answer. While the second chapter focused primarily on the Nigerian 
banking sector and it traced the history of banking and banking regulation in Nigeria. The 
elements of the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms initiated by the CBN and NDIC 
were presented in the previous chapter as a background to this study. On that account, this 
chapter reviews related literature on banking regulation and supervision, the rationale for 
regulating banking institutions, international and national regulatory initiatives, financial 
safety nets, techniques for measuring bank performance, and exploratory and empirical bank 
performance-related studies. Additionally, the three most utilised measures for analysing the 
performance of banking institutions are also covered in this chapter. Therefore, the chapter 
starts by briefly defining banking regulation and supervision before trying to rationalise why 
banking institutions should be regulated and supervised.        
 
3.2 Banking Regulation and Supervision 
 
Financial systems world over have experienced various forms of banking crisis alongside 
extensive changes in the structure and nature of banking in recent times. Events ranging from 
the deregulation of financial systems, innovations and technological advancements, cross-
border banking and lately the most damaging financial crisis since the Great Depression, the 
Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009) have all made it necessary for local and international 
policy makers to divert considerable attention to the essential function of banking regulation 
and supervision (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2013). Regulation therefore in the context of 
banking can be viewed as laws and rules applicable to banking, while supervision refers the 
enforcement of banking regulation and the monitoring of banks’ activities by regulatory 
agencies (Crockett, 2001). 
28 
 
Regulations have a strong hold on the operation and developments of financial markets, and 
they are often adjusted and revised to be able to cope with changes in market structure, new 
financial instruments and innovations, financial markets developments and sporadic financial 
crisis. Although countries through the functions of regulation and supervision, want financial 
systems that (1) encourage innovation and efficiency, (2) provide transparency, (3) ensure 
safety and soundness, and (4) promote competition in global markets, policy trade-offs 
become unavoidable. Acharya et al. (2011) opined that financial intermediation and 
innovation might become less efficient for the reason that the policies that were initially put 
in place to ensure greater financial robustness. For instance, measures designed to promote 
financial growth and innovation may grind down safety, soundness and transparency. 
Even though countries world over all seek to maintain confidence and stability in their 
financial systems, regulatory arrangements differ. It is based on the different views adopted 
by different societies that this research will look at the contrasting approaches (official 
regulation and private monitoring) to banking regulation and supervision, the rationale for 
regulating banking institutions, and the different types of banking regulation.  
 
3.3 The Rationale for Regulation and Supervision 
 
The pivotal role played in today’s modern economies by financial institutions cannot by 
overlooked. Banks as major players in the financial system are the most regulated institutions 
because they are saddled with the responsibilities of running the payment systems of 
countries and the management of investors’ money, in addition to allocating financial capital 
to different sectors of the economy, and the implementation of monetary policies (Pilbeam, 
2010).  More so, the explosive nature of financial markets, the specificity of banks, increased 
competition and diversification further exposes banks to risk and challenges. Traditionally, 
governments intervene to regulate and supervise the operations and activities of banks 
because of the financial intermediation roles they play and their economic importance, but in 
recent times government intervention has been rationalised on the grounds of “market failure 
(for instance the Global Financial Crisis).” Consequently, Pilbeam (2010) opined that a 
market devoid of some form of regulation would produce a suboptimal outcome. 
29 
 
According to Heffernan (2005) and Pilbeam (2010), financial institutions are subjected to 
regulation and supervision for a variety of reasons: 
 Investor/Consumer Protection: Financial products offered to investors do not 
explicitly show the risks associated. Insiders in the form of directors and managers are 
privy to certain information, which they can use to their advantage, and to the 
detriment of outsiders (investors and consumers). 
Hence, the onus is on the government to ensure that financial institutions make 
available adequate information. For this reason, various countries have adopted 
regulations designed to prohibit insider trading, and regulators have imposed financial 
information disclosure requirements. 
 Externalities: Because banks are significant for resource allocation and economic 
growth: the failure or collapse of a banking institution may impinge on the stability of 
the entire financial system. Governments, therefore, intervene through systemic 
supervision to ensure financial stability and mitigate against systemic failure. 
 Illegal Activities: Effective regulation and supervision can subdue the criminal 
activity of agents (directors, managers, and staff) in the forms fraud, tax evasion and 
money laundering. 
 Market Power: Financial institutions may exert too much power especially in markets 
where competition is absent. For instance, the pricing of financial products and 
services may be grossly unfair because of monopolistic power held by a few large 
institutions. Policies aimed at protecting consumers against monopolistic exploitation 
are therefore introduced to encourage competition and price-setting. 
Although, the rationale for banking regulation and supervision have been well documented. 
Economic views can only justify bank regulation and supervision on the uncertainties that 
exist in financial systems and financial instabilities (Llewellyn, 1999). Lindgren, Gillian, & 
Matthew (1996) opined that in recent years, bank failures have become more common, 
systemic in nature, and expensive: therefore questioning the justification of regulation and 
supervision. Proponents of regulation argue that the increasing vulnerabilities experienced in 
financial markets and especially banking institutions make a case for increased effective 
regulation and supervision. While, the societal viewpoint argues that regulation and 
supervision further imposes costs on the taxpayer, in addition to the moral hazard problems it 
creates ( Barth et al., 2006). More so, Benston & Kaufman (1996) suggested that arguments 
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mostly used to buttress the need for the regulation of banks are not supported both theory and 
empirical evidence. While also stating that banks should only be prudentially regulated to 
scale down the negative externalities resulting from the deposit insurance schemes imposed 
by governments. 
Conversely, Drage, Mann, & Michael (1998) opined that effective regulation and supervision 
is necessary for the development of banking systems and so blamed the Asian banking crisis 
on poor regulation. In agreement,  Llewellyn (1999) suggested that weak management, bad 
incentive structures and control systems within banks, alongside poor regulation, monitoring 
and supervision are elements that emerge in banking crises. Also, Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, & 
Parker (2007) argued that when regulation is imposed in a bid to limit banking activities, the 
efficiency and the conduct of banking business will be gravely affected. This in turn could 
result in banks investing in risky activities that evade regulation (regulatory arbitrage), 
therefore, negatively affecting financial stability and economic growth for which it is 
intended. 
The submissions agree that regulation and supervision of banking institutions is important, 
however weak regulation has been blamed for the inability to manage banking risk and 
protect banks from failing. This position is reinforced in recent banking literature as various 
academics and market players have suggested that the recent global financial crisis occurred 
due to the failure of regulation and supervisors (Ayadi, Naceur, Casu, & Quinn, 2016, Cihak, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Martinez, Soledad, 2013; Merrouche & Nier, 2014).    
In spite of the criticisms ascribed to weak international and national regulation and 
supervision due to the event of the global financial crisis, effective financial regulation and 
supervision are considered integral to financial stability as a well-functioning regulatory, 
supervisory framework has the potential of minimising moral hazard and discouraging 
excessive risk-taking (Ayadi, 2016). It is a result of the above that this study examines the 
regulatory and supervisory initiatives of Nigerian regulators and to what extent they have 
instituted a well-functioning regulatory and supervisory framework in the Nigerian banking 
sector.   
As highlighted in the first two chapters of this thesis, the Nigerian banking reforms of 2005 
and 2009 aimed at improving the general efficiency, performance (profitability) and stability 
of Nigerian DMBs. On that account, the reforms paid particular attention to recapitalisation 
with the view that the efficiency, performance and stability of DMBs will be guaranteed 
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when they have adequate capital. Therefore, it can be suggested that Nigerian banking 
reforms were more of capital regulations.   
 
3.4 Capital Regulation 
 
Capital regulation became the focus of banking regulation since consultations for the first 
Basel accord began in 1988. The focal opinion was that more capital should make banking 
institutions better able to absorb losses with their resources, without becoming insolvent or 
requiring bailouts with public funds. On that account, regulatory consensus comes to view 
capital as a tool for curbing risk-taking created by limited liability and intensified by deposit 
insurance and bailout expectations. Given recent happenings, the global financial 
unquestionably indicated that existing capital regulation, in its design or implementation, was 
inadequate in the prevention of panic in financial systems, which necessitated emergency 
government intervention around the globe to prevent the collapse of banking institutions. 
Moreover, a large proportion of the rescued institutions appeared to be in compliance with 
minimum capital requirements shortly before and during the financial crisis (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Detragiache, & Merrouche, 2013).   
In like manner, Deli & Hasan (2016) opined that capital regulation is the flagship of financial 
regulation because it is considered a means to mitigate the risk of bank failures and related 
systemic adverse macroeconomic developments. However, the theoretical debate on the 
effects of capital regulation (almost exclusively referring to capital requirements) and general 
bank performance (profitability, efficiency, and stability) highlight both negative and positive 
effects.  
Put differently literature offers two scenarios through which capital requirements may 
influence systemic risk. On the one hand, capital requirement may likely reduce the 
individual risk-taking behaviour of banking institutions and consequently aid to reduce 
systemic risk, for the reason that individual risk is a significant driver of systemic risk. On the 
other hand, banking institutions response to capital requirements may promote linkage within 
the banking system, and as a result, increase systemic risk. Thus, decreasing individual risk 
may not always concurrently reduce overall systemic risk (Zhou, 2013). To that end, this 
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section reviews such literature as precedence for ascertaining the recapitalisation exercises of 
the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms.    
Given the view expressed above, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) investigated the effectiveness 
of current regulatory capital regulations and tested theories that support the use of capital 
regulation to curtail bank risk-taking incentives and absorbing losses. They found support for 
the assertion that stronger capital levels are important components during systemic crises. 
Therefore, suggesting that the current focus on strengthening capital requirements is 
appropriate. Additionally, they found that greater emphasis on ‘higher quality capital’ in the 
form of tangible assets or Tier I capital is justified.  
Similarly, Fanti (2014) investigated the effects of capital accords introduced by the BIS 
(Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III). The main result obtained suggested that the introduction of 
sufficiently high capital requirements is effective for the objective of maintaining or restoring 
banking sector stability with heterogeneous and homogeneous banks’ expectations.   
Likewise, Berger & Bouwman (2013) examined the relationship between bank capital and 
different facets of bank performance in normal times, and banking and market crisis periods 
for US banks. Their study indicated that bank capital increases the probability of survival and 
market share of small banking institutions at all times (normal times, banking crisis, and 
market crisis). Additionally, they found that high capital levels help medium and large 
banking institutions primarily during banking crises, and particularly during the one with 
relatively limited government intervention, and the credit crunch of the early 1990s. In sum, 
they are of the opinion that capital acts as an absorber of losses.    
Deli & Hasan (2016) examined the effects of bank capital regulation on loan growth by using 
bank-level data from 125 countries within the period of 1998 to 2011. The results indicated 
that capital regulation only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. Moreover, the effect is 
entirely offset when banks hold moderately high levels of capital. However, they found that 
the components of capital requirements that have the most significant negative effect on loan 
growth are those associated with the prevention of banks to utilise as capital borrowed funds 
and assets other than cash or government securities.  
Lutz (2016) examined the effects of new capital requirements for systematically important 
financial institutions (SIFI) proposed by the U.S Federal Reserve. The results obtained 
indicated that the announcement to recapitalise SIFI led to lower abnormal initial stock 
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returns for the SIFI that then reverse and dissipate after three days. Interestingly, the findings 
suggest that the increased capital requirements proposal for large SIFIs had no impact on 
economic and financial market interest rates.  
 Guidara, Lai, Soumare, and Tchana (2013) investigated the cyclical behaviour of Canadian 
banks’ capital buffers and evaluated its effect on banks’ risk and performance throughout 
business cycles and about Canadian regulatory changes during the different Basel regimes. 
They found that Canadian banks were well capitalised, which explains how they weathered 
the recent global financial crisis. More so, they found that bank capital buffers demonstrate 
positive co-movements with business cycles. Conversely, their results did not show any 
strong evidence that variations of banks’ capital buffer affect the exposure of banks to risk 
and return on equity. Thus, the drive to hold excess capital buffer may be motivated by 
market discipline.   
Dagher, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong (2016) examined how various levels of 
bank capital would have performed in past banking crises. They found that high capitalisation 
can absorb losses during banking crises, but decline fast once capitalisation attains 15 – 23 
percent of risk-weighted assets. They suggested that protection against extreme crises 
requires significantly more loss absorption capacity; however, such crises are rare. Moreover, 
results are slightly different for emerging and low-income countries. Although banking crises 
in these countries have been historically associated with greater bank losses, banking systems 
are usually smaller than those in developed economies are. To that end, losses more than 
capital will likely represent only a small fraction of GDP and may as well have limited 
macroeconomic effects.  
The literature on capital regulation above shows that high capital levels were able to absorb 
losses in some jurisdictions, but failed to do the same in other jurisdictions. More so, losses in 
banking institutions in developed countries had more impact on the macro economy than in 
less developed countries. Additional, though the Basel Accords motivated banking 
institutions to acquire and retain more capital, the Accords were unable to absorb losses 
during the episode of the global financial crisis. Hence, the endorsement of the Basel III 
Accord by the BIS on December 20, 2010. The new Basel III was unveiled to address the 
market failures showcased by the global financial crisis, and the failure of the previous 
accords to prevent the crisis. Therefore, the limited scope of the application of Basel III 
encourages researchers to continue to observe as countries implement the recommendations.   
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Conclusively, the submissions above indicate that bank performance and stability transcends 
recapitalization and capital regulation. However, the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian-banking 
reforms positioned recapitalisation as the main component. To that end, this study examines 
how successful these reforms have been in promoting bank performance and financial 
stability. Additionally, given that other factors like asset quality, management quality, 
liquidity, and size were in one way or another affected by the Nigerian reforms, other 
sections of this chapter reviews literature that examined these factors in relation to the 
efficiency, performance, and stability of banking systems.                    
 
3.5 Banking Consolidation 
 
The consolidation of Nigerian DMBs through mergers and acquisition was a major element 
of the 2005 banking reforms. As already highlighted in the preceding chapter, Nigerian 
DMBs either merged or were acquired in a bid to meet the N25bn capital requirement. On the 
premise that the consolidation of Nigerian DMBs was targeted at meeting the minimum 
capital requirement, literature on banking consolidation is not extensively considered. More 
so, consolidation involves mergers and acquisitions, which are not the primary focus of this 
study. However, due to the importance of the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking 
reforms, this section dwells on the concise review of banking consolidation literature.  
The consolidation of the financial sector has continued to be an internationally significant 
issue due to financial events in the last two decades. Consolidation modifies the structure of 
the banking sector through mergers and acquisitions (Montes, 2014).  More so, consolidation 
has been considered because of the global trend of technological development, deregulation 
and globalisation. In reaction to these developments and events, the performance of banks 
relying on traditional systems has decreased considerably, leading to an increase in mergers 
and acquisitions (Shin & Kim, 2013). Evidence from the literature suggests that bank 
consolidation due to changes in the financial markets occurs in developed economies, while 
governments have been the driving forces of consolidation in emerging economies (Gelos & 
Roldes, 2002). True to this assertion, the government through the regulatory authorities 
engineered the consolidation of Nigerian DMBs in 2005. Given the brief introduction of bank 
consolidation and the rationale for considering it in this study, a few related studies are 
presented below.       
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To shed light on the logic for the trend of consolidation in the banking industry, Tadesse 
(2006) investigated the Japanese banking sector before the onset of the banking crisis and 
structural reforms of the 1990s. The evidence obtained showed diseconomies of scale to be 
pervasive in large banks, thus defying the rationale for consolidation. However, the study 
provided evidence of underlying technological progress that operates to increase the banking 
industry’s efficient minimum size and generating economies at larger banks that justify the 
option of consolidation.    
Chu (2015) investigated the Canadian experience of banking consolidation over the period of 
1867 – 1935. The evidence showed that out of the 27 banking failures examined, only one 
was an acquiring bank, while all the other acquiring banks grew substantially in both size and 
market share.  
Mishkin (1999) argued that even though financial consolidation leads to the creation of large 
institutions that might expose the U.S financial system to increased systemic risk. The 
downside of financial consolidation can be handled by vigilant supervision and government 
safety net guarantees. However, Mishkin suggested that financial consolidation has been 
beneficial because it presents the opportunities to radically reduce the scope of deposit 
insurance and limit it to narrow bank accounts, while also limiting moral hazard created by 
government safety nets.      
Olivero, Li, & Jeon (2011) examined the relationship between increased consolidation in 
banking and monetary policy transmission in eighteen Asian and Latin American countries 
from the period of 1996 to 2006. Their results indicated that an increase in banking sector 
consolidation weakens the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. They, 
however, submitted that recent banking consolidations raised the market share of large banks 
for which the supply of loans is less responsive to changes in monetary policy conditions.  
To conclude the discussion on banking consolidation, the reviewed literature suggest that 
consolidation results in concentrated banking systems constituted of a small number of larger 
institutions. More so, some of the studies opine that large institutions benefit from the 
economies of scale. On that account, the impact of consolidation depends on the dynamics of 
the banking system. Additionally, literature submits that consolidation might account for the 
creation of SIFI whose failure could generate into systemic crises. On that account, this study 
examines the Nigerian DMBs to ascertain the extent to which the consolidation exercise of 
the 2005 banking reforms improved or derailed performance.     
36 
 
3.6 Regulatory Responses (Policy Initiatives) to the Global Financial 
Crisis 
 
Recent literature suggests that the Basel III framework was a reaction of the Basel Committee 
to the episode of the global financial crisis, through which policy-makers world over sought 
to rectify the damage done to financial systems and economies through various forms of 
financial reforms. Therefore, to reposition financial institutions to mitigate against future 
financial and banking crises, several countries reviewed their regulatory frameworks. Notable 
mentions include the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
the United States, and the splitting-up of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the 
United Kingdom into the Financial Policy Committee, Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and the Prudential Regulatory Authority in 2013.     
The aims of the Dodd-Frank Act are to enhance financial stability and to simplify the 
resolution of too-big-to-fail financial institutions while shielding taxpayers from financial 
losses (Cabral, 2013). In summary, the Dodd-Frank Act purposes to achieve its aims by 
enhancing existing regulatory framework with new regulatory institutions and new policy 
instruments (Skeel, 2011).  In a bid to reduce the scope of regulatory arbitrage, the Act 
harmonises standards across agencies. The Act creates a new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and a new Financial Stability Research Office. The Act also extended the scope of 
the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC. Also, the Act extended the regulatory 
framework to non-bank and bank financial institutions that the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council deems “systematically important,” to mean large bank holding companies that have 
consolidated assets of at least $50bn (Cabral, 2013). In like manner, the Act also regulates 
most derivatives transactions, hence reversing the deregulation approach introduced by the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (Davis Polk, 2010). In addition, the Act also 
created an orderly liquidation regime for large failing SIFIs (Skeel, 2011). In summary, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was designed with the goal of improving systemic crisis management 
through enhanced policy instruments and improved monitoring and evaluation of risks 
(Cabral, 2013).     
Though the above suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act will improve banking regulation and 
supervision in the United States, some studies have reservations concerning the adequacy and 
ability of the Act. Concisely, for instance, Skeel (2011), Kane (2012), and Kupiec & 
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Wallison (2015) opine that the Act advances insufficient attention to capital and liquidity 
requirements, does not address the issue of regulatory capture, provides excessive discretion 
to regulators and supervisors, and fails to introduce rules-based procedures for resolution of 
large SIFIs. Additionally, Cabral (2013) submits that the Act limits bailouts as a response to 
crises. Most important of the criticisms of the Act is that it is largely unfinished since its 
implementation depends on ongoing rulemaking by US banking regulatory agencies (Cabral, 
2013). 
In like manner, the United Kingdom also adjusted its regulatory and supervisory framework 
following the episode of the global financial crisis. The new system of regulation saw the 
creation of three new bodies: The Financial Policy Committee (FPC), The Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA), and The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to replace the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) from April 2013. The FPA is to be responsible for 
macro-prudential regulation (regulation of the ability and resilience of the financial system as 
a whole). The PRA assumes the prudential regulation (micro-prudential regulation) of all 
banks, building societies, insurers, credit unions, and major financial firms. While the FCA is 
responsible for conduct regulation, plus the prudential regulation of institutions not covered 
by the PRA. The FSA suggested that the overall objective of the new system of regulation is 
to produce a stable financial system that is resilient in providing vital financial services to a 
healthy and successful economy (FSA, 2012, Allen & Overy, 2013). In essence, financial 
regulation in the U.K was diversified so that different aspects of regulation will get the 
needed attention with the view of limiting unforeseen scenarios like the global financial 
crisis.  
Conclusively, this section reviewed instances of regulatory responses to the global financial 
crisis from two major economies. The submissions above indicate that though the 
recommendations of the Basel Accords are highly regarded, individual economies design 
their regulations. More so, different countries responded differently to the global financial 
crisis (just like the 2009 Nigerian banking reforms), as they were affected in diverse ways. 
On the account, the next section dwells on a synopsis of literature on government rescue 
packages/measures and their impact on the performance of banking institution. 
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3.7  Government Rescue Initiatives  
 
The rationale behind government intervention and fiscal policy has come under intense 
scrutiny in recent times because of the episode of the global financial crisis. Many 
governments were averse to the idea of bank failures as liquidation or bankruptcy of banking 
institutions may have devastating implications on the financial system and the economy of 
the country in the whole. To that end, governments adopted a host of rescue packages to 
prevent the collapse of affected banking institutions. Chang (2014) suggested that recuse 
packages adopted to stabilise banking institutions are divided into three main categories: 
government purchases of distressed assets, government guaranteed debt issuance programs, 
and direct equity capital injections.  
On account of the above, the countries that were plagued and adopted various rescue 
initiatives include: Canada (distressed asset purchases), Italy (direct capital injections), 
Australia (asset purchases and guaranteed debt issuance), Japan and Switzerland (asset 
purchases and capital injections), Austria and Sweden (issuance and capital injection), 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, Netherlands, United States of America, and United 
Kingdom (asset purchases, debt issuance, and capital injections) (Brei, Gambacorta, & von 
Peter, 2013; Chang, 2014). To be specific, a few of the above rescue packages are reviewed 
to set the tune for the analysis of the initiatives of Nigerian regulators within the period under 
review.  
The central aim for adopting rescue packages is to support financial institutions in distress. 
However, this raises a vital question: Should distressed financial institutions be rescued by 
the government and therefore by tax payers? For one thing, rescue measures seem proper 
given that the bankruptcy costs for the economy would exceed the costs of the rescue. On the 
flipside, with a government as the lender of last resort, there is little incentive for institutions 
to take on sophisticated risk management strategies. Hence, the issue of moral hazard. In light 
of the above, the appropriate design of rescue packages seems the preferred route to 
safeguarding the financial system. To that end, the design of a rescue package should depend 
largely on the targets. To name a few, the stabilisation of financial systems through 
recapitalisation, taxpayer protection, and separation between good and bad management 
performance are examples of reasons why governments design rescue packages. 
Additionally, the costs associated with bank failure are not easily quantified, therefore 
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making it difficult to determine an exact trade-off (Breitenfellner & Wagner, 2010). The 
position above suggests that although rescue packages do not always achieve the objective of 
which they are designed, the role of government as the lender of last resort and the mandate 
to promote financial stability prevails.      
Regarding the general effectiveness of rescue packages, Klomp (2013) examined the 
effectiveness of financial sector rescue packages advanced by national governments during 
the global financial crisis. The results suggest that there exists a significant negative 
relationship between various rescue packages and default risk. That is, government 
interventions have a negative impact on the change of the credit default premium. More so, 
the obtained results showed that the effect of the various rescue packages varied across 
banking institutions: most interventions do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks, 
while they affect high-risk banks. Additionally, Klomp found that interventions aimed at a 
specific financial institution are more effective than broad interventions taken to stabilise the 
financial system as a whole.   
Kollmann, Roeger, & in't Veld (2012) in contributing to the intense debate on the efficacy of 
government stimulus packages opined that government support for the banking system can 
have a strong positive effect on real activity. In essence, support extended to banking 
institutions has a positive effect on investment, while a rise in government purchases crowds 
out investment.  
Ait-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, & Tamirisa (2012) examined the impact of 
macroeconomic and financial policy announcements in the U.S.A, U.K, the Euro zone, and 
Japan during the recent global financial crisis. They found that market moves surrounding 
policy announcements suggest that markets viewed interest rates cuts and bank 
recapitalisation as the most promising policy steps to resolve the crisis. Secondly, they also 
found that domestic policy initiatives often had significant bearing on credit and liquidity risk 
premium in foreign interbank markets. Hence, international spillovers of policy 
announcements were amplified as the crisis deepened and policy makers doubled their efforts 
to restore financial stability. In addition,  Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) are of the opinion that 
system-wide rescue packages may be less effective because their impact is more difficult to 
gauge.  
To be particular, the government of the United States adopted the Trouble Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) to help stabilise the financial system, restart economic growth, and avert 
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preventable collapses during the global financial crisis in 2008. The cornerstone of the 
programme was the purchase of equity capital in financial institutions. To that end, 
institutions like the American International Group, Citibank, and Bank of America got 
involved in the TARP programme. Consequently, the above banks were spared from collapse 
(Chang & Chen, 2016). Additionally, different studies have either hailed or criticised the 
TARP. Apart from preventing the collapse of some institutions, Berger & Roman, (2015) 
suggested that the TARP gave participating institutions a competitive advantage in raising 
deposits because they were perceived to be safer. On the contrary, Montgomery & Takahashi 
(2014) empirically examined the impact of the bank recapitalisation programme of the TARP 
and found evidence that overturned much of the existing literature on the effectiveness of 
capital injections into the banking sectors of the United States and Japan. Montgomery & 
Takahashi, (2014) showed that the TARP programme failed to achieve the stated policy 
objective of stimulating bank lending. More so, they found that banking institutions that 
received capital injections grew assets significantly slower, for the most part heavily risk-
weighted assets such as loans. The submissions expressed suggest that even though 
government rescue packages forestall the collapse of banking institutions, they do not 
eliminate the problem of moral hazard.   
Conclusively, this section reviewed the rationale behind the recourse to government rescue 
packages and enumerated countries that relied on at least one the three main categories of the 
rescue packages due to the episode of the global financial crisis. The experience of the U.S is 
presented to further indicate the diversity in literature concerning the debate of relying on 
rescue. However, even though the problem of moral hazard cannot be separated from 
government rescue packages, the ability of rescue packages in averting banking collapse 
cannot be faulted. Additionally, further government rescue initiatives are discussed under the 
section of financial safety nets.      
 
3.8 Performance Measurement Approaches  
 
Given the presentation of the importance of banking institutions to economic development 
and the rationale for embarking on banking reforms, this section dwells on the review of 
measures adopted in the evaluation of bank performance in different periods and 
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jurisdictions. Literature suggests that the measures fall predominately under three main 
approaches (Ratio analysis, Regression analysis, and frontier analysis).  
 
3.8.1 Ratio Analysis 
 
Considerable studies in an attempt to analyse and evaluate the performance of banking 
institutions have relied on conventional financial ratios (Ayadi, Adebayo, & Omolehinwa, 
1998; Sharma, Sharma, & Barua, 2013). The return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) are the most popular and commonly utilised financial ratios for evaluating bank 
performance (Badreldin, 2009; Karr, 2005; Wilcox, 1984). Karr (2005) suggested that the 
ROA and ROE measures mostly correlate with each other and at the same time provide the 
same indication of performance related to the tendency and movement of financial 
performance. Although widely used, the shortcomings of adopting the use of financial ratios 
have been criticised on a large scale. Indicators such as the ROA and ROE only provide a 
narrow and incomplete picture of performance, while other financial ratio indicators may 
give contradictory results. Simply put, one principal disadvantage of financial ratios analysis 
is that each single ratio must be compared against a benchmark ratio one at a time while it is 
assumed that all other factors are fixed, and the chosen benchmarks are appropriate for 
comparison (Avkiran, 2011). Another main weakness of using financial ratios is that each 
ratio examines only part of a bank’s activities and in the process fails to capture the 
multidimensional nature of banks, and thus it fails to provide enough performance 
information (LaPlante & Paradi, 2015). More so, financial ratios offer a retrospective and not 
prospective examinations and are based on accounting data, while neglecting economic data 
(Karr, 2005).   
Examples of studies that relied on financial ratios to measure bank performance include: 
Kumbirai & Webb (2010) who used financial ratios to analyse the performance of 
commercial banks in South Africa from 2005 -2009; Kirikal, Sorg, & Vensel (2004) used a 
variant of the traditional financial ratios called DuPont Financial Ratios Analysis to examine 
the performance of Estonian banks. While Chandani, Mehta, & Chandrasekaran (2014) made 
use of financial ratios as computed from financial statements and the CAMEL model (a 
combination of financial ratios used by bank regulators) to ascertain the performance of 
domestic banks in India. Similarly, Sargu & Roman (2013) used the CAMELS framework to 
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analyse the financial soundness of commercial banks in Bulgaria, Czech Republic and 
Romania.    
 
3.8.2 Regression Analysis 
 
The regression analysis is a common methodology used in bank performance studies. The 
central advantage of regression analysis is that it allows for measurement errors and statistical 
inference. The advantage of regression analysis over traditional ratio analysis is that the effect 
of multiple independent variables on the dependent variable can be estimated simultaneously. 
More so, for instance, regression analysis can be used to provide information about the 
average performance of banks included in a given sample and this information can be utilised 
to estimate the expected performance of other banks (Paradi & Zhu, 2013). 
Even though regression analysis is effective in a wide range of circumstances in measuring 
and ascertaining relationships between variables, it has some inherent limitations that make it 
unsuitable for utterly reflecting the increasing multifaceted nature of banking. One limitation 
of regression analysis is that it is a parametric method that requires a general production 
model to be specified. Another limitation of regression analysis is that it is a central tendency 
method in which predicted values results from a regression model provide the average or 
anticipated level of outcome given particular inputs, instead of the maximum realisable 
outcome. Also, regression analysis is only appropriate when modelling single input – 
multiple outputs or multiple inputs – single output systems (Paradi & Zhu, 2013; Tonidandel 
& LeBreton, 2011).                
Examples of studies that utilized regression analysis in bank performance studies include: 
Alkhatib (2012) employed three indicators (ROA as a financial performance indicators, the 
Tobin’s Q model as a market financial performance indicator and economic value added as 
an economic, financial performance indicator) to design a multi-regression model in order to 
measure bank performance in Pakistan. Doucouliagos, Haman, & Askary (2007) used 
regression models to explore the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
performance in Australian banks using panel data from 1992 to 2005. Using a three-stage 
least squares equation in addition to other regression models, Limpaphayom & Polwitoon 
(2004) examined the relationship between bank relations and market performance in 
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Thailand. Castelli, Dwyer, & Hasan (2012) used regression models to examine the 
connection between the number of bank relationships and firm performance in small Italian 
firms that are financed by banks.   
In relation to the above and due to that extensive use of regression analysis in banking 
studies, this study uses panel data regression which is a variant of regression analysis to 
ascertain the determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and financial stability. This 
technique is further elaborated upon in the research methodology chapter of this study, while 
related empirical studies that adopted regression analysis to ascertain the determinants bank 
efficiency, performance, and financial stability in different jurisdictions and Nigeria are 
presented in subsequent sections of this chapter.   
 
3.8.3 Frontier Efficiency Methodologies  
 
In recent times, research employing the frontier approach has become popular (Paradi & Zhu, 
2013). The frontier approach is perceived to be robust when compared to traditional financial 
ratios analysis as it offers further meaningful insight into the efficiency and performance of 
organisations (Berger & Humphery, 1997). Frontier efficiency methodologies are 
benchmarking technique based models that assess how well organisations (Decision Making 
Units – DMUs) are performing compared to the best performing organisation (DMU) that are 
doing business under the same operational conditions. The best organisations are identified 
from the data set, and they are used as the efficient frontier. Hence, organisations are not 
benched marked against some abstract assumptions but rather against performing 
organisations operating in the same business clime. A central advantage of this methodology 
over other indicators of performance is that it provides overall objective numerical efficiency 
scores including economic optimisation mechanisms in complex operational climes and sums 
up performance in a single statistic (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Paradi & Zhu, 2013). 
Correspondingly, frontier efficiency techniques can be utilised in numerous ways to assist 
management in assessing whether they are performing better or worse than their competitors 
(peers) regarding cost minimization, revenue, scale technology, and profit maximisation. 
Consequently, bank managements can utilise the resultant feedback from frontier efficiency 
analyses to identify operational areas that require improvement; ascertain attractive targets 
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for mergers and acquisitions; and set future development strategies. Frontier analysis can help 
provide recommendations to non-efficient organisations or institutions to improve their 
performance to catch-up with the efficient ones. More so, frontier efficiency analysis 
techniques can assist in determining the effects of environmental variables and achievable 
targets for inefficient organisations to provide further understanding into the production 
systems of organisations (Banker & Cummins, 2010). 
Literature in the past three decades has led to the conclusion that there are five main frontier 
efficiency analysis techniques that have been employed in the evaluating performance and 
efficiency. The non-parametric linear programming approaches are Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull. While the other three approaches: Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA), Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) and Thick Frontier Approach 
(TFA) are parametric econometric models. These various approaches differ based on the 
imposed assumptions on the specifications of the efficient frontier, the existence of random 
error, and the distribution of the inefficiencies. The non-parametric linear programming 
approaches make use of few assumptions while identifying the best-practice frontier and they 
do not account for random errors. Whereas the parametric econometric approaches require a 
priori specification of the form of the production function, and characteristically they include 
an error term that captures inefficiency and random error. However, only the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) are commonly used in 
banking studies (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Dong, Hamilton, Tippett, 2014; Thanassoulis, 
Boussofiane, & Dyson, 1996, Borger, Ferrier, & Kerstens, 1998). 
In line with the above advantages ascribed to the frontier approach over ordinary financial 
ratios and regression analysis, this study employs the frontier approach in measuring bank 
efficiency and performance. To be specific, this study has adopted a variant of the DEA 
approach called the DEA Window analysis to obtain efficiency estimates for Nigerian DMBs 
for the period of 2000 – 2013. In that regard, the DEA approach is discussed in the research 
methodology chapter before narrowing down to the specific DEA window approach 
employed to estimate bank performance and efficiency in Nigerian DMBs. Nonetheless, 
studies that adopted the DEA approach are briefly reviewed below.   
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3.9 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Empirical Studies 
 
Sahin, Gokdemir, & Ozturk (2016) examined the effects of the global financial crisis on 
public, private, and foreign-capitalized commercial banks in the Turkish banking sector using 
an input-oriented approach. Adopting a study span of eight years and relying on the variable 
returns to scale DEA model (BCC), they found an increasing trend of efficiency during the 
global financial crisis. Also, they found that private banks were responsible for the decrease 
in the average efficiency of the Turkish banking sector as their input-oriented efficiency 
scores plummeted in the post-global financial crisis period.  
Moradi-Motlagh & Babacan (2015) examined the efficiency of eight Australian banks using 
the bootstrap DEA method within the period of 2006 – 2012. The study found that the 
efficiency of Australian banks dropped considerably during the global financial crisis. They 
also pointed out that the efficiency of the examined Australian banks did not improve until in 
2012 as all the banks showed low-efficiency levels in 2009.   
Gulati & Kumar (2016) assessed the impact of the global financial crisis on the Indian 
banking sector. The study employed a DEA-based meta profit frontier framework that 
accounted for technological heterogeneity across different groups of banks. The results 
indicated that the efficiency level of Indian banks dropped mildly during the global financial 
crisis but recovered immediately after the crisis. The study, however, noted that the global 
financial crisis had a differentiated impact across ownership groups. The DEA results showed 
that private banks were the worst hit by the global financial crisis, while foreign banks 
performed better because of their adherence to best practices and access to superior 
technology.    
The DEA model has been employed as a benchmarking tool to identify the most efficient 
institutions within a sample. However, very few studies have used it as a forward-looking 
alternative method to predict future bank failures and distress (Avkiran & Lin, 2012). 
Avkiran & Lin (2012) found out that the DEA can be used to identify distressed banks up to 
two years in advance. They indicated that the robustness test they carried out revealed that the 
DEA technique produces an efficient frontier and the discriminatory and predictive powers of 
the technique do not change even after perturbations. The further opined that the DEA 
technique could be employed as an off-site screening tool by regulators to gauge the 
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likelihood of financial distress. Simply put, the DEA technique can assist regulatory agencies, 
investors and managers in making vital economic decisions.   
Other than using the DEA to examine bank performance and predict financial distress, other 
scholars used the technique for similar purposes. Pille & Paradi (2002) developed DEA four 
models alongside a Z-Score model modified by government regulators and the equity-to-asset 
ratio to detect financial failures in credit unions in Ontario (Canada). The foci of the study 
were the needs of government regulators, and they tested which models were best competent 
in predicting bankruptcy. Following the input-oriented model and using a pool of input and 
output variables, they suggested that the DEA technique was an adequate tool for detecting 
financial failures. Nonetheless, the study failed to present the preferred model or 
combinations of inputs and output variables that best detect financial failures. 
Conversely, in a bid to extend the application of DEA in the banking sector, Kwon & Lee 
(2015) explored an innovative performance model for a two-stage sequential production 
process by combining the data envelopment analysis (DEA) and back-propagation neural 
network (BPNN). Contrary to several banking studies and the studies reviewed in this 
section, Kwon & Lee followed the DEA output-oriented model. They opined that DEA alone 
lacked predictive capacity, hence the combination with BPNN. They found that by combining 
DEA and BPNN, managers can predict the performance of DMUs previously not seen by the 
DEA alone. To that end, this study justifies the adoption of qualitative content analysis and 
panel data regression to increase the reliability of the research outcomes.    
Similarly, Premachandra, Chen & Watson (2011) employed the DEA additive super-
efficiency model to predict corporate failures and success in the United States. Using a 
sample of 50 large U.S bankrupt firms and 901 healthy matching firms, the findings of the 
study demonstrated that the DEA model was relatively weak in predicting corporate failures, 
as they found it to be better suited to predicting corporate success.      
Furthermore, Alam (2013) calculated the technical efficiency of 70 Islamic banks from 11 
countries using the DEA model and the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach 
simultaneity to ascertain the relation between bank regulation and supervision on risk and 
efficiency. The results obtained indicate that regulations and strict monitoring of banking 
operations and higher supervisory powers of regulatory agencies translate to increased 
technical efficiency in Islamic banks, with higher restrictions resulting in reduced risk taking 
in Islamic banks. The study also revealed that even though Basel II and Basel III suggested 
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that very strict regulations and supervision may hamper banking efficiency. Nevertheless, the 
DEA scores in the study suggest that Islamic banks do not follow this trend, as they appear to 
be technically efficient in stricter regulatory climes. 
In like manner, Pasiouras (2007) employed a two-stage DEA model to provide international 
evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision approaches on banks’ efficiency using 
a sample of 715 banks from 95 countries. Using an input-oriented model, the results obtained 
show evidence in line with the view of the three pillars of Basel II, that banking institutions 
should adopt strict capital adequacy regimes, develop powerful supervisory agencies, and 
create disciplining mechanisms.                  
Furthermore, in addition to the studies reviewed in this section, Pasiouras (2007) suggest that 
most DEA studies in banking follow the input-oriented model. The input-oriented model 
identifies the efficiency of DMUs as a proportional reduction in input usage for a particular 
level of output (examples of studies that followed the input-oriented model include Raphael, 
2013; Herrera-Restrepo., et al 2016; Paradi et al., 2004; Seelanatha, 2012; Sufian, 2011). 
Whereas the output-oriented model identifies DMUs can increase their output while keeping 
inputs at particular levels (Coelli et al., 1999). In addition to Premachandra et al. (2011), 
examples of studies that adopted the output-oriented model includes Attaullah et al., (2004); 
Ataullah & Le (2006). Hence, the large number of studies that employ the input-oriented 
model indicates that it is preferred above the output-oriented model. Moreover, it is claimed 
that the intermediary role of banking institutions suits the input-oriented model (Pasiouras, 
2007).  
Finally, the studies in this section buttress the ability of the DEA technique as an adequate 
measure for ascertaining the efficiency level of banking institutions. Additionally, some of 
the reviewed studies also relied on the DEA approach to predict financial distress. Therefore, 
the DEA technique is used to examine the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs as they went through 
the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms, and ascertain whether it was able to identify 
DMBs that were in danger of collapse. None of the studies reviewed above adopted the DEA 
window technique, however, the few banking studies that made use of it are presented in the 
methodology section. To that end, the use of the DEA window technique, which is a variant 
of the conventional DEA technique, contributes to the literature on predicting financial 
distress.  
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The next section of this thesis centres on the review of regression analysis studies that made 
use of bank-specific CAMELS variables to show the determinants of efficiency, performance 
and stability. In relation to the studies reviewed above, the efficiency scores obtained from 
the DEA technique were used as dependent variables in the second stage regression analysis 
in several banking studies like in Pasiouras (2007), Premachandra., et al. (2011), and Moradi-
Motlagh & Babacan (2015). In like manner, DEA efficiency scores are used as dependent 
variables in this study. Hence, the section below covers some recent banking performance 
(CAMELS) regression studies in various jurisdictions and periods.        
 
3.10 CAMELS and Bank Performance 
 
Maghyereh & Awartani (2014) are of the view that the examination of bank instability and 
distress is an important issue due to the following reasons: 
 It enhances the ability of regulators in predicting financial crises, which consequently 
makes the management and coordination of supervision more efficient.  
 The early distinction between sound and troubled banks allows appropriate actions to 
protect healthy institutions and prevent the collapse of distressed ones. 
 The cost of bailing out distressed banks and restructuring a troubled sector is usually 
high and may consume amounts that could have been used for other developmental 
projects. 
 A crisis in the banking sector may create other crisis, such as currency crisis, that may 
additionally weaken the economy, and increase the cost of distress. 
 Finally, bank distress is usually accompanied by a credit crunch, which may further 
hamper growth in the economy.  
Therefore, because of the above, the identification of appropriate variables to unearth banking 
sector problems has attracted enormous attention in research and literature. 
The research to gain insight into banking distress and stability in financial literature has been 
developed around macroeconomic variables and bank-specific variables. On the one hand, 
the macroeconomic variables such as interest rate changes and inflation are perceived to be 
liable to either enhance or distress the financial performance of banks (Sahut & Mili, 2011).  
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Cordella & Yeyati (1998) are of the view that if there are widespread shocks to the economy 
and banks are incapable of controlling their asset portfolio risks, the full transparency of the 
risk position of banks may destabilise the banking system. More so, the microeconomic 
environment of a country may also affect transparency levels, and consequently make it 
difficult to relate to the financial performance of banking institutions (Sahut & Mili, 2011). 
Even though macroeconomic variables are important tools for the timely detection of banking 
system instability, they do not analyse the impact of weaknesses inherent in individual banks 
that contribute to the occurrence of bank instability and distress. To be precise, models that 
make use of macroeconomic variables are unlikely to differentiate between distressed banks 
who have been hit by exogenous shocks, and those that various specific weaknesses may 
have led to systemic financial distress (Sahut & Mili, 2011).     
Several studies suggest that models, which rely on macroeconomic factors to examine 
banking instability and distress, have several limitations. Macroeconomic focused models of 
examining banking distress do not provide sufficient information for use by bank supervisors 
as to which particular banks within the system are the most vulnerable and most likely to fail. 
This sort of assessment may mislead bank supervisors in dealing with issues at an aggregate 
level, and as a result introduce policies that could affect both weak and sound banks in less 
than optimal ways (De Graeve, Kick, & Koetter, 2008; Konstandina, 2006; Wheelock & 
Wilson, 1995).  
Progressively, Konstandina, (2006) opined that using individual bank data for assessing bank 
performance and stability will be beneficial in discovering why and how. And even though 
all banks may have faced similar macroeconomic shocks, not all of them eventually 
experience distress or failure. Konstandina further suggested that the identification of specific 
characteristics inherent in distressed or failed banks compared to non-distressed banks can be 
used to advance monitoring techniques for better identification of banking instability and 
vulnerability in the future. Therefore, by examining the resolution and restructuring processes 
of healthy individual banks, best practices can be recommended to unhealthy banks and can 
be used for the resolution of distressed banks.  
On the other hand, various studies have relied on micro-level and bank-specific variables to 
analyse bank instability and distress in specific countries or regions using cross-section, 
micro-level data. Thus, this section will review studies that made use of CAMELS indicators 
(Capital, Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market 
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risk) and bank-specific variables to measure bank performance, predict bank failures, and 
estimate the stability of banking institutions. 
Numerous studies agree on the ability of the CAMELS approach in assessing financial 
vulnerability and predicting bank distress (Poghosyan & Cihak, 2011). In relation to capital 
adequacy, low capital and high volume of risky assets are major causes of bank instability 
and distress (Oshinsky & Olin, 2006). Banks with large capital cushions have the capacity to 
write-off bad loans in the future, which makes them less vulnerable to financial distress 
especially during financial crises as opposed to banks with weaker structural liquidity which 
may eventual fail (Chiaramonte, Croci, & Poli, 2015; Kick & Koetter, 2007). Berger & 
DeYoung (1997) suggested that low capital may spur moral hazard practices and riskier loan 
portfolios. While Santos (2001) opined that low capital increases the likelihood of bank 
failures. And to add, Gasbarro, Sadguna, & Zumwalt (2002) are of the opinion that capital 
adequacy declines as the result of continuing losses. The asset portfolio of banks plays a 
significant role in determining their health. However, the nature of exposures leading to 
failures varies in literature. In that manner, Barrell, Davis, Karim, & Liadze (2010) and Cole 
& White (2012) are of the view that real estate financing and construction are major causes of 
distress. Equally, Torna (2010) and DeYoung & Torna (2013) by examining bank failures 
during the global financial crisis enumerated five banking activities as sources distress: 
derivatives trading, securitization, insurance, investment banking, and venture capital 
investments. However, the only investment activity that advances bank survival and stability 
was brokerage.  
Additionally, the quality of assets that banks create also matter. Various studies have stressed 
the substantial influence of variables like ex-post provisions taken against losses and non-
performing loans (Barth & Landsman, 2010; Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, & Sarlin, 2014; 
Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, & Trujillo-Ponce, 2010; Jin, Kanagaretnam, & 
Lobo, 2011; Ng & Roychowdhury, 2014). More so, credit growth in periods that precede 
financial crisis may contain predictive information about possible failures in the banking 
sector (Arena, 2008; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999; Jin et al., 2011).                   
Managerial inefficiency has been found to be a significant contributor to bank distress (Barr, 
Seiford, & Siems, 1993; R. DeYoung, 2003; Wheelock,  & Wilson, 1995; Wheelock & 
Wilson, 2000).  
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Likewise, considerable amounts of research are of the opinion that bank liquidity is equally 
integral to stability. Laeven (2011) suggested that liquidity played a big role in the recent 
banking crisis. Diamond & Rajan (2005) opined that liquidity stress due to the inability to 
raise deposits consequently leads to asset liquidation. Whereas, Wagner (2007) studied the 
temptation of banks to allocate more assets into risky marketable securities to avoid liquidity 
stress.  
Therefore, the various submissions above present a consistency in supporting the importance 
of the assessment of the various CAMELS indicators in banks. They show that the various 
indicators bring to light the financial soundness and stability of banking institutions. Hence, 
the CAMELS methodology is an appropriate framework the assessment of the financial 
performance of banks.      
Increasingly so, Maghyereh & Awartani (2014) empirically examined bank distress 
prediction in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries with the aid of a simple hazard model 
which incorporates bank-level variables and other variables including the influence of 
regulation, bank management, diversification, competition, and ownership. They found that 
banks that are small, not adequately capitalised, banks with low profitability, banks with high 
volume of risk asset portfolios, and low liquidity are more disposed to distress than other 
banks. Likewise, as expected, they found that banks that are poorly managed are more likely 
to encounter troubles in the near future. Maghyereh & Awartani (2014) also found that non-
intermediation activities are bad for the health of banks. And they concluded that CAMEL-
type specific variables are important leading indicators to predicting bank distress in the GCC 
countries.  
Also to predict bank financial failures, Boyacioglu, Kara, & Baykan (2009) employed twenty 
(20) financial ratios with CAMELS features. Using the CAMELS proxies, the study carried 
out multivariate statistical methods analysis, multivariate discriminant analysis, K-means 
cluster analysis, and logistic regression analysis to predict bank failure in the Turkish banking 
sector. The study showed that the CAMEL proxies could be employed as variables to predict 
banking failure. Thus, the results obtained indicate that a combination of methods makes the 
prediction of banking failure more accurate.       
Atikogullari (2009) also made use of the CAMEL framework to analyse the performance of 
banks in the Northern Cyprus banking sector. The study focused on post-2001 crisis 
performance of the five largest banks in Northern Cyprus. The results obtained suggested that 
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the profitability and management quality of the assessed banks improved during the period 
under review, whereas a deterioration of capital adequacy and liquidity levels were identified.  
Erol, Baklaci, Aydogan, & Tunc (2014) utilised the CAMELS approach to compare the 
managerial and financial performance of Islamic banks against conventional banks in Turkey. 
The study utilised the logistic regression method in the comparative performance analysis of 
the banks within the period of 2001 – 2009. The results showed that Islamic banks operating 
in Turkey performed better regarding profitability and asset management ratios. More so, 
Islamic banks lagged behind in sensitivity to market risk criterion as conventional banks 
performed better in managing their exposures to market risk. However, Erol et al., (2014) 
suggested that the variations in performance may be as a result of the fact that Islamic banks 
enjoy some form of tax advantages in addition to allowing for lower provisional losses 
compared to Conventional banks.  
Also in a comparative study, Shen & Chang (2012) compared the performance of Taiwanese 
banks that are members of a Financial Holding Company (FHC) with independent banks 
from the first quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2006. Based on 14 performance ratios 
mirrored on the concept of the CAMEL framework, the study found that FHC banks 
performed better regarding capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity sufficiency. 
However, Shen & Chang found that FHC banks and Independent banks had equal 
profitability and management efficiency.    
Numerous studies that employed the CAMELS approach have also been carried out on 
individual banks. For instance, Christopoulos, Mylonakis, & Diktapani (2011) analysed the 
financial particulars of Lehman Brothers from 2003 – 2007 using the CAMEL ratios. The 
scope of the study was to find out whether the collapse of Lehman Brothers was due to the 
effect of the global financial crisis or the result of internal malfunctioning which could have 
gone undetected by supervisory authorities. The results showed credits to be bad and 
doubtful, while the management seemed unwilling and reluctant to reverse the declining 
course. The CAMELS ratios indicated negative trends within the period under review; hence 
supervisory authorities should have foreseen the declining fortunes of Lehman Brothers and 
reacted accordingly. 
Furthermore, in relation to the financial performance and stability of banks that have been 
involved in mergers, Koetter et al., (2007) employed the CAMEL approach to analyse 
approximately 1000 mergers in the German banking industry. Their study found that among 
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merging banks, improving financial profiles reduces the likelihood of distressed mergers 
more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. More so, the study also revealed that both 
distressed and non-distressed mergers have below average CAMEL profiles when compared 
to non-merging banks.      
Also in relation to bank mergers during the global financial crisis and CAMELS, Dunn, 
Intintoli, & McNutt (2015) examined a sample of targets and acquirers involved in US 
commercial bank mergers during both pre-crisis (1st quarter of 2004 to the 2nd quarter of 
2007) and crisis (3rd quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2010) sub-periods. Using proxies for 
components of CAMEL ratings employed by banking regulatory authorities, the study found 
evidence that targets have poorer performing assets than their acquirers during the global 
financial crisis. They also confirmed that Acquirers have equity share prices that are more 
sensitive to market risk during periods of the financial crises, but not so during the crisis. 
Consequently, this study shows that the CAMELS framework can be a tool for examining 
different scenarios; thus it furthers the need for a CAMELS study in the Nigeria banking 
industry due to the various regulatory assisted and non-regulatory assisted mergers prior and 
after the global financial crisis.       
Mckenzie & Keneley (2011) embarked on a CAMEL analysis to evaluate the performance of 
two Australian banks and two insurance companies before and after privatisation. The study 
tested the hypothesis of whether bank performance was different after privatisation; however, 
the results from the banks did not support the hypothesis. The study did not find any 
particular difference in the performance of privatised institutions with other private 
institutions both before and after privatisation. As a result, this shows that privatisation in 
Australian financial institutions does not necessarily result in above average CAMEL 
profiles.       
Finally, even though all the studies reviewed thus far show that the CAMELS framework is 
an appropriate tool for measuring the financial performance of banks and bank stability. The 
results obtained indicate that generalisations cannot be made with results from various 
studies, owing to the reason that even banks of different orientations in the same country or 
region indicate variations in results. For instance, Conventional banks outperform Islamic 
banks in some countries, while the reverse is the case in other countries. More so, merged 
banks which become megabanks show glowing CAMELS ratios in some countries and very 
low ratios in others, while small banks perform better in some jurisdictions and worse in 
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others. Therefore, these variations support the view that CAMELS based studies should be 
carried out in individual countries per bank and year.   
Additionally, it can be observed that CAMELS indicators can be used in various ways. Some 
researchers use CAMELS proxies in stand-alone studies to examine bank performance and 
bank stability, while others use them as variables in multiple regression analysis, factor 
analysis and logistic regression analysis. The flexibility and effectiveness of the application 
of the CAMELS framework make it appealing for adoption. However, the fact that there is no 
consensus of which financial ratios/variables most accurately measures the CAMELS 
components is a minus in its application. But this disadvantage can be overlooked as more 
than one financial ratio/variable can be used in each of the components, thereby increasing its 
effectiveness in analysing bank performance and stability. 
 
3.11 Financial and Banking Stability 
 
Financial markets within the last three decades have experienced accelerated growth by way 
of technology adoption, product innovation and sophistication, in addition to sectoral and 
geographic integration. This rapid development of financial markets despite contributing to 
enhanced financial stability may also complicate the benefits and translate into new sources 
of risks to financial systems (Swamy, 2014). More so, no single financial system is a mirror 
of the other as they are made up of different institutions, and are supervised by different 
regulatory agencies. These various peculiarities make financial systems unique, hence the 
dilemma of ensuring stability.  
Therefore, it is in a bid to understand what financial stability entails and how it can be 
estimated that this section dwells on the various definitions of financial stability and banking 
stability in particular, in addition to the review of related literature. Moreover, the Z-score, 
which is the adopted banking stability indicator, is elaborated upon in the research 
methodology chapter.       
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3.11.1 Definition of Financial Stability 
 
Although it is extensively used, the literature suggests that financial stability is difficult to 
define and measure based on the various submissions by academics and scholars. Financial 
stability as a concept is hazy with no acknowledged definition. However, several attempts 
have been made to define financial stability. Financial stability relates to the smooth 
functioning of the constituent parts of the financial system which includes, financial markets, 
financial institutions, and payments, settlement, and clearing systems (Cihak, 2007; Klomp & 
Haan, 2009). 
 In line with the above view of financial stability, Alastair (2008) suggested two competing 
notions. The first view has to do with the robustness of the “financial machinery”, that is of 
the institutions, which operate in financial markets, the market mechanisms themselves, and 
activities which include the payment systems, clearing systems and settlements processes that 
underpin markets. In keeping with this view, maintaining financial stability translates to 
avoiding serious disruptions in the operation of the financial machinery, such that the entire 
financial system can continue to perform functions expected of it. These functions include the 
provision of a store of value, facilitation of transactions (in goods, services, financial assets, 
etc.) and the provision of a mechanism for allocating savings. And in addition, this should 
ensure the stability of the monetary transmission mechanism. Whereas, the second 
conception does not dwell on the robustness of the financial machinery but on what the 
machinery offers regarding asset prices and financial flows, with particular focus on their 
stability or volatility. Put differently; it is the notion that a financial system may be structured 
to operate in such a manner that encourages or even allows, an “excessive” degree of 
volatility (Alastair, 2008). 
Progressively, the European Central Bank defines financial stability as “a condition in which 
the financial system, comprising of financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructures is capable of withstanding shocks, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly 
impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment opportunities” (ECB, 2015).   
More so, Schoenmaker & Siegmann (2014) view financial stability in relation to systemic 
risk, which they view as “the risk that an event will give rise to a loss of economic value or 
confidence in a substantial section of the financial system that is weighty enough to have 
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serious adverse effects on the real economy”. Moreover, given the intertwined nature of the 
concepts of systemic risk and financial stability, threats to financial stability are considered to 
create systemic risks. Thus, the Committee on Global Financial Stability (2010), view 
systemic risk as “the risk that disruptions to financial services caused by impairments to the 
whole or parts of the financial system are capable of having serious negative consequences 
for the real economy”.            
Additionally, Morgan & Pontines (2014) are of the view that a financial system is stable 
when it is capable of facilitating positive economic performance by dissipating financial 
imbalances that arise inherently or as a result of unanticipated and adverse events.  
A look at all the views and definitions of financial stability above show that they lay 
emphasis on the ability of financial systems (financial markets, financial institutions, 
payment, clearing and settlement systems) to withstand shocks and have the capacity to 
effectively perform the basic functions of intermediating savings and investments in the real 
economy. What is central to all the definitions and views of the concept of “financial 
stability” is that the individual components of financial systems are capable of functioning in 
ways that mitigate risk both in periods of financial bliss and financial crises.                 
To be specific, this study is centred on banking institutions, and in line with the definitions of 
financial stability presented above, it is appropriate to zero down on the meaning of banking 
sector stability or soundness.  
Swamy (2014) opined that the banking sector is a part of the financial system, however, it is 
the most central part of the financial system in most emerging economies and it is the main 
source of risk for financial stability. Swamy suggested that banking stability is the benchmark 
to determine whether an economy can withstand both internal and external shocks. More so, 
financial stability is the result of stability conditions prevailing in the banking system, 
financial markets, and the real economy and amongst them. Thus, banking stability is integral 
of financial stability (Swamy, 2014).       
Lindgren, Garcia, & Saal (1996) perceive bank soundness as the ability of a bank to 
withstand adverse events that may take the form of bank runs, major policy changes, financial 
sector liberalisation and natural disasters. Therefore, it reflects the ability of a bank to be 
solvent and stay so even under difficult economic conditions by way of their capital and 
reserve accounts.  
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Additionally, Jokipii & Monnin (2013) refer to banking sector instability as the probability of 
the banking sector becoming insolvent within the next quarter. They considered a banking 
sector to be insolvent when the market values of the assets owned by all the banks in the 
country are not sufficient to cover the total debt at a particular point in time.   
The views presented above press on the fact that the stability of banks is crucial for financial 
stability as a whole and economic growth. Likewise, as there is no generally accepted 
definition of financial stability or banking stability, different studies make use of different 
indicators to measure and estimate financial stability and banking stability. However, to avoid 
misconceptions, financial stability and banking stability are used interchangeably in 
literature. This study therefore dwells on banking stability with a view of making revelations 
that will affect financial stability.  
 
3.11.2 Financial and Banking Stability Studies  
 
Literature centred on banking stability indicates that numerous factors determine the 
soundness of banking systems. Below is a review of literature on bank stability and the 
various factors or elements that seem to derail financial stability and economic growth.  
Jokipii & Monnin (2013) explored the relationship between banking sector stability and the 
consequent evolution of real output growth and inflation in a sample consisting of 521 banks 
covering 18 OECD countries. Their study sought to capture the extent of stability by 
estimating the distance-to-default for the various banks involved in the sample. The adopted 
VAR model showed that banking sector stability is significant for GDP growth. Jokipii & 
Monnin also suggested that periods of stability are on the whole followed by an increase in 
real output growth, whereas instability translates to periods of reduced growth. More so, they 
opined that a stable banking sector reduces uncertainty in real output growth.       
In relation to the recent global financial crisis, a host of scholars in addition to the various 
other causes of the crisis blamed the use of derivatives as one of the main sources. Keffala, 
(2015) investigated whether the use of derivative instruments was responsible for the 
magnification of the global financial crisis. Keffala measured the effect of the use of 
derivatives on the stability of banks from emerging countries within the period of 2003 – 
2011. The study employed the use Generalised Methods of Movements (GMM) estimator 
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technique and made use of the Z-score as the dependent variable. The results of the study 
showed that forwards and swaps are not disruptive factors, whereas futures and to a large 
extent options can contribute to bank instability in emerging countries. Keffala (2015) 
concluded that options and futures, and not forwards and swaps should be considered risky 
and partly responsible for the amplification of the global financial crisis. 
Additionally, given the various takeovers and purchase assumptions agreements that ensued 
in most banking systems around the world in recent times, especially after the global 
financial crisis, Gomez (2015) examined the effect of failed banks takeovers on financial 
stability. Gomez presented two opposite views. First, Gomez (2015) asserted that incumbent 
takeover might enhance financial stability due to the incentive to be solvent to benefit from 
the failure of competitors. Secondly, the incumbent takeover of failed banks may derail 
financial stability by creating “Systemically Important Financial Institutions”.     
Furthermore, regarding the relationship between market power and bank stability that focus 
on concentration, two views exist in literature: “concentration stability” and “Concentration 
fragility” (Bretschger, Kappel, & Werner, 2012; Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014). Advocates of 
the “concentration-stability” view (e.g. Allen & Gale, 2004; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Levine, 2006; Chang, Guerra, Lima, & Tabak, 2008) are of the opinion that larger banks in 
concentrated banking sectors scale down financial fragility through at least five (5) channels: 
 Larger banks are more likely to increase their profits, thus building up high “capital 
buffers, which allow them to be less prone to liquidity or macroeconomic shocks; 
 Larger banks have the capacity to increase their charter value, and this consequently 
dampens bank managers’ appetite of excessive risk taking;  
 The monitoring of few large banks is easy and uncomplicated. This increases the 
efficiency of supervisory authorities, and consequently translates to a reduction in the 
risk of a system-wide contagion; 
 Larger banks are equipped to provide credit monitoring services; and  
 Given higher economies of scale and scope, larger banks have the capacity to 
efficiently diversify their loan portfolio geographically through their cross-border 
activities/operations. 
Chang et al. (2008) examined the stability-concentration relationship in the Brazilian banking 
system. The Brazilian case aligns with the main intuition of the concentration-stability view 
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that banks in largely concentrated banking system can diversify their loans, while also 
improving their risk-return trade-off. Likewise, Beck et al. (2006) using data from 69 
countries over the period of 1980 – 1997 indicated that financial crises are less probable in 
more concentrated banking systems.          
On the other hand, proponents of the “concentration-fragility” view (e.g. Boyd & De-Nicolo, 
2005; Caminal & Matutes, 2002) are of the opinion that larger banks in a concentrated 
banking sector weaken stability through three channels: 
 Larger banks are perceived to be too-big-to-fail institutions, which will be rescued 
through government guarantees, and consequently making the moral hazard problem 
more severe; 
 Larger banks usually charge high loan interest rates by their market power, which 
may encourage increased risk-taking amongst borrowers to compensate for such high 
rates, and the repercussion could be increased default risk; and  
 The managerial efficiency of a large bank in areas such as risk diversification in assets 
and liabilities may decline with time, and consequently resulting in high operational 
risk.                     
Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) provided empirical evidence that national banking market 
concentration has a negative impact on the financial soundness of European banks over the 
period from 1997 to 2005 as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for bank-
specific, macroeconomic, regulatory, and institutional factors. The result of the analysis 
revealed that Eastern European banking markets that are characterised by a higher fraction of 
government-owned banks, fewer diversification opportunities, and lower levels of 
competitive pressure are more prone to financial instability, while capital regulations were 
found to support banking stability.     
In addition to the above and with regards to the effect of market power, Nguyen, Skully, & 
Perera (2012) explored 151commercial banks from four South Asian countries (Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) within the period of 1998-2008. The findings indicated that 
South Asian Banks with greater market power performed better and were more stable when 
their activities transcend traditional banking activities. More so, Nguyen et al. (2012) further 
found that higher market concentration led to increased competitive pressure, which gave rise 
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to increased lending to low-creditworthy customers that consequently materialised in higher 
non-performing asset ratios for less banking institutions.         
Soedarmono, Machrouh, & Tarazi (2011) based on a sample of commercial banks from 12 
Asian countries over the period of 2001 – 2007; found out that greater market power in the 
banking sector translates to higher instability. They suggested that although banks in less 
competitive markets were better capitalised, their default risk remained higher; however, they 
indicated that such behaviour is dependent on the economic environment. 
Bornemann, Homolle, Hubensack, Kick, & Pfingsten (2014) examined the motives for the 
creation and usage of General Banking Risk (GBR) Reserves in German banks and assessed 
their role in financial stability. They found that GBR reserves are primarily created for the 
sole purpose of building up Tier 1 capital for the management of regulatory capital and 
earnings management. Additionally, the results indicated that banks using GBR reserves are 
less likely to experience financial distress or default events. Bornemann et al. (2014) further 
concluded that the existence of GBR reserves serves both as a convenient capital earnings 
management tool for bank managers and as a regulatory instrument for the enhancement of 
bank stability.         
Maudos & Fernandez De Guevara (2011) analysed the relationship between bank size, 
market power and financial stability. They used data panel from banks in 25 EU countries, 
the US, Canada, and Japan in the period of 2001 – 2008. In relation to financial stability, 
Maudos & Fernandez De Guevara (2011) suggested that an increase in market power leads to 
greater stability. They hold that this view supports the traditional notion that excess 
competition in the banking sector can be harmful to financial stability. They also asserted that 
although size has a negative effect on financial stability, the corresponding relationship is not 
linear with respect to very big banks, as an increase in size decreases the probability of 
bankruptcy.  
Creel, Hubert, & Labondance (2014) used the seminal work of Beck & Levine (2004) and 
adopted the same variables and econometric method to estimate the link between economic 
performance and financial stability in European countries, while also independently 
controlling for the level of financial depth. They tested how different measures of financial 
instability (microeconomic indicators, institutional index, and derived statistical index – 
principal component analysis) affect economic performance. And they found out that 
financial instability has a negative effect on economic growth. 
61 
 
Swamy (2014) employed a robust panel of 56 Indian banks covering the period from 1996 to 
2009 to measure the degree of volatility and soundness in the Indian banking sector. The 
study made use of a micro vector autoregressive (VAR) model and corroborated the 
significance of the interrelatedness of bank-specific variables such as capital adequacy, asset 
quality, liquidity and profitability. Swamy provided empirical evidence for the centrality of 
banking system stability for aiding financial stability in the context of banking dominated 
emerging economy (India). The results showed that within the period of 1996 to 2009, the 
Indian financial system and in particular the banking system demonstrated continued stability 
when compared to other countries. 
Chiaramonte et al. (2015) investigated the accuracy of the Z-score on a sample of banks from 
12 European countries over the period of 2001 – 2011. The study examined whether the Z-
score is a valuable model for predicting bank distress relative to the CAMELS-related 
covariates, and if its ability to signal bank distress differs through the period, bank size, 
business model (shareholders/stakeholders oriented banks), and geographic region. Using 
probit and survival analysis models, the study found that the Z-score is largely a valuable and 
fewer data demanding measure of predicting bank distress. They opined that the ability of the 
Z-score to predict bank distress over the entire period of the study (2001 – 2011) and in the 
crisis years (2008 – 2011), is to some extent as good as more data demanding models, such as 
the CAMELS model. Additionally, Chiaramonte et al. (2015) suggested that the Z-score is a 
more effective predictor for commercial banks and in particular large banks. In particular, to 
the sample, the study indicated that the Z-score was relatively more successful in predicting 
distress and non-distress events in the European countries that were less affected by the 
financial crisis.            
Conclusively, the views expressed by the financial and banking stability related studies 
indicate that several factors influence stability. Though the studies show that the Z-score is a 
popular indicator of stability, its determinants vary according to periods, business cycles, 
jurisdiction, type of banking institution (Conventional or Islamic), and customer base. In 
summary, the size of banking institutions, banking concentration levels, ownership structure, 
macroeconomic circumstances, earnings, liquidity levels, and management structure amongst 
others influence financial stability in the whole. To that end, studies to ascertain the changing 
and dynamic factors that influence stability must be regularly embarked upon. Thus, the 
various determinants highlight the rationale to ascertain the factors that determine the 
stability of Nigerian DMBs.         
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3.12 Financial Safety Nets 
 
Nigerian regulators relied on a couple of financial safety net initiatives to prevent the collapse 
of deposit money banks in recent times. On that account, this section dwells on the discussion 
of financial safety nets and the particular initiatives (bailouts and bridge banking mechanism) 
adopted by Nigerian regulatory authorities to avert banking collapse in the Nigerian banking 
sector.     
Due to the failures of several banking institutions and the events that unfolded during the 
recent financial crisis, significant attention from academics, policy makers and the general 
public at large has been directed towards policy responses that are meant to protect 
shareholders of financial institutions, customers and taxpayers when financial excesses 
threaten. The global attention vested on policies that border on financial stability are because 
banking crises usually involve huge cost not only to the banks and their shareholders but also 
to customers and taxpayers, and more broadly they affect the economic indicators like 
unemployment, money supply and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For Instance, when 
the lending capacity and payment systems of banks are disrupted during a banking crisis, 
there are usually reductions in investments outlays. And to manage the effects of banking 
crises, national governments often incur large costs (Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2008).   
Therefore, to ensure financial system stability and to reduce the huge cost involved in 
remedying banking crises, various countries have at one point, or another introduced 
“financial safety nets”. White, (2004) suggested that the term “safety net” is often used to 
depict the instruments and methods employed by governments to mitigate and manage 
damages in the event of difficulties in their financial systems. The instruments and methods 
considered are both micro and macro in nature. The micro instruments include deposit 
insurance schemes (explicit and implicit), short-term liquidity support to financial 
institutions, government guarantees, crisis coordination, and exit policies. While the macro 
instruments are in the form of easing monetary policies and support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). For the sake of this research, this section will dwell only on the micro 
instruments (deposit insurance and bank bailouts). In the current financial landscape, where 
we are facing the aftermath of a major financial crisis, recent literature on banking regulation 
consider financial safety nets in the light of crisis management more than crisis prevention. 
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Though the main and enduring criticism of the use of financial safety net instruments is based 
on the economic theory of moral hazard, financial safety nets can equally be employed to 
mitigate the damages that arise during periods of financial difficulties (Morrison & White, 
2011). While it is understood that financial safety net provisions encourage imprudent risk-
taking by bank management, both national and international regulators have in recent times 
further emphasised the important role played by financial safety nets in crisis management. 
Thus the increased recourse to the use of financial safety nets by governments following the 
global financial crisis is worth researching. 
The above also tends to present the dilemma whether the moral hazard problem remains 
serious enough to merit considerable attention from regulators and supervisors based on the 
assumption that the “good design” of the safety net instruments could to a large extent limit 
the moral hazard problem, as could better regulation and supervision. 
 
3.12.2 Financial Safety Net Issues  
 
The need for effective resolution techniques to assist countries in dealing with financial 
difficulties was fortified by the event of the global financial crisis. The need to strengthen 
financial resolution techniques has become the priority of regulators and governments (Azis, 
2013).  
Economic literature seems to agree that financial safety net instruments are required to limit 
the damages caused by financial crises and bank failures. Schich (2008) argued that without 
the presence of an appropriate financial safety net, news of problems concerning solvency or 
liquidity of a financial institution can be blown out of proportion and result in a full-blown 
financial meltdown. He further opined that when an appropriate financial safety net is 
employed, depositors’ confidence in the financial systems tends to be high and the incidence 
of bank runs and panic are less likely to occur. 
Most definitions of financial safety nets are limited to deposit insurance and the lender of last 
resort function. For the purpose of this study, financial safety nets discussions will dwell on 
the elements of bank bailouts and bridge banking. Each of these instruments presents a 
similar trade-off. They are all designed to mitigate financial difficulties emanating from bank 
failures on the one hand. While on the other hand, if they are not properly designed to reduce 
64 
 
the effect of moral hazard, they can further increase financial fragility, which they were 
designed to minimise. To emphasise, governments and regulatory agencies must ensure that 
the benefits of choosing any particular instrument must outweigh the risk of moral 
hazard(Davis & Obasi, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2008). Thus, Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detriagiache (2000) suggested, financial safety nets are difficult to design and implement 
due to the conflicting objectives of protecting customers and reducing the incentives of 
banking institutions to engage in risky activities.  
Events based on the recent financial crisis have presented a dilemma concerning the type of 
institutions that should be covered by financial safety net instruments. The focus of financial 
safety net instruments in the past was predominately on deposit taking institutions like 
commercial banks. Commercial banks use to be the only systematically important 
institutions, but with the advent of financial innovation, traditional distinctions between 
financial activities, including securities dealing, derivatives trading, and asset management 
have changed the financial terrain. More so, financial institutions have witnessed closer and 
more complex inter-linkages in the financial landscape, therefore exposing banks to more 
universal risks and spill over effects. Also, traditional banks have all evolved, and other 
financial institutions have also become systemically important. For the scope of this study, 
financial safety nets will only be discussed in relation to commercial banks (Barth et al., 
2013).  
Furthermore, in a bid to manage the aftermath effects of the recent financial crisis, financial 
safety nets have been enhanced mainly because existing mechanisms have been viewed to be 
deficient. Pickford (2011) opined that insufficient amounts of financial outlay to make 
available adequate liquidity to offset private outflows and convince markets, and 
insufficiently flexible ways to disburse funds to financial institutions in difficulties make a 
case for enhanced financial safety nets. 
More so, in the last four years, the level of financial resources offered for support operations 
have substantially increased. Apart from enhanced individual national arrangements to deal 
with the spillover effects of the financial crisis, regional and international set-ups have made 
available a variety of financial resources. For instance, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) at the London G20 Summit in 2009 tripled the IMF resources, at the same time 
created, and strengthened the regional financing arrangements (RFAs). The immediate 
reaction by the international community when the financial crisis became full-blown was to 
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channel liquidity through an IMF initiated network of central bank swap arrangements to aid 
finance-affected countries. Similarly, the European Balance of Payments Facility for non-
Eurozone countries, alongside the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism made 
available to all EU members, which were enlarged in 2010 by an additional mechanism to 
support countries in the Eurozone that were experiencing crisis (European Financial Stability 
Facility). In the same light, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) that was set up in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis as a mutual support mechanism among the 13 ASEAN+3 countries, 
was considerably strengthened to the tune of $120 billion as a self-managed reserve pooling 
arrangement (IMF, 2011; Pickford, 2011). 
However, despite these incentives and innovations, the existing solvency and liquidity 
resolution techniques and mechanism available to financial institutions have sometimes 
proved inadequate. For the sake of this study, the bailout strategy and the bridge banking 
mechanism are reviewed due to their recent application in the Nigerian banking sector.  
 
3.12.3 Bank Bailouts 
 
As the importance of banking institutions as a tool for economic growth continues to 
increase, the need to ensure stability in financial institutions has become vital. The incidence 
of financial difficulties and banking crises have become more frequent in recent times, the 
need for urgent intervention to ensure financial stability has also become more intense. 
Policymakers have been presented with the dilemma of allowing financial institutions to 
either collapse or bail them out by providing liquidity for them to continue operations. 
Allowing an institution to fail results in loose of confidence in the financial systems, and this 
could lead to the failure of other financial institutions. While the bailout of an institution 
results in the use of taxpayers’ fund, which lots of studies argue could result in moral 
hazard(Gorton & Huang, 2004; Smith, 2011). Likewise, Poczter (2012) is of the view that the 
most controversial element of many governments’ responses to the recent financial crisis is 
the bailout of the banking sector. Advocates of the bailout arrangements believe they add 
liquidity during periods of financial difficulties and facilitate financial systems recovery. On 
the hand, policymakers and scholars who do not support the provision of bailouts and similar 
arrangements argue that they result in moral hazard because bank managements assume more 
risk due to the believe that government will bail out any eventual losses. Also, Smith (2011) 
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in his study on the dilemma of bank bailouts indicated that bank bailouts are disliked 
because: 
 They are an abuse of taxpayers’ funds, which could be used for infrastructural 
development, and 
 Bailouts disregard the free-market theory that holds that they prevent market forces 
from naturally correcting market defects. 
Hence, this dilemma presents the need to study the impact of financial safety nets (bailouts) 
on financial stability and bank performance.    
Gorton & Huang (2004) argued that governments can effectively provide liquidity. They 
opined that governments are better placed to bailout banks; hence, they can inject liquidity 
more efficiently than private investors when banks are in distress. The rationale of 
governments world over to implement bailout policies, and similar arrangements rest on their 
intent to stabilise the banking sector and ensure banks carry out their intermediary roles. The 
questions that should be asked at this junction are “Will bank bailouts ensure long-term 
financial stability? And how will bank bailouts policies be designed to promote effective 
bank performance and financial stability? So, before seeking to answer this question in 
regards to the scope of this study, it is important we look at existing literature on the subject 
of bank bailouts.  
Furthermore, Grossman & Woll (2012) indicated that bank bailouts are a function of 
economic pressures, so governments have no choice but to intervene during periods of 
financial difficulties. Progressively, they engaged in a comparative analysis of bailouts in 
different economies. They illustrated that the comparison of the Danish and Irish financial 
systems showed that they both experienced similar types of exposures to the recent financial 
crisis, but their bailout arrangements differed. The government handled the Irish bailouts of 
the banking sector, while the private sector in Denmark participated alongside the 
government, meaning only minimal amount of tax payer’s money was used. Denmark was 
not alone in this approach, as the study also indicated the private sector coordinated with the 
government in France to bail out the French banking sector. Additionally, the British 
government initially wanted to rely on private takeovers but had to inject funds and 
nationalise banks like the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB in the wake of the 
financial crisis.                 
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Most research and attention in recent times that centre on bank bailouts stem from the fact 
that the cost of bailing out banking institutions are huge and the consequence of these costly 
interventions worldwide are unknown (Poczter, 2012). Poczter in her study on the long-term 
effects of bank bailouts in Indonesia opined that though the rationale for government 
intervention (bailouts) is to reduce systemic risk and restore lending, the injection of liquidity 
to save banks from collapse might create long-term incentives to engage in excessive risk-
taking. She also suggested that recent critics of the U.S bailout programme implemented 
through the Troubled Assets Recovery Program (TARP) have indicated that bailed out banks 
are not increasing lending but rather channelling the capital received elsewhere. Similarly, 
Giannetti & Simonov (2013) argued that government intervention (liquidity support) for bad 
banks encourages bank management to engage in worse lending decisions.  
Dell’Aricca & Ratnovski (2012) revisited the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. 
They opined that government intervention in the form of bailouts creates moral hazards and 
encourages risk-taking. Though acknowledging that bailouts have moral hazard effects that 
encourage risk-taking, Dell’Aricca & Ratnovski showed that when there are risks 
externalities across banks, bailouts also protect prudent banks against contagion. To that end, 
bailouts are not in themselves bad. Hence, they suggested that bailouts should encourage 
adequate supervision and monitoring to reduce bank risk taking.       
Furthermore, Giannetti & Simonov (2013) are of the view that theoretical evidence on bank 
bailouts indicate that the real effects of bailouts depend on the size of the recapitalizations, 
the quality of the banks’ clients and the banks’ ability to meet capital requirements. In this 
line of thought, Bhattacharya & Nyborg (2011) argued that to be effective, the injection of 
liquidity must be large enough to solve the debt problems of banks. If the recapitalization is 
not enough, it would be ineffective in spurring bank lending and preventing a bank run or 
failure. 
Recent empirical evidence on the long-run benefits of bank bailouts is limited. Related 
literature on bank bailouts try to present arguments for or against bank bailouts and how 
governments are to inject capital and who to receive them. For instance, Giannetti & 
Simonov (2013) argued that bailouts should be designed in ways that will not alter ex-ante 
lending incentives of banks. While Diamond (2001) suggested, governments should only 
extend bailouts to banks that have specialised knowledge about their borrowers. This 
assertion holds that banks that grant loans without due process should be exempted from 
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bailouts. In another perspective, Diamond & Rajan (2005) opined that bank bailouts should 
not be given to failing banks because it could backfire by increasing the demand for liquidity 
and result in further insolvency. These arguments go to show that no study has provided an 
optimal solution to the dilemma of bank bailouts.  
In like manner, De Caux, McGroarty, & Brede (2016) analysed the long-term costs and 
benefits of bailout strategies in banking systems. They found that bailouts serve as effective 
tools that limit the occurrence of bank failures in the short-run. However, inappropriate 
intervention strategies hearten risk-taking, which renders bailouts inefficient and 
disadvantageous to long-term system stability. Hence, bailouts should be accompanied with 
strategies that enhance risk management practices.  
Bank bailouts have been granted to different banks and in various banking sectors. The 
evident benefit was that some of these banks were saved from collapse. Conversely, the real 
problem remains in some countries, as governments have not been able to find lasting 
solutions to the bailed out banks. Some of these banks have been nationalised and finding 
buyers have proved difficult. For instance, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Bank 
have not been able to find worthy buyers. The fact that the banks remain in the control of the 
government (politicians) also presents a different dimension. Governments come and go, 
meaning different governments with different policies and financial institutions like banks 
require some form of stability to function at optimum.         
The submissions above show that moral hazard has remained the cardinal problem of bailout 
strategies. The bailout strategy seems to be a temporary fix as it forestalls the collapse of 
banking institutions in the short term. However, it does not prevent nor guarantee that bank 
executives will not engage in risky ventures. The inability of bailout strategy to overcome the 
moral hazard problem suggests that regulatory authorities will continue to experiment until 
they come up with the most suitable strategy that does not require the use of taxpayer’s funds. 
To that end, Nigerian regulators employed the bridge banking mechanism after it 
experimented with the bailout strategy in 2009. The bridge banking mechanism is therefore 
presented below.  
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3.12.4 Bridge Banking Mechanism 
 
Nigerian regulators employed bank bailouts and bridge banking in recent times. The bailout 
resolution strategy was addressed in the proceeding section, while this section focuses on the 
bridge banking resolution mechanism.  
Carmassi, Luchetti, & Micossi (2010) suggested that the bridge banking special resolution 
tool is in two parts. A newly licensed banking institution under the supervision of the 
regulatory authority with the mandate to carry on the performing assets, including part or all 
of the deposits and other liabilities. The impaired assets and remaining share of liabilities stay 
with the residual banking institution that is subsequently closed and liquidated. If 
reorganisation of the banking institution fails, this technique lets operations to continue in the 
bridge bank, while the residual banking institution’s operational licence can be revoked and 
liquidated.  
The view of what a bridge bank is by the BIS somewhat differs from that presented above. 
The BIS is of the opinion that the bridge banking resolution technique allows certain critical 
functions and viable operations to continue until a permanent solution can be found. 
Regulatory authorities close the unsound bank and mark it for liquidation. Consequently, a 
new bank, referred to as a bridge bank, is licenced and placed under the control of the 
liquidator. Regulators should have the power to establish the terms and conditions under 
which the bridge bank can function as a going concern. The liquidator has the mandate to 
determine which assets and liabilities are transferred to the bridge bank. Hence, the assets and 
liabilities that are not transferred to the bridge bank remain with the liquidator. Therefore, a 
bridge bank is primarily designed to bridge the gap between the failure of a bank and the time 
when the liquidator can evaluate and market the bank to a satisfactory third party. 
Additionally, it accords ample time to potential purchasers to assess the bank’s condition to 
submit their offer without interrupting service to bank customers (BCBS, 2015).    
Literature evidence indicates that the bridge banking mechanism has not been widely 
explored. Hence, the theoretical position of the submissions. On that note, this study relies on 
the efficiency scores produced by the DEA window analysis to evaluate whether the bridge 
banking mechanism is a good fit.        
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Finally, the evidence presented after the recent financial crisis makes this study to conclude 
that financial safety nets typically evolve after financial crises. Like in the aftermaths of the 
following events, the great depression of the 1930s that led to the adoption of some form of 
deposit insurance by the US in 1934. The Asian Crisis of 1998, which resulted in the 
formation of the Chiang Mai Initiative that was further enhanced after the 2007 financial 
crisis and the several bank bailouts in the US, UK and other countries. These examples and 
those mentioned in the above paragraphs show that financial safety nets have over time been 
able only to enhance customer confidence during financial crises, but do not prevent the 
occurrence of the crises. 
Consequently, the recourse to the use of financial safety nets has been on the rise, and the 
problem of moral hazard remains central. The use of these safety nets to address short-term 
issues in financial systems may have long-term repercussions. Good design of safety net 
instruments has been proposed, and can to some degree reduce the effect of moral hazard, but 
the problem of interconnected financial systems and increased innovation will continue to 
persist.  
 
3.13 Review of Nigerian Banking Literature  
 
So far, this chapter started by presenting the rationale for regulating and supervising banking 
institutions, before focusing on capital regulation because the last two Nigerian banking 
reforms of 2005 and 2009 centred on recapitalisation. Furthermore, regulatory reactions to 
the global financial crisis from other countries were discussed as the 2009 banking reforms 
were also the response of Nigerian banking regulators to the global financial crisis. 
Progressively, the three main measures of evaluating banking performance (ratio analysis, 
regression analysis, and frontier analysis) in banking literature were presented. More so, 
given that this study utilises DEA window analysis and regression analysis, related literature 
are reviewed.  
Therefore, the preceding sections of this chapter set the mood for the review of Nigerian 
banking studies, which investigated various aspects of banking performance, efficiency, and 
financial stability.       
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3.13.1 2005 Nigerian Banking Reforms Literature  
 
This section is centred on the review of Nigerian banking studies that focus on the various 
dimensions of this research work. Studies that dwell on the regulation and supervision of 
Nigerian banks, and bank performance studies that adopt related CAMELS bank-specific 
variables and the DEA window analysis technique are discussed. In addition, the submissions 
reviewed shows how this study is unique as to the best of the knowledge of the researcher; 
there is no study that employed the same methodologies in a mixed research study of bank 
regulation and bank performance in Nigeria. 
Aburime (2008) sought to ascertain the determinants of bank profitability in the Nigerian 
banking sector by empirically employing a sample size of 33 banks over the period of 2000 to 
2004. Aburime asserted that the study arrived at three reliable conclusions: capital levels, size 
of credit portfolio and ownership concentration are significant determinants of bank 
profitability in Nigeria; size of deposit liabilities, state of IT, productivity of labour, 
ownership, control-ownership disparity and structural affiliation are not significant 
determinants of bank profitability in Nigeria; and the relationship between bank risk and 
profitability is inconclusive. And as such, the study suggested that bank managements should 
focus on maintaining substantial reserves, improving the quality of credit portfolios, and 
amplifying ownership concentration levels, whereas regulators should formulate policies and 
guidelines that foster the suggestions.         
Olajide, Asaolu & Jegede (2011) conducted a study to ascertain the impact of financial 
reforms on the performance of Nigerian banks for the period of 1995 to 2004. In a bid to 
determine the effects of regulatory policies of recapitalization, interest rate deregulation, and 
exchange rate reforms, a pooled panel regression analysis was adopted. The results obtained 
showed mixed effects on the net interest margin and profitability level of Nigerian banks. The 
study, however, concluded that bank-specific characteristics disclosed significant positive 
effects on the profitability and efficiency of banks, whereas the industry structure proxies 
suggested not to have contributed significantly to the profitability and efficiency performance 
of Nigerian banks.     
In an attempt to examine the effect of changes in capital levels of Nigerian banks, Agbeja 
(2013) employed panel data from thirty-two (32) commercial banks for the period 1992 – 
2007. The results obtained indicated that capital base requirement was not effective in 
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reducing distress in the Nigerian banking industry. Agbeja opined that the minimum capital 
requirement imposed by regulatory authorities was not sufficient. And as such, he suggested 
that the CBN further increase the capital base of Nigerian banks to stimulate efficiency.           
Regarding the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms, Ezeoha (2011) sought to 
ascertain the major determinants of bank assets quality. Using a sample of 19 banks within 
the period of 2004 to 2008, the study tried to establish how consolidation increases the 
occurrences of non-performing credits in a fragile banking terrain. The study indicated a 
decline in asset quality and increased credit crisis in the Nigerian-banking sector within the 
sampled period were aggravated by the failure of banking institutions to utilise their asset 
structure to boost their earnings profiles adequately. Additionally, Ezeoha claimed that 
although excess liquidity and the huge capital bases of Nigerian banks fuelled imprudent 
lending, the increased level of unsecured credits in the portfolio of banks unexpectedly aided 
to mitigate the level of non-performing loans within the study sampled period.                      
Barros & Caporale (2012) examined the Nigerian banking consolidation process for the 
period 2000 – 2010 using a dynamic GMM panel. The study included the 25 Nigerian banks 
that emerged after the 2005 recapitalization exercise. Barros & Caporale tested the 
relationship between banks’ cost and the following variables: foreign bank ownership, banks 
involved in mergers and acquisitions, bank size and consolidation. The results obtained 
revealed that the Nigerian banking sector benefited from the 2005 consolidation exercise, and 
in particular foreign ownership, mergers and acquisitions, and bank size decrease costs.    
Ikpefan (2012) also conducted a study to ascertain the performance of Nigerian banks post-
consolidation. He attempted to find out if the consolidation exercise engineered mergers and 
acquisitions had any impact on the performance of banks. The empirical results found 
shareholders’ funds not to be significant to ROE in both pre and post-merger periods. The 
findings equally indicated that shareholders’ funds have a statistically insignificant 
relationship to profit before interest and tax (PBIT). Whereas, bank assets had a positive 
relationship and are statistically significant to changes in the PBIT of Nigerian banks. In a 
nutshell, Ikpefan concluded that bank performance improved post-consolidation as the bank 
assets, bank loans, bank deposits, and value of shareholders’ funds increased in the post-
merger period.      
Yauri, Musa & Kaoje (2012) investigated the impact of capital regulation on bank liquidity 
and financial distress in the Nigerian banking sector over a ten-year period (1997 – 2006). 
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The sampled period includes four bank recapitalisations that took place in the Nigerian 
banking sector “from N50 million to N500 million in 1997; to N1 billion in 2001; to N2 
billion in 2002; and to N25 billion in 2005.” Employing a simple regression model, 
correlation analysis and the product moment correlation analysis, they found that a 
relationship exists between an increase in the minimum capital base of commercial banks and 
their liquidity and asset quality as liquidity and asset quality tend to improve with 
recapitalization. Yauri, Musa & Kaoje (2012) however noted that increasing the capital base 
of banks alone only accounts for a short-term or temporary improvement in the asset quality 
and liquidity of banks position of banks as the strategy does not have a long-term effect of 
forestalling bank distress. And as such, they suggested that bank regulators in Nigeria in 
addition to capital regulation should adopt approaches like the fortification of the corporate 
governance framework in order to curb financial distress in commercial banks.      
Nwankwo (2013) also conducted a study that dwelled on the performance of the Nigerian 
banks in relation to the banking consolidation exercise that culminated in 2005. The study 
empirically investigated the effect pre and post bank consolidation performance of Nigerian 
banks on the Nigerian economy using T-test. The study results suggested that banking 
consolidation engineered mergers and acquisitions gave rise to improved bank performance 
regarding asset quality, liquidity, and profitability, which in turn had positive effects on the 
economy. In essence, the study implied that the banking sector contributed little to economic 
growth in periods before the banking consolidation reforms, whereas the contribution of 
Nigerian banks to economic growth increased in the post-banking consolidation period due to 
improved asset quality, liquidity levels and profitability.         
Ezike & Oke (2013) investigated the impact of the adoption of capital adequacy standards on 
the performance of Nigerian banks. Using a mix of three old generation banks (Pre-SAP) and 
three new generation (Post-SAP) banks within the period of 2003 to 2007, Ezike & Oke 
(2013) employed the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation technique to ascertain the effect 
of loans and advances, shareholders’ funds, total assets and customer deposits, on earnings 
per share and profit after tax. The results indicated that capital adequacy exerts a major 
influence on the performance of Nigerian banks. Additionally, they opined that regulatory 
authorities increased the minimum capital requirement in line with the Basel Accord 
framework recommendations, and the impact was positive. However, even though the 
recapitalization of Nigerian banks led to improved performance of Nigerian banks, Ezike & 
Oke (2013) suggested that regulatory authorities should look beyond capital regulation as the 
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sole determinant of bank performance. They opined that regulators should also concentrate 
on efficient and effective bank supervision and risk management.  
Olalekan & Adeyinka (2013) sought to ascertain the effect of capital adequacy on the 
profitability of deposit-taking banks in Nigeria. The study relied on primary data from a 76% 
of 518 questionnaire responses obtained from bank staff and secondary data from published 
financial statements of banks for the period of 2006 to 2010. The results from the analysis of 
the primary data revealed a non-significant relationship between capital adequacy and 
profitability of banks, whereas the analysis of secondary data indicated a positive and 
significant relationship. They opined that the results implied that capital adequacy plays a 
central role in the determination of profitability in the Nigerian banking sector. In 
furtherance, Olalekan & Adeyinka suggested that adequate capital in deposit taking banks 
serves to cushion them against losses not covered by current earnings. In addition, they 
opined that the increased capital levels of Nigerian banks after the 2005 recapitalization 
reforms also doubles as a confidence booster due to the renewed belief in the ability of banks 
by depositors, the public and Nigerian regulatory authorities. In conclusion, the study 
recommended that Nigerian regulatory authorities should ensure that the gains of banking 
reforms are sustained.  This can, therefore, be achieved by taking additional decisive 
measures aimed at tightening the risk management framework of banking institutions because 
of its positive effect on bank profitability. 
Ikpefan (2013) investigated the effect of capital adequacy on the management and 
performance of Nigerian commercial banks for the period of 1986 to 2006.The study tried to 
capture the relationship between bank capital and bank performance empirically. In essence, 
the study examined how capital adequacy and bank performance have been improved by the 
recapitalization exercise and the consolidation of the Nigerian banking sector. Using the 
ordinary least square regression method on a sample of fourteen (14) commercial Nigerian 
banks, the study indicated that the capital adequacy ratio adopted (shareholders’ funds/total 
assets) which measures the capital adequacy of banks (risk of default) has a negative effect 
on return on assets (ROA). Similarly, the study showed that the efficiency of management 
proxied by operating expenses is negatively related to return on capital (ROC). In a nutshell, 
Ikpefan (2013) suggested that the findings imply that adequate shareholder funds served as a 
stimulating variable in strengthening the performance of Nigerian banks in addition to 
heightening the confidence of depositors in the Nigerian financial system.                                     
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Zhao and Murinde (2011) developed a three-stage procedure to systematically investigate the 
interaction among variables that proxy financial reforms, bank production efficiency, bank 
risk-taking and bank competition. They applied the procedures to reform experience of the 
Nigerian-banking sector during the period 1993 – 2008. The study period covered both the 
deregulation and the regulation of the Nigerian banking sector. Based on results obtained 
through three modelling techniques (data envelopment analysis- DEA, conjectural variations- 
CV and seemingly unrelated regression- SUR), Zhao & Murinde suggested that deregulation 
and prudential regulation influence bank risk taking and bank efficiency directly as well as 
indirectly through the impact on bank competition. More so, their findings showed that 
deregulation initiatives offer banks the opportunity to price risk as well as diversify business 
lines, thus promoting both efficiency and the safety of bank’s loan portfolio. While the 
tightening of the minimum capital base (2005 banking consolidation reform) brought about 
increase in bank risk and bank efficiency. However, the increase in bank risk may offset the 
increase in bank efficiency. Unlike the impact of deregulation, Zhao & Murinde offered that 
the impact of tightening the minimum capital base on bank risk taking and bank efficiency 
appeared to be exclusively associated with its direct impact.  
Ozili (2015) empirically investigated the determinants of bank profitability in relation to the 
Basel capital regime. Using a sample of six Nigerian commercial banks within the period of 
2006 to 2013 in two panel data regression models, the study indicated that Basel Capital 
Regime had no significant effect on bank profitability. Ozili opined that the result is 
significant because it lends supports to the view that the adoption of the modified Basel 
Accord in different countries may be for the purpose of meeting other prudential objectives 
other than for the intended objective of reducing excessive bank risk-taking. Furthermore, 
Ozili (2015) employed the profitability metrics of ROA and NIM and found that the 
determinants of bank profitability and its significance depended largely on the employed 
profitability metric. And in addition, he asserted that bank size and cost efficiency 
significantly influences ROA, whereas the quality of loan influences bank interest margin. 
More so, Ozili observed that the capital adequacy ratio of banks is a significant determinant 
of bank profitability. However, in as much as the study by Ozili makes important 
contributions to the research of bank profitability in relation to the Basel capital accord, the 
limited number of sampled banks derails the reliability of the study.               
Oladejo (2010) in an exploratory study examined the effect of capital regulation on the 
performance of Nigerian banks. The study found out that scholars and major players in the 
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Nigerian banking industry highlighted upsurge in the performance of Nigerian banks in terms 
of increased liquidity and profitability. However, Oladejo noted that the banking 
consolidation exercise presented challenges that have been overshadowed by empirical 
findings that hail the increase in liquidity and profitability. As such he submitted that 
challenges occasioned by the consolidation reforms were observed in the areas of cultural 
integration, lax corporate governance structures, and information technology related issues 
due to the incompatibility of software packages amongst merging banks. Equally, Oladejo 
opined that low capital base was not the main reason for bank distress prior to the 2005 
banking recapitalization exercise. 
Dogarawa (2011) employed a content analysis technique to x-ray the implication of the 2005 
banking consolidation reforms on the Nigerian economy. He asserted that the Nigerian 
banking industry experienced boom-and-bust cycle periods that culminated in the banking 
consolidation reforms. The aim of which was to enable the banking sector play the efficient 
role of financial intermediation and in so doing help bolster economic growth and 
development. Conversely, Dogarawa opined that the reforms in the Nigerian banking 
industry had not achieved the desired objectives. He claimed that either this was because of 
the poor implementation or improper institutional arrangement or maybe the short span 
accorded to achieving the elements of the reforms. And as such, Dogarawa suggested that 
reforms should be backed by adequate legislation in view that they should be designed in line 
with the uniqueness of the Nigerian economy and the institutional behaviour of banking 
institutions. Furthermore, Dogarawa in agreement with the submissions of Oladejo (2010) 
opined that banks faced several challenges as a result of the banking consolidation reforms. 
The challenges surfaced in the areas of integration as merged banks found it difficult in 
assimilating disparate cultures, while the synchronisation of information technology 
processes and the harmonisation of systems and staff proved difficult.  
Given the studies reviewed, the empirical studies largely agree on the notion that the 2005 
banking reforms in general and the consolidation exercise, in particular, had positive effects 
on capital adequacy, liquidity and profitability. However, some suggested that improved 
performance occasioned by the episode of the banking reforms was short-term. On that 
account suggesting that regulation should transcend capital regulations to have a long-term 
impact on the performance of banking institutions. Additionally, the theoretical studies 
reviewed made assertions contrary to the glowing effects of the 2005 reforms made by the 
empirical studies. They held that the 2005 consolidation reforms presented challenges that 
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derailed the long-term performance and efficiency of Nigerian banks. In particular, the 
studies mentioned challenges that emanated from the strive to integrate disparate banking 
cultures, especially amongst merged banks. In addition, challenges also surfaced in the area 
of the synchronisation of information technology processes (banking software packages).  
Although there seems to be ample research on banking reforms in Nigeria, the studies mostly 
only address the effect of the 2005 banking reforms, while neglecting the 2009 banking 
reforms. More so, the studies are either empirical with the adoption of various regression 
models or theoretical with the employment of literature exploratory analysis and content 
analysis. Hence, no study has combined an array of techniques to ascertain the effect of 
banking reforms on the performance of Nigerian banks. To that end, this study fills this gap.            
 
3.13.2 Banking Performance and CAMELS Studies  
 
This section focuses on Nigerian banking studies that utilised bank-specific CAMELS 
variables to ascertain the performance of Nigerian DMBs. Most of the studies employed 
some form of multiple regression estimations to ascertain the factors that determine 
performance.   
Onaolapo & Ajala (2013) examined the post-merger performance of the Nigerian banking 
sector with the intention of determining the effect and extent to which mergers influenced 
bank performance. Bank performance ratios (ROE, ROA, and NIM) were adopted as 
dependent variables, while bank specific variables that proxy asset profit, capital structure, 
operating efficiency, liquidity risk, and credit risk stood in as independent variables. Multiple 
regression analysis was used to analyse the variables from 15 commercial banks within the 
period of 2001 – 2010. The results obtained revealed a strong relation between bank 
performance and merger. Thus, they asserted that the merger of Nigerian banks during the 
banking consolidation reforms positively influenced bank performance.       
Beck, Cull & Jerome (2005) sought to ascertain the effect of privatisation on the performance 
of Nigerian banks (1990 – 2001). Using an unbalanced panel of 69 banks and based on the 
empirical regression analysis, which adopted three performance measures (ROE, ROA, and 
NPL). The results obtained indicated some performance improvements due to privatisation. 
Elaborately, they found out that banks that were privatised within the 1990 – 2001 performed 
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significantly worse than privately owned commercial banks before privatisation, though this 
gap was effectively reduced by privatisation. However, according to Beck, Cull & Jerome, 
this slight improvement is notable given the inhospitable macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment that hindered true financial intermediation during their sample period. In 
addition, their results also provided evidence that long established banks that predominately 
relied on retail banking performed significantly more poorly than new wholesale banks that 
were fixated on fee-based businesses and lending to the government.      
Osuagwu (2014) empirically investigated the determinants of bank profitability in relation to 
bank-specific variables, industry related factors and macroeconomic variables. The dataset 
consisted of selected banks that hold about 60% of the banking sector’s total assets within the 
period of 1980 – 2010. The results suggested that bank profitability is to a large extent 
determined by credit risk and bank specific that relate to the internal organisation of banking 
institutions. In addition, the study opined that exchange rate is a significant determinant of 
bank profitability as revealed by its impact on return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin 
(NIM), although it did not have a significant effect on return on assets (ROA) as a measure of 
profitability. In conclusion, Osuagwu (2014) submitted that internal organisation and 
managerial effectiveness are significant to the profitability of banks and as such bank 
management could effectively rely on policies that improve their balance sheet positions 
without regard to external influences.     
Ugwuanyi (2015) in a post-financial crisis study sought to examine the interaction between 
the regulation of minimum capital requirements in Nigerian banks and the risk-taking 
behaviour of bank operators. The study regressed bank-level data of thirteen (13) banks for 
the sampled period of 2009 – 2013. The results obtained showed that increase in the size and 
capital levels of banks correspondingly lead to increased bank risk taking appetite. The 
results also suggested that an increase in credit risk leads to increased loan loss provisions. 
Conversely, Ugwuanyi opined that improved regulation translates to reduced risk taking 
appetite.   
More so, in a bid to position Nigerian banks to compete globally with international banks, 
Nigerian banks started adopting IFRS in 2010. To find out if improved financial information 
quality impacted the performance of Nigerian banks, Hassan (2015) investigated firm 
attributes from the perspective of structure, monitoring, performance elements and the quality 
of earnings of listed Nigerian banks in pre and post-adoption periods of IFRS. The results 
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revealed that banking institution attributes in the form of leverage, bank size, profitability, 
liquidity, and bank growth do have significant effects on earnings quality of listed Nigerian 
banks after the adoption of IFRS. Whereas, the firm’s attributes in the pre-IFRS period 
showed no significant impact on earnings quality. Hence, the study is of the notion that the 
adoption of the principles of IFRS should be encouraged to promote effective monitoring of 
banking institutions. 
Babatunde & Alawiye-Adams (2013) used the CAMEL analytical technique to measure Pre-
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Post-Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
performance of Nigerian banks (1971 – 2005). The panel data model they used adopted 
Earnings per Share (EPS), Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Return on Equity (ROE) 
as proxies for bank performance (dependent variables), while interest rate, real financial 
savings and exchange rates were adopted as proxies for financial sector liberalization 
(independent variables). Additionally, Babatunde & Alawiye-Adams conducted various 
diagnostic tests to evaluate the regression models (Breuch-Godfrey Serial Correlation 
Lagrange Multiplier test, Ramsey Reset Test of specification error, and the cumulative sum 
tests of parametric stability). The results, especially for the proxies of EPS and ROE, revealed 
that the effect of financial sector liberalisation on bank performance was not significant 
enough to transform the nations’ economy to the desired level. In sum, the results indicated 
that Nigerian banks were better off in the Pre-SAP era. As such, Babatunde & Alawiye-
Adams most importantly suggested that a precondition for an efficient banking sector in a 
liberalised financial sector is a stable macroeconomic environment.        
In a bid to provide empirical evidence on the effect of credit risk management and capital 
adequacy on the financial performance of Nigerian banks, Ogboi & Unuafe (2013) employed 
a fixed effect panel data technique on data from six Nigerian banks for the period of 2004 – 
2009. The regression model adopted estimated the relationship between loan loss provisions 
(LLP), loans and advances (LA), non-performing loans (NPL), capital adequacy (CA) and 
return on assets (ROA).  And the results obtained revealed that sound credit management and 
capital adequacy have positive effects on the financial performance of Nigerian banks aside 
loans and advances (LA), which displayed a negative effect on the profitability of banks 
within the study review period. In essence, Ogboi & Unuafe (2013) opined that effective 
credit risk management and capital adequacy promote improved bank performance and credit 
risk is a key predictor of bank performance. In addition, the Ogboi & Unuafe (2013) 
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concluded that the increased capital base of Nigerian banks scaled down the effect of the 
global financial crisis on the Nigerian banking sector.      
Adeyeye, Fajembola, Olopete & Adedeji (2012) attempted to predict the probability of bank 
failure in Nigeria by adopting the principal component analysis and the discriminant score 
model. The results suggested that differences in asset quality, capital adequacy levels, 
liquidity and profitability are key distinguishing characteristics between failed and healthy 
banks. On the contrary, the study opined that management quality, economic quality and staff 
productivity are not significant predictors of financial distress in Nigerian banks, although 
they might have some sway in repositioning banks that are facing difficulties.  
Ajibo (2015) in an exploratory research expressed that recurrent distress and failures in the 
Nigerian banking industry have shown that the predominant reliance on recapitalization and 
credit rating statistics by regulators and investors to determine the soundness of institutions is 
less than adequate. While not dismissing the relevance of capitalization strategy and credit 
rating data, Ajibo opined that the future of banking regulation in Nigeria should be risk-based 
regulation. As such, he suggested that risk-based supervision should be made a priority by 
regulatory agencies in Nigeria, in addition to the adoption of Base II/III accords that lay 
emphasis on risk regulation and management.   
Conclusively, though the studies above examined different dimensions of bank performance 
none of them employed variables that covered the entire spectrum of CAMELS to review the 
impact of both the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms. More so, in line with the previous section 
of this thesis, the focus of most of the studies was the recapitalisation exercises carried out by 
Nigerian regulators. Additionally, there was no consensus on the factors that influenced bank 
performance with different studies presenting diverse views on capital adequacy levels, 
liquidity, management quality, asset quality, and macroeconomic conditions. In like manner, 
the literature also opined that Nigerian DMBs that depended on government patronage and 
corporate customers outperformed DMBs that relied on retail and small customers, however 
recent reforms sought to reduce the reliance of DMBs on government funds. To that end, this 
study evaluates the performance of Nigerian DMBs in relation to the elements of the last two 
Nigerian banking reforms. In conjunction to relying on the CAMELS framework to ascertain 
the determinants of bank performance, this study is different from all other Nigerian banking 
studies because it also reviews the impact of the global financial crisis. Therefore, this study 
contributes extensively to banking literature in emerging economies.         
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3.13.3 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Studies  
 
Several studies in recent times have employed the use of DEA to evaluate bank efficiency 
and performance world over. However, only a handful of these studies dwell on Nigerian 
DMBs. This section, therefore, reviews these studies with the view of further highlighting the 
suitability of the DEA technique in ascertaining banking efficiency and performance.    
Eriki & Osagie (2014) used DEA analysis to examine the performance efficiency of nineteen 
(19) commercial banks in Nigeria for the year 2009. They made use of two inputs (total 
assets and equity) and two outputs (interest income and gross earnings). The DEA results 
were based on three performance measures, the constant return to scale (CRS); variable 
returns to scale (VRS); and scale efficiency (SE). Out of the nineteen (19) banks in the 
sample, the CRS DEA model showed that only four (4) banks were efficient. Whereas based 
on the VRS technical efficiency scores, eight (8) banks were found to be efficient, while 
results revealed eleven (11) inefficient banks. Likewise, an examination of the scale 
efficiency (SE) of the banks revealed that only four (4) were scale efficient while fifteen (15) 
were found to be scale inefficient. In summary Eriki & Osagie (2014), found out that the 
small and medium-sized banks in the Nigerian banking industry were more efficient than 
megabanks.  
Muhammad (2008) utilised the DEA and Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) to analyse the 
performance of Nigerian commercial banks over a five (5) year period. Following the 
intermediation approach, net fixed assets and total deposits were used as input variables, 
whereas the output variables used were total loans and advances, other earning assets and 
operating income. The inputs and output variables were used to analyse both the CRS and 
VRS approaches. And according to Muhammad (2008), the utilisation of the CRS and VRS 
approach was anchored on the desire to measure bank performance based on changes in 
efficiency and changes in technology. The study showed that the CRS and the VRS of the 
banks revealed continuous improvement. More so, the results on the average indicated that 
the banks consistently improved within the five-year period although the improvement in the 
third year under review appeared lower than in the other years. In addition, the study 
compared the performance of Nigerian banks across two ownership structures (state-owned 
banks and private owned banks). The results indicated that the privately owned banks 
performed better than the state-owned banks. He pointed out that the efficiency scores of the 
82 
 
privately owned banks were closer to 1 (100) or the best practice frontier. Additionally, to 
further verify the differences in the efficiency scores of the private and state-owned banks, 
the study measured the statistical significance of the banks using the one-sample Kolmogorov 
– Smirnov test. The results indicated that the differences in efficiency scores were statistically 
significant.  
Olugbenga & Olankunle (1998) provide the first evidence on the use of the DEA in the 
Nigerian banking industry. Their study sought to analyse the performance of Nigerian banks 
within an 11-year period (1983 – 1993). The sample of 278 banks comprised of commercial 
and merchant banks. However, the sample contained twenty (20) commercial banks before 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 and 35 commercial banks afterwards. 
The input variables used in the study consisted total deposits, interest paid on deposits, total 
capital and overhead costs, while the outputs variables included gross earnings and earning 
assets. The results of the average efficiency measures indicated stable efficiency levels 
among banks in periods leading to the introduction of the 1986 SAP. Progressively, the study 
suggested that the efficiency levels of the Nigerian banking industry witnessed a major 
upward surge between 1986 and 1987. Olugbenga and Olankunle opined that the upward 
surge was most probably due to the effect of the economy-wide deregulation, which affected 
the entire banking industry. The entire banking industry witnessed a decline in efficiency 
levels for the five-year period that followed (1987 – 1991). However, the banking industry 
started showed signs of recovery in periods after 1991.  
The study by Ayadi et al., (1998) is another DEA study on Nigerian banks. The study 
represented an attempt to determine the bank performance and the efficiency of bank 
management by employing the use of the DEA model. Their study used a sample of ten (10) 
commercial and Nigerian merchant banks that were listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
The inputs used include total deposits, interest paid on deposits, and expenses on personnel 
and administration. While the output variables consisted of interest income, non-interest 
income, and total loans. The results of the study revealed that of the ten (10) commercial and 
merchant banks, only three (3) banks were efficient in 1991. In the same line, two (2) banks 
were efficient in 1992, and three (3) banks were found to be efficient in 1993. However, the 
results indicated that there was a decline in efficiency levels and only one bank was efficient. 
Owing to the results, Ayadi et al., (1998) suggested that bank supervision in the industry was 
weak and many of the sampled banks should have been identified by Nigerian bank 
regulators and appropriately liquidated. They, however, recommended that the banking 
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industry could be sanitised by improving banking supervision and by removing government 
interference.                                   
Akeem & Moses (2014) empirically analysed commercial banks in the periods of 2002 to 
2011 to ascertain efficiency, productivity, and growth. They used a sample of ten (10) 
randomly selected commercial banks. The three (3) input variables used include deposits, 
assets and operating expenses, while the four (4) output variables used were loans and 
advances, interest income, non-interest income, and investment. The results showed that 
seven (7) of the banks analysed were to some extent efficient and had a consistency in their 
performance. Over the ten (10) years of their study, the average allocative efficiency score of 
the sampled banks was found to be 0.896. Additionally, the results meant that the sampled 
banks did not efficiently maximise their inputs in the magnitudes that would minimise costs. 
More so, Akeem and Moses opined that the inefficiency in the sampled banks might be due 
to higher non-interest and administrative expenses, rising levels of interest rates, poor 
investment strategies, rising competition in the banking industry and the less competitive 
managerial services offered to bank customers at higher input prices.  
Obafemi (2012) used DEA to ascertain the technical efficiency of Nigerian banks. The study 
made use of sixty-seven (67) commercial and merchant banks in the periods of 1984/1985, 
1994/1995, 1999/2000, and 2003/2004. Obafemi claimed that the deregulation of the 
Nigerian banking industry had a mixed effect on the efficiency of Nigerian banks. He was of 
the view that the efficiency scores of some banks were continuously on the increase, while 
some were continuously decreasing, and the third group had inconsistent efficiency scores. 
Obafemi (2012) was also of the opinion that efficiency scores of privately owned banks were 
better than those owned by the government. It is worth noting that, the periods covered in this 
study are before the two (2) Nigerian banking reforms of 2005 and 2009. Thus, Obafemi 
suggested that based on the technical efficiency scores of the sampled banks, the banking 
consolidation reforms embarked upon by the CBN was not wrong. He opined that the 2005 
banking consolidation reform weeded out inefficient banks from the banking system, thus 
ensuring that bank resources were better used by banks that are more efficient.  
Likewise, Obafemi, Ayodele, & Ebong (2013) in their study employed a two-stage DEA 
approach to examine technical efficiency in Nigerian commercial and merchant banks. In the 
first stage DEA model, the study generated efficiency scores, which were regressed against a 
set of explanatory variables in the second stage. The results they presented were consistent 
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with those presented by Obafemi (2012) above. Even though they added that market share 
and liquidity ratio were positively related to bank efficiency and were statistically significant. 
Capital-labour ratio was found to be negatively correlated to bank efficiency, even though it 
was significant at 10%. More so, the quality of management, capital adequacy and ownership 
were found to be positively related to bank efficiency but no significant. Due to been a 
retrospective study of bank performance and efficiency covering periods before the banking 
consolidation reforms of 2005. They submitted that the Nigerian banking industry was 
inefficient before the banking consolidation reform of 2005 and that the 2009 banking reform 
that aimed to reform bank management practices and corporate governance was a step in the 
right direction. 
Tankoano (2013) compared the efficiency and productivity of Burkina Faso and Nigerian 
banks around the 2008 global financial crisis. Based on a sample of thirty-three (33) banks, 
he used the DEA window Analysis and the Malmquist Productivity Index Approach to assess 
the efficiency and productivity of the banks from 2004 – 2011. A three-year period was 
selected for the study and the eight-year period allowed for six (6) windows. The study made 
use of two variable inputs (interest expenses and non-interest expenses) and two output 
variables (Interest income and non-interest income). Tankoano (2013) suggested that both the 
Burkina Faso and Nigerian banking industries were affected by the global financial crisis. 
Although the efficiency of the Burkina Faso Banks improved after the global financial crisis, 
the Nigerian banks did not witness improvements because of the banking crisis that plagued 
the Nigerian banking industry in 2009 and 2010. Tankoano additionally opined that foreign 
banks in both countries performed better than local banks. He also was of the view that based 
on the results of the DEA CCR and BCC models during and after the global the crisis, the 
average efficient scores of Nigerian banks were higher than those of Burkina Faso banks.   
Finally, a review of the studies in this section indicates the study by Tankoano (2013) is the 
only study that utilised the DEA window analysis. Moreover, the study by Tankoano is a 
comparative study of the Burkina Faso and Nigerian banking sectors. Apart from the lack of 
DEA window analysis studies, the period x-rayed in this study differs from all those reviewed 
by the studies in this section. More so, these Nigerian studies concentrated on ascertaining the 
efficiency and performance of Nigerian DMBs and recently the global financial crisis without 
exploring financial safety nets (bailouts and bridge banking mechanisms). Furthermore, DEA 
analysis was not utilised to predict banking distress in the Nigerian banking sector. On that 
account, DEA window analysis results are evaluated to uncover if they could be used to 
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predict banking distress. In conclusion, this study is particularly more exploratory because it 
utilises the DEA analysis to evaluate the performance and efficiency of DMBs in relation to 
the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms, the bailout of eight DMBs, and the 
nationalisation of three DMBs into bridge banks.     
 
3.14 Chapter Conclusion    
 
This chapter discussed and reviewed various facets of literature on banking regulation and 
supervision, the rationale for regulation, capital regulation/recapitalisation, and banking 
consolidation. Policy responses and reactions to the global financial crisis were also 
considered. The chapter also presented literature on financial safety nets with a particular 
focus on bank bailouts and bridge banking mechanism because they were utilised by Nigerian 
regulators to prevent the collapse of distressed DMBs. The central objective of both the 2005 
and 2009 Nigerian reforms was to promote financial stability, hence the review of banking 
and financial stability literature. To that end, studies that are related to the methodologies 
adopted to ascertain the determinants of efficiency, performance, and financial stability were 
also discussed within this chapter. Evidence showed divergent opinions on the factors that 
determine bank efficiency, performance, and financial stability, hence the rationale for this 
study. More so, arguments that show the limitations of banking literature in the areas of 
interest in relation to the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms were also highlighted in 
the concluding paragraphs of every section of this chapter. To round-up the chapter, Nigerian 
banking studies were presented with particular focus on the methodologies adopted in this 
study. The reviewed studies indicate the adoption of mostly one or two methodologies in the 
evaluation of banking performance. Therefore, this study is highly robust and exploratory as 
it incorporates DEA window analysis, multiple regression analysis and content analysis to 
examine the Nigerian banking sector from 2000 – 2013.  
 
 
  
86 
 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Any research should adopt the appropriate guidelines and procedures to be able to achieve the 
desired outcome. To this end, this chapter dwells on the systematic framework that this 
research followed in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the study. 
This study examines the effects of banking reforms on the performance, efficiency, and 
stability of Nigerian deposit money banks. Interview responses, in addition to annual 
financial stability reports and annual reports from the CBN and NDIC, are used to evaluate 
the activities of bank managements and regulatory authorities. The performance and 
efficiency of Nigerian banks are gauged using the DEA window analysis technique based on 
selected input and output variables. While multiple regression analysis is employed to 
ascertain the effects of capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning ability, 
liquidity, sensitivity to market risk, bank size and GDP on bank efficiency, bank 
performance, and banking stability. Thus the focus of this chapter will be on the description 
of the processes adopted to answer the research questions in order to achieve the aims and 
objectives of the study.  
This chapter focuses on the research methodology and the procedures employed in 
conducting this study. Research methodology is the exposition of the guiding principles that 
comprise of the systematic data collection and interpretation of data, geared towards 
uncovering logical relationships that lead to valid conclusions (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2010; 
Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016). With a view to give direction to this study, this research 
methodology chapter is a sequential presentation of the array of choices, paradigms, data 
collection methods, techniques of data analysis and the entire process navigated by the 
researcher in order to provide answers to the research questions and realise the aims and 
objectives of the study.  
In sum, this chapter dwells on the research framework adopted to achieve the aims and 
objectives of this study. The research philosophy, research approach, research strategy, 
methods of data collection, techniques used for data analysis and testing, the validity and 
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reliability of the study and constraints that were encountered in solving the research 
problems. 
In order to ensure a sequential flow of the discussion of the procedures employed in 
conducting this research, the scope of the study is presented to lay the foundation for further 
deliberations. The scope of the study highlights the time frame of the study and the 
institutions involved. 
 
4.2 Scope of Study 
 
The Nigerian banking sector is regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). The CBN and NDIC are the 
two main regulatory authorities in Nigeria, and they are saddled with the task of safeguarding 
the banking industry and ensuring the efficiency and soundness of banking institutions. The 
CBN and NDIC oversee the activities of commercial banks, merchant banks, micro-finance 
banks and mortgage banks operating in Nigeria. Nonetheless, only banks termed as Deposit 
Money Banks (DMBs) by the Nigerian banking regulatory authorities are examined in this 
study. Deposit money banks in the Nigerian banking sector include only commercial and 
merchant banks. Additionally, some commercial banks either acquired or merged with the 
merchant banks, and for that reason, all the banks that survived the banking consolidation 
reforms of 2005 operate under commercial banking licences. In broad terms, this study 
examines the impact of the activities of the CBN and NDIC on the efficiency and 
performance of DMBs in Nigeria. Hence, the institutions of focus are the CBN, NDIC and 
Nigerian Deposit Money Banks. 
The efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian DMBs are examined over a period of 
fourteen years (2000 – 2013). This period is chosen by virtue of the events that transpired in 
the Nigerian banking industry and the world. In view of the Nigerian banking sector, the 
banking system went through two banking reforms that changed the landscape of the 
industry. The Nigerian banking sector went through the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms 
within a period of five years. More so, Nigerian regulators bailed-out eight DMBs in 2009, 
and adopted the bridge banking model to resolve three (3) distressed banks in 2011. While in 
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general, the global financial crisis that affected global economies and financial institutions 
started in the second half of 2007. 
In conjunction with the above, the periods before the 2005 banking reforms (i.e. 2000 – 2004) 
are examined in order to present a robust picture of the Nigerian banking sector before the 
consolidation exercise that trimmed down the number of banking institutions. In like manner, 
the period 2010 – 2013 is included in the study to evaluate how the banks fared after the 
global financial crisis and the 2009 banking reforms. 
 
4.3 Research Philosophy 
 
One significant and initial aspect of the research process is the research philosophy. Research 
philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge in 
relation to research (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). The philosophical position of the researcher 
influences the way in which the entire research process is conducted. Thus the research 
philosophy highlights the researcher’s perspective of the study, the variables adopted, the 
relationships uncovered, influencing factors, and the desired outcome. The philosophical 
choice of the researcher also defends the position taken in relation to the alternatives that 
could have been adopted. 
It is important to examine the philosophical issues in research because it enables the 
researcher to evaluate research critically. A review of the philosophy adopted is essential to 
discern the fundamental and conceivable contentious, assumptions upon which research 
reports are established even when these are not explicit, and therefore to be able to examine 
the aptness of the methods that have been utilized and the validity of the conclusions reached 
(Walliman, 2009). Research philosophy covers the entire research and includes distinct and 
significant assumptions concerning the study. It expresses the philosophical stand of the 
researcher in relation to the nature of reality, what is acceptable knowledge and values in 
research. The research philosophy also dwells on the research strategy and the methods the 
researcher adopts. Nonetheless, before individual philosophical standpoints are presented, 
this study aligns with Saunders et al (2009) who opines that no research is superior in relation 
to the other. They hold that it is, however, crucial to select the most appropriate philosophy or 
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philosophies that will assist in providing a valid conclusion to the research aims and 
objectives. 
According to Saunders and Lewis (2012), the main strands of research philosophy are 
positivism, realism, interpretivism, and pragmatism. 
 
4.3.1 Positivism 
 
Positivism or the positivist approach is an epistemological position that supports the 
application of natural scientific methods to the study of social sciences (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). The positivist approach entails collecting data around an observable reality and 
searching for regularities and casual relationships in data to build law-like generalizations 
like those produced by scientists (Myers, 2013). Positivist research generally assumes that 
reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are 
independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments. The theory of knowledge 
according to positivists excludes evidence such as emotions, personal insight and opinion 
(Henning, Rensburg & Smit, 2004). Simply put, positivism aims to describe an experience or 
test a theory through observation and measurement (O’Leary, 2004). The Positivist 
philosophy accepts that the growth of knowledge is to all intents and purposes a cumulative 
process in which new insight is added to the existing stock of knowledge. Positivist research 
is most commonly associated with quantitative methods of data collection and analysis 
(Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). However, positivists hold that observation through the senses 
must also be tested through the senses. 
 
4.3.2 Realism 
 
Realism as a research philosophy holds that objects exist independently of our knowledge of 
their existence. Just like positivism, realism relates to scientific inquiry (Saunders and Lewis, 
2012). Scientific experiments are conducted specifically considering the open character of the 
world where events are subject to several casual variations. In natural sciences, the idea of 
experiments is to create closed systems by creating the appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic 
conditions in order that regular sequences of events may occur in the empirical domain. 
90 
 
Realism lays emphasis on experimentation just like positivism, even though it disagrees with 
the possibility of generalizing experimental findings because of  the nature of reality that is 
stratified and dynamic consisting of  underlying contingent structures (Bechara & Van de 
Ven, 2007). Positivism relies on the regular sequence of events generated under controlled 
experimental conditions contingent upon the Humean conception of causality. While realism, 
on the other hand, regards experiments in the light of providing ideal conditions for the study 
of mechanisms (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Tsang, 2014). Realism as a philosophy offers a 
methodology that neither pursues the particular nor the general, instead it measures casual 
relationships in the core of the object of study, in accordance with processes or structure and 
mechanisms. These powers are activated in accordance with the contingent relations or 
contextual conditions that are peculiar to the object. The advantage of this philosophical view 
is its ability to engage with causality and complexity in context (Smyth & Morris, 2007). 
 
4.3.3 Interpretivism 
 
Interpretivism aims at understanding the world of human experience and it is the view that 
reality is socially constructed (Cohen & Manion, 1994, Mertens, 2005). It understands 
phenomena through the context that people assign to these phenomena. (Trauth,2001). 
Interpretivists assume that individuals have inner capabilities that stimulate agency. They also 
believe that cause and effect are mutually interdependent and that achieving complete 
objectivity is difficult. Interpretivism holds that an understanding of individual circumstances 
is ideal and should be held over predictive generalizations. Interpretivists opine that the world 
is constituted of multifaceted realities that are best studied from the perspective of different 
individuals. They are also of the view that inquiry is always swayed by the researcher's 
values (Naidoo, 2011). In sum, the interpretivist approach relies on the views of the 
participants in a study. Consequently, it is the presumption that the background and 
experiences of participants’ impact on the research. Interpretivists inductively develop 
theories or patterns of meaning throughout the research process. This is a deviation from the 
positivist approach which begins with a theory. Interpretivism is largely subject to qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis; however, it sometimes combines both qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). 
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4.3.4 Pragmatism 
 
Each philosophy of science above presents its unique problem (ontology), the means of 
knowing the problem (epistemology), the methods for explaining or understanding the 
problem, and the model for evaluating solutions. Consequent on these different outcomes, the 
dilemma exists on which direction researchers should pursue. An alternative is the adoption 
of a philosophy that is not committed to any particular paradigm or reality but at the same 
time relies on all. The pragmatic paradigm or philosophy focuses on using common or 
convergent outcomes from each perspective (Bechara & Van de Ven, 2015). Pragmatists 
engage in triangulation which refers to the use of multiple data sources, theories and methods.  
They focus on the “what” and “how” of the research problem (Creswell, 2009; Mackenzie & 
Knipe, 2006). Early Pragmatists were of the notion that social inquiry is not only likely to 
present the truth about real world situations by relying on a single scientific method (Mertens, 
2005). Pragmatism hinges on the procedure for establishing the convergent and discriminant 
validity of measures (Bechara & Van de Ven, 2015). The triangulation of philosophies or 
paradigms assumes that the bias inherent in any particular method, theory, or data source will 
be eliminated, or minimized, by relying on the convergent information from the diverse 
methods and approaches (Mathison, 1988). Thus, pragmatism is perceived as the approach 
that offers the underlying philosophical framework for research combining both qualitative 
and quantitative methods – mixed methods (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006; Somekh & Lewin, 
2005). However, although mixed methods can be used in any paradigm, “the research 
problem” is cardinal in the pragmatic paradigm and it applies all approaches to understanding 
the problem (Creswell & Plano-Clerk, 2011). Most importantly, pragmatist employs the use 
of multiple data collection methods to best answer the research question. The pragmatic 
approach allows the collection of qualitative and quantitative data from various sources with 
a singular focus on the practical implications of the research. In sum, it emphasizes the 
importance of steering research that best addresses the research problem (Creswell, 2015). 
Consequently, for the reason that this study does not limit itself to any particular paradigm 
and it resorts to the triangulation of data collection methods and analysis, it can be discerned 
that this study leans towards the pragmatic paradigm. This study adopts pragmatism because 
of its flexibility and its ability to allow the triangulation of philosophies, data collection 
sources, and methods of analysis. Pragmatism is problem-centred and its application ensures 
that data obtained and methods of data analysis are specifically chosen with the singular 
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purpose of providing answers to the research questions in order to achieve the aims and 
objectives of the study. 
 
4.4 Research Approach 
 
Research approach can be divided into two main groups: deductive and inductive (Saunders 
et al, 2012). There also exists a third research approach called abduction, which sways 
between deduction and induction (Saunders et al, 2012; Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
The deductive approach is known as theory testing, where the researcher develops a theory or 
hypothesis, and designs a research strategy to test the formulated theory (Saunders et al, 
2012). According to Ang (2014), the deduction approach is theoretically driven. It starts with 
the establishment of relationships between concepts with the aid of theories. These theories 
are then narrowed down to unambiguous hypotheses. Consecutively, the generated 
hypotheses are then tested using data. The test will reveal if the designed hypotheses are 
supported or not, before conclusions and implications are derived from the obtained results. 
The simple diagram below illustrates the flow of the deductive approach. 
 
Figure 4.1: Deductive Approach 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the inductive approach is known as a building procedure, where data is 
collected and analyzed to understand the research phenomenon in an attempt to develop a 
theory (Saunders et al, 2012). The inductive approach is grounded on observations that seek 
to explain what was observed.  Inductive researchers make observations and attempt to 
uncover patterns from these observations. Propositions and hypotheses are formulated to aid 
in explaining what was observed. And in line with the formulated hypotheses, conclusions, 
and a theoretical framework are established. More so, the inductive approach attempts to 
make broader conclusions based only on a part of the evidence. The strength of the 
Observations Hypotheses Theory 
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generalizations that emerge from indicative reasoning is dependent on the extent of coverage 
of the observations and the number of observations. To be concise, the validity of the 
inductive approach is fortified as the number, scope, and diversity of observations increase 
(Ang, 2014). The diagram below is a simple illustration of the inductive approach. 
 
Figure 4.2: Inductive Approach 
 
 
 
 
However, it is essential to note that even though the deductive and inductive approaches are 
mutually exclusive, they are often used simultaneously (abduction). Abduction has grown in 
popularity in business research and in other social scientific disciples. Abduction, just like the 
deductive and inductive approaches is used to make logical inferences and build theories. It is 
proposed as a way of navigating through the limitations associated with the deductive and 
inductive approaches. In particular, the deductive approach is subject to a strict logic of 
theory-testing and the fabrication of hypotheses; however, problems emerge because the path 
of selecting theories to be tested is usually obscure. Also, the shortcoming of the inductive 
approach stems from the reproach that no amount of empirical data will certainly enable 
theory-building. Hence, the abductive approach is proposed to overcome the limitations of 
deduction and induction (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Abduction starts with a dilemma or surprise and then seeks to explain it. Issues or dilemmas 
may arise when researchers run into empirical phenomena which existing theory cannot 
account for. Abduction, therefore, seeks to identify the conditions that would make the 
phenomenon less of a mystery, while also turning the surprising facts into a matter of course. 
This process entails going back and forth with the engagement of the social world as an 
empirical source for theoretical ideas, as well as literature, in a bid to promote analytic 
shuttling. In brief, the abduction approach involves selecting the most appropriate 
explanation from an array of competing explanations or interpretations of obtained data 
(Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013; Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Hypotheses Theory Observations 
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According to Fann (1970), Charles Pierce (1839-1914) who is viewed as the father of 
abduction was of the opinion that abduction is based on the pragmatist philosophy. More so, 
the pragmatic approach relies on abductive reasoning that seesaws between induction and 
deduction by converting observations into theories and subsequently assessing the theories 
through action (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Collins, 2011).  
Consequent on the adoption of the pragmatic philosophy in this study, this study also seesaws 
between deduction and induction in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the study. To 
be specific, the evaluation of the performance of DMBs with particular reference to the 
banking reforms of 2005 and 2009 is deduction. While seeking to understand what happened 
in the Nigerian banking sector during the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, in order to make 
recommendations that enhance bank performance and efficiency and promote financial 
stability in the Nigerian banking sector is induction. In effect, this study incorporates 
deduction and induction, and as such it adopts the abduction approach. 
 
4.5 Research Strategy 
 
In line with the combination of the deductive and inductive research approaches, this study 
adopts a mixed method strategy. That is the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
methods of data collection and analysis. The mixed method strategy essentially entails the 
incorporation of qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation in a single study (Ang, 
2014; Bryman & Bell, 2015). Additionally, a mixed method research strategy involves the 
collation of both numeric and text information so that the final database embodies both 
quantitative and qualitative information (Creswell, 2015). Another definition advanced by 
Johnson et al (2007) holds that mixed methods research combines the elements of 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches (for instance, use of quantitative and 
qualitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the all-expansive 
purpose of breadth and depth of understanding and authentication (Johnson et al , 2007; 
Carayon et al, 2015). 
Qualitative data and analysis involve the description of phenomena and text, while 
quantitative data involves numbers and categories, where statistical methods are employed to 
describe phenomena. Even though mixed methods research implies the triangulation of 
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qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis, both methods can be 
exclusively employed (Howe, 2012). 
Several scholars have made submissions to the advantages of mixed methods research. 
Denzin (1978) opined that the triangulation of the methods leads to the elimination of bias 
inherent in any particular data source and any innate bias will be cancelled out when various 
data sources and methods are utilized. Progressively, Jick (1979) was of the view that 
triangulation allows researchers to be more confident of their finding and results; encourages 
the development of creative ways of gathering data; leads to thicker and richer data; leads to 
integration or unification of theories; may lead to the unearthing of contradictions; and it may 
serve as a litmus test for opposing theories. More so, Greene, Caracelli, & Graham (1989) 
offered five rationales: (a) triangulation – seeking convergence and confirmation of different 
results from various methods studying the same phenomenon; (b) complementarity – in 
search of elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the results from one 
method to help inform the other method; (c) development – utilizing the findings from one 
method to help inform the other method; (d) initiation – developing paradoxes and 
contradictions that result in the reframing of the research question; (e) expansion – seeking to 
expand the scope and range of inquiry by using various methods for different inquiry 
components. 
The above highlight the advantages of the mixed research method and they reinforce the 
choice of the researcher to adopt it for this study. However, even though mixed methods 
research is full of numerous advantages because of its complementary nature, it also has 
some disadvantages. For one, conducting mixed methods research is not easy (Creswell, 
2015). It requires a lot more work and financial resources and tends to take additional time. 
The combination of strategies extends the time frame for research design, data collection, and 
analysis (Denscombe, 2010). More so, the researcher needs to develop a broader array of 
skills that spans both qualitative and quantitative research. This increases the demands on the 
researcher and advances the possibility of missing the mark on both fronts (Denscombe, 
2010; Cameron & Price, 2010).  Furthermore, the underlying philosophy of mixed methods 
research “pragmatism” is vulnerable to misinterpretation. The common sense of the word 
“pragmatic” suggests expediency and a certain lack of principles underlying a course of 
action. Hence, the possibility exists that mixed methods research is often times mistaken to 
the extent it is perceived as “anything goes”. Moreover, results from different methods might 
not corroborate each other, which may force the researcher to extend the study in order to 
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unravel reasons for this (Denscombe, 2010). Notwithstanding the disadvantages of the mixed 
methods research, the advantages of adopting both qualitative and quantitative methods 
downplay the disadvantages of adopting both methods. 
Conversely, Denscombe (2014) articulated the purpose of mixed methods research which 
downplays its disadvantages and is also the reason for the employment of the mixed method 
research in this study. Denscombe (2014) reviewed several mixed methods research and 
suggested that: 
 Some researchers employ the use of the mixed method strategy to improve the 
accuracy of data; 
 Mixed methods is employed to produce a more thorough representation by combining 
information from complementary types and sources of data; 
 Mixed methods are also utilized as a means of circumventing biases intrinsic to 
single-method strategies, as a way of compensating for strengths and weaknesses 
associated with individual methods. 
 Mixed methods are used as a way of developing the analysis process and building on 
a preliminary finding by using different types of data or methods. 
Therefore, consequent on the above and in addition to the views expressed by Myers (2013) 
and Saunders et al (2012), the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods is adopted 
in this study to overcome the weaknesses associated with using one method, and provide the 
scope for richer data collection, analysis and interpretation. 
Finally, in view of the peculiarity of this study, the mixed methods approach is employed to 
obtain primary information from bank regulators and bank executives that complement the 
financial figures of deposit money banks (DMBs). Even though the financial figures utilized 
in this study cover the periods Nigerian DMBs went through the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms and the global financial crisis periods, interview responses were obtained from 
professionals who are players in the Nigerian banking sector.  Bank regulators were involved 
in initiating the reforms and supervising DMBs through the global financial crisis, while bank 
executives implemented the reforms and initiated internal control practices to mitigate risk 
and manage the effects of the global financial crisis on individual DMBs. The use of 
statistical models in this study eliminates the bias usually ascribed to qualitative interview 
data because of its great level of human involvement. Therefore, the use of qualitative and 
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quantitative techniques in this study ensures that they compensate for the strengths and 
weaknesses of the individual techniques. Lastly, the use of content analysis, DEA window 
analysis, and regression analysis in a single study is exploratory as this study has so far been 
unable to find another study based on the Nigerian banking sector that utilized the same 
techniques. 
 
4.6 Methods of Data Collection 
 
The qualitative and quantitative data utilized in this study were obtained from a wide variety 
of sources. Qualitative data was obtained from primary and secondary sources, while 
quantitative data was acquired from a secondary database. 
 
4.6.1 Primary Data (Interview Process) 
 
Saunders and Lewis (2012) describe primary data as data collected explicitly for the research 
project being undertaken. To that effect, primary data was obtained through face-to-face 
interviews and Skype interviews. Interviews are referred to as ‘conversation with purpose’ 
(Cameron & Price, 2009). An interview is a two-way conversation initiated by an interviewer 
to obtain information from an interviewee or participant (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 
2014). The differences in the roles of the interviewer and interviewee or participant are 
pronounced. Ordinarily, the interviewer controls the topics and patterns of discussion. The 
interview technique allows the researcher or interviewer to steer conversations in directions 
suggested by responses, in order to prompt and probe, explore meanings and in the long run 
generate rich qualitative information (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Cameron & 
Price, 2009; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
In relation to this study, the interview technique was employed in order to obtain up-to-date 
information from participants as quantitative data mostly offers only historical data. 
Interviews offer flexibility, informality, and interactivity. The flexibility of the technique 
ensured that the questions asked were designed to meet and match the researchers’ 
specifications. This study also adopted this method in a bid to obtain in-depth information 
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bordering on regulation and supervision, in addition to the perception of experienced players 
in the Nigerian banking sector. 
While secondary data and the quantitative analysis was able to capture financial data from 
almost all the banks that existed in the Nigerian banking industry from 2000 – 2013, the 
interview technique was only able to solicit responses from the surviving deposit money 
banks and the two main regulatory agencies in the Nigerian banking industry. Although it 
was the desire of the researcher to obtain responses from a total of twenty-three individuals, 
one from each deposit money bank and one each from the regulatory authorities, only a total 
of seventeen individuals were interviewed. That is, fifteen senior bank managers from fifteen 
different DMBs were interviewed, in addition to the director of banking supervision from the 
CBN and a senior research officer from NDIC. It is, however, worth noting that the response 
from the director of banking supervision was received as a PDF attachment via email, as 
access for a face-to-face interview was not sanctioned. 
However, before data was collected, approval was sought from the University of Salford 
Research Ethics Committee. Ethical approval (Appendix 3) was obtained on May 14, 2014, 
to embark on field study. Data collection involved face-to-face interviews; hence, the 
researcher had to travel to Nigeria in June 2014. The Interviewer (Researcher) spent a total of 
three months (July – September) in Nigeria.  In order to gain access to the appropriate 
personnel and obtain relevant information, official letters were delivered by the researcher to 
the head offices of all the organizations involved in the study. Follow-up telephone calls were 
also made and those that responded were interviewed. The entire month of July 2014 was 
spent on the delivery of interview access letters and making the follow-up calls. The entire 
process was cumbersome as some phone calls to gain access were not returned and some 
DMBs did not grant the required access. A total of 12 interview responses were obtained by 
the end of September 2014. 10 interviews were obtained from the DMBs and 2 from the 
banking regulators. Apart from the written response to the interview questions from the CBN 
directorate of banking supervision, the other 11 interviews were conducted face-to-face.    
Furthermore, the 12 interviews collected during the fieldwork in Nigeria were inadequate to 
draw conclusions. On this account, the researcher relied on Skye calls to increase the number 
of interview participants. These additional 5 interviews were conducted within the span of 6 
months (January – June 2015). To that end, a total of 17 interviews were conducted as at the 
end of June 2015. Persistent calls to further increase the number of interview responses did 
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not receive favourable feedback. Hence, the content analysis of qualitative data relied on the 
interview responses of 15 senior bank managers and 2 senior bank regulators. A sample of 
the official letter presented to gain access in shown in appendix (Appendix 4). 
Additionally, the interview questions were largely “open-ended” in order to generate in-depth 
responses that explore various perspectives. Though the questions asked were structured to 
meet the needs of the research, follow-up questions in the bid to obtain clarifications were 
also posed. The participants (interviewees) from the CBN and NDIC answered similar 
questions (Appendix 1), while participants from the surviving DMBs responded to different 
questions (Appendix 2). The questions asked are unique to the functions of the different 
institutions in order to obtain valid and reliable responses. 
Despite the various advantages ascribed to the use of the interview technique, it is also 
weighed down by a couple of disadvantages. For one, human beings possess different 
perspectives even when they experience the same phenomenon. Hence, the accuracy of 
interview responses is dependent on the knowledge and experience of the participant; the 
participant’s willingness to divulge vital information; and the ability of the participant to 
understand the questions asked and articulate responses. In sum, interviews are susceptible to 
influence and bias. 
Additionally, the interview method is not a simple method to undertake. For instance, not all 
bank staff are right participants as their work schedule does not entail them to understand the 
interaction of banks with regulatory authorities. In like manner, not all the staff of CBN and 
NDIC are suitable to respond to the interview questions meant for bank regulators as they do 
not belong to the banking regulation and supervision departments of the regulatory authorities 
and their duties and responsibilities does not afford the opportunity to understand the 
interactions between regulators and banks. As such, only senior bank managers that were 
working in the banking industry during the two Nigerian banking reforms were interviewed. 
The positions they held ensured that they have risk management experience in addition to the 
workings of the CBN and NDIC. In relation to the participants from the regulatory 
authorities, responses were sought from the highest-ranking regulatory officers. The Director 
of Banking provided responses to the interview questions, while the NDIC mandated a Senior 
Research Officer with vast experience to respond to the interview questions. To sum up, the 
researcher ensured in this study that the appropriate participants responded to the interview 
questions. 
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Cameron & Price (2009) and Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) opined that the interview technique 
is time-consuming when compared to other techniques. It entails obtaining access, fixing 
appointments for the interview, the interview session, recording, transcribing, interpretation 
and analysis. These processes are cumbersome and time-consuming. Consequent on the 
cumbersome and time-consuming nature of interviews, small sample sizes are usually used. 
A large sample size is generally preferred but this is not always feasible with interviews. In 
relation to this study, only seventeen interviews were conducted but the interview 
submissions were detailed. 
Even though the number of interview responses was not large, its effect is downplayed in this 
study by the employment of various secondary data sources. The reliability and validity of 
the data sources employed to augment the small sample size of interview responses are 
discussed below. However, the study set out to obtain interview responses from twenty-three 
participants and achieved a 73.9% response rate. Additional, the triangulation of data sources 
and techniques of analysis make amends for perceived limitations. 
 
4.6.2 Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data forms an integral part of data used for this research.  Banking regulations are 
laws and guidelines that are found in circulars, reports, gazettes, and organizational 
documents. Therefore, in order to achieve the aims and objectives of this study, data on the 
two banking reforms, interventions by regulatory authorities, sanctions meted out by 
regulatory authorities and information on major events that affected the banking system were 
obtained from the financial stability reports of the CBN and the annual reports of the NDIC. 
More so, annual regulatory indices were also obtained from the CBN and NDIC reports. 
Circulars from the CBN and NDIC to commercial banks, in addition to the websites of the 
regulatory agencies, were also utilized as sources of up-to-date secondary data. 
Still more, secondary data is essential to this study because of the richness of information 
which is well beyond the resources of an individual researcher. The financial stability reports 
of the CBN and the annual reports of the NDIC are produced annually by the research 
departments of both regulatory authorities. The information contained in the publications 
includes submission made by banking institutions and those obtained through on-site bank 
101 
 
visits and surveillance. Additionally, the information obtained from the various reports are 
vital pieces of information as third party users like foreign investors and global regulatory 
agencies like BCBS, World Bank, and IMF rely on them. Moreover, secondary data is 
employed in this study to validate and complement interview responses (primary data). The 
secondary data used in this study adds depth to the interview responses and broadens the 
database in order to allow for wider articulation and generalization of findings (Adams, 
Khan, Raeside, White, 2007). 
Likewise, even though further information is presented on the variables used for the DEA 
Window analysis and multiple regression analysis, it is worth noting where they are acquired. 
The input and output variables used to calculate efficiency scores using the DEA window 
analysis technique, the bank-specific CAMELS ratios, and Z-Score adopted for various 
regression models were obtained from the BANKSCOPE Database. While the consumer 
price index (inflation) used to calculate bank size and GDP growth are obtained from the 
National Bureau of Statistics. Further discussions on the variables are presented in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Conversely, disadvantages of secondary data exist which studies that rely on must consider. 
Secondary data are historical in nature and may not be relevant to contemporary issues. In 
relation to this limitation, most financial figures and indices are mostly historical in nature. 
However, this study goes back in time to examine the performance of Nigerian DMBs, so 
that forward-looking recommendations can be made. More so, an understanding of history 
ensures past mistakes are not repeated.  
Similarly, secondary data are sometimes manipulated from their original source and 
manipulated data are plagued by errors and inconsistencies which result in false findings and 
conclusions. Likewise, secondary data can spring from unreliable sources which did not pass 
through rigorous scientific sources. In order to ensure that the secondary data employed in 
this study are not manipulated, only reliable databases (BANKSCOPE) and government 
prepared documents are used. 
So far, the chosen research philosophy, adopted research approach, research strategy, and the 
sources of data used to achieve the aims and objectives of this study have been discussed. 
They all form the background to the techniques employed to analyze obtained data. 
Therefore, subsequent sections of this chapter will dwell on the in-depth review of the 
analysis techniques and the variables used. 
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4.7 Data Analysis Techniques 
 
As mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter, this study triangulates qualitative and 
quantitative methods. As such, various techniques are utilized for the presentation and 
analysis of data. Three techniques are employed for the presentation and analysis of data. 
Content analysis is adopted for the analysis of interview responses and other regulatory 
documents. DEA Window analysis is used for the evaluation of bank performance and 
efficiency. Whereas, multiple regression analysis is employed to examine the relationship 
between capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning capacity, liquidity, 
sensitivity to risk, bank size, and GDP on bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial 
stability. Thus, the content analysis process used to analyze interview responses and 
regulatory documents is first presented.  
 
4.7.1 Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is utilized to evaluate data obtained from interview responses, CBN 
financial stability reports, NDIC annual reports, circulars, banking supervision reports and 
implementation guidelines. In sum, content analysis is used for the analysis of qualitative 
data in this study. 
Byrman and Bell (2015) view content analysis as an approach to the analysis of documents 
and texts that try to quantify content in terms of prearranged categories and in a systematic 
and replicable manner. In like manner, content analysis is viewed as a research methodology 
which analyses textual data for patterns and structures, drawing out key features to which 
researchers base their attention, develop categories, and incorporate them into perceptible 
constructs in order to derive text meaning (Gray & Densten, 1998; Shoemaker & Reese, 
1996; Vitouladiti, 2014). 
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4.7.1.1 Justification for the Adoption of Content Analysis 
 
Several advantages, which have been ascribed to content analysis, facilitated its adoption in 
this study. 
Foremost, content analysis provides an avenue for a replicable methodology that can access 
deep individual and collective structures such as values, intentions, attitudes, and cognitions. 
Additionally, the flexibility of content analysis magnifies the desire for its adoption. 
Furthermore, the strengths of content analysis (Vitouladiti, 2014), which justifies its 
utilization in this study, are presented below: 
 Content analysis can be applied to examine written documents as well as pictures, 
videos, and situations. 
 It is widely used and easily understood. 
 It can help in interpreting trends in individuals or groups. 
 It is not an expensive method and it can be easily repeated in the event problems arise. 
 It is not obstructive and does not necessarily entail contact with people. 
 It is convenient for analyzing archival material. 
 Establishing reliability is simple and straightforward. 
 Content analysis, when compared to other research methods, scores highest with 
regard to ease of replication. Materials used can be made available for others to 
validate. 
Conversely, content analysis also has some weaknesses (Vitouladiti, 2014): 
 It is purely a descriptive methodology. Thus, it describes what there is, but may not 
disclose cause and effect. In other words, content analysis might not reveal the 
underlying motives for the observed pattern. 
 Most importantly, the analysis is limited by the availability and authenticity of data. 
This study acknowledges that content analysis has some inherent weaknesses; however, steps 
have been taken to downplay these shortcomings. Owing to the notion that content analysis is 
largely descriptive and it might not reveal cause and effect, this study obtained data from 
various sources that triangulate responses from different sets of participants. For instance, 
participants from regulatory authorities commented on the performance of banks, while 
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senior bank managers responded to inquiries bordering on the role of regulators in promoting 
bank performance and financial stability. Likewise, this study was not limited by the 
availability of data, as information from several sources were utilized. Interview responses 
were solicited from experienced individuals from reputable institutions and the financial 
stability reports and annual reports are official government sanctioned documents from the 
CBN and NDIC. 
Consequent on the advantages of content analysis and the various sources of data employed 
to minimize the weaknesses of the technique, quotations have been used to buttress the views 
of interview participants. In addition, the broad concepts of banking reforms, risk 
management, financial safety nets, and financial stability/soundness are x-rayed. 
Progressively, the key terms and concepts under the above mentioned broad concepts that 
guide the qualitative analysis of data include: banking reforms, recapitalization, 
consolidation, risk management credit risk, non-performing loans/credits, credit committee, 
loan approval, loan approval officers, market risk, interest rate, liquidity, liquidity risk, 
liquidity ratio, excess liquidity, operational risk, fraud and forgeries, composite risk rating, 
financial safety nets, deposit insurance, deposit insurance contributions, deposit insurance 
scheme, bank bailouts, bridge banking, purchase and assumption technique, capital 
injections, and financial Stability. 
It is worth noting that the content analysis used in this study reviewed all the information 
brought to the attention of the researcher in the course of the interview. However, the terms 
mentioned above guided the researcher in analyzing interview responses and served as launch 
pads for the probing of CBN financial stability reports and NDIC annual reports. 
Progressively, the sections below dwell on the two quantitative techniques employed to 
complement the qualitative content analysis of interview responses.  
Additionally, the justification for adopting of two quantitative techniques (DEA window 
analysis and multiple regression analysis) would have been appropriate at this junction. 
However, the position of this thesis on the rationale behind the adoption of both techniques is 
better presented after both techniques have been individually discussed.      
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4.7.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The Seminal work of Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes (1978) followed the works of Farrell 
(1957) and brought the DEA model to prominence. DEA is a non-parametric linear approach, 
which is capable of employing the use of multiple inputs and multiple outputs. It is a ‘data 
oriented’ methodology for evaluating the performance of Decision Making Units (DMUs). 
Avkiran (2011) refers to DEA as a non-parametric linear programming technique used to 
develop empirical production frontiers and to assess the performance of Decision Making 
Units (DMUs).  For the sake of this study, banks are the Decision Making Units (Farrell, 
1957; Charnes et al., 1978). 
In the last three decades, the application of DEA to evaluate the performance of various 
entities and activities in different countries has become commonplace. For the reason that 
DEA requires little assumptions, it has opened up possibilities for use in instances that have 
previously appeared resistant to other approaches because of the multifarious nature of the 
relations between the numerous inputs and outputs involved in DMUs. The DEA approach 
has been utilized to provide insight into activities that have been examined by other methods. 
For instance, DEA is used in studies for benchmarking inefficient organizations against 
efficient ones. Since the seminal work of Charnes et al (1978), academics and researchers 
have recognised that the DEA is an excellent methodology for modelling organizational 
activities and operations for performance evaluation (Charnes et al., 1978; Cooper, Seiford, & 
Zhu, 2011; Cooper, Seiford, Tone, & Zhu, 2007). 
Charnes et al (1978) referred to DEA as a mathematical programming model that is applied 
to observational data to provide novel ways of obtaining empirical estimates of relationship. 
The DEA methodology is directed to frontiers and not central tendencies. Cooper et al (2011) 
are of the view that rather than trying to fit a regression plane through the center of data as in 
statistical regressions, the DEA approach floats a piecewise linear surface to rest on 
observations. Owing to this assertion, the DEA methodology is able to uncover relationships 
that would remain hidden from other measures. The DEA technique is able to ascertain the 
efficiency and performance of organizations in a straightforward manner without the recourse 
to assumptions and variations that are usually required in other models such as linear and 
nonlinear regression models (Cooper et al, 2011). 
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In evaluating the performance and efficiency of DMUs, the DEA approach does not assign 
any priori measures or information of relative importance to any input or output variable. The 
DEA approach calculates the distance of each DMU from the efficient frontier by 
determining by how much each DMU input should be reduced and each output should be 
increased for each DMU to reach the frontier. Thus, in line with the ‘Pareto Principle’, a 
DMU is said to be efficient (100%) if and only if none of its inputs or outputs can be 
improved without negatively affecting its other inputs or outputs. A DMU is regarded as been 
fully efficient (100%) on the premise of presented evidence if and only if the performances of 
similar DMUs do not indicate that some of their inputs or outputs can be improved without 
negatively affecting some of their other inputs or outputs. Likewise, inefficient DMUs have 
scores that are less than 100%. Therefore, in a standard DEA approach, a DMU is said to be 
efficient if its performance relative to other DMUs cannot be enhanced (Cook, Seiford, & 
Zhu, 2013; Paradi & Zhu, 2013).    
Furthermore, the efficiency of a DMU is determined by its ability to transform inputs into 
desired outputs. Put differently, DEA assigns an efficiency score of 100% to an efficient 
DMU, and less than 100% to inefficient DMUs. A score less than 100% indicate that a linear 
combination of other DMUs from the sample could produce the same vector of outputs, using 
a small vector of inputs. The efficiency score reveals the radial distance from the estimated 
production frontier to the DMUs under evaluation, that is, the minimum proportional 
decrease in inputs yielding efficiency. Thus, DEA provides an efficiency rating (efficiency 
score) for efficient and inefficient DMUs.  The efficiency score of DMUs is defined as: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
 
In essence, the DEA approach considers how much total productivity can be improved, and 
ranks (efficiency scores) the productivity of individual DMUs (Ho & Zhu, 2004). Therefore, 
in this study, efficient DMBs will have efficiency scores of 100%, whereas inefficient DMBs 
will have less than 100%. However, efficiency scores are sensitive to changes in data and 
hinge greatly on the number and type of input and output factors considered (Casu & 
Molyneux, 2003). To that end, the specific input and output variables and the chosen period 
of evaluation will determine the efficiency scores of the examined Nigerian DMBs.  
The advantages of the DEA model over other approaches for evaluating bank performance 
serves as the rationale for the choice of DEA for this study. The ability of the DEA approach 
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to concurrently capture the relationship between multiple inputs and multiple outputs is a 
common motivation for employing the DEA to measure performance. Specifically, DEA is 
conditioned to a broader view of performance measurement and this is regarded as its 
superior advantage over traditional financial ratio analysis, which typically depends on two 
variables in a ratio (Avkiran, 2011). 
One advantage of the DEA model is that it does not institute any biased structure on data 
when determining efficient organizations (in this case, banks). In other words, DEA approach 
does not assume a specific production technology or correspondence. It distinguishes 
inefficient banks from efficient ones by comparing them (that is comparing similar firms), 
rather than associating or correlating a bank’s performance with statistical averages (Paul & 
Kourouche, 2008). 
In general, the non-parametric DEA approach is simple and easy to compute because it is not 
required to impose any assumptions about functional form, and it does not take into account 
the effect of random error and environmental noise (Sharma et al., 2013). 
However, as with other techniques, the DEA has some disadvantages. One major downside is 
the need for homogeneity of the DMUs, which denotes that the analyzed institutions should 
use the same types of resources, generate similar classes of products and the conditions that 
contextualize the productive process should be identical (Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2007). 
Another drawback is that the DEA analysis technique is a deterministic model. It assumes 
that resulting inefficiencies are based absolutely and entirely on the mismanagement of the 
DMUs, thereby ignoring any possibility of random influences. Likewise, the DEA techniques 
demand that extra care should be taken in the selection of variables, owing to the reason that 
there are no applicable tests for the selection and evaluation of significance (Coelli, Rao, 
O’Donnell & Battese, 2005; Fuentes, Fuster & Lillo-Banuls, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the disadvantages of the DEA analysis technique, the advantages of 
employing it to evaluate the performance of banks are greater and more significant than any 
potential drawbacks. For that reason and due to its use in similar studies, as presented in the 
literature review chapter, this method was selected for this study. 
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4.7.2.1 DEA Efficiency Measures 
 
Efficiency is referred to as a technical term, and it is a sign of efficacy. The DEA technique 
holds that any producing unit (bank) is said to be technically efficient when it can produce the 
maximum amount of output while using a given level of input. The non-parametric frontier 
requires that for the chosen inputs, the highest level of output realizable from those chosen 
inputs are in line with the available DMU data under alternative assumptions that could be 
made about production. For instance, under the DEA methodology, it might be assumed that 
banks operate under the constant returns to scale (CRS) or under variable returns to scale 
(VRS) (Cooper et al., 2007). 
Farrell (1957) asserted that components of efficiency are technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency.  Farrell opined that a DMU is technically efficient when it is able to obtain 
maximum output from a given set of inputs. Whereas allocative efficiency indicates a DMU’s 
ability to utilize inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices and production 
technology (Coelli et al, 2005).  Therefore, the technical efficiency of Nigerian DMBs are 
evaluated under the variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption. 
To further drill down, Farell (1957) referred to ‘technical efficiency’ in terms of an 
organization’s success at producing the maximum amount of output, given a particular set of 
inputs. The DEA generated technical efficiency scores for a DMU (bank) is a relative 
measure indicating the particular DMU’s input-output conversion performance in comparison 
to what is possible according to the frontier. It is worth noting that the measure is specific to 
the sample and a DMU is only 100 per cent efficient in the event that there is no evidence of 
inefficiency when compared against all other DMUs. In line with assumptions of Farrell 
(1957), the production frontier is composed of the most efficient DMUs evaluated, whereas 
relatively inefficient DMUs fall below the frontier. 
In this study, DMBs are benchmarked against the most efficient DMBs in the industry, that 
is, the relative efficiency of each DMB is measured against the frontier. The fully efficient 
DMBs form a best practice production frontier and are ‘benchmark’ peers for inefficient 
DMBs (Rouse, Harrison, & Chen, 2010). Therefore, a bank is technically efficient when it is 
able to convert multiple resources at its disposal to multiple financial services at a profit  
(Bhattacharyya & Kumbhakar, 1997). On the contrary, a DMB is said to be technically 
inefficient if it operates underneath the frontier. 
109 
 
Furthermore, in evaluating technical efficiency, two extended DEA models can be operated. 
These are the CCR model and the BCC model. Brief discussions about the two models are 
presented below. 
 
4.7.2.2 CCR Model 
 
CCR Model denotes Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), the originators of the model. 
Their work extended the works of Farrell (1957) by incorporating the concept of multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs. The CCR model is anchored on the assumptions of constant 
return to scale (CRS). The CCR model assumes that a constant relationship exists between 
inputs and outputs. For example, if one input yields three outputs, then two inputs would 
yield six outputs. Additionally, the CCR model does not discern between pure technical 
inefficiencies and inefficiencies due to variable returns. Hence, the assumption of constant 
returns to scale (CCR) is only justified when all DMUs in a sample are operating at an 
optimal scale. Thus if the CRS assumption is made when some of the DMUs are not 
operating at an optimal scale, the computed technical efficiency scores will be tainted with 
scale efficiency (SE) (Cooper et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2009; Sufian & Habibullah, 2012). 
A pictorial representation of the CCR model is shown in figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4.3: The CCR Production Frontier 
 
Adapted from Cooper, Lawrence, & Tone (2006)  
 
In relation to figure 4.3 above, it is assumed that there is only one input and one output. 
Centered on the constant returns to scale assumption (CCR model), the DMU at point C 
situated on the efficient (production) frontier is the sole CCR-efficient DMU for the reason 
that its efficiency score equal 100% or 1. The other DMUs (i.e. A, D, E, G, and N) are 
inefficient owing to their efficiency scores being less than 100% or 1. Moreover, the CCR 
model implies that no DMU situated under the frontier (straight line) is more efficient than 
DMU C. In, like manner, no input/output combination in the inefficient DMUs could produce 
efficiency scores higher than that of DMU-C.     
 
4.7.2.3 BCC Model 
 
Likewise, the BCC Model, Banker, Charnes, Cooper (1984) broadened the previous works of 
Farrell (1957) and the 1978 CCR model. They were of the view that if efficiency is 
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hypothetically measured under the CRS assumption, a DMU may be inefficient and might not 
have allocative efficiency, scale efficiency, and technical efficiency. Consequently, Banker et 
al (1984) introduced the variable returns to scale (VRS) hypothesis that breaks down 
technical efficiency (TE) into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE), and 
it is called the BCC model. Theoretically, the VRS assumption offers the measurement of 
pure technical efficiency (PTE), and it is the measurement of technical efficiency (TE) 
without the effects of scale efficiency (SE). The BCC model assumes that a variable 
relationship subsists between inputs and outputs. Therefore, if a proportional increase (or 
decrease) in inputs transpires into a different proportional increase (or decrease) in outputs, it 
can be opined that variable returns to scale are present (Cooper et al., 2007). For instance, if 
one input yields three outputs, but two inputs yields five outputs, it can be suggested that 
variable returns to scale subsist.  
Furthermore, in view of the BCC model (variable returns to scale assumption), the best 
practice frontier encases the inefficient points more tightly. Hence, the distance between the 
inefficient DMUs and the efficient DMUs (best practice frontier) is less. As such, the 
efficiency scores under the BCC model are usually higher than the CCR efficiency scores 
(Cooper et al., 2007).       
A pictorial representation of the BCC model is shown in figure 4.4 below: 
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Figure 4.4: The BCC Production Frontier 
 
Adapted from Cooper et al. (2006)  
 
Assuming the case of one input to one output, the production frontier of the BCC model 
depicted in figure 4.4 shows three efficient DMUs, which are DMUs A, C, and E. The line 
section that connects point A and point C indicates the increasing returns to scale (IRS) 
portion of the efficiency frontier, whereas the line segment that joins point C to E shows the 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) portion of the efficiency frontier. And just like figure 4.3, C 
indicates the constant returns to scale (CRS) portion of the efficiency frontier. Apart from 
showing DMUs at increasing, decreasing, and constant returns to scale, figure 4.4, indicates 
that more DMUs appear efficient under the BCC model.         
Therefore, based on the above theoretical descriptions, the mathematical depictions of the 
CCR and BCC models are presented below, as the variant of the DEA analysis (DEA 
Window Analysis) adopted for this study is discussed. However, even though both the CCR 
and BCC efficiency scores are calculated, this study relies largely on the BCC model for the 
analysis of efficiency. The BCC model is specifically adopted because it is viewed as an 
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upgrade on the CCR model. The CCR model is a specific type of the BCC model (Toloo & 
Nalchigar, 2009) and as such the BCC model is utilised in this study due to its capacity to 
take into consideration scale effects in order to ascertain the most productive scale size for 
each DMU. Put differently, by adjusting for “scale effects”, the BCC model is in a better 
position to evaluate “pure” technical efficiency. Likewise, the BCC model is adopted because 
it ensures the discretization of technical efficiency from the effects of scale efficiency (Sahin, 
Gokdemir, & Ozturk, 2016). To that end, the BCC model is better than the CCR model in 
relation to providing policy recommendations, like the introduction of performance measures 
to embolden operations at the most productive scale size or the fine-tuning of performance 
outcomes in order to be able to control for scale differences (Alrashidi, 2015). More so, 
DMBs are determined to be more efficient under the BCC model which is based on the 
variable returns to scale assumption results in higher efficiency scores than under the CCR 
model.  As such, DMBs may be efficient under the BCC model but not under the CCR 
model. Equally, an inefficient DMB (DMU) may have different efficiency scores depending 
on the model adopted.      
 
4.7.2.4  DEA Window Analysis 
 
As a model, window analysis tries to offer a more comprehensive treatment to the evaluation 
of efficiency changes over a time period (Charnes, Clark, Cooper, & Golany, 1985; Cook & 
Seiford, 2009). The DEA window analysis technique is based on the principle of moving 
averages (Cooper et al., 2007; Gu & Yue, 2011; Yue, 1992). A DMU in each different period 
is evaluated as if it were a different DMU in a different window. Explicitly, the performance 
of a DMU in a particular period (window) is compared against its own performance in other 
periods (windows) in addition to the performance of the other DMUs (Cooper et al., 2011). 
Webb, Bryce, & Watson (2010) in line with Webb (2003) are of the view that the DEA 
window analysis technique is of advantage when examining the performance of the entire 
banking sector as well as units within individual organizations. They enumerated the 
advantages that also serve as motivation for the adoption of the DEA window analysis 
technique as follows: 
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 The technique makes it easy to analyse the performance of DMUs (banks) over a 
specified period of time taking into consideration cost/expenses and income/profits. 
 The technique can also be utilized to examine stability and other properties of 
efficiency and performance across as well as within windows. 
 DEA is at most useful when analysing closely homogenous organizations that operate 
in closely homogenous markets. For instance, comparing a bank in 2000 with another 
one in 2013 could render relative results meaningless. On this account, analysing 
banks in a three-year period “windows” reduces the problem and may be considered 
an improvement on the traditional DEA panel model. 
 Each bank in the sample is treated as a different bank in a different period. This 
treatment increases the number of data points. Put differently, each bank in a different 
period is evaluated as if it was a different bank (independent) but remains comparable 
in the same period (Repkova, 2014). Therefore, the problem of small sample sizes is 
solved with this approach. 
 The performance of a bank being analysed by the DEA windows technique in a period 
can be compared to itself and other banks over the course of time (Asmild, Paradi, 
Aggarwall, & Schaffnit, 2004; Repkova, 2014). 
The window analysis has been only used in a handful of studies to ascertain the performance 
of banking institutions over a time period (examples of studies include Asmild et al., (2004) – 
Canadian banking industry, Gu & Yue (2011) – Chinese Listed banks, Sufian (2007) – 
Singapore commercial banking group, Kisielewska, Guzowska, Nellis, & Zarzecki, (2007) – 
Polish banking industry, Repkova (2014) – Czech banking sector). 
Therefore, the performances of Nigerian DMBs have been evaluated using the DEA window 
analysis based on the advantages enumerated above and following the listed adaptations of 
the approach in various banking industries. 
Consequently, this study has considered the following formulas in line with Asmild et al., 
(2004), Gu & Yue (2011)and Repkova (2014), where N DMUs (n = 1, 2, …, N) observed in 
T (t = 1, 2, …, T) periods using r inputs to produce s outputs. Let 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑛
𝑡  represents a 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑛 
in period t with a r dimensional input vector 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 = (𝑥𝑛
1𝑡 , 𝑥𝑛
2𝑡 , … 𝑥𝑛
𝑟𝑡) and s dimensional input 
vector 𝑦𝑛
𝑡 = (𝑦𝑛
1𝑡, 𝑦𝑛
2𝑡, … 𝑦𝑛
𝑠𝑡). If windows start time k (1 ≤ k ≤ T) with window width w (1 ≤ 
w ≤ t - k), then the metric of inputs is given as follows: 
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𝑋𝑘𝑤 = (𝑥1
𝑘, 𝑥2
𝑘 … , 𝑥𝑁
𝑘+1, 𝑥2
𝑘+1, … , 𝑥𝑁
𝑘+1, … , 𝑥1
𝑘+𝑤, 𝑥2
𝑘+𝑤, … , 𝑥𝑁
𝑘+𝑤) 
And the metric of outputs as: 
𝑌𝑘𝑤 = (𝑦1
𝑘, 𝑦2
𝑘 … , 𝑦𝑁
𝑘+1, 𝑦2
𝑘+1, … , 𝑦𝑁
𝑘+1, … , 𝑦1
𝑘+𝑤, 𝑦2
𝑘+𝑤, … , 𝑦𝑁
𝑘+𝑤) 
 
The CCR model (constant returns to scales, CRS) of DEA window problem for 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑛
𝑡  is 
given by solving the following linear program: 
min 𝜃 
Subject to             𝜃𝑋𝑡 −  𝜆𝑋𝑘𝑤 ≥ 0 
𝜆𝑌𝑘𝑤 −  𝑌𝑡 ≥ 0      
𝜆𝑛  ≥ 0 (𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 ×  𝑤). 
 
The BCC model -variable returns to scales (VRS) formulation can be obtained by adding the 
restriction ∑ 𝜆𝑛 = 1
𝑁
𝑛=1  (Banker et al., 1984). The objective value of the CCR model is given 
as technical efficiency (TE), and the objective of BCC model is pure technical efficiency 
(PTE). The BCC model is given as follows: 
min 𝜃 
subject to   𝜃𝑋𝑡 −  𝜆𝑋𝑘𝑤 ≥ 0 
𝜆𝑌𝑘𝑤 −  𝑌𝑡 ≥ 0     
∑ 𝜆𝑛 = 1
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝜆𝑛  ≥ 0 (𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 ×  𝑤) 
 
Importantly, there is no theory that justifies the most appropriate window size (Sufian, 2007). 
Asmild et al., (2004) in line with Charnes (1995) opined that major technological and 
environmental changes do not usually occur in narrow window widths, thus they suggested 
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that the adoption of a three or four-year window will result in more reliable comparable 
results. Likewise, Sufian (2007), Repkova (2014) and Reisman, Daouas, Oral, Rebai, & 
Gatoufi (2003) adopted the three-year window to examine bank performance in Malaysia, 
Czech, and Tunisia respectively. More so, the only study on DEA window analysis of the 
Nigerian banking sector by Tankoano (2013) adopted a three year window. Tankoano (2013) 
insinuated that the three-year window was used because banking institutions in a narrow 
window usually operated within the same technological and regulatory bracket. Additionally, 
radical environmental changes do not occur within narrow windows. Hence, the evaluation of 
banking institutions in a three-year window will offer more reliable results. Thus in a bid to 
ensure the reliability and credibility of the results of this study, the three-year window, which 
is consistent with the seminal DEA window analysis work of Charnes et al., (1985) and the 
Nigerian banking study by Tankoano (2013) is adopted.   
To illustrate from table 4.1 below, the first window incorporates years 2000, 2001, and 2002. 
The earliest period is dropped anytime a new period is introduced. Looking at the table, the 
year 2000 is dropped in window two, and year 2003 is added to the window. Successively, 
years 2002, 2003 and 2004 are assessed in window three. The window analysis is performed 
in twelve (12) windows and ending in the analysis of years 2011, 2012 and 2013.  And as 
suggested that each DMB is treated as a different entity in each year and there are 82 banks 
used in this study, the DEA window analysis technique results in 1,164 observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Table 4.1: Definition of Three-Year Window Analysis Period 
Window 1 2000 2001 2002 
Window 2           2001 2002 2003 
Window 3                    2002 2003 2004 
Window 4                             2003 2004 2005 
Window 5                                       2004 2005 2006 
Window 6                                                2005 2006 2007 
Window 7                                                          2006 2007 2008 
Window 8                                                                    2007 2008 2009 
Window 9                                                                              2008 2009 2010 
Window 10                                                                                        2009 2010 2011 
Window 11                                                                                                  2010 2011 2012 
Window 12                                                                                                            2011 2012 2013 
 
4.7.2.5  Determining Input-Output Specifications 
 
An important element of DEA rests on the appropriate selection of the input and output 
variables. Judging from the literature presented above, there is no consensus amongst 
researchers on the best combination of input and output variables. Even though there are 
various models for selecting inputs and outputs, the production and the intermediation 
approaches are the two main approaches competing in literature in regards to the definition 
and measurement of the input and output variables (Avkiran, 2006). Avkiran submitted that 
the other models are the value-added approach and the user-cost approach. 
The production approach views financial institutions as the producers of services for account 
holders. The producers process documents and perform transactions on deposit accounts such 
as loans. According to the production approach, the number of accounts and related 
transactions is the best measure of output, while the number of employees and physical 
capital is considered as inputs (Ferrier & Lovell, 1990; Fried, Lovell, & Vandeneeckaut, 
1993; Sherman & Gold, 1985).  Neal (2004) and  Sathye (2003), followed this approach. 
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The value-added approach is a variation of the production approach. Under the value-added 
approach, labour, purchased funds and physical capital are categorized as inputs, whereas 
high value generating activities requiring large expenditures on labour, as well as physical 
capital such as making loans and taking deposits are categorized as outputs(Avkiran, 2006; 
Berger & Humphrey, 1992; Wheelock & Wilson, 1995).  
The user-cost approach on the other hand, describes an asset as an output if the financial 
returns outweigh the opportunity cost of funds. Likewise, a liability item is considered an 
output if its financial costs are less than its opportunity costs. However, if none of the 
conditions above are satisfied, both the assets and liabilities are classified as inputs (Hancock, 
1991). Hancock (1986) is considered as the pioneer of the user-cost approach and he opined 
that the user-cost approach can be applied for the computation of all the assets and liabilities 
on the balance sheet. In application, the user-cost approach is somewhat confusing as the 
designation of assets and liability items as inputs and outputs are subject to change in 
accordance with movements in service charges and interest rates (Berger & Humphrey, 1992; 
Grigorian & Manole, 2002; Hancock, 1986, 1991). 
The Intermediation approach views banks as the intermediaries that transform and transfer 
financial assets from the surplus side of the economy to the deficit side of the economy. This 
study follows this approach. Additionally, this approach consists of several 
conceptualizations when defining the appropriate inputs and outputs. Some of these 
conceptualizations define inputs in terms of capital costs, deposits, and labour and define 
outputs in terms of financial investments and loans (Kirkwood & Nahim, 2006). Another 
conceptualization defines inputs in terms of expenses and outputs in terms of revenue (Paul & 
Kourouche, 2008). This study follows a variant of the intermediation approach which makes 
use of elements of the two conceptualizations as used by Yue in his study of the performance 
of Missouri banks in1992. 
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Table 4.2: Input and Output Variables  
 
Inputs Outputs 
Interest Expenses (IE) 
Non-Interest Expenses (NIE) 
Total Deposits (TD) 
Interest Income (IC) 
Non-Interest Income (NIC) 
Total Loans (TL) 
 
The advantage of employing these particular variables is that they capture all the costs 
incurred by banks in running their operations and the revenue they generated as a result of 
their activities. Therefore, how successful DMBs are in maximising profitability and 
efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector is the motivation for adopting the intermediation 
approach that utilises the particular input and output variables (Table 4.2). More so, the 
inputs and outputs were specifically chosen because they cover revenue and costs of DMBs. 
Additionally, the inputs (interest expenses, non-interest expenses), and the outputs (interest 
income and non-interest income) are variables from the income statements of DMBs. While 
the input “total deposits” and the output “total loans” are variables from the balance sheet.  
Furthermore, DEA studies are either input-oriented or output-oriented. Input-oriented models 
are used to examine if DMUs can reduce their inputs while keeping outputs at current levels. 
The input-oriented model therefore seeks to identify technical inefficiency as a proportional 
reduction in input usage. On the other hand, the output-oriented model is used to determine if 
DMUs can be increase their outputs while keeping inputs at their current levels. Also an 
inefficient DMU is made efficient through the proportional increase of its output, whereas its 
inputs remain unchanged in an output-oriented model. Furthermore, inefficient DMUs can be 
made more efficient by projections onto the frontier. However, model orientation controls the 
direction of the projection for inefficient DMUs. Efficiency can be improved in the input-
oriented model via the proportional reduction of inputs, whereas improving efficiency in the 
output-oriented model entails proportional augmentation of outputs (Martic, Novakovic, & 
Baggia, 2009; Zhu, 2014).  
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On account of the above, this study adopts the input-oriented model. Although theoretical 
literature is inconclusive as to the best choice amongst the alternative orientations, most 
studies have tended to adopt the input-oriented model. More so, proponent users of the input-
oriented model are of the view that input quantities appear to be the primary decision 
variables. However, it is crucial to highlight that the input- and output-oriented models will 
estimate the same frontier and hence, by definition, identify the same set of efficient DMUs 
(Casu & Molyneux).  In particular, the Nigerian banking reforms were aimed at increasing 
the capacity (efficiency, profitability, and stability) of DMBs. Therefore, the Nigerian 
banking reforms sought to minimise inputs with the view of producing a given level of output 
or increasing the level of output of Nigerian DMBs. On that account, the input-oriented DEA 
approach is adopted in this study.  
Finally, the inputs and outputs variables based on the intermediation approach, were also 
chosen based on the effects of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms on DMBs financial 
statements. On the premise that the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms affected all aspects of 
Nigerian banking operations, the DEA efficiency scores are calculated only from the 
financial statements of DMBs.  
 
4.7.2.6 Description and Sources of DEA Data  
 
The data set covering the period of 2000 – 2013 of the selected input and output variables 
from eighty-two DMBs is used in this study. Prior to the 2005 banking reforms, the Nigerian 
banking sector had a total of eighty-nine (89) DMBs. Due to the various mergers and 
acquisitions, and purchase and assumption agreements, the numbers of DMBs were reduced 
to twenty-five (25) at the end of 2005. However, at the time of data collection and at the 
beginning of this study, the Central Bank of Nigeria put the number of DMBs operating in 
Nigeria at twenty-one (21). The data used in this study was obtained from the Bureau Van 
Dijk Bankscope Database. The choice of eighty-two DMBs was due to the availability of data 
in the database. Even though it was the intention of this study to include input and output data 
from all the eighty-nine (legacy) DMBs, the database only had information on eighty-two 
(82). 
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It is also worth noting that the number of DMBs utilized in this study is limited to the 
availability of data, and for the sake of uniformity, only data from the Van Djik Bankscope 
Database is used. The number of DMBs continuously fluctuates throughout the span of the 
study due to the merger and acquisitions, and the purchase and assumption agreements that 
occurred during and after the 2005 banking consolidation reforms. More so, the names and 
numbers of DMBs kept changing as a result of the host merger and acquisitions that 
transpired and the nationalisation of three banks into bridge banks. This study includes the 
three bridge banks because the utilisation of the bridge banking model is novel to the 
Nigerian banking sector with the view of uncovering if the performance of the nationalised 
DMBs have improved. As a result, an unbalanced panel is used in this study. 
 
4.7.2.7 Justification for Using DEA Window Analysis 
 
Although advantages of the traditional DEA technique and those of the DEA Window 
analysis technique have been discussed in previous sections of this chapter, this section 
centers particularly on the reasons the DEA Window Analysis technique is appropriate for 
this study. 
The conventional DEA is only performed in a single period, therefore limiting the 
measurement of performance changes when there is more than a single period as it is the case 
in this study. Therefore, as the window analysis technique is anchored on the principle of 
moving averages, it is suitable for measuring performance in cross-sectional and time-varying 
data. As a result, its adoption in this study is to detect changes in the performance of Nigerian 
DMBs from 2000 - 2013(Charnes et al, 1985; Savic, Radosavljevic, & Ilievski, 2012). 
An additional defence to the employment of the DEA window analysis is its ability to capture 
chronological changes in the performance of banks and show the short-term evolution from 
one window to another. Therefore, the DEA window analysis technique is a more robust way 
of measuring bank performance (Repkova, 2014). In view of this study, and in relation to the 
reforms that took place in the Nigerian banking sector, the technique is able to evaluate the 
performance of DMBs both before and after the reforms in several windows. The results 
obtained show how DMB performance slowly evolved in different periods and if a particular 
event had an impact on the performance of the DMBs. 
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Another main justification for utilizing the DEA window analysis in this study stems from its 
relative little application in the Nigerian banking industry. The relative application of this 
approach suggests that this study will contribute to DEA and bank performance literature. As 
one of the first studies to utilize the DEA window analysis in bank performance studies in 
Nigeria, it sets precedence for further application of the approach in banking performance 
studies in Africa and other emerging economies. 
The Nigerian banking sector consists of few DMBs (twenty-one to be specific). Several 
studies share the view that the DEA window analysis technique is appropriate for the analysis 
of small sized banking industries, as banks are treated as different entities in different 
windows (Asmild et al., 2004; Nguyen, Roca, & Sharma, 2014; Sufian 2007). Hence, the 
application of the technique will provide the opportunity of obtaining a robust view of 
efficiency changes and performance of Nigerian DMBs from 2000 -2013. 
Equally, the unavailability of other sources of robust data makes the choice of adopting the 
DEA window analysis easy. DEA makes use of data from annual financial statements. The 
availability of a database with data from annual financial statements ensures that results 
obtained can be relied upon and validated. 
Finally, the disadvantages of the DEA approach already mentioned also apply to the DEA 
window analysis. However, the above submissions buttress the view that it is suitable for 
application to the evaluation of the performance of commercial banks. 
Progressively, the next section of this chapter will focus on multiple regression estimations. 
The various regression models adopted for uncovering the relationship of bank performance 
variables, banking stability variables, and the calculated DEA efficiency scores are presented 
and discussed. 
 
4.7.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
This section dwells on the multiple regression analysis of bank performance, efficiency and 
stability of Nigerian deposit money banks (DMBs) from 2000 to 2013. The regression models 
to suit the aims and objectives of the study are also presented. Additionally, the efficiency 
scores obtained from the DEA window analysis and the Z-Score (a proxy for banking 
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stability) are regressed against the bank specific CAMELS proxies to infer whether the 
methods, when harmonized, uncover any further disparity in the performance of DMBs. 
More so, the variables employed in this study that draw inferences and establish relationships 
that were influenced by the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global financial crisis in 
the Nigerian banking sector are presented and explained in this section. 
The general purpose of multiple regression analysis is to learn more about the relationship 
between a dependent variable and several independent or predictor variables. Multiple 
regression analysis describes the relationship between a dependent variable and numerous 
independent variables. It examines the simultaneous effects that some independent variables 
have over one dependent variable (Hinton, 2014). 
There are several multiple regression analyses techniques that dwell on either time series or 
cross-sectional data. However, for the purpose of this study, panel data regression is 
employed because available data contain both time series and cross-sectional elements. A 
panel of data embodies information across time and space and most importantly, a panel 
retains the same entities and measures some quantity about them over time (Brooks, 2008). 
As such, this study employs the use of the panel data regression to analyse the performance 
of Nigerian DMBs from 2000 – 2013. 
Additionally, the advantages of Panel Data (Baltagi, 2013; Gujarati & Porter, 2009), that 
reinforced the utilization of panel data regressions are presented below: 
1. Panel data relates to individuals, firms, states, countries, regions, etc., over time, and 
as such, there is bound to be heterogeneity in these units. And estimation techniques 
for panel data can take such heterogeneity explicitly into account by allowing for 
subject specific variables. 
2. Panel data combines time series of cross-section observations, thus providing more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of 
freedom and most importantly more efficiency. 
3. By repeatedly studying cross sections of observations, panel data estimation 
techniques are better suited to study the dynamics of change. 
4. Panel data estimation techniques can better detect and measure effects that cross-
section or pure time series cannot. 
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5. Panel data enables the study of more complicated behavioural models. For instance, 
phenomena like economies of scale and technological change are better handled by 
panel data estimation techniques than by pure cross-section or pure time series data. 
6. Panel data minimizes the bias that might arise when individuals or firms are 
aggregated into broad categories due to the availability of several thousand units. 
Econometrically, the panel data standard linear model can be written as follows (Verbeek, 
2012; Brooks, 2014): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable for firm –I at time-t; 𝛽0 is the intercept term; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a k-
dimensional vector of independent variables; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term; the error term changes over 
individuals and time, and encompasses all unobservable factors that affect 𝑌𝑖𝑡.   
Moreover, in examining the panel data set through multiple regression techniques, this study 
is aware of the treatment of the possibilities of individual effects in the adopted models. 
Individual effect implies that each individual has a divergent effect. There are two core 
individual effects models in panel data analysis: the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model (Koop, 2008). 
The Fixed Effects Model (FEM) takes into account the existence of each individual effect of 
the observations in a particular model. Put differently, the FEM allows for heterogeneity or 
individuality among entities by allowing them have separate intercept values. Hence, the 
individual effect subsists when it is assumed that each entity can have diverse intercepts in a 
particular model. Econometrically, the fixed effects model can be expressed as the equation 
below (Koop, 2008).  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎ᵢ + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 The above equation is almost similar with the common pooled model. Where, 𝑎ᵢ symbolizes 
a fixed (individual) effect.  The difference resides in 𝑎ᵢ, which varies across entities. Hence, it 
allows each entity to have its own separate intercept.   
While the Random Effects Model (REM) just like the fixed effects model suggests different 
intercept terms for each entity and again these intercepts are constant over time, with the 
relationships between independent and dependent variables assumed to be same, both cross-
sectionally and temporally (Brooks, 2014).  
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Nonetheless, the divergent view is that under the random effects model, the intercepts for 
each cross-sectional unit are presumed to originate from a common intercept, which is the 
same for all cross-sectional units and over time, in addition to a random variable that varies 
cross-sectionally but remains constant over time. 
The random effects model can be written as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑎ᵢ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Where, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a k-dimensional vector of independent variables, but unlike the FEM, there are 
no dummy variables to capture the heterogeneity (variation) in the cross-sectional element; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎ᵢ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which implies that the error term consist of two components: an individual 
specific component that does not vary over time, and a remainder component that is assumed 
to be uncorrelated over time (Brooks, 2014; Verbeek, 2012).  
Moreover, in deciding whether to adopt either the FEM or the REM, this study employs the 
Hausman-test. According to Koop (2008), the idea behind the Hausman-test rests on the 
assumption that if H0 (the individual effect is uncorrelated with any of the independent 
variables) is true, then both the FEM and REM estimators are consistent and provide 
relatively identical results. But, in the instance where ‘H0′  is false, the REM will be 
inappropriate, while FEM will be suitable, and the results obtained could be quite dissimilar.   
In a nutshell, multiple regression analysis makes it possible to analyse the relationships 
between background variables (CAMELS proxies and macroeconomic variables) and the 
dependent variables (bank efficiency scores, bank performance indicators, and bank stability 
indicator) of interest under the fixed effects or random effects models. In essence, panel data 
regression analysis is employed to evaluate the relationship between the efficiency scores 
(obtained from the Data Envelopment Window Analysis), ROA (proxy for bank 
performance) and Z-Score (proxy for bank stability) against bank specific CAMELS proxies, 
bank size, and GDP. 
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4.7.3.1 Multiple Regression Models  
 
The regression models below dwell on the effects the capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earning capacity, liquidity profile, sensitivity to market risk, the size of 
Nigerian deposit money banks, and the Gross Domestic Product on bank efficiency, bank 
performance, and financial stability. The first three models are the base models on which the 
extensions are generated to further ascertain the effects of the independent variables on 
efficiency, performance, and financial stability.  
 
Bank Efficiency 
Base Model 1: 𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
BCC (dependent variable) is the proxy for bank efficiency in model 1a. Thus, BCC is 
regressed against capital adequacy (ETA), asset quality (ILGL), management quality (CIR), 
earning capacity (NIM), liquidity (LADSTF), sensitivity to risk (TSTA), bank size, and GDP 
in model 1.   
 
Bank Performance  
Return on assets (ROA) it the proxies for bank performance and it is the dependent variable 
used to ascertain the impact of capital adequacy (ETA), asset quality (ILGL), management 
quality (CIR), earning capacity (NIM), liquidity (LADSTF), sensitivity to risk (TSTA), bank 
size, and GDP on bank performance. ROA is the dependent variable in model 2.  
Base Model 2: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Financial Stability  
Similarly, Model 3 employs the Z-Score as the dependent variable. 
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Base Model 3: 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Z-score is employed as a dependent variable to examine if the stability of banking institutions 
is affected by bank-specific CAMELS variables, bank size, and GDP. Put differently, the 
model seeks to empirically test the relationship between the bank stability measure (Z-Score) 
and asset quality, management quality, earning capacity, liquidity, sensitivity to risk, bank 
size, and GDP. Capital adequacy (ETA) is removed from this model because it is used for the 
calculation of the dependent variable (Z-score).    
Additionally, in order to ascertain the effects of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms on 
efficiency, bank performance and financial stability, the sample period is divided into three 
periods. The sample period was divided as follows, pre-2005 reforms period (2000 – 2004), 
2005 reforms and global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008), and 2009 reforms and post-
global financial crisis period (2009 – 2013). Hence, the results obtained from the various 
periods are compared with the results of the entire period (2000 – 2013). 
 
 
4.7.3.2  Model Extensions 
 
Introduction of Dummy Variables 
To further confirm the effects of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms on the efficiency, 
performance, and stability of Nigerian DMBs, dummy variables are introduced. Dummy 
variables are used in the analysis of efficiency, performance, and stability to split data into 
periods where DMBs went through reforms and normal periods. On that account, a dummy 
variable taking the value of ‘1’ for reforms periods and a value of ‘0’ for normal periods is 
introduced. Dummy 1 which is the proxy for the 2005 banking reforms starts from 2005 and 
ends in 2008. Hence, the period of 2005 to 2008 take the value of ‘1’, while other periods 
assume the value of ‘0’. In like manner, Dummy 2 which is the proxy for the 2009 banking 
reforms starts from 2009 and ends in 2013. To that end, the period of 2009 to 2013 assume 
the value of ‘1’, while all other years (2000 – 2008) take on the value of ‘0’. Consequently, in 
line with the base regression models (model 1 – model 3) the extended models (model 4 – 
model 6) are redefined as follows: 
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Bank Efficiency 
Extension Model 4: 𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑈1 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑈2 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Bank Performance 
Extension Model 5: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑈1 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑈2 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Financial Stability 
Extension Model 6: 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑈1 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑈2 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
It is worth noting that apart from the inclusion of the dummy variables, the independent 
variables of model 4 – model 6 remain the same as those of the base models (model 1 – 
model 3).  
 
Introduction of Lagged Independent Variables  
Additionally, it is not uncommon to find that the efficiency, performance and stability of 
banking institutions in the current period depend, amongst other things, on the operations of 
the previous period. To that end, the independent variables are lagged by 1 year as follows. 
 
Bank Efficiency 
Extension Model 7: 𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Bank Performance 
Extension Model 8: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Financial Stability 
Extension Model 9: 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Furthermore, the independent variables are lagged because regulatory submissions (chapter 
2) held that Nigerian DMBs were still settling down in 2006 in reaction to the host of changes 
engineered by the 2005 banking reforms. More so, the independent variables are lagged to 
handle the two-way causality problem and bad control problems.  
 
 
4.7.3.3 Multiple Regression Variable Definition 
 
Dependent Variables 
 DEA Window Analysis Efficiency Scores: Average Annual BCC Efficiency Scores   
 Bank Performance Variables: Return on Assets (ROA) 
 Bank Stability: Z-Score 
Independent Variables 
 CAMELS 
 Capital Adequacy – Equity/Total Assets Ratio (ETA) 
 Asset Quality – Impaired Loans/Gross Loans Ratio (ILGL) 
 Management Quality – Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
 Earnings – Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
 Liquidity – Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short Term Funding Ratio 
(LADSTF) 
 Sensitivity to Risk – Total Securities/Total Assets Ratio (TSTA) 
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 Non-CAMELS Variables 
 Bank Size – Natural log of Total Assets (SIZENLTA) 
 Macroeconomic Variables 
 Gross Domestic Product Growth – GDP 
 
 
4.7.3.4 Multiple Regression Variable Explanation 
 
Bank Efficiency: Average Annual BCC Efficiency Scores 
DEA efficiency scores have been used as dependent variables in various banking studies. For 
instance, Seelanatha (2012) regressed the efficiency scores of Sri Lankan commercial banks 
against a range of explanatory variables. Chortareas et al (2012) engaged in a second stage 
analysis and used efficiency scores as dependent variables in a truncated regression analysis 
of banks in the European Union. Sathye (2001) examined the efficiency of Australian banks 
and used overall efficiency from DEA analysis as a dependent variable. Maghyereh & 
Awartani (2014) in examining the effect of market structure, regulation and risk on bank 
efficiency in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries adopted technical efficiency scores as a 
dependent variable in a truncated panel data regression. 
In like manner, this study adopts the average annual BCC efficiency score as the proxy for 
efficiency. This study relies on the BCC efficiency scores of the window technique to 
ascertain the efficiency level of individual DMBs. Given that a three-year window is used 
and there are mostly three efficiency scores for a single year. The average yearly efficiency 
score for the examined DMBs are utilised. Therefore, due to the elaborate review of the DEA 
technique in subsequent sections, the DEA technique is not extensively reviewed here. 
However, the target of the employment of the average annual BCC efficiency score is to 
ascertain the influence of bank-specific CAMELS ratios and macroeconomic factors on 
efficiency.  
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Bank Performance Indicators: Return on Assets (ROA) 
The performance of banking institutions can be measured by several variables. And as such, 
there is no specific theoretical viewpoint or sufficient empirical evidence that upholds the 
superiority of any specific performance proxy over others. On this account, this study adopts 
the Return on Assets (ROA) as the preferred proxy for bank performance. More so, the 
Return on Assets (ROA) is one of the most commonly used proxies of bank performance 
adopted in banking performance literature.   
ROA determines profitability which is net income after taxes for the year relative to total 
average assets. ROA is an internal performance measure of shareholder value, and it is a very 
popular measure of performance due to: (1) it presents an avenue for the direct assessment of 
the financial returns of shareholders; (2) it is easily accessible for analysts, investors and 
researchers who rely on public information; and (3) it also allows for comparison between 
different institution or different sectors of the economy (Daly & Zhang, 2014). Nonetheless, 
the ROA is biased upwards for banks that make substantial portions of their profits from off-
balance sheet operations, for instance, derivative activities, as these activities generate 
revenue and expenses that are not recorded as assets (Rhoades, 1998).         
Numerous studies have emphasized the importance of the ROA as an adequate measure for 
evaluating bank performance. Amongst various studies, the following studies recently made 
use of the ROA as proxy of bank performance. Ghosh (2015) utilised the ROA to evaluate 
the performance of MENA banks during the Arab Spring. Tunay, Tunay, & Akhisar (2015) 
used the ROA as a measure of performance to estimate the interaction of Internet banking 
and bank performance. Daly & Zhang (2014) employed the ROA to comparatively analysis 
the performance of Chinese-owned in Hong Kong. Shah & Jan (2014) also utilised the ROA 
as a dependent variable to analyse the financial performance of private banks in Pakistan. 
Though ROE was also used as a measure of performance in some of the studies above, the 
ROA is adopted as the preferred indicator of performance in this study because it takes debt 
into account (Lui, 2013).  
Additionally, the Nigerian banking consolidation reforms of 2005 and 2009 banking reforms 
centered on recapitalization, translated to increase in bank assets. All the surviving banks 
after the 2005 banking consolidation reforms either raised funds through public offers or 
private placements. More so, various mergers and acquisitions transpired, in addition to 
purchase and assumption transactions boosted the asset level of Nigerian banks (CBN, 2006; 
132 
 
NDIC, 2006). Thus, the utilization of the ROA as a dependent variable is based on the above 
and as well as its use in literature. 
 
Financial Stability Indicator: Z-Score 
The Z-score is a book-based indicator that is used as a proxy for banks’ distance to default. 
The Z-score has been widely used in literature as a stability indicator (Cihak & Hesse, 2010; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011; Fu et al., 2014; Ghosh, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009). 
Thus, it is used to indicate the stability of each DMB in the sample within the period of 2000 
– 2013.   
Additionally, from a statistical point of view, the Z-score indicates the critical threshold of 
standard deviations that a ROA realization has to drop below its expected value before equity 
is exhausted and a DMB becomes insolvent. Whereas, from an economic viewpoint, the Z-
score initially measures the probability of a DMB becoming insolvent when the value of 
assets becomes lower than the value of debt. Hence, a higher (lower) Z-score implies a lower 
(higher) probability of insolvency risk (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009).   
The Z-score formula as used in Boyd & Runkle (1993) Chiaramonte et al., (2015) Cihak & 
Hesse (2010) and Kasman & Carvallo (2014) and adopted in this study is defined below as: 
𝑍𝑖 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝐸𝑖/𝑄𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝑖
 
 
Where 𝑍𝑖 is the Z-Score for bank i, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝐸𝑖/𝑄𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are the mean return on assets and ratio of 
equity to assets, respectively, for bank i during the sample period, and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝑖  is the ROA 
standard deviation for bank i during the sample period. 
The attractiveness of the Z-score measure rests on the fact that it does not require strong 
assumptions and can be used for the assessment of small and large banks. As opposed to the 
market-based risk measures, which can only be calculated for listed institutions, the Z-score 
can be computed for both listed and unlisted banks. It is a more direct measure of soundness 
compared to other measures of risk (Ghosh, 2014).  
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Despite the above advantages, the Z-score is also plagued by a few disadvantages. Firstly, its 
reliability depends on the quality of the accounting and auditing framework employed. In 
addition, the Z-score may offer positive assessments of bank distress/soundness if banks 
smooth accounting data over time. Secondly, the Z-score and market-based measures like the 
distance-to-default assess banks individually, thus potentially downplaying the risk that the 
failure of one bank may impact negatively on other financial institutions in the system 
(Chiaramonte et al., 2015).  
Regardless of the disadvantages ascribed to the Z-score, it is employed as a proxy for bank 
soundness and stability in this study. In relation to the view that the accuracy of the Z-score 
can be hampered by the reliability of the accounting and auditing framework, this study 
makes use of variables obtained from the Bankscope database to calculate the Z-Score for 
individual DMBs.  
 
Bank-Specific CAMELS Variables  
Capital Adequacy Proxy – Equity/Total Assets Ratio (ETA) 
This proxy determines how well banks are able to cope with shocks to their bottom-line. 
Capital adequacy is measured in relation to the relative risk weights apportioned to the 
diverse category of assets held both on and off balance sheet items (Sahut & Mili, 2011). It is 
assumed that better-capitalised banks are less exposed to distress. A low Equity to Total 
Assets Ratio means high leverage, which implies that a bank is less likely to be able to 
withstand shocks (Chiaramonte et al. 2015; Naceur & Kandil, 2009; Petria et al., 2015; 
Sufian et al., 2016). 
 
Asset Quality Proxy – Impaired Loans/Gross Loans Ratio (IL/GL) 
Asset quality indicators reveal symptoms of difficulties with the loan portfolio of banks. 
Problems with the asset quality of banks are typically assumed to lower profitability. More 
so, the solvency of banks is typically at risk when their assets become impaired. Therefore, it 
is essential that the asset quality indicators of banks are monitored in order to spot upsurge in 
specific risk areas such as an increase in the volume of non-performing loans (Sahut & Mili, 
2011). A bank whose borrowers default on their repayments may likely encounter cash flow 
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problems that eventually impact on its liquidity. Thus, the Impaired Loans (NPL) to Gross 
Loans ratio is utilised as an indicator of asset quality because it captures the quality of 
disbursed loans and the effect of credit risk on bank performance. The higher the ratio of 
impaired loans to gross loans, the lower the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio, other things 
being equal. Thus, an increase in the ratio should lead to an increase in the probability of 
bank distress (Chiaramonte et al., 2015; Growe, DeBruine, Lee, & Maldonado, 2014; Ongore 
& Kusa, 2013). Other users of impaired loans to gross loans to ascertain the determinants of 
efficiency, performance and stability include Kirkpatrick et al. (2008), Sufian. (2011), Petria 
et al. (2015), and Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009).  
 
Management Quality – Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
The Cost to Income ratio is adopted to show the managerial ability of bank management to 
properly manage cost against generated income. Put differently, it expresses the capacity of a 
bank to cover its operational expenses from the income generated. It is defined as the 
operational cost to operational income. Low values of CIR indicate better managerial quality 
(Chiaramonte et al., 2015; Roman & Sargu, 2013). Studies who adopted CIR as a proxy for 
management quality include, Sufian, (2011), Das & Ghosh, (2006),  Berger & DeYoung, 
(1997), Petria et al. (2015), Rashid & Jabeen, (2016), Uhde & Heimeshoff, (2009), and 
Bourkhis & Nabi, (2013) 
 
Earnings Proxy – Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
The Net Interest Margin (NIM) is defined as net interest divided by total earning assets. It is a 
measure of the difference between interest income generated and the amount of interest paid, 
relative to the amount of interest-earning assets. NIM is usually expressed as what financial 
institutions earn on loans in a particular time period in addition to other assets minus the 
interest paid on borrowed funds divided by the average amount of the assets on which income 
was earned in that time period (Ongore & Kusa, 2013). More so, NIM measures the gap 
between interest income accruable to banks based on receipts from loans and securities and 
interest cost from borrowed funds. Thus, it depicts the cost of bank intermediation activities 
and consequently, bank efficiency. Therefore, the higher the NIM of a financial institution, 
the higher is its earning margin. Nonetheless, a high NIM could also reflect deep-rooted risky 
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lending practices which could translate to substantial loan loss provisions (Khrawish, 2011). 
Few studies utilise the net interest margin as a proxy for earnings, however Sufian, (2011), 
Daly & Zhang, (2014), Uhde & Heimeshoff, (2009) adopted NIM to ascertain if it determines 
efficiency, performance, and financial stability.  
 
Liquidity – Liquid Assets/Deposit & Short Term Funding Ratio (LADSTF) 
The importance of liquidity cannot be downplayed in banking as the inability to meet 
liquidity and funding obligations may lead to failure if external support is not obtained. This 
covariate measures the ability of banks to continuously use their deposits and short term 
liquidity position to meet its customer needs and short-term liabilities. It is a deposit run-off 
ratio and it shows the percentage of customer deposits and short-term funding that could be 
realised when funds are suddenly withdrawn. And the higher the value of this ratio, the more 
liquid a bank is said to be and the less vulnerable to a classic run (Bunda & Desquilbet, 2003; 
Pasiouras, Tanna, & Zopounidis, 2007). Users of the liquid assets to deposit & short term 
funding ratio include Assaf et al. (2011), Salim et al. (2016), Ghosh, (2015), Flamini et al. 
(2009), Heffernan & Fu, (2010), Al-Jafari & Alchami, (2014), Almumani, (2013), Ayaydin & 
Karakaya, (2014), Chiaramonte et al. (2015), and Marques et al. (2013).  
 
Sensitivity to Risk – Total Securities/Total Assets Ratio (TSTA) 
The concern of this CAMELS quotient is the impact on banks from shifts and fluctuations in 
the financial market. Market forces affect the viability of banks. For instance, price 
movements that favour the portfolio of a bank may positively impact the bank’s balance 
sheet, whereas unfavourable movements may have negative effects on the bank. This proxy 
shows the relationship between the total securities portfolio of banks and their assets. It 
provides the percentage change of the portfolio in changes related to interest rates or other 
issues related to the issuers of the securities. Thus, a low value of the total securities to total 
assets ratio is an indication that a bank’s reaction towards market is appropriate. While a high 
value of the ratio depicts that the bank’s portfolio is vulnerable to market risks (Christopoulos  
et al. 2011; Mayes & Stremmel, 2012). 
 
136 
 
Non- CAMELS Ratio: Bank Size – Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
The natural Logarithm of Total Assets is the Non-CAMELS bank-specific variable employed 
for this study. However, to arrive at the Natural Logarithm, total assets inflation-adjusted 
values are calculated. The total assets of banks are divided by the yearly (2000-2013) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and then multiplied by 100 before obtaining the Natural 
Logarithm. More so, ‘natural logarithm’ is a logarithm to the base of e (2.71828183……). 
Thus, bank size is defined in this study as the logarithm of total assets to the base of e. 
Increased bank size is presumed to confer benefits that can improve performance and 
profitability. Perceived benefits of increased bank size include improved technological 
efficiency, greater market power, and the capacity to secure funding at a lower cost. 
Nonetheless, increasing size beyond certain levels may bring about scale inefficiencies as 
bureaucracy disrupts communication (Growe et al., 2014). Larger banks are more prone to 
diversification, which could have effects on risk, profitability and decision-making. As a 
result, the relationship between size and performance may be positive or negative. Due to the 
ambiguous relationship of size and bank performance in literature and in various financial 
jurisdictions, size is included as an independent variable in the regression models (Sufian, 
2011; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Heffernan & Fu, 2008; Tan & Floros, 2013; Ben Naceur 
& Goaied, 2008; Menicucci & Paolucci, 2016; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009; Fu et al., 
2014; Carretta et al., 2015). More so, the wave of bank mergers and acquisitions, in addition 
to the purchase and assumption transactions that were witnessed in the Nigerian banking 
industry as a consequence of the banking reforms within the span of the study supports the 
inclusion of this variable. 
 
Macroeconomic Variable: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Economic growth is believed to impact bank performance favourably, through increases in 
loan demand and decreases in loan default rates while favouring banks to charge higher fees 
for their services. However, this may be balanced by the increasing supply of banking 
services, as developments and new bank entrants are motivated by observed favourable 
conditions.  Conversely, literature also depicts that there are several negative ways that in 
which unfavourable economic cycles affect bank performance. In economic downturns, bank 
lending is more likely to decelerate, the quality of loans more likely to depreciate, and default 
risk also more likely to surge (Alam, 2013; Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Flamini, Mcdonald, & 
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Schumacher, 2009; Growe et al., 2014; Heffernan & Fu, 2008; Koetter et al., 2007; Lee & 
Kim, 2013; Rashid & Jabeen, 2016; Safrali & Gumush, 2012; Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). 
Macroeconomic variables are expected to assume significant importance in our study due to 
the episode of the global financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007. Hence the real 
change in gross domestic product (GDP) is incorporated in this study. 
Table 4.3: Expected Coefficient Sign of Independent Variables 
Variable Measure Notation Expected 
Sign 
(Efficiency) 
Expected Sign 
(Performance) 
Expected Sign 
(Stability) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Equity to Total 
Assets Ratio 
ETA + +  
Asset Quality Impaired Loans 
(NPL) to Gross 
Loans Ratio 
ILGL - - - 
Management 
Quality 
Operating 
Expenses to 
Operating 
Income Ratio 
(CIR) 
CIR - - - 
Earnings Net 
Interest(Interest 
received – 
Interest paid) to 
Total Earning 
Assets Ratio 
NIM + + + 
Liquidity Liquid Assets to 
Deposits & 
Short Term 
Funding Ratio 
LADSTF + +/- +/- 
Sensitivity to 
Market Risk 
Proxy 
Total Securities 
to Total Assets 
Ratio 
TSTA - - - 
Bank Size Natural 
Logarithm of 
Total Assets 
SIZENLTA +/- +/- +/- 
Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
GDP + + +/- 
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4.8 Justification for Adopting Two Quantitative Techniques 
 
The DEA window analysis and multiple regression analysis are jointly employed in this study 
due to the reasons below.   
DEA window analysis examines the efficiency of individual DMBs, whereas regression 
analysis aggregates financial ratios of all DMBs to indicate the impact of a range of 
CAMELS bank-specific variables, size and GDP on efficiency (efficiency scores). 
Additionally, regression analysis also examines the impact of CAMELS bank specific, size 
and GDP on bank performance and financial stability. Recent studies have engaged in the 
second stage analysis of bank efficiency by using efficiency scores as dependent variables 
(examples include Assaf, Barros, & Matousek, 2011; Chortareas, Girardone, & Ventouri, 
2012; Sufian, 2011; Wang, Lu, & Liu, 2014; Wu et al 2016). This makes the examination of 
efficiency more robust as the regression analysis indicates the determinants of efficiency. 
More so, the inclusion of additional dependent variables (ROA proxy for bank performance 
and Z-Score proxy for banking stability) in similar regression models (model 2 and model 3) 
provides avenues to discover the determinants of bank performance and financial stability. 
Moreover, the results of the regression models make for interesting comparison.      
Furthermore, the employment of the DEA window analysis and multiple regression analysis 
are complementary. DEA window analysis is based on the moving averages analogue, while 
regression analysis can be manipulated to account for the effects of independent variables in 
different periods. Therefore, the results from both techniques are used in this study to shed 
light on the effects of the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reform on the efficiency, 
performance, and stability of Nigerian DMBs.  
More so, the use of two quantitative techniques increases the reliability of the results of this 
thesis. As both techniques can be easily replicated, the results obtained in this study can be 
relied upon.  To this end, the validity and reliability of this thesis which adopts two 
quantitative methods and one qualitative method in a mixed methods research are elaborated 
upon below.       
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4.9 Validity and Reliability 
 
4.9.1 Validity  
 
The question that should be asked here is “are we measuring what we think we are 
measuring?” Kumar (2005) opines that validity is the ability of an instrument to measure 
what it is designed to measure. Hence, validity is defined as the degree to which the 
researcher has measured what he or she set out to measure (Denscombe, 2014). To further the 
definition of validity, Saunders & Lewis (2012) suggest that validity is the extent to which a 
data collection method or methods accurately measure what they set out to measure and the 
research findings are really about what they acknowledge to be about. Simply put, validity is 
concerned with whether research findings are actually about what they seem to be about. 
Validity is a crucial factor that should be considered in research strategy design. This is 
owing to the view that various factors can render research findings invalid. Thus, to arrive at 
valid research conclusions, the factors that threaten the validity of findings must be 
eliminated (Saunders & Lewis, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012). 
Consequently, the principal factors that threaten validity (Saunders & Lewis, 2012) and how 
this particular study navigates through them in order to draw valid conclusions are presented 
below: 
Subject Selection – This points to the notion that biases may exist as a result of selecting 
research subjects, which are not representative of the general population. However, in a bid to 
ensure that the population used in this research are valid and can be used to draw conclusions, 
this study makes use of data that covers all the institutions involved. The data collected from 
the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation have aggregated 
information of all the commercial banks that operated in Nigeria. This indicates that the 
information used is a true representation of the general population, and thus valid 
generalisations can be made. Though it was the desire of this study to interview one 
individual each from all the twenty-three institutions (twenty-one commercial banks and the 
two regulatory agencies) presently in existence, only seventeen individuals were eventually 
interviewed. But to scale down this limitation and increase validity, financial figures covering 
all the banks still in existence and those that operated in the country before the consolidation 
reforms of 2005 are examined in this study. 
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History – Specific events, which occur in the history of the observed phenomenon, may have 
a significant effect on research findings. Due to the effect of such events, the research 
strategy employed should be able to incorporate the history. Accordingly, in order to ensure 
validity, the scope of this study is fourteen (14) years (2000 – 2013). The periods before and 
after the 2005 banking reforms, the 2009 banking reforms, the global financial crisis that 
started in the second half of 2007, and the periods before some banks were nationalised and 
transformed into bridge banks are all covered within the scope of the study. All these events 
that are perceived to have some impact on the performance of banking institutions are 
discussed in this study and interview questions solicited answers, which sought to bring to 
light the effects of these events. 
Testing – This factor suggests that the process of collecting data may have effects on the 
subjects. For instance, respondents may try to impress the interviewer, and in the process, 
stray from providing valid responses. In relation to this study, responses were only obtained 
from seasoned, experienced bankers who had no reason to impress the interviewer because 
they acted in positions of trust and had their reputation and those of their institutions to 
protect. More so, the information collected from regulatory documents, the financial stability 
reports of the CBN and the annual reports of the NDIC are documents that were carefully 
prepared because of the audience. Likewise, the data obtained from the BUREAU VAN 
DJIK Bankscope database are adaptations from original bank financial statements, and this 
database is renowned to be used for academic and professional research. Thus, to ensure the 
validity of this study, only trusted data sources as mentioned have been used. 
Mortality – This is mainly an important issue for the conduct of longitudinal research if it 
happens that the research subject is lost. However, institutions matter in this particular study 
but not individuals. Even though some banks ceased to exist during the period covered, their 
non-existence is integral to this study. 
Furthermore, validity can be viewed under two perspectives (internal and external validity). 
The factors discussed above are predominantly viewed as internal validity. External validity 
refers to the extent to which conclusions are generalizable under different research settings. 
This dwells on whether the institutions used can be relied upon to guarantee generalisations. 
The concern of this research is to x-ray the regulatory terrain in the Nigerian banking sector, 
and it does not make recommendations that should exactly fit into the scope of another 
banking sector. However, the generalisations made can be used as a reference source 
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especially to developing countries in Africa,  while the methods employed can be adopted to 
be applied in other jurisdictions (Heukelom, 2009; Saunders & Lewis, 2012).  
 
4.9.2 Reliability 
 
When a research tool is consistent and stable, for this reason, predictable and accurate, it is 
said to be reliable. As a result, the greater the degree of consistency and stability of a method, 
the greater is its reliability (Kumar, 2005). 
Equally, for a research to be reliable, it must adopt data collection methods and analysis 
procedures, which are bound to produce consistent findings. The consistency referred to 
points to the degree to which the questions below can be answered: 
 Will the measures used produce the same results if used on other occasions? 
 Will other researchers’ produce the same results if they adopt the same methods and 
procedures? 
 Will those interpreting the research clearly understand how conclusions were drawn 
from the data collected (Saunders & Lewis, 2012)? 
The adopted research strategy, data collection methods, and analysis techniques were 
carefully chosen to ensure reliability. In answering the questions above, the responses 
obtained from interviewees even though from different banks provided similar results. Thus, 
using the same research questions to obtain responses from different interviewees 
(experienced bank executives) will generate the similar results. More so, the technique used 
to analyse data (content analysis, DEA window analysis, and multiple regression analysis) 
can be replicated. While enumerating the strengths of content analysis, Vitouladiti (2014), 
suggested that establishing reliability is easy and straightforward. Whereas, the DEA window 
analysis technique will reveal the same results as long as the same input and output variables 
are used to examine the efficiency of banking institutions. Equally, the multiple regression 
analysis carried out will present the same results as long as the same variables and tests are 
employed. As already discussed in the literature chapter, the techniques utilized for analysing 
data have been used severally in the estimation of bank performance. Hence results and 
findings obtained via the utilization of the DEA window analysis and multiple regression 
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analysis can be relied upon. Additionally, the conclusions to be drawn in this study will be 
able to be understood in line with the collected data. 
Conclusively, proponents of mixed research methods of which this study adopts are of the 
view that triangulation leads to thicker and richer data and complementary data analysis 
techniques which ensure validity and reliability (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2011). 
 
4.10 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter centered on the comprehensive presentation of the procedures adopted to 
achieve the aims and objectives of this study. The philosophical stand of the research study; 
the adopted research approach; the appropriate research strategies; the research study period; 
and the data collection and analysis techniques employed in this study were examined in this 
chapter. In summary, this research leans towards the pragmatic paradigm as it relies on 
elements of both the positivist and interpretivist in order to answer the research questions. In 
like manner, the abduction research was also discussed as the preferred research approach as 
it seesaws between induction and deduction in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the 
study. Progressively, the chapter also highlighted triangulation of data collection methods as 
qualitative and quantitative research strategies were employed to obtain data for analysis. 
Furthermore, presentations that center on the three data analysis techniques were made. 
Firstly, content analysis is used in this study to analyse interview responses and regulatory 
documents. Secondly, DEA window analysis which is anchored largely on either the CCR 
model (constant returns to scale assumption) and the BCC model (variable returns to scale 
assumption) are comprehensively discussed, before indicating that the BCC efficiency scores 
are relied upon instead of the CCR efficiency scores due to the inability of the CCR model to 
identify scale effects. Thirdly, panel data variant of multiple regression estimations is used to 
ascertain the relationship between the dependent variables proxies of bank efficiency, bank 
performance, and bank stability, and the independent variables proxies of capital adequacy, 
asset quality, management quality, earning capacity, liquidity, sensitivity to market risk, bank 
size, and GDP. Finally, the validity and reliability of this are justified to round up the chapter. 
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Chapter Five: DEA Window Analysis Technique 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter dwells on the analysis of the performance of Nigerian DMBs based on 
efficiency scores obtained through the utilisation of the DEA window technique. As 
mentioned in previous chapters of this thesis, the DEA window method measures the 
performance of a DMU against other DMUs and itself within a particular window. Therefore, 
the performances of Nigerian Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) are analysed in twelve windows 
(window 1 – window 12) to ascertain the effects of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, and 
the global financial crisis on efficiency. Put differently; this chapter examines efficiency 
scores based on the inputs and output relationship influenced by the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms, the event of the global financial crisis, the bailout strategy and the bridge banking 
mechanism. Therefore, the performance of Nigerian Tier I (big DMBs) and Tier II (medium 
& small sized DMBs), bailed-out DMBs, and bridge banks are x-rayed within the period of 
2000 - 2013.   
As presented and discussed in the literature and methodology chapters of this study, the basic 
DEA models are based on two broad assumptions i.e. the constant returns to scale (CCR) and 
the variable returns to scale (BCC). This study initially set out to ascertain the efficiency of 
Nigerian banks based on the calculated CCR and BCC efficiency scores for the period of 
2000 to 2013. However, this section relies primarily on the BCC efficiency scores to draw 
conclusions owing to the similarity in the pattern of efficiency scores. More so, due to the 
premise that CCR indicates the overall technical efficiency (OTE) of banking institutions, 
while BCC is more comprehensive as it decomposes overall technical efficiency (OTE) into 
pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). The BCC model estimates whether 
organisations are operating under increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. 
Therefore, the BCC model is picked over the CCR model in the assessment of the efficiency 
of Nigerian DMBs.      
Consequently, BCC efficiency scores obtained from the interaction of Nigerian DMBs inputs 
(interest expenses, non-interest expenses, and total deposits) that produced outputs (interest 
income, non-interest income, and total loans) are trusted in the evaluation of the performance 
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of individual DMBs and classes of DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector from 2000 – 2013. 
The analysis of the efficiency scores of DMBs, therefore, shows the extent to which the 
initiatives and strategies of Nigerian regulators influenced inputs and output production.     
In addition, the similarity in the slope of the aggregate efficiency scores of both the CCR and 
BCC models as depicted in the diagram below affirms the position of the study to rely on the 
efficiency scores of one out of the two models. 
 
Figure 5.1 BCC and CCR Aggregate Average Efficiency Score 
 
 
The superior slope of the BCC is an indication that the BCC (VRS) efficiency scores are 
higher than the CCR (CRS) efficiency scores. Hence, when the results of the BCC model are 
compared against those of the CCR model, the DMUs under the BCC model show higher 
degrees of efficiency, although there are instances where they are the same. Therefore, the 
number of efficient banks (DMUs), the percentage of efficient banks, and the average 
efficiency score under the BCC model are higher than those of the CCR model.    
Although the efficiency scores under the constant returns to scale assumption (CCR) are not 
discussed in conjunction with the adopted variable returns to scale assumption model (BCC), 
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the CCR efficiency scores are presented in the appendix section to validate the conclusions of 
the study.  In addition, the CCR efficiency scores are attached to increase the robustness of 
our results. Likewise, only the BCC efficiency scores are used as dependent variables in the 
estimation of the effects of bank-specific CAMELS variables, size and GDP on efficiency.  
 
5.2 Banker – Charnes – Cooper (BCC) Model 
 
As depicted above, the BCC model relies on the variable returns to scale assumption. 
Therefore, the efficiency of Nigerians DMBs are measured using different returns to scale 
(increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale). This section dwells on the analysis of the 
BCC efficiency scores.   
The table below is a summary of the BCC model analysis, and it shows the number of DMBs 
in each window, the number of DMUs or observations, the number of efficient and inefficient 
DMUs, the percentage of efficient and inefficient DMUs, and the average efficiency score of 
DMUs in each window. 
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Table 5.1: BCC Outcome  
Windows 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
Years 
2000 – 
2002 
2001 – 
2003 
2002 - 
2004 
2003 - 
2005 
2004 - 
2006 
2005 - 
2007 
2006 - 
2008 
2007 - 
2009 
2008 - 
2010 
2009 - 
2011 
2010 - 
2012 
2011 - 
2013 
No. of Banks 
 
75 73 70 62 40 29 24 23 23 25 24 20 
No. of DMUs 
 
187 186 163 127 89 72 65 64 63 63 61 60 
Efficient DMUs 21 14 13 20 22 21 21 26 18 16 18 23 
Inefficient DMUs 
 
166 172 150 107 67 51 44 38 45 47 43 37 
Efficient DMUs 11.23% 7.53% 7.98% 15.75% 24.72% 29.17% 32.31% 40.63% 28.57% 25.4% 29.51% 38.33% 
% of Inefficient DMUs 88.77% 92.47% 92.02% 84.25% 75.28% 70.83% 67.69% 59.38% 71.43% 74.6% 70.49% 61.67% 
Average Efficiency 
Score 
71.04% 65.07% 70.15% 73.07% 71.85% 81.83% 85.1% 89.83% 82.92% 77.91% 77.23% 85.26% 
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5.3 Window 1: BCC (2000, 2001, and 2002) 
 
The table above shows that 75 DMBs with data translated to 187 DMUS or observations in 
window 1 in line with the three-year window size adopted for this study. The results revealed 
21 efficient DMUs and 166 inefficient DMUs. Thus, 11.23% of the DMUs are efficient, 
while 88.77% are inefficient. The lowly 11.23% is a poor showing for the Nigerian banking 
sector, in particular for a period that consists of 187 DMUs. The average efficiency score of 
71.04% is 28.96% less of the efficiency mark of 100%. Therefore, in line with the principles 
of DEA, the aggregate performance of Nigerian DMBs in window 1 is not good enough to be 
tagged as efficient.  
The table below shows efficient Nigerian DMBs that were at least efficient in one of the three 
years in window 1. 
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Table 5.2: Window 1 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2000 2001 2002 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓ ✓ ✓ 
First Bank   ✓ 
Skye Bank   ✓ 
IBTC Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Sterling Bank   ✓ 
Manny Bank ✓   
Bank of the North ✓  ✓ 
Assurance Bank  ✓  
Cooperative Dev   ✓ 
Centre-Point Bank  ✓  
National Bank ✓ ✓  
Lead Bank  ✓ ✓ 
NUB Bank  ✓  
Fortune Bank   ✓ 
Indo-Nigerian Bank ✓   
 
Regarding the performance of individual DMBs within window 1, 15 DMBs were efficient in 
at least one of the three years covered. Table 5.2 indicates that Citibank was the most 
efficient DMB with efficiency scores of 100% in all the three years. IBTC Bank, Bank of the 
North, National Bank and Lead Bank were all efficient in two years within the window. And 
the remaining banks on the table were only efficient in a year each within the window. 
Based on the classes of the efficient DMUs, Table 5.2 consist of mostly small-sized DMBs. 
The large presence of small banks on the efficiency frontier is an indication that small banks 
in Nigerian within the period of 2000 to 2002 made better use of their inputs. Therefore, 
suggesting most of the large banks were not efficient in the utilisation of inputs at their 
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disposal. However, the only exceptions to the lax performance of large banks within window 
1 are First Bank and Bank of the North. Bank of the North was efficient in 2000 and 2002, 
whereas First Bank was only efficient in 2002. The fact that Bank of the North and First Bank 
are the only big banks on Table 5.2 highlights the superior performance of small DMBs over 
large DMBs in window 1 of this study. In addition, apart from Oceanic Bank which had an 
efficiency score of 93.27 in 2001 in window 1, the efficiency scores of big banks like GTB, 
Union Bank, Intercontinental Bank and Zenith Bank were below 90% in all three years. More 
so, some big banks had efficiency scores that were below 50% in some years in window 1. 
For example, Afribank had an efficiency score of 48.4 in 2000, while UBA had an efficiency 
score of 46.67 in 2001. As such, these results suggest that large DMBs were inefficient within 
window 1.      
Conversely, though small DMBs operating in Nigeria are depicted to have more DMUs on 
the efficiency frontier, some the small DMBs had efficiency scores that were below 50% 
within the window. The small-sized DMBs with efficiency scores below 50% include: 
Metropolitan Bank which had an efficiency score of 36.06 in 2000; Broad bank had an 
efficiency score of 31.52 in 2001; NNB International Bank had an efficiency score of 39.35 
in 2002; Societe Generale bank had efficiency scores of 40.58 and 36.75 in 2000 and 2001; 
Platinum bank had efficiency scores of 44.41and 40.2 in 2001 and 2002; Fountain bank had 
efficiency scores of 39.28 and 37 in 2001 and 2002; and Fidelity Bank had an efficiency 
score of 39.81 in 2001. Though there are more small DMBs with efficiency scores that are 
below 50%, it should also be noted that the number of small DMBs outweighs the number of 
large banks in the Nigerian banking sector. Hence, the BCC efficiency scores suggest that the 
performance of small-sized DMBs showed conflicting results, with some exhibiting excellent 
efficiency scores, while others produced unsatisfactory scores.        
Furthermore, the efficiency scores of NUB international bank present an unusual position. 
NUB International bank was on the efficiency frontier with a score of 100 in 2001 but 
plunged to 23.68 in 2002. The performance of NUB indicates that the performance of a 
banking institution can radically change within one year. Thus suggesting the regular 
assessment of banks to mitigate against sharp decreases in efficiency levels.       
Additionally, the foreign DMBs with operations in the Nigerian banking sector in the pre-
2005 era include Citibank, Ecobank Nigeria, Indo-Nigeria Merchant Bank, Centre-Point 
Merchant Bank, NBM Bank, Regent Bank, Reliance Bank, Standard Chartered, and Stanbic 
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Nigeria. Three foreign banks are at least efficient in one year within the window (Citibank, 
Centre-Point bank, and Indo-Nigerian bank). Citibank is the most efficient DMB in window 1 
with 100% efficiency scores in all the years. Therefore, suggesting mixed results in the 
performance of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector within the window. The limited 
amount of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector does not make an accurate 
comparison between local and foreign DMBs. A review of the foreign DMBs within the 
window reveals that most of the efficiency scores range from 50% to 90%.  Hence given the 
performance of small local DMBs within the window, there are more local Nigerian DMBs 
with efficiency scores below 50%, as Reliance Bank is the only foreign DMB with an 
efficiency score that is below 50% (43.53 in 2002).  
In conclusion, small-sized DMBs dominate the efficiency frontier of window 1, while the 
most efficient DMB in the Nigerian banking sector is a foreign DMB (Citibank). Also, large 
DMBs are sparsely represented on the efficiency frontier as only two large DMBs (3 DMUs) 
are on the table of efficient DMUs (DMBs).      
 
5.4 Window 2: BCC (2001, 2002, and 2003) 
 
73 banking institutions with a total of 186 DMUs are examined in window 2. 14 out of the 
186 DMUs in window 2 are efficient whereas 172 are inefficient. Therefore, the proportion of 
efficient DMUs stood at 7.53%, while the remaining 92.47% of the DMUs were inefficient. 
When compared to the results of window 1, the results of window 2 reveal an aggregate fall 
in the efficiency level of Nigerian DMBs. Equally, the average efficiency score in window 2 
plummeted to 65.07% by 5.97% from that of window 1. Despite the fact that the performance 
of this window was worse than that of window 1, it has the same conclusion. Nigerian DMBs 
when compared to themselves and their peers in the years, 2001, 2002, and 2003 indicate that 
the summative performance of the banking sector was also inefficient. 
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Table 5.3: Window 2 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2001 2002 2003 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓  ✓ 
First Bank   ✓ ✓ 
Skye Bank  ✓  
IBTC Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Bank of the North  ✓  
Assurance Bank ✓   
Centre-Point Bank ✓   
National Bank ✓   
NUB Bank ✓   
Fortune Bank  ✓  
 
The number of efficient DMBs and in general DMUs plummeted in window 2. The most 
efficient DMB in this window is IBTC Bank because it is efficient in the three years of the 
window. IBTC was efficient in 2001 and 2002 in window 1, therefore its efficiency in all the 
three years examined in this window signify sustained performance. Consequently, IBTC 
replaced Citibank as the most efficient bank. And it can be seen from the table above that 
Citibank is efficient in two years (2001 and 2003) within window 2. However, it is not 
efficient in 2002 even though it was efficient in the same year in window 1. Thus indicating 
that the most efficient frontier in the analysis has changed and the performance of Citibank in 
2001 and 2003 was better than the performance of the bank in 2002, even though the 
efficiency score of 2002 was good enough to be on the efficiency frontier in window 1. 
Therefore, suggesting that the performance of Citibank dropped in 2002 before picking up 
again in 2003.  
Furthermore, given the performance of foreign banks in window 2, Citibank and Centre-Point 
bank are the only foreign banks to make it to the efficiency frontier. As mentioned above, 
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Citibank is efficient in 2001 and 2003 (i.e. is two years). It was the most efficient bank in the 
Nigerian banking sector in window 1 according to the BCC efficiency scores obtained. 
However, it can only be viewed as the most efficient foreign bank in window 2, as IBTC 
bank revealed perfect efficiency scores in all three years in the window. Whereas Centre-
Point bank maintained its 2001 efficiency score of window 1 in window 2, but the absence of 
data for subsequent years derailed the further assessment of the performance of Centre-Point 
bank in this study. In the light of the general performance of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian 
banking sector, the results obtained reveal the limited presence of foreign DMBs on the 
efficiency frontier. More so, the efficiency scores of the foreign DMBs were not superior to 
those of Indigenous Nigerian DMBs.           
Simultaneously, only two of the large Nigerian DMBs are on the table of efficient DMUs 
(DMBs) within window 2. First Bank is efficient in two years (i.e. 2002 and 2003) in this 
window is First Bank, while Bank of the North is efficient in 2002. The result of First Bank 
in this window is an improvement on its performance in window 1, as it was only efficient in 
one year within window 1. The absence of Bank of the North disclosed financial statements 
hindered further analysis of the performance of the bank in this study. However, the bank 
merged with other banks in 2005 during the consolidation exercise of the 2005 Nigerian 
banking reforms. In sum, the limited presence of large DMBs on the efficiency frontier 
continued in window 2. The performance of the large DMBs hovered around 50% to 90% 
just like most of the other banks in the Nigerian banking sector. Thus the performance of the 
large DMBs within window 2 did not stand out.    
Moreover, a look at the table of efficient DMUs (DMBs) indicates that there were more 
efficient small deposit money banks. Nonetheless, the efficiency level of the smaller DMBs 
within the window is not significant as the performance of DMBs in the entire banking sector 
was worse than the performance of window 1. However, given the principles of DEA, it is 
possible that the reduced number of efficient DMUs (DMBs) in window 2 was due to the 
increased efficiency of the efficient frontier of within the window.    
More so, Nigerian banking regulators increased regulatory capital from N500 million to N1 
billion for existing DMBs, and from N1 billion to N2 billion for new DMBs in 2001. The 
efficiency level of DMBs increased in 2001 in window 1, although there were more efficient 
DMUs in 2002. In like manner, the performance of DMBs in 2001 was superior to the 
performance of DMBs in 2002 and 2003. Thus the result obtained in 2001 might be 
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connected to the capital increase. More so, the reduced number of efficient DMBs in 2002 
and 2003 suggests that efficiency level increases immediately capital is injected in Nigerian 
DMBs, but such surges in efficiency levels are not sustained. Also, the number of efficient 
DMBs in 2002 and 2003 also suggest that the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs is not dependent 
on capital regulation and capital requirement. 
 
5.5 Window 3: BCC (2002, 2003, and 2004) 
 
Window 3 consists of 70 DMBs and 163 DMUs, analysed in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
Owing to the three-year window size adopted in this study, 2002 is the first year to appear in 
all three windows thus far. The performances of banks in 2000 are only examined in window 
1, while the performances of banks in 2001 are examined in window 1 and window 2.  The 
results showed 13 efficient DMUs out of 163. Therefore, 150 out of the 163 DMUs examined 
in window 3 were inefficient. The percentage of efficient DMUs stood at 7.98%, while that of 
the inefficient DMUs was 92.02%. However, even though window 2 had more efficient 
DMUs, a slight positive movement in the percentage of efficient DMUs in window 3 was 
noticed. In the same manner, the average efficiency score witnessed a growth of 5.08% to 
tally up at 70.15% in this window. Conversely, though a positive movement occurred in the 
aggregate efficiency score of the Nigerian banking sector, the performance of the Nigerian 
banking sector was inefficient in line with the principles of the DEA methodology. 
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Table 5.4: Window 3 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2002 2003 2004 
CitiBank Nigeria  ✓  
First Bank  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Guaranty Trust Bank   ✓ 
Skye Bank ✓   
IBTC Bank ✓ ✓  
Wema Bank   ✓ 
Manny Bank   ✓ 
Bank of the North ✓   
Fortune Bank ✓   
Co-operative Bank  ✓  
 
Dwelling on the particular performance of individual DMBs in window 3 under the BCC 
model, First Bank is the only bank to be efficient in all the three years. Thus First Bank is the 
most efficient bank in window 3, and this is also the first time a big bank is the most efficient 
bank in any particular window. The performance of First Bank is an improvement on its 
performance in window 2, as it moved from being efficient in 2 years to being efficient in all 
3 years in this window.  
More so, this window witnessed an increase in the number of big banks on the efficiency 
frontier with GTB joining First Bank and Bank of the North on the table of efficient DMUs 
(DMBs). The results show GTB to be efficient in 2004 which is an increase on the 2002 and 
2003 of the bank. The surge in the performance of GTB was not marked by any significant 
event in the Nigerian banking sector, although the surge could be associated to the 
pronouncement of 2005 banking reforms on July 6, 2004.  
Furthermore, apart from First Bank, IBTC is the only DMB to the efficient in two years in 
window 3, as all the other banks on the table have efficiency scores of 100% in not more than 
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one year each. IBTC was the most efficient DMB in window 2, but its efficiency score of 
85.57 in 2004, ensured it lost its position as the top bank according to the BCC efficiency 
scores.         
With the change in the years examined in every window, Citibank, which was efficient in two 
years in window 2, was only efficient in one year (2003). A look at the table of efficient 
DMUs (DMBs) reveals that Citibank is the only foreign DMB on the efficiency frontier 
within window 3. Thus suggesting the performance of foreign DMBs in Nigeria within 
window 3 are not superior to those of indigenous DMBs.    
Progressively, apart from the few big banks and the sole foreign DMB on the table of 
efficient DMUs (DMBs), the other efficient DMBs on the efficiency frontier are the smaller 
Nigerian DMBs. Thus given the classification of banking institutions in the Nigerian banking 
sector, medium or small DMBs are more efficient in the utilisation of their inputs.  
 
5.6 Window 4: BCC (2003, 2004, and 2005) 
 
Following the announcement of the commencement of the banking reform programme that 
culminated on 31 December 2005, banking institutions embarked on various capital raising 
initiatives within this window. For that reason, the number of money deposit banks examined 
in this window reduced to 62, which then amounted to 127 DMUs. The number of efficient 
DMUs under the BCC model increased to 20, with the inefficient banks amounting to 107. 
As such, the percentage of efficient DMUs stood at 15.75%, with the remaining 84.25% 
being inefficient. In like manner, the average efficiency score increased to 73.07% (window 
4) from 70.15% (window 3). Therefore, the average efficiency score of 73.07% suggest that 
the Nigerian banking sector is inefficient. 
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Table 5.5: Window 4 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2003 2004 2005 
CitiBank ✓  ✓ 
First Bank of Nigeria ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Guaranty Trust Bank   ✓ 
IBTC Bank ✓  ✓ 
UBA   ✓ 
Wema Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Zenith Bank   ✓ 
Oceanic Bank   ✓ 
Intercontinental Bank   ✓ 
Manny Bank  ✓  
Chartered Bank  ✓  
National Bank  ✓  
Lead Bank ✓   
Fortune Bank ✓   
Co-operative Bank ✓   
 
A look at the table above shows that 6 DMUs are efficient in 2003, while 5 DMUs are 
efficient in 2004. The year 2005 has the highest number of efficient DMUs with nine (9) 
efficient DMUs within the window. Therefore, the capital requirement increase of the 2005 
banking reforms might have probably led to the increased number of DMUs within the 
window and in the year 2005 to be particular.  
Just as in window 3, First Bank is efficient in all the three years of the window, thus it retains 
its position as the most efficient DMB in window 4 according to the BCC efficiency scores. 
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First Bank is a large Nigerian DMB (Tier I), and it can be seen from the above table that the 
number of large DMBs on the efficiency frontier has increased. The increase in the number of 
efficient DMBs is visible in 2005. The 2005 banking reforms mandated DMBs to increase 
their regulatory capital to N25 billion before the end of 31 December 2005. Some DMBs 
simply raised capital from the capital market, while most banks merged or were acquired 
before they raised additional capital through the capital market. Thus a host of banking 
institutions seized to exist. The DMBs that emerged after the 2005 banking reforms are listed 
in Appendix 8. 
The small or medium-sized DMBs dominated the efficiency frontier in 2003 and 2004, while 
the big banks dominated in 2005. The BCC efficiency scores indicate that more DMBs in the 
window were efficient in 2005 compared to 2003 and 2004, thus suggesting that the 2005 
banking reforms had positive effects on the performance of Nigerian DMBs.  
Furthermore, the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms affected Nigerian 
DMBs in different ways. To ascertain the effects of the reforms on the performance of 
DMBs, this study will rely in large part on the scenario presented by the banks on the table of 
efficient DMUs (banks) above. The results show that Lead bank was efficient in 2003 in 
window 4 but its performance dipped to 96.57 in 2004. Afribank acquired Lead bank due to 
the inability of the bank to raise additional capital to meet the N25 billion minimum capital 
base. Although Afribank was considered a big bank, the acquisition of Lead Bank did not 
lead to a significant increase in the efficiency score of the bank, as the 2005 efficiency score 
of Afribank for window 4 stood at 68.39. This scenario reveals that bank acquisitions do not 
necessarily translate into efficiency.  
In the case of Fortune bank, even though it was efficient in 2003 and the efficiency scores of 
the bank in previous windows ranged between 70 and 100, the bank was unable to raise 
additional capital to meet the minimum capital requirement. Consequently, it was liquidated 
by the NDIC in 2006.   
Similarly, Co-operative Bank had an efficiency score of 100 in 2003. It merged with Prudent 
Bank, EIB International Plc, Bond Bank, and Reliance Bank to form Skye bank after the 
2005 banking reforms. Prudent Bank was only efficient in the year 2002 in window 1 to 
window 3. While Reliance Bank, Bond Bank and EIB International Bank were not efficient 
in any of the windows and years, they had data before the merger. Given the efficiency of the 
resulting DMB, the merger did not translate into healthier efficiency levels. Thus, suggesting 
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that the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms did not lead to improved 
efficiency levels.     
Manny bank was one of the banks acquired by Fidelity Bank, alongside FSB International 
Bank. Even though Manny bank was efficient in 2004 within window 4 before the deadline 
of the 2005 banking reforms, its merger with Fidelity Bank did not make Fidelity Bank 100% 
efficient. However, the merger led to a surge in the efficiency score of Fidelity Bank within 
the window, as efficiency increased from 62.52 in 2004 to 82.83. The results of Fidelity Bank 
in this window is an indication that the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms 
had a positive effect on the efficiency of some DMBs.     
Chartered Bank was for the first time efficient (efficiency score of 100) in any of the 
windows examined thus far. Its efficiency score of 100% in 2004 (window 4) was a slight 
increase from its 2003 efficiency score of 91.63. However, the efficiency score plunged to 
93.98 in 2005. Although it can be posited that the declining efficiency score was due to the 
preparation for the merger of the bank with IBTC bank which happened at the end of 2005. 
More so, IBTC Bank which merged with Chartered Bank had an efficiency score of 100 in 
2005. The impact of the merger on the performance of the resulting bank is examined in 
window 5 when the bank became IBTC Chartered Bank.  
Furthermore, National Bank, which was efficient in 2004, merged with Wema Bank in 2005. 
The results obtained reveal that Wema Bank was efficient in 2005. Consequently, suggesting 
that the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms had a positive impact on the 
performance of the new Wema bank.  
The performance of large DMUs (Tier I) in the Nigerian banking sector improved in 2005 as 
depicted in the table of efficient DMUs (DMBs) above. Apart from First Bank that is the 
most efficient bank within the window and is efficient in all the three years, all the other large 
DMBs (GTB, UBA, Zenith Bank, Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental Bank) on the table of 
efficient DMUs are only efficient in 2005. First Bank merged with FBN Merchant Bankers 
and MBC International Bank. Hence, the 100% efficiency score of First Bank in 2005 opines 
that the merger of the DMB with different DMBs did not impact negatively on the efficiency 
scores of the DMB as it maintained its efficiency level.      
In the same vein, UBA merged with Standard Chartered Bank and Commercial Bank but 
retained the name UBA. All the three banks that merged to make up the new UBA were 
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individually not efficient according to the DEA efficiency frontier technique in any of the 
windows examined before this window. The merger further consolidated the position of the 
DMB as one of largest DMBs in Nigeria. Therefore, the 100% efficiency score of the bank in 
2005 is an indication of the positive impact of the 2005 banking reforms. Given the inputs 
employed to ascertain the efficiency of banking institutions in Nigeria, the surge in the 
performance of UBA in the merger year could be down to increased deposits that accrued to 
the bank due to the increase in branch network and customer base. Also, the surge in 
efficiency scores could be down to the increased regulatory capital. Nonetheless, although all 
the banks that survived the 2005 banking reforms had N25 billion or more as regulatory 
capital, the 2005 efficiency scores suggest only nine DMBs were efficient. Hence, signifying 
that surviving DMBs reacted differently to the new capital base and size due to the various 
mergers and acquisitions that might have overwhelmed some institutions. 
Oceanic Bank acquired International Trust Bank, while Intercontinental Bank merged with 
Global Bank, Equity Bank, and Gateway Bank. Both Oceanic and Intercontinental Bank were 
not efficient in any of the examined windows, and they were not efficient in any of the years 
before 2005. Therefore, it can be posited that the increase in regulatory capital and the 
increased bank size, branch network and customer base of Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental 
Bank which was fostered by the event of the 2005 banking reforms led to the efficiency of 
the DMBs in 2005.    
Additionally, GTB and Zenith bank were not involved in any mergers and acquisitions but 
witnessed improved efficiency levels in 2005, as depicted in Table 5.4. The presence of GTB 
and Zenith Bank on the efficiency frontier is most likely due to the increased regulatory 
capital; however not all the surviving banking institutions were efficient in 2005 within the 
window. Consequently, the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs is not hinged on capital 
requirement.       
Citibank is the only foreign bank on the table of efficient DMUs (DMBs), and it is efficient in 
2003 and 2005. The number of foreign DMBs dwindled in 2005 during the 2005 banking 
consolidation exercise as bigger Nigerian banks acquired some of them (Appendix 8). Been a 
member of the American Citi group, Citibank met the minimum capital requirement without 
merging with other Nigerian DMBs. Thus the bank was not weighed down by the rigours of 
merging with another bank, which could in addition to the increased regulatory capital be 
responsible for the 100% efficiency in 2005. 
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In conclusion, the results suggest that the 2005 banking reforms enhanced the efficiency of 
Nigerian DMBs, even though different DMBs reacted differently to the mergers and 
acquisitions that transpired during the consolidation exercise of the reforms. The large DMBs 
reacted positively to the reforms as they dominated the efficiency frontier in 2005. 
Additionally, the numbers of foreign DMBs on the efficiency frontier were limited as 
Nigerian DMBs became bigger, although some of the foreign DMBs merged with indigenous 
Nigerian DMBs during the consolidation exercise.   
 
5.7 Window 5: BCC (2004, 2005, and 2006) 
 
The years examined in this window are integral to achieving the aims and objectives of this 
study. Although the number of DMUs decreased because of the consolidation exercise of the 
2005 banking reforms, the number of efficient DMUs positively increased to 22, while the 
number of inefficient DMUs conversely fell to 67. In like manner, the percentage of the 
efficient DMUs amounted to 24.72%, with the percentage of inefficient DMUs totalling up to 
75.28%. Though the number of efficient DMUs increased and translated to an increase in the 
proportion of efficient DMUs, the average efficiency score plunged to 71.85%. The drop in 
the average efficiency score indicates that although a larger number of banks were efficient in 
this window; other DMUs within the window had inferior efficiency scores that pulled down 
the efficiency level of the window. In a similar vein, the aggregate efficiency scores of all the 
banks in the window just like in previous Windows signifies inefficiency. 
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Table 5.6: Window 5 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2004 2005 2006 
Access Bank   ✓ 
CitiBank Nigeria  ✓ ✓ 
First Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
IBTC Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard Chartered   ✓ 
Stanbic Bank Nigeria   ✓ 
UBA  ✓ ✓ 
Wema Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Zenith Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Oceanic Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Intercontinental Bank  ✓ ✓ 
National Bank ✓   
 
The table above shows that 2006 is the most efficient year in the window as it has 11 efficient 
DMUs. DMUs in 2005 are more efficient to DMUs in 2004, as 2005 has eight efficient 
DMUs, whereas 2004 has only three DMUs. The 2006 efficiency scores indicate that there 
was an improvement in the performance of banking institutions when compared with the 
efficiency scores of 2004 and 2005. Therefore, the efficiency scores of this window reveal 
that the 2005 banking reforms had a positive impact on the performance of DMBs.  
The table above shows that two DMBs (First Bank and IBTC Bank) had efficiency scores of 
100% in all three years of the window (6 DMUs). First Bank maintained its performance in 
this window, as it was the only bank with 100% efficiency scores in all three years in window 
4. IBTC bank was efficient in 2 years (2003 and 2005) within window 4; however, the results 
of window 5 show that IBTC was efficient in 2004. The performance of a DMB is measured 
in every window without consideration to the performance of the same DMB in other 
windows. Hence, the parameters for comparison must have changed as the efficiency frontier 
in every window differs in line with the principles of the DEA window technique. As such, 
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the change in the efficiency frontier of window 5 led to the efficiency of IBTC bank in 2004. 
More so, the results of IBTC in this window suggest that its merger with Chartered Bank to 
become IBTC Chartered Bank was beneficial as the DMB continued to be efficient even as 
other DMBs were trying to get their acts together following the consolidation exercise of the 
2005 banking reforms. 
Apart from First Bank and IBTC Bank, National Bank is the only other efficient bank in 2004 
in window 5. Manny bank, Chartered bank, and Wema bank were efficient in 2004 in 
window 4; however, the results of this window showed that they are not on the efficiency 
frontier for the same period. Therefore, the efficiency level of Manny bank, Chartered bank, 
and Wema bank in 2004 fell below the efficiency frontier when compared against more 
efficient DMUs in 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, National Bank is the only bank that did not 
survive the consolidation exercise on the table of efficient DMUs.  
As presented in the previous window, Wema Bank acquired National Bank during the 
consolidation exercise, which could be responsible for the efficiency of the bank in 2006 
even though Wema bank was also efficient in 2005 within window 5. As a result, the 
performance of Wema Bank in 2006 is commendable as it was able to muster an efficiency 
score of 100 immediately after its merger with National Bank. In like manner, the 
performance of Wema Bank highlights the positive effect of the 2005 banking reforms.  
Additionally, Zenith Bank, UBA, Oceanic bank, and Intercontinental bank improved on their 
window 4 performances in this window as they are all efficient in 2 years (2005 and 2006) in 
this window. The efficiency scores of these big banks and those of First Bank in the entire 
window and the 2006 efficiency score of Access Bank highlights the positive effect of the 
2005 banking reforms on the performance of large DMBs and the banking sector in general.  
Conversely, GTB had an efficiency score of 100 in 2005 in window 4 but was not on the 
efficiency frontier in either 2005 or 2006 of window 5. The efficiency scores of GTB dropped 
to 99.05 in 2005, and further fell to 95.61 in 2006. The slight decline of the 2005 efficiency 
score of GTB in this window is an indication that the other DMBs on the frontier are more 
efficient when compared to the performance of GTB. Similarly, a host of DMBs just like 
GTB had their efficiency scores below 100% in window 5. The DMBs that survived the 
banking consolidation reforms with efficiency scores below 100% in window 5 include 
Diamond Bank, Fidelity Bank, FCMB, Skye Bank, Sterling Bank, Union Bank, Bank PHB, 
ETB, and Afribank. The performance of these DMBs reveals that the 2005 banking reforms 
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did not immediately translate to 100% efficiency scores as most of the DMBs had efficiency 
scores below 100%. However, even though most of the DMBs were not 100% efficient, there 
were improvements in their efficiency scores. More so, the several mergers and acquisitions 
that occurred in the Nigerian banking sector between 2005 and 2006 could be responsible for 
the inability of some DMBs to post 100% efficiency scores. As most DMBs were striving to 
come to terms with changes such as the integration of banking IT packages, banking cultures, 
and personnel. Thus, it is possible that these changes affected the ability of inputs to produce 
optimum output in the DMBs that either merged or were acquired.     
Continuously, the performance of foreign DMBs in this window fell below the performance 
of Indigenous DMBs. Citibank, Standard Chartered, and Stanbic Bank are the only foreign 
DMBs on the efficiency frontier in window 5. The number of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian 
banking sector was reduced to four after the 2005 banking reforms. Hence, Ecobank is the 
only foreign DMB not to make it to the efficiency frontier within the window. Citibank is the 
most efficient of the foreign DMBs as it is efficient in 2 years (2005 and 2006) within the 
window. Citibank was not efficient in 2004 in the previous window, and this did not change 
in this window, however, the 100% perfect efficiency scores of the DMB in 2005 and 2006 
lead to the conclusion that the increased regulatory capital impacted positively on the 
efficiency level of the DMB. In the same vein, Stanbic Bank and Standard Chartered Bank 
were not on the efficiency frontier in window 4 but both banks made entrances after the 2005 
banking reforms in 2006. The perfect efficiency scores of these banks in 2006 is a further 
confirmation to the positive effect of the 2005 banking reforms on the performance of DMBs 
operating in Nigeria. 
In conclusion, the efficiency levels of DMBs in this window attest to the notion that the 2005 
banking reforms positively impacted on the performance of DMBs. Correspondingly, this 
window indicates that Indigenous DMBs performed better than their foreign counterparts 
within the Nigerian banking sector. 
 
5.8 Window 6: BCC (2005, 2006, and 2007) 
 
With the elimination of 2004 from the window and the introduction of the year 2007, the 
number of Nigerian DMBs further dropped to 29 in all the years x-rayed. 21 out of the 72 
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DMUs in this window were efficient, while 51 DMUs were inefficient. The percentage of 
efficient DMUs in window 6 tallied up to 29.17%, with the remaining 70.83% were 
inefficient. The average efficiency score improved by nearly 10% from 71.85% in window 5 
to 81.83% in window 6. And just like in previous Windows, the aggregate efficiency of the 
Nigerian banking sector remains unsatisfactory. However, the improvement in the average 
efficiency score even though is still far from the efficiency level of 100% indicates that the 
2005 banking reforms had a positive effect on the Nigerian banking sector.  
Table 5.7 shows that there are more efficient DMUs in 2007, thus signifying improved 
efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector as the performance of DMBs in 2007 are better than 
the performance of DMBs in 2006, while the performance of DMBs in 2006 are also better 
than the performance of DMBs in 2005. In sum, this also leads to the notion that the 2005 
banking reforms impacted positively on the performance of DMBs in the Nigerian banking 
sector.    
About the performance of individual DMBs in window 6, IBTC was one of the two DMBs to 
be efficient in all three years in the previous window. The table of efficient DMUs (DMBs) in 
this window shows that IBTC Chartered Bank is the only DMB with 100% efficiency scores 
in all the three years in the window. Thus, the results make it the most efficient DMB in 
window 6. More so, IBTC Chartered was efficient as a purely indigenous Nigerian DMB 
before it merged with Stanbic bank in 2007 to become a foreign controlled DMB. Similarly, 
Stanbic bank was efficient in 2006 in both this window and window 5. Hence, the merger 
was of two efficient DMBs according to the obtained BCC efficiency scores. Also, the 
merger of two efficient DMBs, in this case, led to the birth of another efficient DMB in 2007 
(Stanbic IBTC Bank). 
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Table 5.7: Window 6 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2005 2006 2007 
Access Bank   ✓ 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓ ✓  
Ecobank Nigeria   ✓ 
First Bank ✓ ✓  
IBTC Chartered Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard Chartered  ✓  
Stanbic Bank  ✓  
UBA ✓  ✓ 
Unity Bank   ✓ 
Wema Bank ✓ ✓  
Oceanic Bank   ✓ 
Intercontinental Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Bank PHB   ✓ 
Afribank   ✓ 
 
In like manner, Citibank another foreign DMB is efficient in two years (2005 and 2006) 
within this window. The performance of the DMB in this window mirrors the performance of 
the bank in window 5. Citibank was not involved in any merger or acquisition during the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms, as such the DMB only increased its 
regulatory capital to N25 billion. Hence the branch network of the DMB remained the same, 
but the DMB was able to at least stay efficient in years within the window, even though much 
larger DMBs were not able to produce 100% efficiency scores in any single year immediately 
after the 2005 banking reforms. Therefore, an extensive branch network does not guarantee 
the efficiency.     
Furthermore, Standard Chartered Bank and Ecobank are the other foreign DMBs on the 
efficiency frontier of window 6. Standard Chartered bank was efficient in 2006, while 
Ecobank was efficient in 2007. Standard Chartered was efficient in 2006 in window 5, 
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whereas Ecobank a Pan-African foreign bank made it to the table of efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
for the first time as it was efficient in 2007. Taking into consideration the merger between 
IBTC Bank and Stanbic Bank, 6 of the efficient 21 DMUs in this window are mostly foreign 
owned. However, the limited number of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector 
indicates that Indigenous DMBs dominate the banking sector. Hence, it is rational for the 
indigenous DMBs to have more of the efficient DMUs although the possibility exists based 
on the efficiency scores in this window that foreign banks would have performed better than 
the Indigenous DMBs if they were of the same number.  
Additionally, First Bank lost its position as the most efficient DMB after its spell as the most 
efficient DMB in window 4 and window 5. First Bank had 100% efficiency scores in 2005 
and 2006 within this window, while its 2007 efficiency score plummeted to 73.91%. The 
efficiency scores on its own cannot provide justifications for the sudden fall, although the 
plunge can be attributed to the episode of the 2007 banking reforms which started in the 
second half of 2007. More so, it is likely that the euphoria of the 2005 banking reforms began 
to wane off and the performance of banking institutions going forward depended on the 
effective utilisation of inputs.  
In furtherance of the performance of DMBs in this window, Access Bank was efficient in 
2006 in window 5 but is not efficient in the same year within this window. However, it was 
efficient in 2007. In like Manner, UBA is efficient in 2005 and 2007 in this window, but it 
also had an efficiency score of 100% in 2006 in window 5. The same can be said of Oceanic 
Bank which was also efficient in 2006 in window 5 but is only efficient in 2007 in window 6. 
The efficiency scores of these banks suggest that their performance in 2007 was superior to 
their 2006 performance, which led to their inability to be on the efficiency frontier. More so, 
the failure of some DMBs to replicate their 2005 performance in 2006 submits that efficiency 
levels surged in reaction to increased regulatory capital before slightly falling in 2006. 
Conversely, DMBs like Wema Bank and Intercontinental Bank maintained their 2006 
position on the efficiency frontier in this window. However, Intercontinental Bank lost its 
2005 position on the efficiency frontier. Therefore, the results of this window indicate that the 
improvement in the performance of the DMB was progressive, as the 2006 and 2007 
performance of the DMB was better than its performance in 2005. On the other hand, the 
2005 and 2006 efficiency scores of Wema Bank were better than its 2007 efficiency score as 
efficiency dropped to 97.59%. Just like the performance of First Bank in this window, it is 
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more likely that the 2005 and 2006 perfect efficiency scores of Wema Bank was hinged on 
the 2005 increase in regulatory capital and the merger of the DMB with National Bank. In the 
same vein, it can also be claimed that the decline in the performance of the DMB in 2007 is 
related to the event of the global financial crisis which started in the second half of 2007.  
Correspondingly, in addition to Ecobank mentioned in the review of the performance of 
foreign DMBs in this window, Unity Bank, Bank PHB, and Afribank appeared on the 
efficiency frontier for the first time with 100% efficiency scores in 2007. Apart from 
Ecobank which is a foreign DMB, Unity Bank, Bank PHB and Afribank were all involved in 
mergers and acquisitions. The fact that all three DMBs were not efficient in 2005 and 2006 
could be down to the cumbersome nature of merger and acquisition strategies. Hence the 
inability of the DMBs to muster 100% efficiency scores in 2005 and 2006. Nonetheless, the 
merger and acquisition process the DMBs went through accorded them larger branch 
networks and larger customer bases which should rationally translate to more deposits and 
business opportunities (further inputs and outputs). Therefore, it is likely these benefits 
account for the 100% efficiency score of the DMBs in 2007.             
In conclusion, all the DMBs that survived the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking 
reforms had regulatory capital of N25 billion and above. Hence, all the DMBs in the banking 
sector had the capacity of competing on the same level based on the general push in inputs. 
However, based on the efficiency scores, not all the DMBs were able to attain efficiency 
levels of 100% after the 2005 reforms. Nevertheless, even though not all the DMBs on the 
table are efficient in all the years and not all the DMBs that survived the consolidation 
exercise are efficient for at least one year within the window. The results indicate an 
improvement in the performance of DMBs because of the 2005 banking reforms and the 
various mergers and acquisitions that the reforms facilitated.       
 
5.9 Window 7: BCC (2006, 2007, and 2008) 
 
With the conclusion of the 2005 Nigerian banking reforms, DMBs in the first year of this 
window were saddled with the task of integrating people, processes, systems and culture. 
Unfortunately, as the money deposit banks were still trying to settle down, the global 
financial crisis started in the second half of 2007 and continued all through 2008.      
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Due to the 2005 banking reforms, a total of 24 DMBs which translated to 65 DMUs 
(observations) is examined in this window. There are 21 efficient DMUs and 44 inefficient 
DMUs in this window. Put differently, 32.31% of the DMUs are efficient, while the 
remaining 67.69% are inefficient. The percentage of efficient DMUs is an improvement on 
the 29.17% of window 6, even as the financial crisis started and took root within this 
window. Similarly, the average efficiency score of this window is also greater than that of 
window 6, as the efficiency scores of DMUs in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 tallied up to 
85.1%.  
In the whole and based on the principles of DEA, the average efficiency score, just like in all 
the windows examined thus far falls below the efficiency level of 100%. However, the raising 
average efficiency score even in difficult periods like the global financial crisis indicates that 
the 2005 banking reforms made DMBs more formidable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Table 5.8: Window 7 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2006 2007 2008 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓   
Fidelity Bank   ✓ 
First Bank ✓  ✓ 
First City Monument   ✓ 
Guaranty Trust Bank   ✓ 
IBTC/Stanbic IBTC ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard Chartered ✓ ✓  
Stanbic Bank ✓   
Unity Bank  ✓  
Wema Bank ✓   
Zenith Bank   ✓ 
Oceanic Bank   ✓ 
Intercontinental Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Bank PHB  ✓ ✓ 
Afribank  ✓  
 
Given the performance of individual banks within window 7, the table of efficient DMBs 
shows that IBTC Bank, which became Stanbic IBTC Bank in 2007 is the most efficient bank 
with efficiency scores of 100% in all the three years. Stanbic IBTC Bank as it is presently 
called retains its position as the most efficient DMB in this window based on the BCC 
efficiency scores obtained. And just like the window 6, the most efficient DMB in the 
banking sector is a foreign DMB. Also, Stanbic Bank also maintains it's 2006 100% 
efficiency score in this window before its merger with IBTC Bank in 2007.  
In like manner, Citibank another foreign DMB is only efficient in 2006, whereas Standard 
Chartered Bank has 100% efficiency scores in 2006 and 2007. Thus, suggesting a decline in 
the performance of foreign DMBs especially in 2008 which could most likely be due to the 
episode of the global financial crisis. Conversely, Ecobank dropped out of the efficiency 
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frontier in this window as it was efficient in 2007 in window 6. Consequently, the absence of 
Ecobank on the efficiency frontier in this window is an indication that the efficiency frontier 
of this window is superior to the efficiency frontier of window 6. More so, the table of 
efficient DMUs (DMBs) indicates that there were more efficient foreign DMBs when 
compared against the efficiency level of Indigenous DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector in 
2006.     
Moreover, in addition to the four foreign DMBs with 100%, efficiency scores in 2006 within 
this window, First Bank, and Wema Bank are the only other banks with 100% efficiency 
scores. Therefore, confirming the superior efficiency frontier of this window over that of 
window 6. In conjunction with the above notion, the inability of Intercontinental Bank to post 
a 100% efficiency score in 2006 in this window confirms the superiority of the efficiency 
frontier of this window. Also, an upgrade of the efficiency frontier is an indication of an 
improvement in the measure of comparison within the window and the Nigerian banking 
sector.   
Furthermore, an examination of the table above reveals that Unity Bank, Intercontinental 
Bank, Bank PHB and Afribank maintained their 100% efficiency scores of 2007 in this 
window. However, only Intercontinental Bank and Bank PHB are efficient in 2008 as Unity 
Bank posted efficiency score of 87.25%, while there was an absence of 2008 data to examine 
the performance of Afribank.  
Simultaneously, apart from Stanbic IBTC Bank which became a foreign controlled DMB in 
2007, all the other efficient DMBs in 2008 within this window are Indigenous DMBs. Hence, 
suggesting that Indigenous DMBs performed better than foreign DMBs in the Nigerian 
banking sector during the global financial crisis. At the same time, the 2008 efficiency scores 
of this window also reveal an improvement in the performance of large DMBs.       
Finally, the results of this window further indicate that the performance of Nigerian DMBs 
improved in the post-2005 banking reforms era. However, the performances of foreign DMBs 
were superior to the performance of Indigenous DMBs in 2006. Also, the efficiency scores of 
2007 and 2008 indicate that the episode of the global financial crisis negatively affected the 
performance of the foreign DMBs more than it affected the performance of Indigenous 
DMBs.      
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5.10 Window 8: BCC (2007, 2008, and 2009) 
 
The years x-rayed in this window predominately covers the entire period of the global 
financial crisis. 23 DMBs that translate to 64 DMUs (observations) are examined in this 
window. According to the results obtained, there are 26 efficient DMUs in this window, 
while 38 DMUs are inefficient. As such, 40.63% of the DMUs are efficient while 59.38% of 
the total numbers of DMUs are inefficient. The increase in the percentage of efficient DMUs 
from 32.31% (window 7) to 40.63% (window 8) is a substantial leap. In the same vein, the 
average efficiency score increased to 89.83%. Even though the average efficiency score falls 
short of the efficiency level of 100% by 10.17%, this result is impressive given that the three 
years examined in this window are the years in which the global financial crisis took root and 
ran its course. However, is should be noted that the efficiency scores of organisations are 
dependent on the most efficient frontier, and that is the reason why some DMUs (DMBs) are 
efficient in a particular year in one window and are not efficient in that same year in another 
window. In summary, the efficiency of a DMU in a particular window is hinged on the 
efficiency of the best performing DMU and the best performing DMU is determined by the 
optimal utilisation of inputs to generate maximum outputs. 
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Table 5.9: Window 8 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2007 2008 2009 
Access Bank  ✓ ✓ 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fidelity Bank  ✓  
First Bank  ✓ ✓ 
First City Monument  ✓  
Guaranty Trust Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Stanbic IBTC ✓ ✓  
Standard Chartered ✓  ✓ 
Union Bank ✓ ✓  
UBA   ✓ 
Zenith Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Oceanic Bank   ✓ 
Intercontinental Bank ✓ ✓  
Bank PHB  ✓ ✓ 
Afribank   ✓ 
 
Regarding the optimum utilisation of inputs by individual DMBs, the number of DMBs with 
efficiency scores of 100% in at least one year within this window is the largest of all the 
windows. 15 DMBs with 26 DMUs or observations are on the efficiency frontier.  
Citibank is the only DMB with efficiency scores of 100% in all the years. Citibank was not 
efficient in 2007 in the previous window but is efficient in this window. There are instances 
that the efficiency frontier of a particular window is lower than that of a previous window. In 
such an instance, a DMU that was not efficient in a previous window might become efficient 
in another. Therefore, it is possible that the efficiency of Citibank in 2007 within this window 
is an indication that the efficiency frontier of this window is below the efficiency of the 
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previous window. Just like in the last window, the most efficient DMB in the Nigerian 
banking sector is a foreign institution.  
Similarly, Stanbic IBTC Bank and Standard Chartered Bank are the other foreign DMBs on 
the efficiency frontier within the window. Stanbic IBTC Bank is efficient in 2007 and 2008, 
whereas Standard Chartered Bank is efficient in 2007and 2009. The results of this window 
suggest that the inability of Standard Chartered Bank to post a 100% efficiency score in 2008 
and failure of Stanbic IBTC Bank to muster a 100% efficiency score in 2009 was likely due 
to the adverse effect of the global financial crisis. The results of this window, in general, 
show that foreign DMBs in Nigeria (apart from Ecobank) were efficient in at least two years. 
Hence they fared well during the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, the possibility exists 
that the efficiency frontier of this window is less superior to the efficiency frontier of the last 
window that is why some DMUs were not efficient in window 7 but are efficient in window 
8. However, the next window will most likely confirm the extent to which foreign DMBs 
operating in the Nigerian banking sector were affected by the episode of the global financial 
crisis.         
Moreover, Intercontinental Bank and Union Bank are the only Indigenous DMBs with 100% 
efficiency scores in 2007 in this window. The unsatisfactory performance of Indigenous 
banks in 2007 within this window highlights the inability of DMBs in Nigeria to sustain the 
benefits of the 2005 banking reforms. Consequently, the results of this window posit that 
increased regulatory capital does not guarantee high-efficiency levels, as efficiency improves 
immediately after capital injections but plummets after just a year or two. Consequently, the 
inability of some DMBs to remain efficient and build on the N25 billion capital base led to 
the bailout of eight DMBs. Likewise, after appearing to be efficient in 2007 and 2008 within 
the window, both Intercontinental Bank and Union Bank were bailed out in 2009 due to high 
levels of non-performing loans. The 2008 performance of both DMBs did not show the banks 
were in grave danger. Even though Intercontinental Bank and Union Bank received capital 
injections in 2009 as a result of the bailout from Nigerian regulators, they were unable to 
muster efficiency scores of 100% in 2009. Intercontinental Bank had a score of 74.34, while 
Union Bank had a score of 69.23. The efficiency scores of these DMBs in 2009 show that the 
performance of DMBs can depreciate severely within one year. Therefore, the bailout 
strategy was unable to reserve negative trends in the utilisation of inputs.         
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In like manner, Afribank, Bank PHB and Unity Bank were efficient in 2007 in window 7 but 
are not efficient for the same period in window 8. The 2007 efficiency scores of this window 
cast doubt on the notion that the efficiency frontier of this window is less superior to that of 
window 7. However, it is pertinent to state that the DEA window technique calculates 
efficiency scores of each window without considering the efficiency scores of other windows. 
Therefore, the make-up of the inputs and outputs of the efficiency frontier could alter the 
composition of the DMUs on the efficiency frontier. Afribank, Bank PHB and Unity Bank 
were also bailed out in 2009. Unity Bank was not on the efficiency frontier in the entire 
window, thus confirming the opinion above that the bailout out strategy did not immediately 
change the fortunes of distressed banks. On the other hand, the bailout positively impacted on 
the performance of Afribank and Bank PHB as both DMBs posted 100% efficiency scores in 
2009, although Bank PHB had a 100% efficiency score in 2008. In sum, the efficiency scores 
of this window show that the bailout strategy of Nigerian regulators affected DMBs in 
different ways. Most of the bailed out DMBs did not become efficient immediately after the 
capital injection, while some instantly stretched their efficiency levels to 100%. For instance, 
Oceanic Bank was only efficient in this window in 2009 after it received the bailout funds.  
In continuation, Fidelity Bank and FCMB are only efficient in 2008 within this window. Both 
DMBs did not carry on their 2008 efficiency levels into 2009 which could be as a result of 
the effect of the global financial crisis. Access Bank, First Bank, GTB, and Zenith Bank are 
efficient in 2008 and 2009 within this window. All four DMBs are classified as large 
Nigerian DMBs with international operations, and in line with the requirements of the 2009 
banking reforms, they all increased their regulatory capital to N100 billion. On that account, 
the perfect efficiency scores of these four DMBs could be anchored on the capital base of the 
DMBs, the large size of the DMBs, the 2009 banking reforms in general, or the ability of the 
banks to actually manage inputs that generate maximum outputs. Furthermore, UBA another 
large DMB is only efficient in 2009 in this window. And the reason for the efficiency of the 
DMB in 2009 could likely be due to the same reasons the four large DMBs above are 
efficient in 2009. 
In conclusion, the results of this window draw down on several issues. First, the foreign 
DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector posted impressive results that suggest they were not 
severely plagued by the episode of the global financial crisis in the initial stages of the crisis. 
In relation to the global financial crisis, Nigerian regulators due to high non-performing loans 
and the adverse effects of the global financial crisis bailed out eight Nigerian DMBs. The 
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efficiency scores of this window indicate that the bailout strategy was not able to return most 
of the banks to efficiency. Finally, the efficiency scores of the large DMBs suggest that the 
2009 banking reforms shielded the DMBs from the adverse effects of the global financial 
crisis as efficiency levels peaked during the global financial crisis. However, some of the 
efficiency scores in the window somewhat propose that the efficiency frontier in this window 
is less superior to the efficiency frontier of window 7 as DMUs that were not efficient in 
window 7 are efficient in window 8.    
 
5.11 Window 9: BCC (2008, 2009, and 2010) 
 
This window is significant to achieving the aims and objectives of this study because of the 
array of events that occurred in the three years examined. The global financial crisis became 
full-blown in 2008, eight DMBs were bailed out in 2009, and the dateline to increase capital 
requirements in line with the four-tier banking model, in addition to the review of corporate 
governance principles all ensued within this window.  
Just as in the previous window, there are 23 banks in this window. The banks with data 
translated to 63 DMUs, of which there are 18 efficient DMUs and 45 inefficient DMUs. As a 
result, 28.57% of the DMUs were efficient, while the remaining 71.43% were inefficient. In 
the same vein, the average efficiency score of this window also plunged to 82.92% after 
attaining the average efficiency score of 89.83% in window 8. The plummeting average 
efficiency score could be due to the adverse effect of the global financial crisis and in general 
the changing economic landscape of the Nigerian banking sector. In conclusion, just like all 
the windows reviewed thus far, the average efficiency score falls short of the 100% efficiency 
mark of the DEA technique. 
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Table 5.10: Window 9 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2008 2009 2010 
Access Bank  ✓  
Fidelity Bank ✓   
First Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
First City Monument ✓   
Guaranty Trust Bank ✓ ✓  
Stanbic IBTC   ✓ 
Standard Chartered   ✓ 
Unity Bank   ✓ 
Zenith Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Oceanic Bank  ✓  
Intercontinental Bank ✓   
Bank PHB ✓   
Afribank  ✓  
 
As regards the performance of individual DMBs within this window, there are less foreign 
DMBs on the table. Stanbic IBTC and Standard Chartered Bank are only efficient in 
2010.Consequently, of the 18 efficient DMUs within the window; a solitary 2 are foreign. On 
this account, this indicates that foreign DMBs were severely affected by the global financial 
crisis than the previous window let on. For instance, Citibank has been a consistent feature on 
the table of efficient DMUs and was the most efficient DMB in the last window. Therefore, 
Citibank was efficient in 2008 and 2009 in window 8 but are not efficient in any of the years 
in this window. The performance of Citibank in this window suggests that the efficiency 
frontier in this window is superior to the efficiency frontier of window 8.     
More so, the results of this window show that First Bank and Zenith Bank with perfect 
efficiency scores of 100% in all three years are the most efficient DMBs in the window. Both 
DMBs in line with the four-tier banking model of the 2009 banking reforms increased their 
regulatory capital to N100 billion. The 100% efficiency scores of the DMBs in 2008 allege 
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that the global financial crisis did not negatively impact on the performance of the DMBs. In 
the same vein, it is also possible that the increased regulatory capital of the large DMBs 
ensured the continuous efficiency of the DMBs within the window.  
In like manner, Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) is efficient in two years (2008 and 2009) within 
this window. The 100% efficiency scores of the DMB further confirm the limited effect of 
the global financial crisis on the performance of large DMBs. As one of the large DMBs in 
the Nigerian banking sector, GTB increased its regulatory capital to N100 billion in line with 
the tenets of the 2009 banking reforms. However, even though it was efficient in 2009, the 
N100 billion capital base was not enough to guarantee its continuous presence on the 
efficiency frontier as its efficiency score in 2010 within this window slightly dipped to 
99.74%. In essence, not all DMBs that increase regulatory capital utilise their inputs in 
excellent ways that produce high-efficiency levels due to diverse business models, 
management styles, risk management techniques, market coverage and customer types.      
Except for First Bank, Zenith Bank and Guaranty Trust Bank, all the other DMBs on the table 
are only efficient in one year each within window 9. Access Bank another large DMB had an 
efficiency score of 99.61 in 2008, which was not far from 100 but not considered to be 
efficient. However, the DMB mustered an efficiency score of 100% in 2009, which could be 
down to the 2009 banking reforms and increased regulatory capital. Progressively, although 
the 2010 efficiency score of Access Bank was 93.55, it was not far from 100. Nonetheless, it 
revealed that increase in regulatory capital was not an assurance for improved efficiency 
levels. It also showed that the efficiency level of DMBs improves right after capital is 
injected or increased but drops in the second year of the capital increase.    
Moreover, Fidelity Bank was efficient in 2008 but saw its efficiency scores plummeted to 
67.13 in 2009 and 73.37 in 2010. The rate of descending shows how fast a DMB can go from 
being efficient to being inefficient. But to be particular in this window, the plunge in the 
efficiency level of Fidelity Bank was most likely due to the event of the global financial 
crisis.   
Concerning the bailout of eight distressed DMBs in 2009, the performances of the bailed-out 
DMBs offer an interesting dilemma. Five (5) out of the eight (8) bailed-out DMBs are on the 
table of the efficient DMUs in this window. Intercontinental Bank and Bank PHB are 
efficient in 2008 on the table, while Oceanic Bank and Afribank were efficient in 2009. 
Equally, Unity Bank is the only bailed-out DMB to be efficient in 2009 within window 9. 
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Firstly, the performance of Intercontinental Bank and Bank PHB after 2008 shows that the 
efficiency level of DMBs can depreciate within one year and capital injections is not always 
capable of transforming the fortunes of a failing bank. Secondly, bailouts can temporarily 
boost the efficiency level of DMBs as it is in the case of Oceanic Bank and Afribank. 
However, this temporary increase was not sustained in subsequent years. Finally, the bailout 
of Unity Bank was not immediately visible as the bank was only efficient in 2010 within the 
table. Therefore, capital injections in the form of bailout packages affect banking institutions 
in several ways, and they do not necessarily translate to efficiency.       
To conclude the review of DMBs in this window, the large DMBs performed better than 
other DMBs and showed they were not adversely affected by the global financial crisis. And 
given the 2009 banking reforms which mandated DMBs with business operations outside the 
shores of Nigeria to increase their regulatory capital to N100bn, the large DMBs were able to 
maintain high-efficiency levels. More so, foreign DMBs performed poorly in this window 
and in essence suggested that they were severely affected by the episode of the global 
financial crisis. Additionally, eight DMBs were bailed-out, but only five of them made it to 
the efficiency frontier in this window. Hence, bailout strategies in most instances do not 
change the input usage of DMBs. This notion is further confirmed by the efficiency scores of 
the other three bailed out DMBs that were not able to post 100% efficiency scores in any of 
the years x-rayed in this window.   
 
5.12 Window 10: BCC (2009, 2010, and 2011) 
 
This window consists of the 2009 reforms and the latter days of the global financial crisis. A 
total of 25 DMBs with data translate to 63 DMUs are examined in this window. There are 16 
efficient DMUs this window, while the inefficient DMUs (observations) are 47. Regarding 
the proportion of efficiency within the window, the percentage of efficient DMUs was 25.4%, 
while 74.6% was inefficient. The average efficiency score further dropped to 77.91% from 
82.92% (window 9). The decline in the average efficiency score in two consecutive windows 
could be a confirmation that the performances of DMBs have been less than satisfactory or 
the efficiency frontier has improved vis-a-vis the performance of other DMBs. More so, the 
decreasing average efficiency score could be because of the adverse effect of the global 
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financial crisis. Nevertheless, in line with the principles of DEA, the average efficiency score 
of 77.91% indicates that the Nigerian banking sector is inefficient. 
 
Table 5.11: Window 10 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2009 2010 2011 
Access Bank ✓   
First Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
First City Monument  ✓  
Guaranty Trust Bank ✓  ✓ 
Stanbic IBTC  ✓ ✓ 
Standard Chartered  ✓ ✓  
Unity Bank  ✓  
Zenith Bank ✓  ✓ 
Oceanic Bank ✓   
Afribank ✓   
 
Data from the table above indicates that only First Bank has perfect efficiency scores in all 
the three years within the window. As intimated in the review of the previous window of 
which First Bank was one of the two most efficient DMBs, the increase in regulatory capital 
for DMBs with international operations was integral to the efficiency of the major Nigerian 
DMBs during the period the global financial crisis persisted. However, the efficiency of Tier 
I DMBs in this window confirms the assertion that efficiency levels improve in the year 
capital requirements is increased but declined in the second year. The only exception to this 
view in this window is First Bank. Zenith Bank was efficient in all three years in the last 
window and but is not 100% (i.e. 95.72) efficient in 2010 in this window. It is 100% efficient 
in 2009 and 2011. In like manner, GTB is efficient in 2009 and 2011 but not in 2010. The 
slight decline in the efficiency scores of both DMBs in 2010 could be down to restructuring 
that occurred in the Nigerian banking sector due to the 2009 banking reforms.  
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The performance of Access Bank was not as impressive as those of First Bank, Zenith Bank, 
and GTB. Access Bank was only able to churn out a 100% efficiency score in 2009 within 
the window. Nonetheless, the DMB was deemed to be in good shape by regulators as they 
approved the DMB’s acquisition of Intercontinental Bank. Intercontinental Bank was bailed 
out in 2009 but was unable to improve on its dwindling risk positions, hence the take-over by 
Access Bank. Nonetheless, the acquisition of Intercontinental Bank led to a dip in the 
efficiency score of the Bank. The efficiency score of the bank dropped from 94.03 in 2010 to 
74.7. In essence, the efficiency score of Access Banks suggests that the acquisition of a 
distressed bank could negatively impact on the efficiency of a well-functioning banking 
institution.             
In the same vein, FCMB was not efficient in 2009 within this window but had an efficiency 
score of 100 in 2010. And in similar fashion with Access Bank, FCMB acquired Finbank in 
2011, and its efficiency score dropped to 84.46 in 2011. Therefore, in conjunction with the 
submission made above, the acquisition of a less efficient DMB could impact negatively on 
the performance of the acquiring DMB.  
In furtherance of the review of the performance of the DMBs in this window, the table of 
efficient DMUs (DMBs), shows that three out of the eight bailed out DMBs are efficient in 
one year each within the window. The performances of Oceanic Bank, Afribank, and Unity 
Bank in this window mirror their performance in window 9. Oceanic Bank and Afribank 
were efficient in 2009, while Unity Bank was efficient in 2010. The 100% efficiency scores 
of the Oceanic Bank and Afribank in 2009 could be down to the bailout capital injection. 
However, the performances of these DMBs did not improve as at 2010, and Oceanic Bank 
was acquired by Ecobank, while the banking license of Afribank was revoked and 
nationalised into a bridge bank (Mainstreet Bank) in 2011. The performance of these DMBs 
and the performance of the other bailed out DMBs that were not able to make any appearance 
on the efficiency frontier within the window posit that the bailout strategy does not always 
lead to improvements in the utilisation of inputs. Therefore, the bailout strategy was 
unsuccessful in transforming the input and output production level of some DMBs. 
Conversely, not all the bailed out DMBs were acquired or nationalised into bridge banks. As 
shown in the table above, Unity Bank being one of the bailed out DMBs was efficient in 2010 
and unlike other bailed-out DMBs that were acquired or nationalised into Bridge banks, 
Unity Bank maintained its status as a National banking institution. Similarly, Union Bank 
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which was bailed out in 2009 also maintained its status as a National banking institution. 
Although Union Bank was not efficient in any of the post-bailout years, it was not acquired 
or nationalised into a bridge bank as it was able to manage its inputs more favourably. As a 
result, the bailout strategy was not entirely unsuccessful.         
Moreover, only two foreign DMBs (Stanbic IBTC and Standard Chartered) were efficient in 
this window. Both DMBs had 100% efficiency scores in 2010 and 2011. The efficiency 
scores of Stanbic IBTC and Standard Chartered Bank indicates they are recovering from the 
adverse effect of the global financial crisis, as the results of previous windows revealed a 
decline in the efficiency of foreign DMBs during the global financial crisis. On the contrary, 
the efficiency scores of the other foreign DMBs (Citibank and Ecobank) in the Nigerian 
banking sector range from 60 to 90. Therefore, not all the foreign DMBs immediately 
recovered from the event of the global financial crisis, even though the acquisition of Oceanic 
Bank by Ecobank could be responsible for its inefficient BCC scores.   
In summary, the limited number of DMBs on the efficiency frontier in this window 
hypothesise that the episode of the global financial crisis negatively impacted on the 
aggregate performance of Nigerian DMB. Specifically, the results obtained in this window 
point out that the global financial crisis affected foreign DMBs more than it affected 
Indigenous Nigerian DMBs. Finally, the efficiency scores in this window suggest that 
performance of the large DMBs were faintly affected by the global financial crisis and the 
2009 banking reforms had a positive effect impact on the performance of Nigerian DMBs. 
 
5.13 Window 11: BCC (2010, 2011, and 2012) 
 
This window consists of the post-global financial crisis and post-2009 Nigerian banking 
reforms and comprises of the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. 24 DMBs that translate to 61 
DMUs or observations are examined in this window. There are 18 efficient DMUs within this 
window, while the remaining 43 DMUs are inefficient. As such, the percentage of the 
efficient DMUs stood at 29.51%, whereas the remaining 70.49% are inefficient. Just as in 
Window 10, the average efficiency score of this window dropped from 77.91% to 77.23%. 
Moreover, the performance of the bailed-out DMBs and those of the bridge banks in 2011 
account largely for the decline in the average efficiency score. Therefore in line with the 
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principles of the DEA technique, the aggregate performance of Nigerian DMBs (77.23%) 
suggests that the banking sector was inefficient in window 11.    
 
Table 5.12: Window 11 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2010 2011 2012 
Access Bank ✓   
First Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
First City Monument ✓   
Guaranty Trust Bank ✓ ✓  
Skye Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Stanbic IBTC ✓ ✓  
Standard Chartered ✓ ✓  
UBA   ✓ 
Unity Bank ✓   
Zenith Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
The table above indicates that half of the DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector are not 
efficient in any of the years covered in this window. The DMBs not on the efficiency frontier 
already suggest they are inefficient. Given the performance of individual DMBs as depicted 
in the table above, there are 10 DMBs on the efficiency frontier, and they are relied upon to 
provide a picture of the general performance of the banking sector.  
First Bank and Zenith Bank are the most efficient banks within the window with perfect 
efficiency scores of 100% in all three years. First Bank was also efficient in all three years in 
the last window. Zenith Bank, on the other hand, was not efficient in 2010 in the last window 
but is efficient in all the years in this window. The change in the efficiency frontier due to the 
inclusion of 2012 most likely led to the efficiency of Zenith Bank, GTB and Access Bank in 
2010, and Skye Bank in 2011. Also, UBA is efficient 2012.  UBA, however, has not been a 
feature on the table of efficient DMUs even though it is one of the largest DMBs in the 
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Nigerian banking sector. The increased presence of big banks could be attributed to the 
increase in capital requirement to N100 billion for DMBs with branches outside Nigeria. 
More so, as intimated in the last window, the inability of Access Bank to post 100% efficient 
scores in 2011 and 2012 in this window was most likely due to its acquisition of 
Intercontinental Bank in 2011. In similar fashion, FCMB is efficient in 2010 within this 
window, and it began the process of acquiring Finbank in 2011. The efficiency scores of 
FCMB dwindled from 100 in 2010 to 89.88 in 2011, and to 76.13. Therefore, with regards to 
the performance of the 24 DMBs in this window, the efficiency scores of FCMB in 2011 and 
2012 indicate that the acquisition of Finbank impacted negatively on the efficiency level of 
the DMB.   
Unity Bank is the only bailed out institution in this window, as it maintained its 2010 100% 
efficiency score. The presence of Unity Bank (i.e. out of the 8 bailed out DMBs) further 
confirms the inability of the bailout strategy in transforming the fortunes of troubled Nigerian 
DMBs.  
Stanbic IBTC and Standard Chartered Bank (foreign DMBs) mirror their performance in 
window 10. The efficiency scores do not suggest an improvement in the performance of 
foreign DMBs in this window. Citibank was one of the most efficient banks in the Nigerian 
banking sector before the global financial crisis. However, the efficiency scores of the DMB 
after the global financial crisis informs this study that it was affected more than other DMBs 
by the event of the global financial crisis. Ecobank as well is not on the efficiency frontier in 
the entire window. It acquired Oceanic Bank in 2011, and although its efficiency score surged 
from 87.95 in 2010 to 88.09 in 2011, it fell to 70.14 which could be as a result of the 
acquisition of a troubled institution.       
In summary, the performance of large DMBs suggests that the Nigerian banking sector has 
recovered from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis. Conversely, the performance 
of the DMBs that did not make it to the efficiency frontier suggests otherwise. The results 
indicate that the 2009 banking reforms improved in large part only the performance of large 
DMBs that increased their regulatory capital to N100bn and above. More so, the limited 
presence of foreign DMBs on the efficiency frontier in this window posits that the 
performance of indigenous DMBs outweighs the performance of the foreign banks operating 
in Nigeria. Finally, the results of the window further revealed that the bailout strategy was not 
as effective as imagined.        
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5.14 Window 12: BCC (2011, 2012, and 2013) 
 
This window consists of the post-global financial crisis and the post-2009 banking reforms 
era. In essence, this window seeks to provide answers to the extent of which Nigerian 
banking sector has recovered from the global financial crisis and whether the 2009 banking 
reforms has a positive effect on the performance of Nigerian DMBs.  
The number of DMBs in this window dropped to 20 because of the acquisition of Oceanic 
Bank by Ecobank, the acquisition of Intercontinental Bank by Access Bank, the acquisition 
of Finbank by FCMB, and the acquisition of Equitorial Trust Bank by Sterling Bank. 
Resultantly, 60 DMUs are examined in this window.   
Given the efficiency of the Nigerian banking sector in window 12, the result shows 23 
efficient DMUs and 37 inefficient DMUs. Put differently, 38.33% of the DMUs in this 
window are efficient, whereas the remaining 61.67% of the DMUs are inefficient. The 
percentage of efficient DMUs in this window witnessed an increase of 29.51% from that of 
window 11. Still, on the positive premise, the average efficiency score surged to 85.26% after 
steadily plummeting from 89.83% in window 8 to 77.23% in window 11. The surge in the 
average efficiency score could be an indication that the Nigerian banking sector has started to 
recover from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis that saw a drop in the efficiency 
level of some banks. Additionally, it could also be an indication that the initiative to reform 
the Nigerian banking sector by regulators was a step in the right direction. Nonetheless, the 
inability of the banking sector to attain a 100% efficiency score suggests in line with the 
principles of DEA that the Nigerian banking sector was inefficient in window 12. 
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Table 5.13: Window 12 List of Efficient DMUs (DMBs) 
Efficient Banks 2011 2012 2013 
CitiBank Nigeria ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Diamond Bank ✓   
Enterprise Bank  ✓  
Fidelity Bank  ✓  
First Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
First City Monument ✓   
Guaranty Trust Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mainstreet Bank  ✓ ✓ 
Skye Bank ✓ ✓  
Stanbic IBTC ✓   
Standard Chartered ✓   
UBA   ✓ 
Zenith Bank ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Apart from Citibank and GTB, all the DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector and this window 
are products of mergers and acquisitions, bridge banking, or purchase and assumption 
agreements. More so, being that the performance of the above DMBs is studied in the post 
global financial crisis and post 2009 banking reforms era, the conclusions inferred are 
significant to achieving the aims and objectives of this research. 
For the first time in this study, there are four DMBs with perfect efficiency scores in all three 
years (Citibank, First Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank and Zenith Bank). Citibank is a foreign 
DMB, whereas First Bank, GTB and Zenith Bank are Indigenous Nigerian DMBs with 
international banking operations with regulatory capital of N100bn and above. The increase 
in the number of DMBs with perfect efficiency scores in all the three years in a particular 
window indicates optimum input utilisation. Hence, even though the increase in the 
efficiency scores of DMBs in this window is an indication of improved performance, the 
possibility exist that the efficiency frontier of this window is less superior to that of window 
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11 because some DMUs that were not efficient in window 11 are efficient in this window. 
More so, UBA another large DMB on the table above is efficient in 2013, thus reinforcing the 
notion that the 2009 banking reforms had a positive effect on the performance of DMBs. 
 In addition, Skye Bank is the only DMB in this window to be efficient in two years (2011 & 
2012). Skye Bank is a Tier 2 Nigerian DMB according to the 2009 banking reforms 
classification and its efficiency scores in this window indicate that it is amongst the most 
efficient DMBs in the banking sector. More so, the other Tier 2 DMBs found to be efficient 
in one year each within the window includes Diamond Bank (2011), FCMB (2011) and 
Fidelity Bank (2012). None of these DMBs were bailed-out in 2009, indicating that they 
satisfactorily navigated the global financial crisis. The performance of these DMBs also 
suggests that the 2009 banking reforms were to some extent successful in shielding Nigerian 
DMBs from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis.  
On account of the above, two bridge banks out of the three nationalised bridge banks are 
efficient in at least one year within this window. Enterprise Bank is efficient in 2012, whereas 
Mainstreet Bank is efficient in 2012 and 2013 within this window. The three bridge banks in 
the Nigerian banking sector came into existence in 2011. The fact that two make it to the 
table of efficient DMUs (DMBs) is impressive. It is, therefore, an indication that the initiative 
to adopt the bridge banking initiative was a step in the right direction. Conversely, the 
success of the bridge banking mechanism highlights the failure of the bailout financial safety 
nets strategy. By the fact that the bridge banking mechanism would not have been adopted if 
the financial safety net bailout strategy was a success.       
In view of the performance of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector, Citibank 
showed 100% efficiency scores in all the three years of this window. Citibank was last 
efficient in window 8, and by being a foreign DMB, it was adversely affected by the global 
financial crisis. Citibank was not efficient in 2011 and 2012 in the last window which 
indicates a change in the measure of assessment of efficiency due to the 2013 inclusion of the 
inputs and outputs financial figures. Equally, Stanbic IBTC and Standard Chartered Bank 
who had better efficiency scores to Citibank in Windows 9, 10 and 11 were only efficient in 
2011 within this window. The plunge in the efficiency score of Citibank in Windows 9, 10 
and 11could be because it is a member of the financial services multinational Citigroup of 
America, whereas the other foreign banks on the table are members of South African banking 
groups. Moreover, because the global financial crisis originated in U.S.A, banking 
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institutions owned by American owners probably suffered more from the adverse effect of 
the global financial crisis. On the contrary, Ecobank is the only foreign bank with no efficient 
DMU in this window. Ecobank acquired Oceanic bank in 2011, and the efficiency scores of 
the bank in this window and the previous window opine that the acquisition of a troubled 
bank impacts negatively on efficiency scores. Nonetheless, the efficiency scores of the 
foreign DMBs in this window lead to the assumption that the foreign DMBs have recovered 
from the episode of the global financial crisis. 
In summary, the aggregate efficiency scores of DMBs in this window opine that the 2009 
banking reforms were successful in repositioning most of the DMBs to navigate the difficult 
situation presented by the global financial crisis. Specifically, the Tier 1 DMBs performed 
better than the Tier II and foreign DMBs, although they all show improved performances. 
Additionally, the presence of two bridge banks on the efficiency frontier indicate that the 
bridge banking model adopted to nurse the troubled DMBs was a success, while the bailout 
strategy was an ineffectual attempt of breathing life into troubled DMBs.          
Conclusively, the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs has been examined under the BCC model. 
The review of the efficiency of the DMBs relied largely on the efficiency scores of the DMBs 
that appear on the efficiency frontier though reference where necessary has been made to the 
efficiency scores of DMBs that did not appear on the efficiency frontier. The absence of the 
DMBs (DMUs) on the efficiency frontier shows that they were not efficient.  Still and all, the 
BCC efficiency scores have been able to provide adequate information that shed light on the 
performance of DMBs before and after the both the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, during 
and after the global financial crisis, and the adequacy of the adopted financial safety 
strategies in resolving troubled DMBs. To that end, conclusions that centre on the aims and 
objectives of this research are addressed below.   
 
5.14 Effects of the 2005 and 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
This study examines the effects of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms on the performance 
and efficiency of Nigerian DMBs from 2000 to 2013. The BCC model (variable returns to 
scale assumption) is relied upon to examine the extent to which the two reforms have 
impacted on the Nigerian DMBs.  
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The first three windows consist of the pre-2005 banking reforms years (2001 – 2004), while 
the year 2005 is in each of the next three windows. Therefore, Window 4 to Window 6 are 
treated as the 2005 banking reforms era, window 7 as post-2005 banking reforms and pre-
2009 banking reforms. Window 8 to Window 10 is the 2009-banking era because the year 
2009 is in each of the windows, while window 11 and window 12 are the post-2009 banking 
reforms period. 
Relying on the results of the BCC model, the performance and efficiency of Nigerian DMBs 
improved over time, although there are windows where efficiency levels plummeted. 
Efficiency levels dropped in window 2 and immediately rose in window 3 in the pre-2005 
banking reforms era. The increase continued in the 2005 banking reforms period in window 
4. However, efficiency levels dropped in window 5. The examined years in window 5 are 
2004, 2005 and 2006. Nigerian regulators made the pronouncement on July 6, 2004, for 
DMBs to adhere to the 13-point agenda of the 2005 banking reforms which includes the 
mandate to recapitalize to the tune of N25bn. The year 2004 is in 3 windows (window 3 – 
window 5), while the year 2005 is in window 4 – window 6. 2004 has the least amount of 
DMUs in all the three windows it was reviewed in, which implies there were more efficient 
DMUs in 2005 when compared to the efficient DMUs in 2004. In similar fashion, the year 
2006 is in window 5 – window 7, and it has more efficient DMUs when compared against the 
efficient DMUs in 2005. The increase in the number of efficient DMUs suggests that DMBs 
in the Nigerian banking sector reacted positively to the 2005 banking reforms. More so, the 
percentage of efficient DMUs increased steadily after the 2005 banking reforms (from 
window 4 – window 8).  
Nonetheless, although the aggregate efficiency of the Nigerian banking sector improved in 
reaction to the 2005 banking reforms, most of the DMBs had efficient scores that were below 
100%. DMBs were mandated to raise their regulatory capital to N25bn, and it was achieved 
through public offers and private placements of stock and consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions. The efficiency scores of DMBs in 2005 and the post-2005 banking reforms 
period shows that DMBs responded differently to the reforms. While some DMBs were able 
to indicate high levels of efficiency in 2005, while others responded positively in the post-
2005 banking reforms period. Relying on the results of the windows that include the year 
2005, the efficiency scores of First Bank, Zenith Bank, Oceanic Bank, Intercontinental Bank, 
IBTC Bank, GTB, and Wema Bank indicate that the 2005 banking reforms had an immediate 
impact.  
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The performance of DMBs that improved in 2005 and 2006 cannot singularly be credited to 
the increase in capital, as only Zenith Bank, GTB, Citibank and Ecobank were not involved 
in any merger and acquisition during the consolidation exercise. The efficiency scores 
indicate that the array of mergers and acquisitions that the Nigerian banking sector went 
through affected the resultant DMBs in different ways. The efficiency scores of some DMBs 
suggest that the merger and acquisition strategy yielded immediate results, as First Bank, 
UBA, Wema Bank, Intercontinental Bank and Oceanic Bank were among the best practice 
DMBs in 2005 and 2006.  
Conversely, the proportion of DMBs that were not on the efficiency frontier reveals that 2005 
banking reforms did not have the same effect on the performance of all DMBs in the Nigerian 
banking sector. Consequently, the inability of most of the DMBs to muster efficiency scores 
of 100% in 2005 and in subsequent years before the 2009 banking reforms could be hinged 
on the host of activities that ensued to meet the 31 December 2005 deadline. In relation to the 
mergers and acquisitions that transpired due to the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking 
reforms, the less glamorous efficiency scores of some DMBs could be due of the 
harmonisation of banking IT systems, unification of banking cultures and personnel of 
merged and acquired banks.  
In view of the performance of the different classes of DMBs. The small and medium-sized 
DMBs and foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector had better efficiency scores in the 
pre-2005 banking reforms era. While all the DMBs that survived the 2005 banking reforms 
had N25bn and above as paid-up capital, the DMBs referred to as the large DMBs posted 
higher efficiency scores in the post-2005 banking era. Also, the foreign DMBs in the also had 
high-efficiency scores in the post-2005 banking reforms period, although only four foreign 
DMBs were in operation after the 2005 reforms.      
To be concise, the effects of 2005 banking reforms on the performance of DMBs as reviewed 
in this study suggests that the efficiency level of Nigerian DMBs improved in the post-2005 
banking reforms era.  Even though efficiency levels did not reach 100% after the 2005 
banking reforms, and Nigerian DMBs remained inefficient according to the principles of the 
DEA frontier technique, the reforms had a positive effect on the general performance of 
Nigerian DMBs.   
The failure of Nigerian DMBs to attain expected efficiency and performance levels led to the 
2009 banking reforms. Although the aggregate performance of the banking sector improved 
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after the 2005 banking reforms, the performance of some DMBs started to plummet after the 
euphoria of the reforms died down. Similarly, other DMBs never raised their efficiency 
scores to acceptable levels after the reforms. According to the obtained BCC efficiency 
scores, the aggregate efficiency of the Nigerian banking sector peaked at 89.83% in window 
8 and plummeted to 82.92% in window 9 and this decline continued till window 12 when 
efficiency levels improved to 85.26%. It is possible that the performance of DMBs did not go 
on to improve because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the tenets of the 2005 banking 
reforms were unable to prevent the plunge in the efficiency scores of the DMBs in the wake 
of the 2008 global financial crisis. Because the 2005 banking reforms were supposed to 
protect the Nigerian banking sector from adverse effects of financial and economic crises, the 
initiative to embark on the 2009 banking reforms suggests flaws in the 2005 banking reforms.   
Furthermore, the efficiency scores of some DMBs, especially from 2007, reveal that the gains 
of the 2005 banking reforms started to erode as some DMBs posted unsatisfactory efficiency 
scores, hence the 2009 banking reforms. The 2009 banking reforms mandated DMBs with 
international operations to increase their capital base to N100bn, while National DMBs were 
to maintain the N25bn capital base and regional DMBs were to have regulatory capital of 
N10bn. Large DMBs that opted to increase their capital base to N100 are referred to as Tier I 
banks, while the medium sized National DMBs are referred to as Tier II banks.  A review of 
the performance of individual DMBs indicates that the Tier I banks dominated the efficiency 
frontier before the 2009 banking reforms and the 2009 banking reforms only further 
confirmed their dominance in the Nigerian banking sector. While the 2009 banking reforms 
further ensured the improvement in the efficiency level of Tier I banks, the BCC efficiency 
scores showed that Tier II banks were less efficient.  
Moreover, the efficiency scores in the post-2009 banking reforms era also revealed that 
foreign DMBs performed poorly. The unsatisfactory efficiency scores of these DMBs were 
probably due to the adverse effect of the global financial crisis. For instance, the headquarters 
of Citibank is situated in the United States of America where the global financial crisis took 
root. And, the operations of Citibank Nigeria were bound to be affected by the activities of 
mother bank. More so, the likelihood exists that foreign money deposit banks do not 
completely adhere to the tenets of Nigerian banking reforms due to complications as they also 
comply with regulations from the host countries of banks’ headquarters. As a result, the 2009 
banking reforms might not have been able to assist foreign DMBs to navigate the global 
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financial crisis and survive in the Nigerian banking terrain. Nonetheless, the BCC efficiency 
scores in window 12 show improvements in the performance of foreign DMBs.                    
In summary, even though the aggregate performance of the Nigerian banking sector did not 
reach the 100% efficiency level in all the windows examined, the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian 
banking reforms had positive effects on the efficiency of individual DMBs. Dwelling on the 
performance of DMBs that survived the 2005 banking reforms, the BCC model revealed 
improved efficiency levels across all the classes of DMBs, although not all the DMBs had 
efficiency scores of 100% in all the windows. The efficiency scores of some DMBs 
plummeted as the euphoria of the 2005 banking reforms died down and in reaction to the 
global financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007. Hence, this study suggests that 
the initiative to embark on the 2009 banking reforms was a step in the right direction as the 
efficiency scores of DMBs in the post-2009 banking reforms period showed improvements. 
To be specific, Tier I DMBs performed better than foreign DMBs and Tier II DMBs in the 
post-2009 banking reforms period. Finally, the two banking reforms had positive effects on 
the performance of Nigerian DMBs, even though the performance of the entire banking 
sector suggests that capital regulation alone cannot ensure the continued efficiency of DMBs.                               
 
5.15 Global Financial Crisis 
 
This section dwells on the effect of the recent global financial crisis on the efficiency of 
individual Nigerian DMBs and the banking sector in general. It is hard to flawlessly depend 
on DEA efficiency scores to ascertain the effect of an event (like the global financial crisis) 
owing to its reliance on the most efficient frontier. As pointed out in the limitations of the 
DEA technique, the most efficient frontier in a particular period might not be overtly efficient 
as it is only the most efficient of the sample. However, the efficiency scores of the DEA 
window analysis are suitable for this study as they present the analysis of the performance of 
institutions before, during, and after the global financial crisis. 
Regarding the performance of the Nigerian banking sector during the global financial crisis 
(2007 – 2009), this study examines the effect of the financial crisis in five windows (window 
6 – window 10). The aggregate efficiency scores increased in window 6 (BCC – 71.8% to 
81.83%). Similarly, the aggregate efficiency level of the banking sector continuously 
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improved in window 7 i.e. to 85.1% and window 7 consists of two global financial crisis 
years (2007 and 2008). Impressively, window 9, which consists of the entire global financial 
crisis period (2007 – 2009), has the highest aggregate efficiency score of 89.83%. In sum, 
these results suggest that the performance of most DMBs operating in the Nigerian banking 
sector did not decline during the global financial crisis. 
On the other hand, high-efficiency scores could be that the best practice DMB or the most 
efficient of the set of DMBs is second-rate. If the best practice DMB or the DMBs on the 
efficiency frontier are not, in reality, efficient, the other inefficient DMBs will appear 
efficient. If that is the case in the windows that contain the global financial crisis period, then 
the banking sector was not as efficient as the efficiency scores portrayed. However, the 
efficiency scores of some DMBs deteriorated during the financial crisis. The eight DMBs that 
were eventually bailed out revealed inferior efficiency scores during the global financial 
crisis. Therefore, suggesting that the global financial crisis had a negative impact on the 
Nigerian banking sector.   
More so, the performance of individual DMBs during the global financial crisis and the 
different classes of DMBs posted mixed results. All DMBs operating in Nigeria had the 
capacity to operate on the same level after the 2005 banking reforms. The efficiency scores in 
the post-2005 banking reforms period show that some DMBs lagged behind. Concisely, poor 
internal risk management practices and the absence of adequate corporate governance 
guidelines are blamed for the inability of banks to leverage on the increased regulatory capital 
base to develop into large financial hubs.  Consequently, the Tier I DMBs took advantage of 
the N25bn capital to expand their market share while keeping their risk profiles healthy by 
efficiently managing their inputs. Other DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector failed to 
manage their risk positions and adequately utilise inputs which led to their near collapse. The 
efficiency scores show that the bailed-out DMBs, which were mostly Tier II DMBs, had 
inferior efficiency scores during the global financial crisis. The BCC efficiency scores of the 
Tier II DMBs before the global financial crisis were high. Hence, this study opines that the 
global financial crisis was responsible for the plunge in the efficiency levels of some DMBs 
that led to their bailout in 2009.  
Similarly, the dynamics of the most efficient sets of DMBs changed because of the global 
financial crisis. An appraisal of the table of efficient DMUs and the efficiency scores, in 
general, show that foreign DMBs had the most efficient DMUs in windows before the global 
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financial crisis. Before the global financial crisis period, Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank, 
and Stanbic IBTC Bank were amongst the most efficient DMBs in the Nigerian banking 
sector. Nevertheless, their efficiency scores during the global financial crisis (2007 – 2009) 
were not impressive; as they in most instances dropped off the table of efficient DMUs 
(DMBs). Therefore, leading to the notion that the global financial crisis negatively affected 
the efficiency of foreign DMBs more than it affected indigenous Nigerian DMBs.  
Furthermore, a review of Table 5.1 (BCC outcome) indicates that the aggregate average 
efficiency scores plunged in window 10 and window 11. This drop in efficiency levels 
suggests that the aggregate efficiency levels of Nigerian DMBs fell after the global financial 
crisis and not during the crisis. Given the analogy made about the performance of the best 
practice bank in a particular window. It is possible that as the effects of the global financial 
crisis eased on, the performance of DMBs became more efficient and the best practice bank 
(efficiency frontier) made less efficient DMBs appear further inefficient. Nevertheless, the 
results of window 12 show that aggregate efficiency has started to rise, thus suggesting that 
all classes of DMBs in Nigeria have recovered from the global financial crisis.  
In conclusion, the performance of Tier II DMBs and foreign DMBs suggest that the Nigerian 
banking sector was negatively affected by the event of the global financial crisis. However, 
the performances of Tier I DMBs (large DMBs) account for the upsurge in the aggregate 
efficiency level of the banking sector during the crisis.  
 
5.16 Predicting Financial Distress 
 
This study aims to find out if the DEA window technique can predict financial distress in 
banks, and if it happens to be able to predict financial distress, how far back can it predict 
financial distress. Using historical annual financial data from 2000 – 2013 to calculate 
efficiency scores under the BCC model. The results reveal that DEA window analysis was 
not able to predict financial distress. Nonetheless, it was able to show poor performing or 
inefficient banking institutions.    
The results indicate that the efficiency level of a banking institution can deteriorate or 
improve within one year. Due to the advantage that the DEA window technique compares the 
performance of a DMU against its performance in another year or period, it can show the 
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extent to which the performance of a DMB has improved or deteriorated. Put differently; the 
DEA window technique can show the efficiency level and performance of banking 
institutions. On that account, it is a poor financial distress predictor.  
The efficiency scores show that the efficiency level of DMBs can change within a single 
year. For instance, a review of the bailed out DMBs show that Intercontinental Bank had 
perfect 100% efficiency scores in 2008, but plummeted to 74.34% in 2009 and further fell to 
44.87% in 2010. Equally, after posting a 100% BCC efficiency score in 2009 in window 9, 
the efficiency score of Afribank dropped to 27.19% in 2010. These results indicate that in the 
whole, the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA window technique can only reveal 
performance level and not predict possible performance. Therefore, the DEA window method 
is not appropriate for predicting financial distress based on the examination of Nigerian 
DMBs.           
Nevertheless, the DEA window technique has shown that it is suitable for examining the 
performance and efficiency of banking institutions. Although this study made use of annual 
financial statements, regulators can rely on quarterly financial statements to spot relapses in 
the performance of banking institutions. Therefore, the use of quarterly financial statements 
can assist regulators in gauging whether the injection of capital, like in the case of the 2009 
bailout has improved efficiency and performance. 
 
5.17 Bank Bailouts 
 
The bailout of eight Nigerian DMBs in 2009 by Nigerian regulators was conceived out of the 
desire to save them from collapse. The CBN and NDIC found eight DMBs to be in danger of 
collapse, hence the bailout. As discussed in the country context chapter (chapter two), the 
global financial crisis and other events in the Nigerian financial sector like the 70% collapse 
of the Nigerian stock market sent waves that affected Nigerian DMBs. The bailed out DMBs 
include Equitorial Trust Bank, Unity Bank, Finbank, Union Bank, Afribank, Bank PHB, 
Intercontinental Bank, and Oceanic Bank.   
Specifically, the performances of the bailed-out DMBs are reviewed to ascertain the effect of 
the capital injection on efficiency. The performance of the DMBs in 2009 are analysed in 
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window 8, window 9, and window 10. The BCC model efficiency scores of the bailed out 
DMBs revealed mixed results.  
Relying on the efficiency scores after the injection of the bailout funds, the efficiency level of 
Unity Bank, Oceanic Bank and Afribank, improved in 2009 (i.e. in the year the bailout was 
received), while the efficiency scores of Union Bank, Equitorial Trust Bank, Bank PHB, and 
Intercontinental Bank did not improve in 2009. Progressively, while Unity Bank was not able 
to post a 100% efficiency score in 2009, in all the windows 2009 is reviewed. Nonetheless, 
the efficiency score of Unity Bank rose to 100% in 2010 in Windows 8, 9, and 10. Whereas, 
the efficiency scores of the other bailed-out DMBs deteriorated to below the 60% in 2010. 
Moreover, the efficiency scores of the bailed-out DMBs in 2010 and 2011 failed to show 
positive upward movements. In essence, the bailout strategy did not have a lasting positive 
effect on the performance and efficiency of the troubled DMBs.  
To reinforce the inability of the bailout strategy to turn around the performance of DMBs, 
four DMB acquisitions involving the bailed out DMBs ensued in 2011. Access Bank acquired 
Intercontinental Bank; Ecobank acquired Oceanic Bank; FCMB acquired Finbank, and 
Sterling Bank acquired Equitorial Trust Bank. More so, due to the failure of bailout financial 
safety net strategy, Bank PHB, and Afribank were nationalised into Bridge banks in 2011. 
Bank PHB became Keystone Bank Limited, while Afribank became Mainstreet Bank 
Limited. In sum, this round of acquisitions and the adoption of Bridge banking indicate that 
the bailout strategy was not an effective strategy, as regulators had to rely on other measures 
to protect distressed DMBs. 
Conversely, not all the bailed-out banks were acquired or nationalised into bridge banks. 
Nigerian regulators did not rely on other financial safety net measures to nurse Union Bank 
and Unity Bank. Although the efficiency scores of Union Bank and Unity Bank remained low 
under the BCC model till 2013 (window 12), the results give the impression they were not in 
grave danger with regard to the other bailed out DMBs (See Appendix 11 for efficiency 
scores).               
In conclusion, the bailout strategy was a temporary fix. Efficiency levels increased in 2009 in 
reaction to the capital injection. The 100% efficiency level in some of the bailed-out DMBs 
was short-lived and at best artificial as DMBs reverted to less impressive efficiency levels the 
following year. In effect, the bailout strategy failed to turn around distressed DMBs.    
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5.18 Bridge Banking Mechanism 
 
Three DMBs were nationalised into bridge banks (Afribank became Mainstreet Bank  Ltd, 
Bank PHB became Keystone Bank Ltd, and Spring Bank became Enterprise Bank Ltd). 
Apart from Spring Bank, Afribank and Bank PHB were bailed out in 2009. The inability of 
the DMBs (especially the bailed-out DMBs) to improve their risk positions and recover from 
the event of the global financial crisis led to the adoption of bridge banking mechanism. The 
efficiency scores of Afribank and Bank PHB (Appendix 11) show that sustained efficiency 
was not achieved after the injection of the bailout funds. Thus the adoption of the bridge 
banking strategy was appropriate. The resolution to create Bridge banks was to nurse troubled 
banks back to health and make them attractive to potential investors.  This section, therefore, 
examines the performance of the three bridge banks. 
Relying on the BCC efficiency scores of the three bridge banks, the results indicate that the 
efficiency scores of all three bridge banks remained low in the year 2011 in window 10, 
window 11, and window 12. Efficiency levels improved in 2012 across all three windows 
(10, 11, and 12). However, the level of increase in Enterprise Bank and Mainstreet Bank were 
weightier to that of Keystone Bank. More so, only Mainstreet Bank achieved an efficiency 
score of 100% in 2013 (window 12), as Enterprise Bank had an efficiency score of 68.51%, 
while Keystone Bank came last with an efficiency score of 58.13%.  
To conclude, even though the efficiency scores of the bridge banks did not transform 
instantaneously to depict excellent efficiency levels, the efficiency scores of the bridge banks 
indicate steady improvements. Therefore, as at 2013, the efficiency scores of the three bridge 
banks suggest that the bridge banking strategy was effective. Nevertheless, interview 
submissions and data from CBN and NDIC will address the most recent state of the bridge 
banks. 
 
5.19 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The DEA window technique was depended upon in this section to examine the performance 
of Nigerian DMBs from 2000 – 2013. Notably, efficiency scores obtained through the 
analysis of input/output production level were relied upon to show the effects of the 2005 and 
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2009 Nigerian banking reforms, and the global financial crisis on Nigerian DMBs within the 
period of 2000 – 2013. The DEA window technique was also trusted in this study to 
determine the extent to which the bailout strategy and bridge banking mechanism were able 
to resolve troubled DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector.  
In summary, the results indicate that small or medium sized DMBs and foreign DMBs in the 
Nigerian-banking sector were more efficient in the windows or years before the 2005 banking 
reforms. With most DMBs merging in 2005 due to the consolidation exercise, the average 
performance of the banking institution improved. Therefore, suggesting that the 2005 
banking reforms had a positive impact on the Nigerian banking sector. Likewise, even though 
the aggregate efficiency score suggested that the banking sector remained inefficient, the 
efficiency scores of individual DMBs indicate improvement in reaction to the 2005 banking 
reforms.          
More so, the efficiency scores after the 2005 banking reforms suggest that DMBs were 
beginning to settle after the euphoria of the banking consolidation exercise that witnessed 
several mergers and acquisitions before the episode of the global financial crisis. The 
inability of DMBs to fully settle down after the 2005 banking reforms due to the timing of the 
global financial crisis is likely responsible for the decline in the performance and efficiency 
witnessed in some DMBs.         
Furthermore, the efficiency scores obtained from the BCC (variable returns to scale 
assumption) suggests that the global financial crisis negatively affected the performance and 
efficiency of the Nigerian DMB. However, the performance and efficiency of some DMBs 
suffered more loss than others did. For instance, foreign DMBs were more efficient in periods 
leading to the global financial crisis and even in window 8, which consists of 2007, 2008 and 
2009. Nevertheless, the performance and efficiency of foreign DMBs dwindled in subsequent 
windows (window 9 – window 11). More so, the performances of some medium-sized DMBs 
were also affected, as Nigerian regulators had to bailout eight distressed DMBs in 2009. On 
the other hand, Tier I DMBs (large DMBs) particularly fared better as they showed 
impressive efficiency scores during the global financial crisis.  
Regarding the impact of the 2009 banking reforms on the performance of Nigerian DMBs, 
efficiency scores of some DMBs in the post-2005 banking reforms period suggest that the 
2009 reforms were necessary to correct the ills in the Nigerian banking sector. To that end, 
the 2009 banking reforms were initiated to correct the shortcomings of the 2005 banking 
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reforms, and it was a response to the global financial crisis. The BCC efficiency scores 
showed that the 2009 banking reforms had a positive impact on the Nigerian-banking sector; 
in particular on the performance of Tier I DMBs. However, the 2009 reforms were unable to 
positively transform the performance of some bailed-out DMBs as regulators had to rely on 
another set of mergers and acquisitions in 2011 and the nationalisation of three banks into 
bridge banks. Nonetheless, the last window of the study shows improved efficiency scores in 
all classes of Nigerian DMBs.    
Additionally, the bailout strategy adopted to breathe life into distressed DMBs failed to 
achieve any meaningful headway. The results of this study in addition to the 2011 mergers 
and acquisitions lead to the conclusion that the bailout strategy only delayed the inevitable 
and it was at best ineffectual in resolving distressed DMBs. On the contrary, the efficiency 
scores of the bridge banks in window 12 suggest that the bridge banking strategy was a more 
suitable approach of resolving distressed DMBs.        
Moreover, the DEA window technique revealed that the efficiency scores of DMBs in 
Nigeria increases in the year capital requirement is increased, or in the year capital is 
injected. For instance, the efficiency scores of DMBs surged in reaction to the 2005 banking 
reforms they were mandated to increase their capital base to N25bn. Similarly, even 
distressed DMBs appeared to be efficient immediately they received capital injections 
(bailouts). Therefore, given the performance of DMBs after a year or two of capital 
injections, this study submits that the continuous efficiency of DMBs is not dependent on the 
amount of capital requirement or capital injected but on the judicious utilisation of bank 
inputs and the proper management of liabilities.        
Finally, due to the triangulation of research methods in this study, the evaluation of the 
findings of the DEA window technique in relation to other studies is undertaken after the 
presentation of multiple regression results and the interpretation of interview responses.  
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Chapter Six: Multiple Regression Estimation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the presentation and interpretation of the regression results of the 
three regression models employed to ascertain the effects of bank-specific CAMELS 
variables, bank size, and GDP on bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial stability. 
On the premise that the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global financial crisis 
impacted the performance of Nigerian DMBs, regression analysis is first undertaken in four 
different periods. To this end, the regression analysis is undertaken for the whole period 
(2000 – 2013), pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), 2005 banking reforms and 
global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008), and 2009 banking reforms and post-global 
financial crisis period (2009 – 2013).  
Therefore, the adopted efficiency dependent variable (Average annual BCC efficiency 
scores) is regressed against capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning 
capacity, liquidity, sensitivity to risk, bank size and GDP (independent variables). While 
return on assets (ROA) and Z-Score are the proxies for bank performance and financial 
stability that are also regressed against the adopted independent variables. In addition to the 
analysis of the determinants of bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial stability in 
the whole period and the three periods, the robustness of obtained results are examined by 
introducing dummy variables and the lagging of independent variables.       
Furthermore, to ascertain the extent to which the independent variables determine bank 
efficiency, performance, and stability, the descriptive statistics of adopted variables are first 
presented. The descriptive statistics of the adopted variables are shown in Table 6.1 below. 
Thus, the mean (central tendency), standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the 
adopted dependent and independent variables are revealed. 
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
DEAWBCC 74.35759 18.32423 20.39 100 
ROA 2.832818 2.516225 -8.66 11.08 
Z-Score 5.412135 2.798636 -1.91 23.48 
ETA 14.88156 7.866008 -2.73 74.77 
ILGL 16.18086 14.25303 0.03 85.94 
CIR 60.7279 12.69819 16.77 93.02 
NIM 8.741127 3.850127 -1.84 23.44 
LADSTF 62.1952 23.09577 5.64 99.89 
TSTA 21.12851 11.61257 1.79 78.49 
SIZENLTA 4.744974 1.521214 0.98 7.93 
GDP 8.081633 1.936568 4.3 11.9 
Notes: DEAWBCC (Efficiency), ROA (Performance), and Z-Score (Stability) are the dependent variables. 
While ETA (Capital Adequacy), ILGL (Asset Quality), CIR (Management Quality), NIM (Earning Ability), 
LADSTF (Liquidity), TSTA (Sensitivity to Risk), SIZENLTA (Bank Size), and GDP growth (Macroeconomic 
Variable) are the independent variables regressed against the dependent variables. 
 
6.3 Appropriateness Tests (Hausman-Test, Prob F-Test, and Adjusted R-
Square) 
 
The fixed effects and random effects panel regression techniques are employed in this study. 
However, the Hausman-test is used to indicate which of the fixed effects or random effects is 
appropriate to analyse the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables.  
The Prob F-test is also relied upon to show the appropriateness of the regression models. In 
instances where the Hausman-test does not show a clear enough distinction between the fixed 
effects or the random effects, the probability F-test is depended upon to further verify the 
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appropriateness of the Hausman-test suggestion. The accepted Prob F-Test is <0.05. Hence, 
only results that fall within the accepted range are considered appropriate to ascertain the 
determinants of bank efficiency, performance, and stability. 
Additionally, the Adjusted R-Sq is also used to determine how well the models measured fit 
the set of observations. Hence, the Adjusted R-Sq of the most suitable models identified by 
the Hausman-test and F-test are reviewed to ensure the right model is accepted and 
comparisons between different periods are carried out with the most suitable results. It is also 
worth mentioning that the low Adjusted R-Sq is because of the small number of DMBs in the 
Nigerian banking sector.  
Finally, the Adjusted R-Sq, Hausman-test, and F-test of all the regression models are shown 
in the summary statistics tables of the results below (table 6.2, table 6.3, and table 6.4).  
 
6.3.1 Multicollinearity Tests 
 
In order to ensure the absence of multicollinearity in the independence variables, the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used and is reported in 
each of the regression results tables. The VIF results show the extent to which the presence of 
multicollinearity inflates the variance of the estimator. The VIF results indicate the absence 
of multicollinearity problems in the independent variables that could prejudice the regression 
results.  
 
6.4 Determinants of Bank Efficiency 
 
This section focuses on the analysis of the determinants of bank efficiency. Table 6.2 below 
displays the summary results of the effects of capital adequacy (ETA), asset quality (ILGL), 
management quality (CIR), earning ability (NIM), Liquidity (LADSTF), sensitivity to risk ( 
TSTA), size (SIZENLTA), and GDP growth (GDP) on bank efficiency (BCC efficiency 
scores).  
 
202 
 
Table 6.2: Base Model: Determinants of Bank Efficiency (Average Annual BCC 
Efficiency Scores) 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
2000 – 2004 
 
Pre-2005 
Reforms 
2005 – 2008 
 
2005 Reforms & 
GFC 
2009 – 2013 
 
2009 Reforms & 
Post GFC 
Expected Sign 
Capital Adequacy 
(ETA) 
0.679*** 
(5.32) 
0.872*** 
(4.85) 
0.487* 
(1.83) 
0.695** 
(2.15) 
+ 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
0.035 
(0.51) 
0.205** 
(2.49) 
-0.048 
(-0.38) 
-0.121 
(-0.86) 
- 
Management 
(CIR) 
-0.32*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.342*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.48*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.264** 
(-2.25) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
-0.369 
(-1.36) 
-0.322 
(-1.24) 
-0.489 
(-0.55) 
-0.215 
(-0.31) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.33*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.139 
(-1.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.06) 
+ 
Sensitivity to 
Risk 
(TSTA) 
-0.254*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.223** 
(-2.24) 
-0.179 
(-1.24) 
-0.256 
(-1.63) 
+ 
Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
5.42*** 
(5.60) 
6.301*** 
(4.09) 
6.773*** 
(3.58) 
2.244 
(0.87) 
+ 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
0.318 
(0.96) 
0.046 
(0.12) 
2.089 
(0.59) 
-0.822 
(-1.20) 
+ 
CONSTANT 74.651*** 
(7.88) 
81.07*** 
(7.81) 
65.509* 
(1.66) 
94.746*** 
(3.99) 
 
NO of OBS 364 213 74 77  
ADJ R-SQ 0.4183 0.3186 0.3493 0.2008  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0303  
HAUSMAN-
TEST 
0.0300 0.2284 0.0006 0.3962  
VIF (MEAN) 1.29 1.27 1.53 1.54  
 Notes: Variables are defined in table 4.3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively; whole period (2000 – 2013) Hausman-Test is <0.05, thus Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random 
Effects is rejected; Pre-2005 reforms period (2000 – 2004) Hausman-Test is >0.05, thus Fixed Effects is 
rejected, while Random Effects is accepted; 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 
2008) Hausman-Test is <0.05, however, F-Test for the Fixed Effects is > 0.05, hence the Hausman-Test is not 
relied upon, thus the Fixed Effects model is rejected, while the Random Effects model is accepted; 2009 
banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period (2009 – 2013) Hausman-Test is >0.5, thus the Fixed 
Effects is rejected, while Random effect is accepted; OLS VIF (MEAN) shows multicollinearity is absent in all 
the independent variables and in all the periods.  
 
6.4.1 Impact of Capital Adequacy on Bank Efficiency 
 
Starting with the whole period of 2000 – 2013, the regression result submits that capital 
adequacy has a positive and statistically significant effect on efficiency. The positive and 
significant association indicates that capital adequacy influences the efficiency of Nigerian 
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DMBs. The result implies that as capital adequacy increases, the efficiency of Nigerian 
DMBs also increases. The pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004) results also show 
a positive and statistically significant relationship between capital adequacy and efficiency. 
The result also implies that efficiency increases when capital adequacy increases. In addition, 
the t-value indicates that the effect of capital adequacy on efficiency was more prominent in 
the pre-2005 banking reforms period than in the other periods. Additionally, the positive and 
significant relationship could also be explained by the improvement in the average annual 
efficiency scores of DMBs in the whole period and especially in the pre-2005 banking 
reforms period when a lot of small DMBs were operating in the Nigerian banking sector.    
Turning to the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period, the effect of capital 
adequacy on efficiency remained positive. However, the significance level plummeted to 
10%. The reduced effect of capital adequacy can be ascribed to the event of the global 
financial crisis, and the restructuring Nigerian DMBs were going through within this period.  
Progressively, the association between capital adequacy and efficiency remained positive in 
the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period, although there was an 
increase in the influence of capital adequacy on efficiency. The results show that statistical 
significance level of the association increased within this period. The increase in the 
influence of capital adequacy on efficiency could be because of the 2009 banking reforms 
elements, which mandated Nigerian DMBs with international operations to increase their 
regulatory capital to N100bn. In addition, Nigerian regulators in reaction to the global 
financial crisis to safeguard shareholder’s funds within this period outlined new corporate 
governance guidelines. 
 
6.4.2 Impact of Asset Quality on Bank Efficiency 
 
The ratio of impaired loans to gross loans (ILGL) is the adopted proxy for asset quality. The 
expected influence of asset quality is negative because an increase should have an opposite 
impact on efficiency. Beginning with the whole period (2000 – 2013), the results shows a 
positive but insignificant relationship between asset quality and efficiency. The insignificant 
relationship implies that level of impaired loans in the whole had no influence on the 
efficiency of Nigerian DMBs within the entire period of 2000 to 2013.  
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Conversely, the pre-2005 banking reforms period result shows a positive and significant 
relationship between asset quality and bank efficiency. The result obtained is contrary to the 
expected effect of the ratio impaired loans to gross loans (asset quality) should have on 
efficiency. The result implies that efficiency increased as the ratio of impaired loans to gross 
loans of Nigerian DMBs increased in the pre-2005 banking reforms period. On that account, 
it is possible that bank managements within this period that the Nigerian banking sector was 
comprised of numerous small sized DMBs were able to manage impaired loans which 
spurred efficiency effectively. More so, this is the only period where the asset quality of 
Nigerian DMBs had an influence on efficiency. Also, the positive effect of impaired loans to 
gross loans within this period is responsible for the positive but insignificant result obtained 
for the whole period of 2000 to 2013. 
On the other hand, the relationship between asset quality and bank efficiency in the 2005 
banking reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008) and 2009 banking reforms & 
post-global financial crisis period (2009 – 2013) is negative but insignificant. The result 
implies that the asset quality of Nigerian DMBs had no influence on efficiency as the 
Nigerian banking sector went through reforms and the global financial crisis. To that end, 
impaired loans discontinued having an effect on the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs after the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms. Moreover, unlike in the whole period 
(2000 – 2013) and the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), the expected negative 
relationship between asset quality and efficiency is obtained in the 2005 banking reforms & 
global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008) and 2009 banking reforms & post-global 
financial crisis period (2009 – 2013).  
 
6.4.3 Impact of Management Quality on Bank Efficiency 
 
The effect of management quality on efficiency is investigated in this section. The cost to 
income ratio (CIR) is the adopted managerial quality proxy and it shows how well bank 
executives manage cost in order to generate income. 
The result for the whole period (2000 – 2013) shows a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between management quality and bank efficiency. In like manner, the 
relationship between management quality and bank efficiency in the pre-2005 banking 
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reforms period, 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period, and 2009 global 
financial crisis & post-global financial crisis period are also negative and statistically 
significant. However, the significance level during the 2009 global financial crisis & post-
global financial crisis period dropped to 5%. These results denote that when the cost to 
income ratio of Nigerian DMBs increase, efficiency levels decreased as anticipated. The 
results also indicate that the influence of management quality on bank efficiency was 
substantial, aside from the in the 2009 global financial crisis & post-global financial crisis 
period when there was a slight decline in the influence CIR on efficiency.  
 
6.4.4 Impact of Earnings on Bank Efficiency 
 
This section centres on the impact of the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs on efficiency. Net 
Interest Margin (NIM) is employed as the proxy for earning ability because it is believed to 
depict the ability of banking institutions to generate earnings from their assets. Hence, a 
positive association is projected.  
The effect of earning ability on bank efficiency is negative and insignificant in the whole 
period (2000 – 2013) and the three sub-periods examined in this study. The negative 
relationship implies that as the earning ability of DMBs decreases, efficiency levels increases 
and vice versa, however, the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs is not a determinant of 
efficiency. In sum, the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs does not impact efficiency.  
 
6.4.5 Impact of Liquidity on Bank Efficiency  
 
The impact of liquidity on the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs is reviewed in this section. 
Liquidity is represented by the ratio of liquid assets to deposit & short-term funding 
(LADSTF). The higher the ratio of liquid assets to deposit & short-term funding, the less a 
banking institution is vulnerable to a bank run. Thus a positive association between liquidity 
and efficiency is expected.  
Beginning with the whole period of 2000 – 2013, the coefficient of the liquidity variable is 
negative and highly significant. The result implies that liquidity influences efficiency and the 
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negative coefficient infers that as liquidity increases, banking efficiency decreases. The same 
result is noticed in the pre-2005 banking reforms period as liquidity has a negative and highly 
significant relationship with efficiency. The influence of liquidity on efficiency in this period 
accounts for the indicated influence of liquidity on efficiency for the whole period (2000 – 
2013). Nonetheless, the diagnosed negative influence was not projected. Therefore, an 
increase in liquidity in the pre-2005 banking reforms period when there were numerous 
banking institutions encouraged engagements in operations that hampered efficiency.   
In like manner, the relationship between liquidity and efficiency is negative but insignificant 
in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period & in the 2009 banking reforms 
& post-global financial crisis period.  This result implies that liquidity ceased to have an 
influence on efficiency when Nigerian DMBs consolidated in 2005, and the number of 
banking institutions dropped from 89 to 25. Equally, even though liquidity was not a 
determinant of efficiency after the Nigerian banking sector went through the 2005 banking 
reforms, the negative association between liquidity and efficiency suggests that increased 
liquidity encouraged DMBs to engage in activities that impede efficiency. 
 
6.4.6 Impact of Sensitivity to Risk on Bank Efficiency 
 
This section of the study ascertains the impact of the sensitivity of risk proxy on efficiency. 
Market forces affect the viability of banks. Thus, the ratio of total securities to total assets 
(TSTA) is the adopted proxy for sensitivity to risk. A low value of the total securities to total 
assets ratio is an indication that a bank’s reaction towards risk is appropriate. On that account, 
a negative association between sensitivity to risk and efficiency is projected.  
Given the regression results of the whole period (2000 – 2013), sensitivity to risk (TSTA) is 
statistically significant and has a negative relationship with efficiency. This submission 
suggests that efficiency increased when Nigerian DMBs were less vulnerable to risk.    
In the same vein, the relationship between sensitivity to risk and efficiency in the pre-2005 
banking reforms period (2000 – 2004) is negative and significant at 5%. The significance 
level of the relationship plummeted within this period. Nonetheless, this could be as a result 
of the value of securities and assets in the pre-2005 banking reforms period which were lower 
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than those of subsequent sub-periods. Nevertheless, the low value of securities to total assets 
within the period of 2000 – 2004 denotes that DMBs were less vulnerable to market risk.     
Conversely, the regression results of the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis 
period (2005 – 2008) and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis (2009 – 2013) 
indicate a negative but insignificant relationship between the sensitivity of Nigerian DMBs to 
market risk and efficiency. The value of securities and assets of Nigerian banking institutions 
increased in 2005 and remained relatively high till the episode of the global financial crisis. 
And even though the value of banking securities plummeted during the global financial crisis 
and in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period, the ratio of total 
securities to total assets ceased to determine efficiency in the period the Nigerian banking 
sector went through the 2005 banking reforms. For this reason, it can be submitted that the 
influence of sensitivity to risk to determine efficiency diminished when after the 
consolidation of Nigerian DMBs in 2005 due to the general increase in the value of securities 
and assets of DMBs.    
 
6.4.7 Impact of Bank Size on Bank Efficiency 
 
Increased bank size is assumed to confer benefits that may increase efficiency, however, 
bottlenecks not present in small banking institutions may also derail efficiency. On account of 
the above, the impact of bank size on efficiency could either be positive or negative. Nigerian 
DMBs were to some extent smaller before the 2005 banking reforms. The consolidation 
exercise of the 2005 banking reforms resulted in bigger DMBs with more branches, assets, 
and capital to continue expanding. Similarly, the 2009 banking reforms further promoted the 
expansion of Tier-I banking institutions by increasing regulatory capital to N100bn for DMBs 
with international banking operations. To this end, this section of the study examines the 
effect of bank size on efficiency. 
The regression results of the whole period (2000 – 2013) show a positive and highly 
significant relationship between size and efficiency. This positive and statistically significant 
result infers that as bank size increased, the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs also increased.  
Equally, the results of the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004) and the 2005 
banking reforms & GFC period (2005 – 2008) mirrors the result of the whole period, as the 
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relationship between size and efficiency are also positive and highly significant. These results 
infer that size was able to determine efficiency when the Nigerian banking sector was largely 
made up of small sized banking institutions before the 2005 banking reforms and when the 
banking sector was consolidated into few DMBs. More so, consistent with the DEA results 
where the efficiency frontier consisted of some large DMBs that were not involved in any 
form of merger or acquisition during the consolidation exercise of the 2005 reforms, size was 
able to determine efficiency in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period. On 
the account that large DMBs that did not merge or acquire others within the period of 2005 – 
2008 were not overwhelmed by post-merger and acquisition issues.  
Furthermore, the only period where size was found not to determine efficiency is the 2009 
banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. The relationship between size and 
efficiency is found to be positive but insignificant. And even though Nigerian DMBs became 
larger within this period as some of them expanded their activities outside the shores of 
Nigeria, increased their capital to N100bn or either engaged in some form of merger and 
acquisition, the obtained result indicates that size was not a determinant of efficiency. 
Another explanation might be that the event of the global financial crisis reduced the 
advantage held by large DMBs over smaller DMBs.   
 
6.4.8 Impact of Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDP) on Bank Efficiency 
 
Economic growth and development are believed to impact positively on efficiency and 
performance. As such, this study examines the impact of GDP growth (adopted 
macroeconomic variable) on efficiency (BCC efficiency scores). 
The regression result for the whole period reveals a positive and insignificant relationship 
between GDP and efficiency. This result infers that GDP growth was not a determinant of 
efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector in the entire period of 2000 – 2013. The same 
insignificant relationship between GDP and efficiency is obtained in the three sub-periods. 
However, the relationship between GDP and efficiency is positive in the pre-2005 banking 
reforms periods and the 2005 banking reforms period, while that of the 2009 banking reforms 
& post-global financial crisis period is negative. In sum, GDP had no influence over the 
determination of efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector.   
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6.4.9 Model Extensions  
 
To further verify the factors that determined bank efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector, 
dummy variables are introduced to particularly ascertain whether the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms affected the efficiency of DMBs. Additionally, all the independent variables are 
lagged (t – 1) to also validate or complement the findings above. Table 6.3 shows the 
regression results for the whole period (2000 – 2013), the whole period (2000 – 2013) with 
dummy variables, and the whole period (2000 – 2013) with lagged independent variables.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
Table 6.3: Model Extensions: Determinants of Bank Efficiency (Average Annual BCC 
Efficiency Scores) with Dummy Variables and Lagged Independent Variables 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
(Model 1) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Dummy 
Variables) 
(Model 4) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Lagged 
Variables) 
(Model 7) 
Expected Sign 
Capital Adequacy 
(ETA) 
0.679*** 
(5.32) 
0.5854*** 
(4.27) 
0.027 
(0.17) 
+ 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
0.035 
(0.51) 
0.0336 
(0.49) 
0.010 
(0.11) 
- 
Management 
(CIR) 
-0.32*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.3186*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.108 
(-1.21) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
-0.369 
(-1.36) 
-0.2522 
(-0.92) 
-0.368 
(-0.98) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.2321*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.050 
(-1.01) 
+ 
Sensitivity to Risk 
(TSTA) 
-0.254*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.2635*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.241** 
(-2.39) 
+ 
Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
5.42*** 
(5.60) 
5.004*** 
(3.64) 
7.801*** 
(6.38) 
+ 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
0.318 
(0.96) 
0.2240 
(0.67) 
0.592 
(1.45) 
+ 
Dum1  4.1212 
(1.51) 
 + 
Dum2  -3.1791 
(-0.81) 
 + 
CONSTANT 74.651*** 
(7.88) 
82.859*** 
(8.12) 
48.696*** 
(3.85) 
 
NO of OBS 364 364 303  
ADJ R-SQ 0.4183 0.4759 0.2789  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
HAUSMAN-TEST 0.0300 0.0045 0.0005  
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively; whole period (2000 – 
2013) Hausman-Test is <0.05, thus Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random Effects is rejected; whole period 
with dummy variables (2000 – 2013) Hausman-Test is <0.05, thus Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random 
Effects is rejected; whole period with lagged variables (2000 – 2013) Hausman-Test is <0.05, hence Fixed 
Effects is accepted, while Random Effects is rejected. 
 
The introduction of dummy variables showed similar results in most instances to that of the 
base model. A positive and significant relationship between capital adequacy and size with 
efficiency was obtained, while management quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk show 
negative and significant relationships with efficiency. Therefore, efficiency levels increased 
when capital adequacy and the size of DMB increased, while efficiency levels reduced when 
management quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk increased.  
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Similarly, earnings, asset quality and GDP had no effect on efficiency in both the base model 
(model 1) and the model extension with dummy variables (model 4). Hence, suggesting that 
the revenue accruing to DMBs, the quality of assets, and GDP growth did not determine the 
efficiency of banking institutions in the Nigerian economy within the period of 2000 - 2013.    
Furthermore, the introduction of dummy variables in the model 4 (model extension) is to 
ascertain the impact of the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms on efficiency. To that end, a 
positive and significant relationship between the two banking reforms and efficiency was 
expected. However, the relationship between the 2005 reforms (dummy 1) and bank 
efficiency is positive but insignificant. This position differs from the average BCC efficiency 
score which increased in reaction to the 2005 banking reforms. Likewise, interview 
submissions from regulators and bank executives suggest that the 2005 banking reforms 
boosted Nigerian DMBs. On the other hand, the possible explanation for the inability of the 
2005 banking reforms to impact on efficiency could be the host of mergers and acquisitions 
that happened in the Nigerian banking sector as DMBs consolidated to avoid being 
liquidated. More so, the global financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007 could 
also be a possible reason for the incapacity of the 2005 banking reforms to determine 
efficiency.    
Additionally, the relationship between the 2009 banking reforms (dummy 2) and bank 
efficiency is negative and insignificant. The result implies that the 2009 banking reforms did 
not determine the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs even though it had a negative relationship 
that was not expected. However, the result can be explained by the event of the global 
financial crisis which affected the efficiency scores of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian banking 
sector and some DMBs that led their bailout in 2009.  
Likewise, the results of model 7 (extended model with lagged independent variables) did not 
show good enough results for the determination of factors that influenced bank efficiency in 
the Nigerian banking sector within the period of 2000 – 2013. To that end, the lagging of 
independent variables to capture the delayed effect of activities that transpired in the Nigerian 
banking reforms failed to reveal meaningful results. Nonetheless, the significant relationships 
of sensitivity to risk (negative) and size (positive) and efficiency mirror the results obtained 
in the base model.   
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6.4.10 Summary 
 
In a nutshell, capital adequacy (equity to total assets ratio) had a positive effect on efficiency 
in all the periods examined. More so, impaired loans to gross loans which is the proxy for 
asset quality was not a determinant of efficiency in the periods the Nigerian banking sector 
went through the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global financial crisis. The effect of 
liquidity on efficiency, the association was significant but negative for the whole period and 
pre-2005 banking reforms period. Additionally, size had a positive impact on efficiency in 
the whole period, pre-2005 banking reforms period, and 2005 banking reforms period. 
Finally, the results obtained from the introduction of dummy variables showed that the 2005 
and 2009 banking reforms did not have significant effects on the efficiency of DMBs. Also, 
the lagging of the independent variables to ascertain if there were any delay in the effect of 
the banking reforms on the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs did not provide convincing results 
to indicate the determinants of efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector.   
 
6.5 Determinants of Bank Performance 
 
The effects of capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning ability, liquidity, 
sensitivity to risk, bank size, and GDP on the performance of Nigerian DMBs is examined in 
this section. The adopted proxy of bank performance is the return on assets (ROA), and is 
regressed against the above listed independent variables.  
In similar fashion, the regression results are reviewed for the whole period (2000 -2013), pre-
2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis 
period (2005 – 2008), and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period (2009 – 
2013). The F-Test and Hausman-Test indicate the appropriateness of either the fixed effect or 
the random effect and the models, and the results are depicted in the notes below table 6.4. 
The impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable numerically presented in 
the table below is outlined in the sections of this study further down.  
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Table 6.4: Base Model: Determinants of Bank Performance (Return on Assets) 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
2000 – 2004 
 
Pre-2005 
Reforms 
2005 – 2008 
 
2005 Reforms & 
GFC 
2009 – 2013 
 
2009 Reforms & 
Post GFC 
Expected Sign 
Capital Adequacy 
(ETA) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.028 
(1.43) 
-0.014 
(-0.30) 
+ 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
-0.035*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.011 
(-0.65) 
-0.003 
(-0.14) 
- 
Management  
(CIR) 
-0.091*** 
(-13.27) 
-0.105*** 
(-10.82) 
-0.075*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.46) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
0.128*** 
(5.24) 
0.118*** 
(3.93) 
0.095 
(0.93) 
0.075 
(0.85) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
0.014*** 
(3.51) 
0.017** 
(2.27) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
0.022* 
(1.84) 
- 
Sensitivity to 
Risk 
(TSTA) 
0.007 
(1.00) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.009 
(-0.75) 
0.058*** 
(2.89) 
- 
Bank Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
-0.353*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.321* 
(-1.91) 
-0.293 
(-1.45) 
-0.126 
(-0.38) 
+/- 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
-0.067* 
(-1.84) 
-0.057 
(-1.09) 
0.278 
(1.24) 
-0.012 
(-0.13) 
+ 
CONSTANT 9.001*** 
(10.29) 
9.489*** 
(1.23) 
5.522 
(1.46) 
4.538 
(1.51) 
 
NO of OBS 
 
361 211 74 76  
ADJ R-SQ 
 
0.5781 0.5266 0.6142 0.5080  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000  
HAUSMAN-
TEST 
0.8745 0.4885 0.0015 0.1609  
VIF (MEAN) 
 
1.29 1.27 1.53 1.54  
Notes: Variables are defined in table 4.3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively; whole period (2000 – 2013) Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is rejected, while Random 
Effects is accepted; Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is 
rejected, while Random Effects is accepted; 2005 Banking Reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 
2008) Hausman-Test is <0.05, Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random Effects is rejected; 2009 Banking 
Reforms & Post-Global Financial Crisis (2009 -2013) Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is rejected, while 
Random Effects is accepted; OLS VIF (MEAN) shows multicollinearity is absent in all the independent 
variables and in all the periods. 
 
6.5.1 Impact of Capital Adequacy on Bank Performance 
 
Starting with the whole period of 2000 to 2013, the regression results indicate a positive and 
insignificant relationship between capital adequacy and bank performance. The same result is 
obtained in the pre-2005 banking reforms period and the 2005 banking reforms & global 
financial crisis period. While the relationship between capital adequacy and bank 
performance in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period is negative but 
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also insignificant like in all the other periods. Nonetheless, the results of the whole period and 
the three sub-periods indicate that though regulatory capital was increased in 2005 and 2009 
in the Nigerian banking sector, capital adequacy is not a determinant of performance.     
 
6.5.2 Impact of Asset Quality on Bank Performance 
 
The impact of asset quality (ILGL) on bank performance (ROA) is examined in this section. 
Starting with the regression results obtained for the whole period (2000 – 2013), the 
association between asset quality and bank performance is negative and statistically 
significant. This implies that as the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans decreases, bank 
performance increases and vice versa. This result is replicated in the pre-2005 banking 
reforms period as the effect of asset quality on bank performance stayed negative and 
statistically significant. Banking institutions were not capitalised enough to grant numerous 
loans/credits in the pre-2005 banking reforms period which could mean that DMBs were not 
weighed down huge non-performing loans within this period. However, the significance of 
the relationship between asset quality and bank performance infers that asset quality 
determined bank performance within the period of 2000 – 2004. More so, the result of pre-
2005 banking reforms period accounts largely for the significant relationship obtained in the 
regression result of the whole period. To that end, a review of the entire sub-periods shows 
that that impact of the level of impaired loans to gross loans in the pre-2005 banking reforms 
period accounts largely for the significant impact of asset quality on performance denoted in 
the whole period of 2000 – 2013.  
In view of the above, the association between asset quality and bank performance is negative 
but insignificant in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period and the 2009 
banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. Regulatory reports submitted that there 
was a build-up of non-performing loans in the Nigerian banking sector after the 2005 banking 
reforms, yet the results indicate that asset quality had no effect on the performance of DMBs 
within the period of 2005 – 2013.    
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6.5.3 Impact of Management Quality on Bank Performance 
 
This section examines the effect of cost to income ratio (CIR) the adopted proxy for 
management quality on bank performance (ROA). In similar fashion with previous sections, 
presented in this section are the regression results for the whole study period (2000 – 2013), 
and the sub-periods of the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), 2005 banking 
reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008), and the 2009 banking reforms & post 
global financial crisis period (2009 – 2013). 
Foremost, the relationship between management quality and bank performance for the whole 
period is negative and statistically significant. The result implies that as the cost to income 
ratio of DMB increases the performance of DMBs decreases and vice versa. Literature opines 
that banking institutions take fewer risks when management are strict and are not 
adventurous. On that account, this result suggests that management quality had an effect on 
the performance of DMBs in the whole.  
More so, the same negative and statistically significant relationship between management 
quality and bank performance are observed in the three sub-periods. These results also imply 
that as the cost to income ratio of banking institutions increased, their performance decreased. 
In addition, cost to income ratio is significant and negatively related to performance in the 
Nigerian banking sector as investments in inputs is indicated to have not translated to 
improvements in performance. As such, the expected impact of the cost to income ratio, 
which is the adopted proxy for management quality on performance, is observed in all the 
reviewed periods. 
 
6.5.4 Impact of Earnings on Bank Performance 
 
Net interest margin (NIM) is the adopted proxy for the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs. 
This section explores the effect of the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs on performance 
(ROA). 
The regression results of the whole period and that of the pre-2005 banking reforms period 
indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between the earning ability of 
Nigerian DMBs and bank performance. These results infer that as the earning ability of 
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DMBs increased, their performance also increased. Hence, the results of the pre-2005 
banking reforms period also suggest that the relatively large number and small size of 
Nigerian DMBs within this period made it possible for earnings to have an effect on 
performance.  
Conversely, though the effect of earning ability on bank performance remained positive in 
both the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period and the 2009 banking reforms 
& post-global financial crisis period, earning ability is not a determinant of bank 
performance. Hence it can be opined that the ability of earnings to determine performance 
plunged as the size of Nigerian DMBs increased in reaction to the consolidation exercise of 
the 2005 banking reforms.   
 
6.5.5 Impact of Liquidity on Bank Performance 
 
The adopted liquidity proxy for this study is the ratio of liquid assets to deposit & short-term 
funding (LADSTF). The higher the ratio, the more liquid a bank is said to be and the less 
vulnerable it is to a bank run. Therefore, the relationship between liquidity and bank 
performance (ROA) is projected to be positive. 
In view of the whole period (2000 – 2013), the relationship between liquidity and bank 
performance is positive and statistically significant. This result implies that as the liquidity 
levels of DMBs increase the performance of the DMBs also increases. In like manner, the 
effect of liquidity on bank performance is also positive and but at a lower level of 
significance in the pre-2005 banking reforms period. This result infers that as liquidity 
increases, bank performance also increases but not in tandem due to the 5% significance 
level.  
On the other hand, the relationship between liquidity (LADSTF) and performance in the 2005 
banking reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008) is positive but not significant. 
This result implies that liquidity was not a determinant of bank performance in the Nigerian-
banking sector during the 2005 banking reforms and the global financial crisis that started in 
the second half of 2007. This result could be due to the fact that all DMBs in the Nigerian 
banking sector had increased liquidity levels in line with the mandate of the 2005 banking 
reforms that all DMBs increase their capital to N25bn. Improved liquidity levels in the entire 
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banking sector meant liquidity shortage ceased to be an issue. Thus, liquidity became 
insignificant to determine bank performance within this period.     
Furthermore, the regression result of the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis 
period indicates a positive and slightly significant relationship between liquidity and 
performance. This result implies that as liquidity increases, the performance of DMBs also 
slightly increases. Eight DMBs suffered liquidity problems and were bailed-out in 2009, 
while DMBs with international operations were mandated to increase their regulatory capital 
to N100bn. This indicates that with the disparity in capital levels and the widening gap in 
liquidity available to DMBs in line with the elements of the 2009 banking reforms, the 
influence of liquidity in the determination of performance re-emerged. 
 
6.5.6 Impact of Sensitivity to Risk on Bank Performance 
 
The association between the sensitivity of Nigerian DMBs to risk and bank performance is 
explored in this section of the thesis. It is worth noting that ROA (dependable variable) is the 
adopted proxy for bank performance, while the ratio of total securities to total assets (TSTA) 
is the proxy for sensitivity to risk. A negative relationship is projected, given the view that a 
high value of the ratio of total securities to total assets is an indication that the banks’ 
portfolios are vulnerable to risk.  
The relationship between sensitivity to risk and bank performance is positive but insignificant 
in the whole period and the pre-2005 banking reforms period. These results suggest that the 
sensitivity of DMBs to market risk was not a determinant of bank performance in the whole 
period and in the pre-2005 banking reforms period when the Nigerian banking sector had 
numerous DMBs that were relatively small in size. However, even though the effect of 
sensitivity to risk on bank performance was insignificant, the observed positive effect was not 
consistent with the projected negative effect.   
More so, the regression results of the sub-period of 2005 – 2008 (2005 banking reforms & 
global financial crisis period indicates a negative relationship between the sensitivity of 
Nigerian DMBs to risk and performance that is not significant. The negative coefficient 
suggests that as the vulnerability of Nigerian DMBs to market risk decreased, bank 
performance increased. Nonetheless, the negative effect on bank performance is rather 
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insignificant. To that end, the sensitivity of Nigerian DMBs to risk had no effect on 
performance in the period the Nigerian DMBs went through the 2005 banking reforms and 
the global financial crisis.   
Conversely, the results of the final sub-period of 2009 – 2013 (2009 banking reforms & post-
global financial crisis period) show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between sensitivity to risk and bank performance. Just like the results of the whole period and 
pre-2005 banking reforms period, the observed positive effect is contrary to the projected 
negative association of sensitivity to risk and bank performance. Therefore suggesting that an 
increase in the vulnerability of Nigerian DMBs to risk also leads to an increase in bank 
performance. This submission is in line with the notion that higher risk translates into higher 
profits. In sum, the result indicates as the vulnerability of Nigerian DMBs to risk increased 
probably due to the elements of the 2009 banking reforms and post global financial crisis 
DMBs managed their risk position in ways that translated into increased performance.   
 
6.5.7 Impact of Bank Size on Bank Performance 
 
This section of the study aims to find out the effect of bank size on the performance of 
Nigerian DMBs. Inflation-adjusted (Consumer Price Index) natural logarithm of total assets 
is the proxy for bank size in this research. Size affects banking institutions in diverse ways, 
and as such, the relationship between the size Nigerian DMBs to bank performance (ROA) 
could be either positive or negative.  
Given the relationship between bank size and bank performance, the result of the whole 
period (2000 – 2013) indicates a negative and significant association. The result implies that 
when the size of Nigerian DMBs increases, performance decreases and vice versa. Put 
simply, bank size and bank performance move in opposite directions. Furthermore, the 
association of bank size and performance is also negative but slightly significant (10%) in the 
pre-2005 banking reforms. Nigerian DMBs were relatively small in this period, and the 
regression results show that bank size had more influence on performance in this period than 
in the other sub-periods.  
Moreover, the regression results of the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period 
and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period indicate the same results. The 
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results indicate a negative and insignificant association between size and performance. In 
essence, this result opines that size ceased to have an effect on bank performance after the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms which created 25 large banking 
institutions with boosted capital and assets and increased branch network. It is likely that the 
wide-ranging developments in all the banking institutions that survived the 2005 banking 
reforms rendered size ineffective to determine performance. 
 
6.5.8 Impact of Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDP) on Bank Performance 
 
This section presents the regression results that explore the extent to which GDP growth 
influences bank performance (ROA) in the Nigerian banking sector.  
In view of the whole period of 2000 – 2013, GDP has a negative effect on bank performance, 
and the association between GDP growth and bank performance is slightly significant at 
10%. Hence implying that as GDP decreases, bank performance increases and vice versa. 
Therefore, the influence exerted by GDP growth on bank performance in the Nigerian 
banking sector over the period of 2000 – 2013 was meagre. 
Conversely, the regression results of the three sub-periods show insignificant relationships 
between GDP and bank performance. The impact of GDP on bank performance in the pre-
2005 banking reforms period and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period 
is negative, while that of the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period is 
positive. However, no matter the sign of the coefficient, GDP growth was not a determinant 
of bank performance in the three sub-periods examined independently. 
 
6.5.9 Model Extensions 
 
To further validate the factors that determined bank performance in the Nigerian banking 
sector, dummy variables are introduced to particularly ascertain whether the 2005 and 2009 
banking reforms affected the performance of DMBs. Additionally, all the independent 
variables are lagged (t – 1) to also corroborate or complement the findings above. Table 6.5 
shows the regression results for the whole period (2000 – 2013), the whole period (2000 – 
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2013) with dummy variables, and the whole period (2000 – 2013) with lagged independent 
variables. 
Table 6.5: Model Extensions: Determinants of Bank Performance (ROA) with Dummy 
Variables and Lagged Independent Variables 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
(Model 2) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Dummy 
Variables) 
(Model 5) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Lagged 
Variables) 
(model 8) 
Expected Sign 
Capital Adequacy 
(ETA) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.0146 
(1.00) 
0.019 
(0.87) 
+ 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
-0.035*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.0343*** 
(-5.0) 
-0.015 
(-1.29) 
- 
Management 
(CIR) 
-0.091*** 
(-13.27) 
-0.0892*** 
(-12.99) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.28) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
0.128*** 
(5.24) 
0.1208*** 
(4.85) 
0.046 
(0.90) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
0.014*** 
(3.51) 
0.0101** 
(2.01) 
0.010 
(1.51) 
- 
Sensitivity to Risk 
(TSTA) 
0.007 
(1.00) 
0.0089 
(1.18) 
-0.033** 
(-2.41) 
- 
Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
-0.353*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.2108* 
(-1.84) 
-0.435*** 
(-2.67) 
+/- 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
-0.067* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0819** 
(-2.19) 
-0.039 
(-0.71) 
+ 
Dum1  -0.3862 
(-1.34) 
 + 
Dum2  -0.7648* 
(-1.90) 
 + 
CONSTANT 9.001*** 
(10.29) 
8.7331*** 
(9.26) 
7.517*** 
(4.43) 
 
NO of OBS 361 361 301  
ADJ R-SQ 0.5781 0.5786 0.2988  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
HAUSMAN-TEST 0.8745 0.8592 0.0143  
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively; whole period (2000 – 
2013) Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is rejected, while Random Effects is accepted; whole period with 
dummy variables Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is rejected, while Random Effects is accepted; whole 
period with lagged variables Hausman-Test <0.05, thus Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random Effects is 
rejected. 
 
As suggested in previous sections, the extension of the base models is to confirm the obtained 
results further when dummy variables that depict the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms are 
introduced and when the independent variables are lagged by one year (t – 1). On that 
account, the regression results of model 5 (extended model with dummy variables) recorded 
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the same results with model 2 (base regression model) in some instances. The relationship 
between bank performance and earnings and liquidity are shown to be positive and 
significant in the base model and the extended model with dummy variables. The results 
imply that the performance of Nigerian DMBs increases when earnings and liquidity level of 
DMBs increase. Asset quality, management quality, size and GDP, on the other hand, 
indicated negative and significant associations with bank performance. Conversely, size was 
significant at 1% in the base model but 10% significant in the extended model with dummy 
variables. Equally, GDP which had a negative and 10% significant relationship with bank 
performance in the base regression model (model 2) showed an increase (5%) in its 
significance level with the introduction of dummies.  
Particularly, the dummy variables were introduced to ascertain the effects of the 2005 and 
2009 banking reforms on bank performance. Although positive associations were expected 
between the dummy variables and bank performance, the regression results show negative 
associations. The association between the 2005 banking reforms is not significant, while that 
of the 2009 banking reforms is slightly significant. The negative and insignificant 
relationship between the 2005 banking reforms and bank performance is not consistent with 
the interview submissions that suggest that the 2005 reforms impelled bank performance. 
Nevertheless, the inability of the 2005 banking reforms to influence bank performance may 
be related to the wholesome transformations that DMBs went through during the 2005 
banking reforms. On the other hand, the negative and significant relationship between the 
bank performance and the 2009 banking reforms could be linked to the event of the global 
financial crisis and the bailout of eight DMBs in 2009 in the Nigerian banking sector.  
Furthermore, the lagging of the independent variables (model 8) shows insignificant 
relationships between bank performance and capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, 
liquidity, and GDP. However, just like the results of Model 2 and Model 5 (Table 6.5) the 
regression results of model 8 show negative and significant relationships between bank 
performance and management quality, and size. Consequently, the lagged proxies of capital 
adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and GDP did not influence bank performance, 
even though asset quality, earnings, liquidity were determinants of bank performance in the 
base model (model 2) and the extended model with dummy variables (model 5). Conversely, 
sensitivity to risk is only significant in the extended model with lagged independent variables 
(model 8). The relationship between bank performance and sensitivity to risk in model 8 
implies that as the sensitivity to risk decreases, the performance of Nigerian DMBs increases.   
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Conclusively, the inconsistent results of model 8 (extended model with lagged independent 
variables) suggest that the lagging of the independent variables did not produce the 
anticipated results. On that account, the delayed effects of the independent variables on bank 
performance are not relied upon to make inferences in this study. On the other hand, the 
consistency of the results of model 5 (extended model with dummy variables) validates the 
results of model 2. Hence, conclusions are drawn from the regression results of the base 
model (model 2).    
 
6.5.10 Summary  
 
In sum, impaired loans (proxy for asset quality) had a negative and significant effect on 
performance in the whole period and pre-2005 banking reforms period. The effect of cost to 
income ratio (management quality) was diagnosed to have a negative impact on performance 
as expected in the whole period and the three sub-periods. While NIM (earnings) was found 
to have a significant and positive association with performance in the whole period and pre-
2005 banking reforms period. In like manner, liquidity was found to have a positive and 
significant effect on performance in the whole period and pre-2005 banking period. This 
study found that liquidity resurfaced as a determinant of performance in the 2009 banking 
reforms & post-global financial crisis. The effect of liquidity on performance in the 2009 
banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period could be down to the increase in the 
regulatory capital of DMBs with international operations from N25bn to N100bn and the 
retracting effect of the global financial crisis. Furthermore, even though a negative 
relationship was projected, the effect of sensitivity to market risk on performance was found 
to be positive and highly significant in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial 
crisis period. Size was diagnosed to have a negative and significant effect on performance in 
the whole period and pre-2005 banking reforms period. While on the other hand, size failed 
to impact on performance in subsequent periods as Nigerian DMBs became bigger in reaction 
to the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms. Equally, GDP is shown to have a 
slight negative effect on performance in the whole period, while it has no effect on 
performance in all the sub-periods. Finally, the base models were extended to include dummy 
variables that proxy the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the independent variables were 
lagged to ascertain their delayed effects on bank performance. The two dummy variables did 
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not show significant influences on bank performance, while the extended model with the 
lagged independent variables indicated inconsistent results.   
 
6.6 Determinants of Financial Stability 
 
This section investigates the determinants of financial stability in the Nigerian banking sector 
within the period of 2000 – 2013. The investigation is directed to ascertaining the 
determinants of financial stability in relation to the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, and the 
global financial crisis. The proxy for financial stability adopted for this study is the Z-score. 
Hence, the Z-score is regressed against proxies for asset quality, management quality, earning 
ability, liquidity, sensitivity to risk, bank size, and the macroeconomic indicator of GDP.  
In like manner, the regression analysis is undertaken for four periods: the whole period of the 
study (2000 – 2013); pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004); 2005 banking reforms 
& global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008); 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial 
crisis period (2009 – 2013). The F-Test and Hausman-Test indicate the appropriateness of 
either the fixed effect or the random effect and the models, and the results are depicted in the 
notes below table 6.6.    
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Table 6.6: Base Model: Determinants of Financial Stability (Z-score) 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
2000 – 2004 
 
Pre-2005 
Reforms 
2005 – 2008 
 
2005 Reforms & 
GFC 
2009 – 2013 
 
2009 Reforms & 
Post GFC 
Expected Sign 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
-0.012 
(-1.15) 
-0.015 
(-1.45) 
-0.03 
(-1.58) 
-0.012 
(-0.63) 
- 
Management 
(CIR) 
-0.05*** 
(-4.92) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.81) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
0.163*** 
(4.05) 
0.158*** 
(5.15) 
0.306** 
(2.35) 
0.251** 
(2.59) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
0.007 
(1.16) 
0.019** 
(2.37) 
0.006 
(0.43) 
0.006 
(0.48) 
+ 
Sensitivity to 
Market Risk 
(TSTA) 
0.012 
(0.98) 
-0.008 
(-0.65) 
0.044** 
(2.10) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
- 
Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
0.299** 
(2.04) 
-1.13*** 
(-6.65) 
-0.878*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.718* 
(-1.64) 
+/- 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
0.177*** 
(3.59) 
0.12** 
(2.42) 
-0.751 
(-1.44) 
0.255*** 
(2.93) 
+/- 
CONSTANT 3.655** 
(2.51) 
8.44*** 
(6.87) 
18.97*** 
(3.44) 
8.866** 
(2.31) 
 
NO of OBS 364 
 
212 74 78  
ADJ R-SQ 
 
0.1455 0.3555 0.5014 0.2659  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
HAUSMAN-
TEST 
0.0018 0.0587 0.0553 0.0000  
VIF (MEAN) 
 
1.29 1.14 1.38 1.48  
Notes: Variables are defined in table 4.3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively; whole period (2000 – 2013) Hausman-Test is <0.5, Fixed Effect is accepted, while Random Effect 
is rejected; Pre-2005 Banking Reforms period (2000 – 2004) Hausman-test is >0.5, Fixed Effect is rejected, 
while Random Effect is accepted; 2005 Banking Reforms & Global Financial Crisis period (2005 – 2008) 
Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effect is rejected, while Random Effect is accepted; 2009 banking Reforms & 
Post-Global Financial Crisis period (2009 – 2013) Hausman-Test is <0.05, Fixed Effect is rejected, while 
Random Effects is accepted because of the low and negative Adjusted R-Sq of Fixed Effect model (-0.0188); 
OLS VIF (MEAN) shows multicollinearity is absent in all the independent variables and in all the periods. 
 
6.6.1 Impact of Asset Quality on Financial Stability  
 
The regression results of the impact of asset quality (ILGL) on financial stability (Z-score) 
are presented in this section. 
Just like in other sections, this section starts with the review of the regression results of the 
whole period (2000 – 2013). The relationship between asset quality and financial stability is 
negative and statistically insignificant in the Nigerian banking sector within the period of 
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2000 – 2013. Equally, the same negative and insignificant effect of asset quality on financial 
stability is observed in the pre-2005 banking reforms period, 2005 banking reforms & global 
financial crisis, and the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. To that 
end, it can be suggested that the level of impaired loans in the Nigerian banking sector was 
not a determinant of stability even as Nigerian DMBs went through the global financial crisis.    
 
6.6.2 Impact of Management Quality on Financial Stability 
 
This section of the research explores the impact of the quality of management on financial 
stability. The cost to income ratio is the proxy for management quality, while the Z-score 
remains the proxy for financial stability in this study. A negative relationship between 
management quality (CIR) and financial stability is expected. 
The regression results of the whole period (2000 – 2013) and those of the three sub-periods 
indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship between management quality and 
financial stability. This relationship implies that as the cost to income ratio of Nigerian 
DMBs increases, financial stability decreases and vice versa. Additionally, this diagnosis 
indicates that stability is enhanced in the Nigerian banking sector when costs of inputs are 
adequately managed and kept low. On that account, the events of the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms, and the episode of the global financial crisis did not change the impact of 
management quality (CIR) on financial stability. 
 
6.6.3 Impact of Earnings on Financial Stability 
 
This section of the thesis dwells on the effect of the earning capacity of Nigerian DMBs on 
financial stability. In line with previous sections, the effect of the earning capacity of 
Nigerian DMBs on financial stability is x-rayed in the whole study period (2000 – 2013), the 
pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), the 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis period (2005 – 2008), and the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis 
period (2009 – 2013). The net interest margin (NIM) is the adopted proxy for earnings, and a 
positive impact on financial stability is expected because the higher the NIM of a banking 
institution, the higher is its earning margin.   
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The regression results of the whole period and pre-2005 banking reforms period indicate a 
positive and statistically high significant relationship between the earning ability of DMBs 
and financial stability. The results imply that financial stability increases when the earnings 
of Nigerian DMBs increase. To that end, the effect of the earning ability of Nigerian DMBs 
on financial stability depicted in the whole period is largely because of the impact of the 
earning ability of Nigerian DMBs in the pre-2005 banking reforms period.      
Equally, the relationship between the earning ability of DMBs and financial stability in the 
2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period, and 2009 banking reforms & post-
global financial crisis period is positive and slightly less significant than in the pre-2005 
banking period. Thus suggesting that the earning margin of Nigerian DMBs continued to be a 
determinant of financial stability in the periods the Nigerian banking sector went through the 
2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global financial crisis. It can also be opined that the 
impact of earnings on the determination of financial stability marginally dwindled after the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms.    
 
6.6.4 Impact of Liquidity on Financial Stability 
 
The proxy for liquidity in this study is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits & short-term 
funding (LADSTF). The results of liquidity regressed against financial stability (Z-score) are 
examined in this section of the study. Liquidity is expected to have a positive impact on 
financial stability as increased liquidity ensures banking institutions carry out their 
intermediation activities without setbacks.  
The regression results show a positive but insignificant relationship between liquidity and 
financial stability for the whole period (2000 – 2013). This outcome indicates that liquidity 
was not a determinant of financial stability.  
Turning to the pre-2005 banking reforms period, a positive and 5% significant relationship 
exist between liquidity and financial stability. The positive coefficient infers that as liquidity 
levels increased in the pre-2005 banking reforms period, financial stability also increased. 
Therefore, liquidity had an effect on financial stability when the banking institutions were 
relatively small, and liquidity was not available as it was in subsequent issues following the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms.    
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Moving on to consider the 2005-banking reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 
2008), the fixed effects regression results show a positive and insignificant relationship 
between liquidity and financial stability. This result suggests that liquidity did not determine 
financial stability during the period the bank went through the 2005 banking reforms and the 
core of the global financial crisis. Additionally, all the DMBs that survived the 2005 banking 
reforms went through the consolidation exercise and had increased liquidity levels, and they 
were all exposed to the global financial crisis. The inability of liquidity to determine financial 
stability could be because all the DMBs within this period went through the same reforms 
and the global financial crisis.   
Furthermore, a positive and 10% significant relationship exists between liquidity and 
financial stability in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. The 
positive coefficient submits that as liquidity increases, financial stability also slightly 
increases. The liquidity levels of DMBs were affected by the episode of the global financial 
crisis and the elements of the 2009 banking reforms enhanced some DMBs to have greater 
access to liquidity. The variance in liquidity levels could, therefore, be responsible for the 
positive and statistically effect of liquidity on financial stability within the period of 2009 – 
2013.    
 
6.6.5 Impact of Sensitivity to Risk on Financial Stability 
 
The proxy for sensitivity to risk is the ratio of total securities to total assets (TSTA). This 
section centres on uncovering the effects of the sensitivity to market risk on financial 
stability.  A negative relationship is projected because a high ratio indicates that a banking 
institution is vulnerable to risk.   
The relationship between sensitivity to risk and financial stability is positive but insignificant 
in the whole period (2000 – 2013). However, although the relationship between sensitivity to 
risk and financial stability is insignificant, the effect obtained is not the expected one.    
Turning to the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), the association between 
sensitivity to market risk and financial stability is also insignificant but negative as projected. 
This result reveals that the sensitivity of Nigerian DMBs to risk was not a determinant of 
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financial stability in the period where numerous small banking institutions dominated the 
Nigerian banking sector.  
Furthermore, the effect of sensitivity to risks on financial stability for the 2005 banking 
reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008) is positive and 5% significant. This 
result implies that as sensitivity to market risk increased within the period of 2005- 2008, 
financial stability increased. Though financial stability is expected to reduce the vulnerability 
to market risk increased, this result suggests otherwise. Therefore, Nigerian DMBs became 
more vulnerable to risk due to the shrinking of the number of banking institutions; however 
the benefits that accrued to banking institutions as a result of 2005 banking reforms probably 
propelled an increase in the stability of DMBs.    
In reverse to the results above, the regression results of the 2009 banking reforms & post-
global financial crisis period denote a positive and insignificant association between the 
sensitivity of Nigerian DMBs to risk and financial stability. This result suggests that the 2009 
banking reforms ceased to impact on the stability of Nigerian DMBs. Additionally, the 
regression result of this period mirrors the result of the whole period (2000 – 2013), which 
also suggested that the vulnerability of Nigerian DMBs to risk did not determine financial 
stability. 
 
6.6.6 Impact of Bank Size on Financial Stability 
 
The effect of the size of Nigerian DMBs on financial stability is the focus of this section.  In 
line with previous sections, the regression results for the whole period (2000 – 2013), the pre-
2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), the 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis period (2005 – 2008), and the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis 
period (2009 – 2013) are examined. The association between size and stability could either be 
negative or positive in line with the submissions presented in the    
Commencing with the whole period, the regression results show a positive and 5% 
statistically significant relationship between the size of Nigerian DMBs and financial 
stability. Thus, implying that as the size of Nigerian banking institutions increases, financial 
stability also increases and vice versa. 
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Conversely, though highly significant, the relationship between size and stability is negative 
in both the pre-2005 banking reforms period and 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis period. The results of both periods indicate that as the size of banking institutions 
increased, within 2000 – 2008, stability decreased. Hence, size and stability move in opposite 
directions.   
In like manner, the relationship between bank size and financial stability in the 2009 banking 
reforms & post-global financial crisis period is equally negative but less significant than it 
was in the previous sub-periods. This implies that the increase in the size of DMBs in line 
with elements of the 2009 Nigerian banking reforms translated to a slight decrease in 
stability. Just like the previous sub-periods, this result differs from the result obtained for the 
whole period, which holds that size has a positive and (10%) a significant effect on stability. 
Therefore, the slight effect obtained in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial 
crisis most likely tilted towards indicating a positive impact of size on stability as some 
Nigerian DMBs became bigger given the N100bn regulatory capital for DMBs with 
international operations.       
 
6.6.7 Impact of Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDP) on Financial Stability 
 
The effect of GDP on financial stability is the focus of this section. In like manner to the 
effect of size on financial stability addressed above, the effect of GDP growth could also be 
either positively or negatively associated with financial stability.  
Beginning with the whole period of 2000 – 2013, the regression result shows a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between GDP and financial stability. This result implies 
that as GDP increases, financial stability also increases. Similarly, the regression result of the 
pre-2005 banking reforms period indicates a positive but 5% significant association between 
GDP and financial stability. This result implies that the influence of GDP growth on financial 
stability was not as substantial as it is depicted in the whole period. The influence of GDP 
growth was possibly not highly significant because the contribution of the Nigerian banking 
sector to GDP growth was meagre in the pre-2005 banking reforms period.    
On the other hand, the regression results of the 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis period show a negative but insignificant relationship between GDP growth and 
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financial stability. This result infers that GDP did not influence the stability of banking 
institutions as the banking sector went through the 2005 banking reforms and the global 
financial crisis.   
In total reverse, the regression result of the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial 
crisis period shows a positive and statistically significant association between GDP and 
financial stability. This implies that as GDP improves in the Nigerian economy, stability also 
improves. The contribution of Nigerian DMBs to GDP growth increased after the 2005 
banking reforms as banks continuously increased in size. It is therefore in view of this that 
GDP within the period of 2009 – 2013 is a determinant of financial stability. 
 
6.6.8 Model Extensions 
 
To further verify the factors that determined financial stability in the Nigerian banking sector, 
dummy variables are introduced to particularly ascertain whether the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms affected the stability of DMBs. Also, all the independent variables are lagged (t – 1) 
to validate or complement the findings above. Table 6.7 shows the regression results for the 
whole period (2000 – 2013), the whole period (2000 – 2013) with dummy variables, and the 
whole period (2000 – 2013) with lagged independent variables. 
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Table 6.7: Model Extensions: Determinants of Financial Stability (Z-Scores) with 
Dummy Variables and Lagged Independent Variables 
Variables 2000 – 2013 
 
Whole Period 
(Model 3) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Dummy 
Variables) 
(Model 6) 
2000 – 2013 
Whole Period 
(With Lagged 
Variables) 
(Model 9) 
Expected Sign 
Asset Quality 
(ILGL) 
-0.012 
(-1.15) 
-0.017 
(-1.65) 
-0.019 
(-1.61) 
- 
Management 
(CIR) 
-0.050*** 
(-4.92) 
-0.054*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.69) 
- 
Earnings 
(NIM) 
0.163*** 
(4.05) 
0.202*** 
(5.28) 
0.062 
(1.13) 
+ 
Liquidity 
(LADSTF) 
0.007 
(1.16) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
0.007 
(0.96) 
+ 
Sensitivity to Risk 
(TSTA) 
0.012 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.012 
(0.81) 
- 
Size 
(SIZENLTA) 
0.299** 
(2.04) 
-0.461** 
(-2.33) 
0.534*** 
(3.03) 
+/- 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(GDP) 
0.177*** 
(3.59) 
0.160*** 
(3.40) 
0.255*** 
(4.40) 
+/- 
Dum1  2.283*** 
(6.22) 
 + 
Dum2  1.852*** 
(3.37) 
 + 
CONSTANT 3.655** 
(2.51) 
7.034*** 
(4.81) 
1.880 
(1.03) 
 
NO of OBS 364 
 
364 304  
ADJ R-SQ 0.1455 0.3771 0.0046  
PROB 
(F-STATISTIC) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
HAUSMAN-TEST 0.0018 0.0071 0.0000  
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively; whole period (2000 – 
2013) Hausman-Test is <0.5, Fixed Effect is accepted, while Random Effect is rejected; whole period (2000 – 
2013) with dummy variables Hausman-Test is >0.05, Fixed Effects is accepted, while Random Effect is 
rejected; whole period (2000 – 2013) with lagged variables Hausman-Test is <0.05, Fixed Effect is accepted, 
while Random Effect is rejected. 
 
Regarding the results displayed in Table 6.7, model 6 (extended model with dummy 
variables) indicated similar significant results with model 3 in three instances. The similar 
significant results are the relationship between financial stability and management (negative 
and significant), and earnings and GDP (positive and significant). The results imply that the 
stability of DMBs dwindles when management quality increases, while stability surges when 
DMBs generate more earnings, and there is an increase in the GDP of the Nigerian economy.   
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More so, just like in the base model (model 3), asset quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk 
are not significant determinants of financial stability in model 6 (extended model with 
dummy variables). Furthermore, size has a positive and 5% significant relationship with 
financial stability in the base model (model 3) but shows a reverse negative and 5% 
significant relationship in model 6 (extended model with dummy variables). The negative and 
significant relationship suggests that financial stability decreases when the size of DMBs 
increases. The result is not consistent with the views expressed by interview respondents that 
submitted that Nigerian DMBs became better as they increased in size.  
As regards the effect of the dummy variables on financial stability, unlike in previous 
extended models (model 4 and model 5), the indicators of both the 2005 and 2009 reforms 
show positive effects on the dependent variable (in this case, financial stability). Dummy 1 
(2005 banking reforms) has a positive and significant relationship with financial stability. 
The result is consistent with interview submissions and the average BCC efficiency scores of 
the DEA window technique which showed positive improvements in reaction to the 2005 
banking reforms. More so, the positive and significant relationship between the 2005 banking 
reforms and financial stability indicates that the 2005 reforms protected the Nigerian banking 
sector from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis as no banking institution in 
Nigerian collapsed.  
In like manner, the association between dummy 2 (2009 banking reforms) and financial 
stability is positive and significant. The 2009 banking reforms was a reaction to the global 
financial crisis, and it was designed to promote financial stability. To that end, the positive 
and highly significant relationship between the 2009 banking reforms and financial stability 
suggest that the objective of the reforms were met. These results could have been boosted by 
the intervention of Nigerian regulators to bailout eight troubled DMBs in 2009 to prevent 
their collapse which may well have derailed the stability of the Nigerian banking sector. 
Additionally, the nationalisation of three DMBs using the bridge banking mechanism in 2011 
to prevent their collapse was an initiative by Nigerian regulators to ensure financial stability.      
In furtherance of the verification of the determinants of financial stability, lagged (t - 1) 
independent variables (model extension 9) are used. The significant effect of management 
quality (negative), size (positive) and GDP (positive) align with the results of the base model 
(model 3). The results imply that financial stability decreases when management quality 
increases, while financial stability increases when the size of DMBs increases and the GDP 
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of the Nigerian economy improves. Equally, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity 
to risk are not indicators of financial stability (extended model 9 with lagged independent 
variables). However, the insignificant relationships between the proxies of asset quality, 
liquidity, and sensitivity to risk align with those of the base model (model 3).   
Finally, only a handful of the results of the extended models (model 6 and model 9) do not 
tally with those of the base model. Interestingly, the relationship between the dummy 
variables (2005 and 2009 banking reforms) and financial stability are positive and significant. 
Hence, in line with submissions expressed by the BCC efficiency scores and the responses 
from bank executives, the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms ensured the stability of Nigerian 
DMBs.       
 
6.6.9 Summary 
 
To round up this section, a summary of the impact of the independent variables on financial 
stability is presented. The cost to income ratio (CIR), which is the proxy for asset quality, is 
negative and significant in all the examined periods. Likewise, earnings are diagnosed also to 
determine financial stability as it has a positive and significant association in all the periods. 
Furthermore, liquidity was only positive and significant in the pre-2005 banking reforms 
period. In like manner, total securities to total assets (sensitivity to market risk) only had an 
effect in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period. Bank size was found to be 
a determinant of financial stability in all the examined periods; however, the results obtained 
suggest that the influence was highest in the 2005 banking reforms and global financial crisis. 
Equally, GDP was shown to have positively impacted financial stability in all the periods 
except within the period of 2005 – 2008 when the Nigerian banking sector went through the 
2005 banking reforms and global financial crisis.  Finally, the introduction of the dummy 
variables as model extensions suggest that both the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms 
positively influenced the stability of Nigerian DMBs.     
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6.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the determinants of bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial 
stability in the Nigerian-banking sector for the whole period of 2000 – 2013, the pre-2005 
banking reforms period (2000 – 2004), the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis 
period (2005 – 2008), and the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period 
(2009 – 2013). Panel data regression was adopted, while the Hausman-Test specified the 
most suitable variant of either the fixed effects or random effects models. The adjusted R-Sq 
displayed in the tables further show the suitability of the models and the variance inflation 
factor of the independent variable indicate the absence of multicollinearity. Diverse effects of 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings capacity, liquidity, sensitivity 
to risk, bank size, and GDP on bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial stability 
were uncovered throughout the chapter. The results obtained indicate diverse reactions of 
Nigerian DMBs to the 2005 banking reforms, 2009 banking reforms and the event of the 
global financial crisis. Additionally, the introduction of dummy variables as proxies of the 
2005 and 2009 banking reforms suggest that the reforms significantly increased financial 
stability, while the results obtained are less conclusive in terms of the effects of the reforms 
on bank efficiency and performance. Finally, due to the nature of this study (mixed methods), 
the findings of this chapter are harmonised with the findings from the DEA window analysis 
and the content analyses of interview responses before further conclusions are drawn in the 
discussion chapter. 
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Chapter Seven:  Content Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analysis of interview responses from regulatory authorities and 
senior bank officials. The analysis of interview responses is carried out using content analysis 
with quotations from interviewees. Data obtained from the financial stability reports of the 
CBN and the annual reports of the NDIC are utilised where necessary. The responses 
analysed dwell on salient issues that quantitative data is unlikely to address, while also 
complementing and clarifying the findings from the quantitative techniques employed in this 
study. Additionally, apart from shedding light on regulatory and supervisory processes in the 
Nigerian banking sector and highlighting the issues that plagued Nigerian deposit money 
banks (DMBs) as they went through the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global 
financial crisis, the interview responses validates and complements findings obtained from 
the DEA window analysis and the multiple regression analysis.  
The reactions analysed in this study centre on the submissions of banking executives from 
DMBs that survived the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms and the mergers 
and acquisitions that ensued in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This study 
acknowledges that the opinion of banking executives and staff of DMBs that ceased to exist 
because of the reforms and resolution initiatives of Nigerian bank regulators might differ to 
those presented throughout this chapter. Nonetheless, the view of banking executives and 
staff of DMBs that no longer exist may be biased and not up-to-date. On that account, the 
analysis of their views is outside the scope of this study. 
Therefore, in order to arrive at valid and reliable conclusions, the analysis of the reactions put 
forward by bank regulators and senior bank officials in this chapter is centred on the main 
areas of this research: banking regulation and supervision, global financial crisis, regulatory 
reforms initiatives, financial safety nets, and financial stability in general. The interview 
questions and the institution of the respondents that guide the analysis of reactions are 
presented in tables.   
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7.2 Banking Regulation and Supervision (Banking Reforms) 
 
7.2.1 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution  
Where the objectives of the 2005 banking 
reforms achieved? 
CBN/NDIC 
How successful was the 2005 banking 
consolidation reforms? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
What impact did the 2005 banking 
consolidation reforms have on your bank? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
The questions above were put forward in order to qualitatively ascertain how banking 
regulation and supervision affected bank performance and banking stability in Nigeria. The 
responses obtained dwell on the effect the banking reform had on the entire banking sector 
and how individual banks were able to cope with the tenets of the reform programme. 
 
7.2.1.1  Objectives of the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
The objectives of the 2005 banking consolidation reforms have been presented in earlier 
sections of this study. As a result, this work sought the views of regulators to ascertain 
whether the objectives of this reform were achieved. As initiators of the various elements of 
the reform, which was mainly geared towards having banks with higher capital levels and 
consequently, a stable banking system, this study is of the view that regulators would offer 
better reactions. The responses obtained from both regulatory institutions offered a 
unanimous opinion. The respondents were both of the opinion that the objectives of the 2005 
banking reforms in terms of recapitalization were met. The respondent from the CBN 
(Director of Banking Supervision) put forward that: 
237 
 
“All the banks that emerged after the 2005 banking reforms had shareholders’ funds (capital) 
at a minimum of N25 billion.” 
In like manner, the senior research officer of the NDIC submitted that: 
“The deposit money banks became stronger and bigger because they all had more capital 
after the 2005 banking reforms programme.” 
The above views from the CBN and NDIC both agreed that the objectives of the banking 
reforms were achieved. A review of all the basic elements of the 2005 reforms revealed that 
to some extent, not all the elements of the reforms were achieved. On the surface, visible 
evidence largely indicates that the 2005 banking reforms were a success because time has 
passed and information flow is centred only on the banks that met the minimum capital 
requirement and those that consolidated through mergers and acquisitions to attain the 
minimum N25 Billion survived. For instance, one element of the 2005 banking reforms 
which was the establishment of an ‘Asset Management Company’ as a tool for resolving 
troubled banks was not given adequate attention. To that end, the establishment of the Asset 
Management Corporation of Nigeria, which was an integral part of the 2005 banking reforms, 
was neglected until after the global financial crisis and the 2009 banking reforms. According 
to the AMCON website, the ‘Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was 
established on the 19th of July 2010 with the signing of the AMCON Act into Law by the 
then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’. This reveals that priority was accorded to 
increasing the capital base of banks as opposed to keeping them sound and stable.     
Still, on the 2005 banking reforms, the perception of bank executives was sought in order to 
validate the reactions obtained from regulators concerning the success of the 2005 banking 
reforms. In line with submissions from the regulatory agencies, all the senior bank managers 
interviewed suggested that the reform was a success. Below are few submissions to support 
the view that the objectives of the reform were achieved: 
“The 2005 banking reforms was a massive success as it led to the increase in the capital base 
of banks, even though some banks were unable to forge merger and acquisition agreements 
to stay afloat.” 
“With the increase in the capital base of banks made possible by the 2005 banking reforms, 
Nigerian banks had the capacity to lend to other sectors of the Nigerian economy like the 
agriculture and real estate sectors.”  
“The N25 billion capital base revamped the Nigerian banking industry. The recapitalization 
exercise opened up Nigerian banks to new possibilities within and outside the country. The 
banks were able to finance some projects, which they previously could not finance. This also 
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laid the foundation for further capital injections because some banks presently have N300 
billion as capital base. The banking consolidation reform was a template for further growth.” 
“Since the 2005 banking reforms, no bank has failed due to the high capital base all the 
banks now possess. The reform also ushered in a level playing ground for all banks.” 
The submissions obtained from the fifteen (15) DMB executives point to the positives 
occasioned by the consolidation reform. Most importantly, all the interviewees agreed that 
the increase in the capital base of Nigerian DMBs affected them positively, even though the 
effect of the impact differed as a result of the experience of the DMBs during the 
recapitalization period. For instance, since most of the surviving banks either merged or were 
acquired, the first submission differed from the rest as it mentioned that some banks did not 
survive the recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking reforms. Secondly, ten out of the 
fifteen interviewees hinted that apart from increasing the capital base of banking institutions, 
the reform ensured that banks had the capacity to lend to other sectors of the economy. This 
indicates that the 2005 banking reforms made it possible for Nigerian banks to properly 
function as financial intermediaries, while also encouraging the growth of other sectors of the 
Nigerian economy. Thirdly, two respondents opined that the 2005 banking reforms were a 
springboard for further recapitalizations as some Nigerian banks now have capital of up to 
N300 billion. Finally, a senior bank executive from one of the Tier II DMBs opined that the 
recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking reforms led to an increase in bank competition 
as the reform fostered a scenario where all banks could operate and compete on a level 
playing ground. In summary, all the interviewed senior bank executives are of the view that 
the 2005 banking reform was a success.   
 
7.2.1.2  Impact of the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
Progressively, this study also seeks to ascertain the impact of the 2005 banking reforms on 
individual DMBs. Away from the fact that the surviving DMBs after the 2005 reforms had 
their capital base fortified, how did this impact on the position and operations of the DMBs? 
This study aims to find out what the surviving DMBs went through to increase their capital 
base and how the increase in capital affected the operational capability of the banks. The 
general view as obtained from the fifteen respondents was that the banks became stronger and 
formidable. However, various reactions highlighted important issues as to how the reforms 
impacted on individual DMBs.  
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First and foremost, the main element of the 2005 reforms was the recapitalization of Nigerian 
banks, as Nigerian banks were mandated to increase their capital base from N2 billion to N25 
billion. Hence Nigerian DMBs had to raise capital from various sources. In reaction to the 
question on how the 2005 banking reforms impacted on Nigerian DMBs, a senior bank 
executive from one of the Tier I DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector highlighted the 
rigorous process the bank went through in order to adhere to the components of the 2005 
banking reforms.   
“The bank had to raise funds from various sources in order to increase its capital base to the 
minimum requirement. The bank had to sell shares to staff and investors on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange and it also offered shares at a discount to existing shareholders through right 
issues and private placements.” 
This submission denotes that the banking reforms led to an increase in the number of 
shareholders in Nigerian DMBs. This submission also indicates that there was an increase in 
the number of banks soliciting to raise funds from the Nigerian Stock Exchange. And in order 
to raise funds from the Stock Exchange, the banks had to be listed. Thus the reform led to the 
listing of banks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In a nutshell, the recapitalization exercise of 
the 2005 banking reforms led to an increase in market capitalization of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.   
More so, some banks merged and also raised capital from the Nigerian Stock Exchange. A 
senior bank (Tier II) executive that experienced the entire process asserted that: 
“The bank went through a difficult merger, as the Central Bank of Nigeria had to approve the 
coming together of nine (9) banks to form a single entity. The merger process was hectic and 
rigorous because of the number of merging banks. The merger also meant that the new bank 
could not accommodate all the top management personnel of the merging banks and most 
of them were relieved of their jobs before the CBN approved the new management team. 
And after the merger agreement was approved, the bank offered its shares on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange Market in order to raise additional capital to meet the minimum capital 
requirement of N25 billion.” 
In view of the above assertion, the interviewee suggested that the merger process was far 
from a pleasant one. The coming together of nine banks will sure present challenges as banks 
have different cultures and use different software packages. More so, the entire 
harmonization of systems was expected to be seamless to ensure that customers are satisfied 
throughout the entire merger process. The submission also indicated that the regulatory 
agencies in the Nigerian banking sector had to approve the merger and the management team 
of the resulting bank. Additionally, the bank also raised capital from the Nigerian Stock 
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Exchange Market. In sum, the process of ensuring the survival of the merging banks as a 
single entity was cumbersome, even though the end result was positive.       
Additionally, another bank executive from a DMB that also went through the merger process 
due to the need to fulfil the elements of the 2005 banking reforms offered a different account 
to show the impact of the banking consolidation reform on his bank. He submitted that:  
“The bank was involved in a merger that changed the core of the bank. The bank was 
referred to as an old generation bank and it merged with another bank that was referred to 
as a new generation bank. The name of the old generation bank was retained because the 
public had a good perception of the bank but most of the management team came from the 
new generation bank. This merger led to rapid changes in terms of banking services, banking 
applications and banking structures as most of the archaic ways of doing things in the old 
bank were jettisoned. In simple terms, the banking consolidation exercise made the bank 
bigger, better and more efficient.” 
The above view presents another merger scenario prompted by the 2005 banking reforms in 
the Nigerian banking sector. The submission shows that the core of the banking institution 
underwent noteworthy changes due to the merger of two different types of banks. On a sad 
note, the management of the old generation bank made way for the management of the new 
generation bank. However, the move is hinted to be progressive as the merger spurred growth 
and innovation due to the availability of funds. And in sum, the interviewee suggested that 
the 2005 banking reforms impacted positively on the bank as it became bigger, better and 
more efficient.         
More so, due to the various merger agreements and the availability of capital, banking 
institutions had access to resources for growth and expansion. Therefore, in line with 
previous submissions, another bank manager highlighted the impact of the 2005 banking 
reforms as follows:   
“The fortunes of the bank changed after meeting the N25 billion minimum capital base. The 
reform led to an increase in branch network which correspondingly led to an increase in 
banking job opportunities.” 
In relation to the above notion, with ample funds for investment at their disposal, Nigerian 
banks had the ability to increase their branch network. This is a positive impact as increased 
branch network can foster financial inclusion. Resultantly, the increase in bank branch 
network led to an increase in job opportunities which should have a positive influence on the 
rate of unemployment in the Nigerian economy.         
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Furthermore, contrary to the previous reactions which have so far dwelled on the views from 
banks that merged and also raised capital from the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market, a senior 
bank executive from one of the Tier I DMBs that did not merge with any other bank during 
the recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking reforms held that: 
“The 2005 banking consolidation reforms further strengthened the bank and made it one of 
the largest and most profitable in the country.” 
The responses from the bank executive above contributed to the positive perception of 2005 
banking reforms. It reveals that whether a bank merged or not during the banking 
consolidation exercise, the reforms fortified banks and made them stronger. In relation to 
other banks, the senior bank executive from the bank above suggested that the reforms made 
it one of the largest and most profitable DMBs in Nigeria. However, this claim cannot be 
substantiated at the moment, perhaps other analysis techniques will reveal such. More so, the 
response indicates that even if DMBs had a minimum capital base of N25 billion, their profit 
levels after the reforms also depended on the characteristics of the bank before the reforms. 
For instance, a big DMB will likely be able to price its shares higher than a smaller bank on 
the stock exchange market; hence the bigger bank will be able to raise more capital.  
Similarly, another interviewee from one of the big banks in the Nigerian banking industry 
asserted that: 
“The reform had a great impact on the bank as the increase in the capital base ensured that 
the bank became stronger, formidable, efficient and reliable. As a result, the bank was able 
to contribute to the growth of the Nigerian economy due to its increased availability of funds 
to lend to its customers from different sectors of the economy.” 
In line with the submissions that dwell on the positive impact of the 2005 banking reforms, 
the above reaction indicates that consequent on the increased capital base, DMBs were able 
to lend to their customers. More so, the submission also opines that increased lending to bank 
customers was not only beneficial to bank customers but to the Nigerian economy at large. 
The above reaction summarizes the position of all the bank executives interviewed. In 
conclusion, evidence obtained from the interview participants hold that the 2005 banking 
reforms was successful and impacted positively on individual DMBs and the Nigerian 
economy in the whole.  
Despite the positive reactions and the glowing praises attached to the 2005 banking reforms, 
Nigerian deposit money banks went through another set of reforms in 2009 to correct the 
growing ills in the Nigerian banking industry. Therefore, the section below will try to 
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uncover what went wrong and whether the elements of the 2005 banking reforms were not 
adequate enough to set the banking sector on a path of stability.     
 
7.2.3 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution 
If the 2005 banking reforms was a success, 
why did regulators embark on the 2009 
banking reforms? 
CBN/NDIC 
What was the main rationale for the 2009 
banking reforms? 
CBN/NDIC 
Where the objectives of the 2009 banking 
reforms achieved? 
CBN/NDIC 
What was the effect of the 2009 banking 
reforms on your bank? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
This section dwells on the 2009 Nigerian banking reforms. The questions above will guide 
the analysis below as the submissions of participants on the rationale, objectives, and effects 
of the 2009 banking reforms are presented.  
 
7.2.3.1  Rationale of the 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
Until now, there has been a general consensus by interviewees that the 2005 banking reform 
was a success and the objectives set out by the regulatory agencies were achieved. However, 
the Nigerian banking sector went through another set of reforms in 2009. The short period 
between the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms argues that the 2005 banking reforms was either 
not properly designed or it was inadequate to handle the global financial crisis. To this end, 
the perception of bank regulators regarding this position was demanded.  
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The reaction presented by the representative of the CBN reaffirmed the view that the 2005 
banking reforms were a success and that the rationale for the 2009 banking reform was 
informed by the following: 
“The Global financial crisis and recession; macroeconomic instability caused by large and 
sudden capital outflows; major failures in corporate governance in banks; lack of investor 
and consumer sophistication; inadequate disclosure and transparency about the financial 
position of banks; and weaknesses in the business environment.” 
Likewise, the response from the NDIC offered a similar view with the above assertion from 
the CBN. The interviewee opined that: 
“The 2009 reform was necessary due to the combined effect of the global financial crisis and 
specific risks in the Nigerian banking industry.” 
The responses indicate that apart from the global financial crisis and weaknesses in the 
business environment, which was beyond the control of regulators in Nigeria, lapses in 
regulation and supervision formed a block of the issues in the banking industry. Banking 
regulation was not able to curb failures in corporate governance in banks and ensure adequate 
disclosure and transparency in the banking industry. More so, lack of investor and consumer 
sophistication is an indication of minimal private sector involvement in bank monitoring. In 
essence, the elements of the 2005 banking reforms were deficient in scope as it failed to 
address important issues such as corporate governance, financial disclosure, and financial 
safety nets initiatives.  
Even though the rationale of the 2009 banking reforms have been spelt out in various 
regulatory documents and in the country context chapter, this study sought to find out devoid 
of the 2005 banking reforms, the main rationale for initiating the reform. In line with the 
financial stability reports of the CBN, the respondent from the CBN, in summary, presented 
the main rationale for the 2009 banking reform as follows: 
“To enhance the quality of banks; establish financial stability; enable healthy financial sector 
evolution, and ensure the financial sector contributes to the real economy.” 
The submission from the CBN indicates that the central focus of the 2009 banking reforms 
was the promotion of financial stability by improving the capacity of banking institutions to 
adequately perform their roles as financial intermediaries without fear of failure. In sum, the 
above response offers a general view to the rationale of the 2009 banking reform. However, 
the submission put forward by the NDIC respondent offers a more focused reaction. The 
interviewee from the NDIC thus asserted that: 
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“The reason the CBN initiated the 2009 banking reform was because bank examinations 
found out that some banks were undercapitalised, and even distressed. Their capitals were 
eroded and they could not be allowed to continue operating. In addition, the contagion of 
the global financial crisis had more or less affected the Nigerian banking sector.”          
The response from the NDIC opines that the fortunes of Nigerian DMBs depreciated in the 
years after the 2005 banking reforms. The submission shows that the intervention in the form 
of the 2009 banking reforms was necessary to prevent some DMBs from going under which 
to a large extent would have led to widespread instability in the banking sector. Additionally, 
the reaction points out that the rationale of the 2009 banking reforms cannot be separated 
from the event of the global financial crisis.  
 
7.2.3.2  Objectives of the 2009 Banking Reforms 
 
This section tries to ascertain the extent to which the objectives of the 2009 banking reforms 
were achieved. The consensus perception from the CBN and NDIC is that the objectives of 
the reforms have been achieved and the banking industry has been set on path of growth and 
stability. In line with the view that the 2009 reform was a success, the interviewee from 
NDIC declared that: 
“The objectives of the 2009 banking reforms have been achieved. The banking system has 
been acknowledged to be healthy both within and outside Nigeria. Most importantly, all the 
toxic assets and non-performing loans in the system have been removed and deposit money 
banks have been able to continue their intermediation role of providing capital and loans for 
economic growth.” 
In as much as the regulatory authorities opine that the reforms were a success, it should be 
noted that the components of the reforms originated from them, and thus the reaction 
obtained to the effect of the reforms might be subjective. However, the other data techniques 
(DEA window analysis and multiple regression analysis) adopted in this study sheds more 
light on the impact of the 2009 banking reforms on bank efficiency, performance, and 
stability. 
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7.2.3.3  Impact of the 2009 Banking Reforms on Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
Continuously, the view of senior bank managers was sought in order to ascertain the impact 
of the 2009 banking reforms on the general operations and structure of individual DMBs. The 
managers offered different opinions bordering on the impact of the reforms. However, the 
responses show that regulatory authorities had to take some hard decisions in order to protect 
bank customers and the Nigerian banking sector.  
A senior manager of one of the banks that was negatively affected by the regulatory reforms 
asserted that: 
“Our bank lost heavily to margin facility exposures in the Nigerian stock market which was 
badly affected as well. The reforms led to the removal of our CEO and the management of 
the bank by the CBN, and the bank was later acquired by AMCON before it was subsequently 
nationalized.” 
Similarly, seven CEOs and their management teams suffered the same fate with the example 
presented above. However, only two more banks were also acquired by AMCON and later 
nationalized into bridge banks. In summary, a total of eight bank CEOs and their 
management teams were removed by the CBN, and three out of the eight banks were found to 
be grievously undercapitalised. As a result, the three banks were acquired by AMCON and 
later nationalized as bridge banks.  
More so, in responding to the impact of the 2009 banking reforms on DMBs, another senior 
bank manager suggested that: 
“The 2008 stress test carried out by the CBN and NDIC found out that the capital base of the 
bank was far below the N25bn capital base requirement for national deposit money banks. 
To that end, the bank was downgraded to a regional bank in line with the 2009 bank reforms 
guidelines.” 
The new banking model put forward by the 2009 banking reforms made provisions for 
regional banks with a minimum capital requirement of N10bn. The submission above 
indicates that the N25bn raised by the bank during the 2005 banking reforms was lost. The 
downgrading of the bank to the status of a regional bank meant that the bank had to close its 
operations in North-Central, North-West, North-East, South-East, and South-South regions of 
Nigeria. Hence, the bank only maintained its operations in the South Western part of Nigeria. 
Although the bank lost its National license, the downgrading of the bank to a regional bank 
highlights the resolve of Nigerian regulators in ensuring financial stability and preventing 
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bank runs. More so, the downgrading of the DMB was also a way of ensuring the continuous 
existence of the bank.  
In reverse to the above view, the 2009 banking reforms served as a springboard for other 
DMBs to increase their capital base and be upgraded to International banks. A senior bank 
manager from one of the National DMBs that increased its capital to the status of an 
International bank suggested that: 
“The 2009 banking reforms created an enabling environment for the bank to raise additional 
capital. Although the bank continuously increased its capital after the 2005 banking reforms, 
the bank increased its capital to N100bn in line with the new banking model of the 2009 
banking reforms in order to be classified as an International bank.”   
The above view indicates that even though some DMBs had the option of remaining National 
DMBs, the new banking model that allowed DMBs with regulatory capital of N100bn and 
above to operate outside the shores of Nigeria spurred DMBs to increase their capital base.  
Furthermore, not all the DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector could raise additional capital in 
accordance with the guidelines of the 2009 banking reforms to International banking status. A 
large portion of the DMBs increased their capital from the N25bn requirement prescribed in 
the 2005 banking reforms. Hence, in moving away from the negative experience of some 
DMBs, the responses below highlight the positive impact of the 2009 banking reforms on 
individual DMBs. The quotes below summarise the position held by most of the interviewees 
from DBMs that were not found to be in distress by the 2008 stress test conducted by the 
CBN and NDIC. As such, the interviewees were pleased with the components of the 2009 
banking reforms and what it ushered, and opined that it heralded growth and stability. Two 
senior bank managers stated that: 
“The 2009 banking reforms made the bank stronger in terms of capital base which reinforced 
the confidence of customers in the bank.”   
“The reforms were positive as it provided the bank with more capital to expand its branch 
network, invest in ICT, and lend to borrowers.” 
The above reactions indicate that the 2009 banking reforms were positioned to enable DMBs 
to become better, more competitive and stable. More so, the increase in the capital base of 
International DMBs meant that they were adequately equipped to function in other 
jurisdictions without endangering the deposits of Nigerian depositors.    
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Conclusively, the varying reactions to a large extent show that DMBs that engaged in good 
banking practices had the opportunity of consolidating on their positions to become 
International DMBs. While DMBs that were found with eroded capital levels most likely 
engaged in unhealthy practices that hampered their growth and progress. Progressively, the 
responses above point to the episode of the global financial crisis as one of the rationales for 
the 2009 banking reforms. Hence, the section below dwells on the effect of the global 
financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007 on the performance of DMBs and the 
Nigerian banking sector in the whole.  
 
7.3 Effects of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Research Interview Questions  Interviewee Institution 
How were Nigerian Deposit Money Banks 
affected by the global financial crisis? 
CBN/NDIC 
How was your bank affected by the global 
financial crisis that started in the second half 
of 2007? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
Do you think Nigerian Deposit Money Banks 
were affected by derivative transactions 
during the global financial crisis? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
This section dwells on the effects of the global financial crisis on the performance of 
Nigerian DMBs. The global financial crisis is central to this study for the reason that it started 
just after the 2005 Nigerian banking reforms when DMBs were settling in due to the host of 
mergers and acquisition that transpired and the euphoria that engulfed the banking sector 
because of the N25bn minimum capital requirement. To this end, in order to ascertain the 
effects of the crisis on Nigerian DMBs, views from both regulatory authorities and Nigerian 
DMBs were solicited.  
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The global financial crisis originated in the USA but its effect was felt the world over as a 
result of the increased level of interaction between financial systems and economies. Nigerian 
regulatory authorities were relied upon to comment on the general impact of the global 
financial crisis on the Nigerian banking sector. In responding to the question of how Nigerian 
DMBs were affected by the crisis, the interviewee from NDIC opined that: 
“Nigerian DMBs were affected by the global financial crisis through: (1) terminal channels, 
(2) direct relations with foreign banks, (3) trading with clients of foreign banks who had 
trading relationships with partners that were hit by the global financial crisis; (4) trading with 
partners in countries that were affected by the crisis, and (5) foreign investors that invested 
in the country.” 
While the interviewee from the CBN similarly opined that: 
“Nigerian banks were affected through (1) reversal of capital inflows; (2) decline in stock 
market capitalization; (3) erosion of banks’ shareholder’s funds; (4) inability to create new 
credits; and (5) increase in the level of non-performing loans.” 
In relation to the above assertions, the global financial crisis had multiple effects on the 
Nigerian banking sector and the Nigerian economy as a whole. The views from both the CBN 
and NDIC agree that the global financial crisis adversely affected the Nigerian banking 
sector. More so, the responses validate the assertion that the global financial crisis was a 
major rationale for the 2009 banking reforms. In like manner, the responses also highlight the 
dangers of foreign investments in Nigerian banking institutions as foreign investors and 
partners recalled their investments when the banking sector was contending with the global 
financial crisis. This happened because foreign partners and investors had to call back their 
loans and investments in the Nigerian banking sector to cushion the effect of the crisis in their 
own economies. In effect, this led to a fall in direct foreign investment. More so, the 
submissions received also suggest that the global financial crisis led to an increase in the 
level of non-performing loans and hindered DMBs from creating new credit. In summary, the 
opinion obtained from Nigerian banking regulators indicate that the global financial crisis had 
far reaching adverse effects on the Nigerian banking sector. To this end, the opinion of 
Nigerian regulators suggests that the global financial crisis affected the financial performance 
of Nigerian DMBs and the Nigerian banking sector in the whole.  
The assertion from Nigerian regulatory authorities suggests that Nigerian DMBs were 
negatively affected by the episode of the global financial crisis. And to confirm the position 
taken by the regulatory authorities, submissions from DMBs were solicited. The fifteen 
senior bank managers interviewed also expressed the view that the banking sector was 
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unfavourably affected by the global financial crisis. However, their responses differed as to 
the level of affliction sustained. One bank manager in line with the general conception 
asserted that: 
“It is true that commercial banks in Nigeria were affected by the global financial crisis and 
this bank, in particular, was gravely affected. The CBN carried out some assessments during 
the financial crisis and termed the profits declared by some banks as paper profits. The 
revenue of the bank plummeted, and non-performing loans became evident, and some staff 
were laid-off. The salaries of staff that were not laid-off were reduced because of the drop in 
revenue. Some of the bank’s branches were also closed; especially branches that were not 
making enough income to cover their expenses.” 
The opinion presented above is in tune with those offered by the CBN and NDIC. However, 
it pointed out further effects of the global downturn. Most importantly, the interviewee raised 
three salient issues. Bank branches were closed as a result of the drop in revenue; non-
performing loans became evident, and bank staff were laid-off in addition to the pay 
reduction suffered by the retained staff. These indicate that the financial crisis had deeply 
rooted repercussions on the fortunes of some banks. For instance, the DMB above laid-off a 
number of its employees in a cost-saving strategy, however, it should be noted that even 
though the bank was not earning enough revenue, it still had to pay off the laid off 
employees. More so, the move to close non-profitable branches was also a cost saving 
initiative. However, businesses that should have been initiated in such branches have been 
lost because some bank branches are meant to serve the customers of other branches. In a 
nutshell, the submission suggested that the adverse effect of the financial crisis was not only 
felt by banking institutions in terms of dwindling revenue but also by households and the 
economy at large due to the laid-off staff that joined the large pool of job seekers in Nigeria. 
In addition, to the effects of the global financial crisis on Nigerian DMBs, the submission 
above also highlighted the importance of the survival of the Nigerian banking sector to the 
Nigerian economy. Hence as banking institutions become profitable and stable, individuals 
and the economy in the whole also prosper.   
Moreover, even though all the fifteen interviewed bank executives agree that the global 
financial crisis adversely affected the Nigerian banking sector, the effect of the crisis on 
DMBs varied. The reactions received focused on the inability of DMBs to recover loan 
facilities emanating from some particular sectors during the financial crisis. As one 
interviewee put it: 
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“Facilities granted to players in the oil and gas sector were not serviced during the global 
financial crisis. The bank was highly geared to the oil and gas sector. To that effect, there 
was a build-up of non-performing loans in the bank during the period the global financial 
crisis lasted” 
The above sums the reaction of most DMBs in the Nigerian banking industry. The Nigerian 
economy is dependent on the oil and gas sector, and as such most DMBs granted more loans 
to players in that industry. As such a change in the dynamics of the price of oil products, no 
matter how small will impact on DMBs that lend predominately to major oil companies in 
Nigeria. Therefore, as the revenue of oil companies and major oil marketers dwindled in 
reaction to the global financial crisis, the level of non-performing loans increased due to 
missed loans repayments.  
Similarly, DMBs that granted large loan facilities to businesses in the oil and gas industry 
were not the ones affected by the global financial crisis. One interviewee reported that: 
“The bank was particularly geared to the real estate sector. Most customers that were 
granted facilities to build properties during the periods leading to the global financial crisis 
were unable to make regular payments in line with agreed terms.” 
On the basis of the evidence from the above two responses, it can be deduced that loan 
repayments during the global financial crisis were a problem to Nigerian DMBs. The 
responses also reveal that the non-repayment of loan facilities during the global financial 
crisis emanated from large corporations.  
Conversely, it seems the level of impact of the global financial crisis on individual DMBs 
depended on the type of operations and businesses DMBs embark on. However, the 
interwoven nature of the financial system spells that all DMBs in Nigeria were adversely 
affected by the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, the banking business culture and 
operations of some DMBs shielded them from the adverse effects of the global financial 
crisis. A senior manager from one of those banks revealed that:  
“The bank was not gravely affected by the global financial crisis because of the type of 
business the bank engages in. The bank has been and is into retail banking and most of its 
customers are individuals and small business owners. The makeup of the customer base of 
the bank protected it during the global financial crisis.” 
The submission revealed that DMBs that stayed true to their banking business culture and 
continued to cater for the needs of small customers and small business owners did not suffer 
the adverse impact of the global financial crisis. The small customers and small business 
owners most probably did not have any business dealings with foreign businesses or partners 
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and as such continued to meet agreed obligations to their banks. The submission above 
represents an interesting opinion to this study. Even though DMBs that engage in corporate 
banking usually rake in more revenues, they are more prone to global financial crises. And as 
such, the reactions obtained indicate that a fair mix of corporate and retail customers is a 
safer banking business model.  
Still, on how the global financial crisis affected Nigerian DMBs, comments were sought from 
senior banks managers on whether derivative transactions affected Nigerian DMBs.  The 
reaction of the effect of derivative transactions on the performance of Nigerian DMBs during 
the global financial crisis was sought because of the views expressed in literature. Various 
scholars suggest that complicated financial instruments like derivatives and securitization 
were responsible for the escalation of the global financial crisis. Consequently, the views of 
bank executives were sought to ascertain the level to which derivatives affected Nigerian 
DMBs during the global financial crisis. The responses received from all the fifteen 
interviewees showed that derivatives (swaps, futures, options and puts transactions) are not 
overtly popular in the Nigerian banking sector. Derivative transactions are only popular with 
large multinational corporations in the Nigerian economy. Thus, in providing a response to 
whether Nigerian DMBs were affected by derivative transactions during the financial crisis, 
one senior bank manager summarised the views of all the interviewed bank executives. He 
opined that: 
“Unfortunately, the derivative market in Nigeria is not so developed, as commodities markets 
for derivative transactions are just being properly developed. Nigerian banks engage in 
derivative transactions but the only limiting factor is the volume of transactions. Only large 
corporations in the country, particularly those in the oil and gas business engage in such 
trades. Derivative transactions cannot be blamed for the problems that engulfed the 
Nigerian banking industry in 2008/2009.” 
With the above view, it can be deduced that the absence of well-developed commodities and 
derivative market in Nigeria prevented the industry from further negative waves that 
emanated from the global financial crisis. This reaction also indicates that it is easier to 
manage a less developed banking system as complex banking transactions do not abound. 
Hence, this view supports the notion that “simple is bliss.” Therefore, the submissions 
obtained agree that derivative transactions did not contribute to the adverse effect of the 
global financial crisis on Nigerian DMBs.    
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7.4 Challenges and Changes in the Regulation and Supervision of 
 Deposit Money Banks 
 
This section dwells on the review of recent challenges and changes effected by Nigerian 
deposit money banks in relation to 2005 banking reforms, 2009 banking reforms and the 
global financial crisis. The risk management guidelines initiated by regulators and the 
changes to risk management practices in a bid to ensure efficiency, performance, and stability 
in DMBs are reviewed. In addition, financial safety nets and in particular bank bailouts, 
initiatives that prompt financial stability, private monitoring initiatives, and international 
regulation are examined in this section. 
 
7.4.1 Banking Reforms and Risk Management 
 
This study investigates how banking reforms affected the performance of Nigerian DMBs. 
Previous submissions suggest that Nigerian DMBs were unable to manage various risk 
positions that consequently led to the erosion of shareholder funds, the sacking of eight bank 
management teams and the nationalization of three DMBs into bridge banks. Hence, this 
section assesses the areas where the banking reforms have improved risk management 
practices, where DMBs have failed in managing their risk positions and what they have done 
to protect shareholder funds and improve efficiency, performance, and stability.    
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution 
How has the Central Bank of Nigeria and 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
improved risk management in commercial 
banks? 
CBN/NDIC 
How often do the CBN and NDIC engage in 
on-site bank examination of commercial 
banks? 
CBN/NDIC 
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What documents does your bank make 
available to supervisors when they come for 
on-site inspections or examinations? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
The Nigerian banking sector which was dominated by a large number of small DMBs has 
now metamorphosed into an industry of a small number of large DMBs. The banking reforms 
especially the 2005 banking consolidation programme changed the Nigerian banking 
landscape as DMBs have more equity and assets at their disposal. As a result, this section 
concentrates on analysing interview responses from regulatory authorities and deposit banks 
that also centre on the main types of banking risk (credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and 
operational risk) that affect banks in Nigeria. 
Beginning with how and if the CBN and NDIC have improved risk management in DMBs, 
questions were put forward in order to access the measures initiated by regulators charged 
with the responsibility of overseeing the activities of DMBs. The position of the CBN is that 
they have continued to promote adequate risk management practices in DMBs in Nigeria by 
issuing guidelines. The respondent from the CBN asserted that: 
“In order to improve risk management in DMBs, the CBN issues guidelines to ensure that 
deposit money banks develop robust risk management systems and practices.” 
The reaction offered by the CBN suggests that DMBs in Nigeria are allowed to develop their 
own individual risk management systems and practices in line with the guidelines provided 
by regulators. The consequence of this assertion is that DMBs must endeavour to have 
experienced risk managers and personnel as employees in order to ensure best practices are 
entrenched. Also, this implies that with banks developing individual risk management 
practices, supervision by regulatory authorities ought to be thorough and frequent.   
In like manner, answers were also sought from the NDIC on how Nigerian banking reforms 
have instigated the development of adequate risk management practices. In furtherance of the 
assertion from the CBN, and in order to improve risk management in Nigerian DMBs, the 
interviewee from the NDIC affirmed that: 
“A  large number of staff from the NDIC and CBN have been trained on ‘risk-based 
supervision’, which the two regulatory agencies have been using as a guide to carry-out bank 
supervision. The CBN and NDIC have also instituted inter-bank risk management frameworks 
and have mandated banks to examine their internal risk management practices in line with 
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prescribed guidelines. The CBN and NDIC also ensure that the corporate governance 
frameworks developed by the CBN are adequately adhered to by DMBs. In addition, DMBs 
will soon start to abide by the reformed Basel II regulatory framework.” 
The affirmation from the NDIC interviewee sheds light on the activities carried out by 
regulatory authorities to improve the management of risk in Nigerian DMBs. First, the 
introduction of risk-based supervision (RBS) is in line with the provisions of the Basel Core 
Principles on Supervision. The adoption of RBS is an indication that the supervision of banks 
is tailored to the needs of individual DMBs. This reveals that supervision in recent times has 
become more focused and detailed. More so, the interviewee opined that supervision prior to 
the 2009 banking reform was not carried out in line with tenets of RBS. Additionally, the 
above submission discloses that the CBN has developed a corporate governance framework. 
Various submissions and reports from both the CBN and NDIC throughout this research have 
indicated failures in corporate governance structures in the Nigerian banking sector. The 
development of the corporate governance framework shows that regulatory authorities are in 
tune with issues in the banking sector and are working on improving risk management 
practices. Most importantly, the interviewee from the NDIC acknowledged that employees of 
the regulatory agencies were being trained on RBS and the Basel Accords. Additionally, even 
though direct observation is not an adopted method of data collection in this study, the 
researcher found out through direct contact with staff of the CBN and NDIC during the 
fieldwork that staff of the CBN were being trained by experts on Basel II and Basel III.     
In line with the above, and information from CBN and NDIC annual reports, this study 
inquired to find out the frequency of on-site bank examination of commercial banks. Bank 
supervision entails a review of financial documents/reports prepared by banks and on-site 
visits/examinations. More so, supervision is an avenue for curtailing banking risk. Therefore, 
in order to find out how well regulatory authorities in Nigeria have facilitated the mitigation 
of risk in the banking industry, views from regulatory authorities were solicited. 
The interviewee from the CBN opined that the number of on-site visits and examinations 
does not determine the effectiveness or manner of supervision. The CBN interviewee 
declared that: 
“On-site bank examinations and stress tests are not conducted based on a defined timetable. 
Bank examinations and stress tests are determined by the composite risk rating of the 
banking sector.” 
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The opinion above implies that the perceived risk in the banking sector determines the type of 
action to be taken by regulators. Consequently, if DMBs abide by regulations set out by 
regulatory authorities, and are adequately managing their risk positions; bank examinations 
and stress tests will be spaced and far in-between.    
The response from the NDIC is in line with the submission from the CBN. Thus in shedding 
more light on the supervisory activities of regulators and how they facilitate the mitigation of 
risk in banking institutions, the interviewee from the NDIC opined that: 
“Supervision prior to the 2009 banking reform was independently carried out by the CBN and 
NDIC; though findings were eventually reconciled and discussed. Nowadays, the CBN and 
NDIC carry out supervision together. Bank examination is done in batches with either the 
CBN or NDIC leading the examination team. Bottom-line, banks are jointly examined by the 
CBN and NDIC under the Risk-Based Supervisory (RBS) framework.” 
The above disclosure informs that there was previously inadequate collaboration between 
regulatory authorities. The lack of harmonization between regulators may have led to the 
inability to notice the decay that nearly crippled the banking sector in the post-2005 banking 
reforms era. The view above further shows that the adoption of RBS by the regulatory 
authorities was to fortify risk management practices and minimise risk in the banking sector. 
In addition, regulatory documents from the CBN and NDIC reveal that regulators embark on 
four types of bank examinations, namely: routine examinations, target examinations, special 
examinations, and special investigations. Therefore, in relation to the determined composite 
risk in the banking sector, regulators either embark on routine examinations, target 
examinations, special examinations, or special investigations.  
In line with the role of supervision in reducing risk in Nigerian DMBs, and in order to 
supplement the above findings on what determines the amount of bank examinations and 
stress tests carried out. This study sought to find out the documents requested by regulators 
when they embark on bank examinations and stress tests. Responses put forward by senior 
bank managers are in line with the conclusions from regulators that composite risk ratings of 
banks determine the type of investigations and consequently, the type of documents to be 
requisitioned. The general opinion from the fifteen interviewees was that supervisors request 
for different documents depending on the reason or focus of the bank examination or 
inspection. Hence, the two most detailed responses are presented. A bank manager from one 
of the Tier I DMBs stated that: 
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“Supervisors, first of all, make sure the archive of the bank is properly maintained when they 
visit. They ensure all the records of the banks are well kept. They check account opening 
packages and documents that have to do with revenue collection and tax remittance. The 
supervisors check to see if the bank makes prompt and exact remittances. The supervisors 
also investigate whether KYC’s are properly done. They check for compliance with statutory 
laws like the display of the last annual statement of account of the bank, and also the display 
of the pictures of the president of Nigeria and Governor of the state of which a bank branch 
is domiciled. Supervisors also check the credit reports of the bank. In summary, supervisors 
check all the books of the bank to make sure they are all properly maintained and the bank is 
operating in line with set guidelines.” 
The reaction above validates the responses from the regulatory authorities. It confirms that 
supervisors engage in bank examinations, to ensure DMBs are operating in line with set 
guidelines and regulations.  
 Additionally, to complement the above submissions, another senior bank manager from a 
Tier II (medium sized) DMB affirmed that: 
“Depending on the aim of examination or inspection, for instance, if it is risk-based, 
supervisors review the loan portfolio of the bank. The supervisors review the level of 
documentation required to grant a loan facility. They inspect general customer 
documentation and review KYC forms. Supervisors also review customer records to make 
sure the bank does not keep the funds of customers that are involved in terrorist activities or 
businesses that have been prohibited by the government. Bank inspectors check whether 
companies that have been granted loans have the necessary documentations and the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) has adequately registered them. The supervisors also 
check and match documents the bank has in its possession with those at the CBN and NDIC. 
They check all the bank’s classes of deposits and how the bank is managing those deposits. 
Returns to the government which also include withholding tax and PAYE are verified by 
supervisors to ensure that the bank is abiding by statutory provisions. In a nutshell, 
supervisors review the entire books of the banks depending on the focus of the bank 
examination.” 
The above further complements previous proclamations and reinforce the opinion that bank 
supervision in the Nigerian banking sector is detailed and focused. Most importantly, it can 
be observed from the last assertions on bank supervision that bank examinations are risk 
mitigation driven. The views from the DMBs stress the keeping of adequate and up to date 
records. They also highlight the importance of KYC especially due to the terrorist activities 
ravaging some parts of the country. Nonetheless, in a nutshell, the submissions all agree that 
bank regulators embark on on-site bank examinations and various target based supervisions.  
Progressively, the opinions expressed show more inclination towards ensuring effective loan 
and credit management in Nigerian DMBs. Consequently, the next section dwells on the 
credit risk management issues and management practices.       
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7.4.2 Banking Regulation and Credit Management Practices 
 
Various sections of this study have positioned the management of loans (credit) which led to 
high levels of non-performing as one of the central problems of bank regulation in the 
Nigerian banking sector.  More so, previous submissions suggested that borrowers or 
counterparties were unable to repay loans or make regular payments in accordance with 
agreed terms especially after the 2005 banking reforms and during the global financial crisis. 
On that account, this section dwells on the loan application process of DMBs and the 
initiatives employed to manage non-performing loans.  
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution 
Can you explain your bank’s loan approval 
process? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
How do you treat non-performing loans in 
your bank? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
 
 
7.4.2.1  Loan Application Process 
 
In view of the established notion that loans and credits were unsystematically granted after 
the 2005 banking reforms in the Nigerian banking sector, this section seeks to find out the 
initiatives or practices embarked upon to reverse the trend of default loan repayments and the 
flouting of loan contracts.    
Senior bank executives provided responses to the extent to which DMBs have modified loan 
application processes in order to militate against credit risk. The overall views expressed by 
the fifteen interviewed bank executives agree that the granting of loan facilities became 
centralized after the 2009 banking reforms. The powers of branch bank managers were 
reduced in order to ensure the elimination of bias in the loan approval process. On that 
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account, a few responses that summarize all the views of the bank executives are presented 
below.       
The reactions obtained reveal that loans are initiated in bank branches and the approval 
process takes it through various bank officers and review committees before approval is 
granted for disbursement. The general view is that those saddled with the responsibility of 
reviewing and approving loan facilities are seasoned risk managers. One bank executive from 
a Tier I DMB opined that: 
“The bank has a robust credit approval memorandum process. It works in such a way that no 
single officer has the absolute power to prepare, recommend and approve a loan facility. 
There are different officers at each level saddled with the responsibility of preparing, 
recommending, and approving loans. Still yet, there are loan approval limits based on the 
amounts involved.” 
The assertion above reveals that the bank has a laid down procedure for which the bank must 
follow before a facility is approved. In consensus, all the interviewees revealed that DMBs all 
have defined loan approval frameworks which must be adhered to before any facility is 
granted. The regulatory authorities suggested in previous submissions that the high rate of 
non-performing loans was one of the reasons for the 2009 banking reforms. However, it 
should be acknowledged that some form of credit approval processes also existed during the 
periods most DMBs suffered from default repayments. Hence, the existence of a credit 
memorandum process is not enough to prevent the build-up of non-performing loans. 
Nonetheless, the initiative to increase the number of personnel in the approval and review 
process of loans will possibly lead to the granting of better loans with less probability of 
default. More so, the above view revealed that the officers responsible for approving loans 
have amount limits they can approve. Thus, not all officers in the approval chain can approve 
certain amounts. Another bank executive from a medium sized DMB (Tier II) in line with the 
limit attached to granting of loans stated that: 
“There are different types of loan and customers make requests for various amounts. Based 
on the loan type and the amount involved, the bank’s delegated lending authority reviews 
the application. At each level, based on the amount involved, there is someone who approves 
a loan application. The higher the amount involved, the higher the rank of the approving 
officer. When the requested amount is very large, the board and the credit approval 
committee decide. Bank branch managers do not have any approval limits, they only support 
and concur to a loan request. Loan approvals are done at the regional level, directorate level, 
credit committee level and board level. So the larger the amount requested, the higher the 
level of reviewers and approvers.” 
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The above account brings so much to light. For one, loan approval has been centralised to 
ensure more experienced bankers and personnel are involved in the loan approval process to 
eliminate the casual granting of loans. Secondly, the granting of loans at branch levels has 
been eliminated and first loan approval level is the regional level which is overseen by a 
regional head. Thirdly, board members are part of the loan approval team. This view 
highlights an improvement in private monitoring as bank boards are made up of both 
executive and non-executive members. In summary, this view reinforces the assertion that the 
loan approval process has been centralised at top management level. This implies that the 
likelihood of granting loans and facilities to undeserving applicants has diminished owing to 
the perceived properly structured loan applications review process.   
Similarly, another bank executive from one of the Tier I DMBs opined that: 
“Prior to 2009 banking reforms, and after the 2005 banking reforms, branch managers had 
the authority to grant a maximum of five N1m worth of loans to five different customers 
without bank management approval. While zonal heads had the authority to approve up to a 
maximum of twenty N1m worth of loans, and regional heads had the power to approve loans 
to the tune of N50m to several bank customers. The bank, however, changed this and moved 
all loan approvals to the credit committee stationed at the bank headquarters. The change 
was informed by the high level of related party transactions. The branch managers therefore 
only had the authority to initiate the loan process, while the zonal and regional heads either 
reject or concur before the loan application is passed to the credit committee at the head 
office.” 
Just like the previous Tier II DMB, the reaction above suggests revisions to loan approval 
processes and credit risk mitigation due to the ill-judged manner in which branch managers 
granted loans and facilities to related parties. The consensus to the type of behaviour 
exhibited by branch managers agrees to the view that mismanagement contributed largely to 
the shrinking of shareholder funds both in Tier I and Tier 2 banks. However, the streamlining 
of loan approval processes to credit committees located at bank headquarters ensures that 
loan approvals are reviewed devoid of bias and by experienced credit officers. In sum, 
experiences, the global financial crisis and the 2009 banking reforms necessitated the re-
engineering of loan approval processes and credit risk management practices in DMBs and in 
the Nigerian banking sector in the whole.                 
Moreover, in line with the view that bank branch managers do not approve loans and loan 
approval has been centralised. Another interviewee from one of the banks that received 
capital injections through the bailout out initiate of Nigerian regulators suggested that: 
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“Temporary overdrafts which were previously approved at branch level by bank branch 
managers were stopped after the 2009 banking reforms. All temporary overdrafts are now 
approved by regional managers. The haphazard temporary overdrafts granted to customers 
by branch managers were hurting the bank. The customers granted temporary overdrafts 
were closely related to branch managers and the rate of default contributed to the erosion of 
the shareholder capital. ”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The opinion presented above showed that the granting of temporary overdrafts was 
streamlined due to the frequency with which bank branch managers granted overdrafts to 
personal friends and family members without due process.  This development sought to 
ensure that temporary overdrafts are thoroughly reviewed and granted to deserving bank 
customers. In totality, the view above indicates that credit risk management was fortified 
after banks lost shareholder funds obtained during the 2005 banking reforms. More so, the 
submission also highlighted the position that mismanagement of shareholder funds led to the 
erosion of capital which necessitated the bailout of the bank by Nigerian regulators in 2009.  
In like manner, another bank executive from one of the bailed-out banks suggested that: 
“Before the changes to the loan application process after the 2009 banking reforms. Bank 
managers granted a lot of small loans to their cronies because they had the authority to 
grant loans and overdrafts to the tune of N1m. The bank management found this out and 
banned the practice.” 
This reaction agrees with the previous submission that highlighted the mismanagement of 
loan approval processes by branch managers. And in line with the above, the bank found it 
necessary to review its loan approval process. Based on these submissions, it can be 
suggested that flouting of set down loan approval processes contributed to the erosion of 
shareholders’ funds which led to the bailout of eight banks in 2009.        
To further drill-down on the loan approval process and how credit risk is being managed in 
the initial process of receiving loan applications, the interview participants suggested that 
DMBs engage in some form of checks to determine the suitability of loan and facility 
applicants. The responses obtained from bank managers reveal that loan/credit officers use 
the common five Cs of credit (capacity, collateral, capital, character, and condition) in 
reviewing customer loan applications. But, the utilisation of the five Cs is a common practice 
in banks and its usage is well documented in credit risk management discussions and 
literature. As a result, this study will not dwell on the five Cs. Nonetheless, in reviewing loan 
applications, bank interviewees were excited about the impact of the credit bureau. The 
increasing level of non-performing loans in the Nigerian banking sector which was 
highlighted by the stress tests that heralded the 2009 banking reforms spurred the CBN to 
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mandate banks to resort to the database of the Credit Bureau before processing customer loan 
applications. The Credit Bureau database which can be accessed by Nigerian lenders contains 
information on creditors, granted loans and defaulting loans. In buttressing the impact of the 
Credit Bureau in ensuring banks grant safe loans, one bank manager suggested that: 
“The credit bureau database has so far been of great help to banks because customer 
information requested and generated are very informative. The database provides the total 
exposure of a loan applicant and even the bank the customer is indebted to.” 
Similarly, another bank manager reported that: 
“The bank carries out checks on customers in the initial stage of the loan application process. 
Checks are done using the credit bureau database. The database provides information about 
the total exposure of customers and who the customers are exposed to. More so, some 
customers do not even know they owe any bank when they apply for loans, so the credit 
bureau database tends to bring to light customer’s exposures and helps banks recover 
written-off loans.”  
The submissions and inferences drawn from interviewees suggest that the rejuvenated Credit 
Bureau has assisted in uncovering perennial debtors and led to the granting of loans to 
deserving applicants who are not geared to other financial institutions. More so, the bank 
managers interviewed were of the view that the continuous use of the Credit Bureau has led 
to reductions in the number of loans approved. In essence, the reactions opine that the 
recourse to the credit bureau is a step in the right direction as it helps to eliminate 
undeserving applicants and reduces credit risk.    
So far, the opinions expressed have indicated that the mismanagement of loan processing 
procedures contributed largely to the erosion of shareholder funds after the 2005 banking 
reforms and during the global financial crisis. However, the centralization of loan application 
processes and the credit bureau have suggested improvements in credit risk management 
practices.   
 
7.4.2.2  Non-Performing Loans 
 
Owing to the documented presence of high levels of non-performing loans in the Nigerian 
banking sector in the post-2005 banking reforms period, this section dwells on the initiatives 
taken to reduce levels of non-performing loans and how established non-performing loans are 
handled in literature.  
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An important aspect of treating non-performing loans rests on whether provisions are made 
for them in the case of a default. In a bid to militate against default and reduce the level of 
non-performing loans, the CBN has mandated that banks make provision for bad debt in case 
of default. The views obtained from all the fifteen interviewees credit Nigerian regulators as 
the main architects in providing guidelines to the treatment of non-performing loans. To that 
end, one bank manager declared that: 
“Provision is made for a loan immediately it is approved and disbursed. In line with the 
prudential guidelines developed by the CBN, I% is provided for notwithstanding whether the 
loan performs or not.” 
The view expressed above opines that the CBN ensures DMBs make provisions for all 
facilities granted. The rationale behind this is that every loan has the probability of defaulting. 
The provision for loans, which the CBN mandates banks to keep, is commendable due to 
cushioning effect it would have in the event of default. More so, a loan can be assessed today 
and judged perfect with no likelihood of default, however, a single government policy or 
terrorist act like the Boko Haram menace can change the dynamics of a previously reviewed 
loan facility. The above submission, in a nutshell, shows that regulators have a vital role to 
play in managing default risk, as the mandate to make a provision of 1% ensures that the 
management of approved loans starts immediately it is sanctioned to be disbursed. 
Still on the management of default risk and disbursed loans, one of the interviewed bank 
managers summarised the views obtained. All the DMBs are regulated by the same regulators 
and guidelines. On that account, he asserted that: 
“The CBN through its prudential guidelines requires banks to classify loans as doubtful debt if 
after a period of 90 days; no principal or interest is paid. And if after a period of 90 to 360 
days no principal or interest is paid, a loan should be classified as a substandard debt. And 
after 360 days a loan facility should be written off as a bad debt. In addition, a provision 
should be made for all these classes of debt in the financial books of banks.” 
Credit creation is one of the main roles of banks. The fact that a fraction of customers always 
default cannot be changed. The ability to continuously devise internal processes in line with 
prudential guidelines determines the level to which default risk is handled. Thus, the mandate 
to continuously make provisions at various periods motivates banking institutions to 
intermittently review loan portfolios. The submissions reviewed in this section have shown 
that regulators in the Nigerian banking sector have played their role in ensuring guidelines 
and directions are provided to assist banks to manage their risk positions.           
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In line with presentations on loan approval processes and provisions made to address non-
performing loans and disbursed loans, information on the recovery process of non-performing 
loans was solicited from bank managers. The reactions obtained from all the interviewed 
bank managers reveal the same process of recovering non-performing loans. One of the 
interviewed bank managers asserted that: 
“When a loan facility has not been serviced, the bank first of all finds out the reason why the 
loan is not performing. The bank secondly writes the borrower to notify him or her and 
advice the borrower to adjust the facility. The facility is then enhanced, restructured or 
renewed depending on the outcome of the notification. Finally, should all amicable resolution 
measures fail; the bank initiates recovery procedures by calling in the collateral or engaging 
debt recovery agents (DRAs).” 
This procedure is the same with all the DMBs interviewed, thus the single quotation. The 
submission above indicates that banks in Nigeria try to find out the reasons borrowers are 
unable to make payments in accordance with their contractual agreement. This process apart 
from serving as an appraisal also exposes loan officers to the customer’s business which 
could help them in assessing other loan applications. Additionally, the reaction shows that 
loans can be restructured after reviewing the outcome of the notification given to the 
customer. Nonetheless, as loans can be restructured, banks may engage in restructuring loans 
in order to avoid making provisions for them as bad loans in their books. The use of debt 
recovery agents (DRA) is presented as the last option if all other efforts to recover bad loans 
fail. However, events in the banking sector do not seem to show that the DRAs are effective 
in recovering loans. The CBN in 2009 had to publish the list of chronic debtors in national 
dailies because they felt DMBs had exhausted all the avenues within their power to recover 
loans. Similarly, the CBN in 2015 again mandated Nigerian DMBs to publish the list of 
chronic debtors in order to elicit payment. This indicates that even though guidelines from 
regulators and internal processes as mentioned in this section are geared towards minimising 
default and credit risk, the steps taken so far are not adequate.  
Nevertheless, reactions emanating from DMBs opine that they have made changes to their 
risk management processes to reduce or eliminate the build-up of non-performing loans. The 
general view as held by interviewed bank managers is that Nigerian DMBs are not advocates 
of selling collateral to recover loans, though the selling of collateral enables banks to recover 
non-performing loans. Two of the interviewees affirmed that: 
“The bank is not in the business of selling or seizing properties. We try as much as possible to 
ensure that our customers do not default, though a fraction of customers always default. 
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And in the event that customers default, the legal department and control unit of the bank 
handles the recovery of debts.” 
“The hurdles involved in selling properties given as loan collateral make the process 
unattractive. The legal hurdles and the cultural sentiments attached to landed properties 
make it difficult to seize and sell collateral. However, the bank in most instances retains the 
possession of collateral without selling them till the borrower pays a substantial part of the 
borrowed amount.” 
In line with the previous reaction, DMBs try to ensure customers do not default on granted 
loans. And when they default, the legal department and control units fashion out modalities to 
ensure the recovery of loans. Even though DMBs are not normally inclined to sell off 
collateral to recover non-performing loans, the paramount interest is to ensure all avenues are 
exploited in order to protect customer funds.  
To that end, the reactions obtained indicate that strides have been made towards improving 
credit/loan management practices in the Nigerian banking sector by both regulators and bank 
managements. To sum up, regulators have enhanced credit/loan management practices by 
rejuvenating the credit bureau and providing prudential guidelines to ensure DMBs make 
provision for 1% of all disbursed loans (whether performing or not). Nigerian regulators also 
enhanced credit/loan management practices by ensuring the appropriate classification of 
loans in banking books. On the other hand, Nigerian DMBs have fortified credit/loan 
management practices by making certain loans are approved by more experienced risk 
managers and dedicated loan approval committees. Credit/loan management practices have 
also been enhanced by moving up the approval of temporary overdrafts from bank branch 
managers to regional managers in some instances and centralizing loan approval processes. 
Conversely, even though evidence shows that credit/loan management practices have been 
fortified, the CBN had to mandate DMBs to publish the names of chronic debtors in national 
newspapers in 2009 and more recently in the second half of 2015 to elicit adherence to loan 
contractual agreements.  
Additionally, in responding to questions that border on the build-up of non-performing loans 
in the Nigerian banking sector, three interviewees divulged perceived reasons for default 
loan/credit repayments. One bank manager asserted that: 
“Interest rates in Nigerian banks are too high for customers. Most interest rates range 
between 17% - 23% and this has led to a decrease in the number of loan applications.”    
In like manner, another interviewee submitted that:  
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“The 17% - 23% interest rates attached to bank loans in Nigerian is the cause of default. The 
interest rate deters customers from paying back loans and advances within the stipulated 
contract period.” 
More so, one interviewee commented that: 
“The high-interest rate scares genuine borrowers from approaching the bank for loans. And 
in most cases, only desperate customers make use of bank loans because of the high-interest 
rates and charges.”    
The submissions highlight an interesting dilemma to this study. The view that the high-
interest rates ascribed to loan facilities have led to a decrease in the number of loan 
applications can have diverse effects on banks. A reduction in loan applications can translate 
to reductions in the amount of non-performing loans because customers who might have 
defaulted are being discouraged by the high-interest rates. However, credit creation is one of 
the functions of banks and it is a main source of income. Consequently, if the high-interest 
rates are actually discouraging customers from making loan applications, then DMBs in the 
Nigerian banking sector are failing in their role as financial intermediaries. Banks naturally 
obtain deposits (funds) from the surplus side of the economy and transfer to the deficit side of 
the economy in order to promote growth and development. To this end, the inability of banks 
to create credits will impact negatively on the Nigerian economy. Progressively, if the high-
interest rate is a unified strategy to generate revenue, the reduction in loan applications may 
translate to reduced incomes. Additionally, the submissions blame the high-interest rate for 
the high level of loan repayment defaults. In sum, the high-interest rates attached to bank 
loans in the Nigerian banking sector seems unfavourable to Nigerian DMBs and the Nigerian 
economy in the whole. In conclusion, the section below will dwell on liquidity management 
in the Nigerian banking sector as this portion of the study centred on the management of 
loans/credits.  
 
7.4.3 Banking Reforms and Liquidity Management Practices 
 
Literature presented in this study revealed that liquidity was a problem during the global 
financial crisis as some DMBs were unable to meet customer demands. The 2005 banking 
reforms transformed the fortunes of the Nigerian banking sector as Nigerian DMBs had at 
their disposal excess liquidity from the recapitalization exercise. However, previous reactions 
highlighted the inability of Nigerian DMBs to manage the excess capital by granting sub-
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standard loans which eroded shareholder funds. More so, the limited time span between the 
2005 banking reforms and the 2009 banking reforms which were informed by the findings 
obtained from the 2008 banking stress-test exercise showed decreasing liquidity levels. 
Therefore, evidence shows that liquidity levels were not properly managed in the post-2005 
banking reforms period as a host of DMBs engaged in the haphazard granting of loans which 
culminated into declining liquidity levels. To that end, the questions in the table below guide 
the discussion as this study seeks to understand the treatment and management of liquidity in 
the Nigerian banking sector.      
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution 
How does your bank treat excess liquidity? Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
What do branches do to maintain liquidity 
levels and in the event they run out of 
physical cash, what is done to pay 
depositors? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
Can you please explain the relationship of 
your bank with the CBN in terms of deposits 
and withdrawals? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
How well has the CBN been playing the role 
of lender of last resort? 
Deposit Money Banks/CBN 
             
To find out if and how liquidity levels plummeted in the Nigerian banking sector after the 
recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking reforms, it was pertinent to find out how DMBs 
handle and treated liquidity (excess liquidity). As regards the treatment of liquidity in 
Nigerian DMBs, the reactions received from most of the senior bank managers attest that 
liquidity as at the time of data collection was not an issue in the banking industry. 
Nonetheless, one interviewee from a medium sized (Tier II) DMB asserted that: 
“Excess liquidity is deposited with the CBN. While excess cash in the bank’s branches are 
moved to the bank’s cash centres before being moved to the Central Bank as deposits.” 
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In furtherance of the above assertion, another bank manager from one of the bridge banks 
stated that: 
“The bank manages liquidity by buying treasury bills and placing excess liquidity in inter-
banks markets.” 
The two reactions sum up the views from the fifteen interviewed bank managers. The 
submissions indicate that excess liquidity is moved to the account of DMBs with the Central 
bank. Additionally, the above submissions also indicate that apart from the utilization of bank 
funds for the creation of loans; Nigerian DMBs buy treasury bills and place excess liquidity 
in the interbank market. The buying of treasury bills and the placement of excess liquidity 
serve as a means of earning returns from excess liquidity.                           
In line with the above, this study sought to find out how liquidity is managed in bank 
branches and what DMBs do to pay depositors in the event they run out of physical cash 
during the course of the day. In unison with the above held position that liquidity is not an 
issue in the Nigerian banking sector, one of the interviewees asserted that: 
“The CBN is always at hand to assist banks whenever the bank runs out of cash. However, 
this rarely happens in recent times as the cashless banking policy has reduced the demand 
for raw cash.”  
Furthermore, all the bank managers interviewed were of the opinion that the introduction of 
the “cashless policy” has helped in the management of liquidity. One interviewee who 
summarised how liquidity is managed in the Nigerian banking industry asserted that: 
“Liquidity levels are managed in the bank by complying with regulatory requirements of cash 
reserve ratio, liquidity ratio, maintaining vault limits, and recourse to the inter-bank market 
in the event of unplanned huge withdrawal requests. However, it is unlikely that the bank will 
not be able to meet its short-term obligation of paying depositors because the ‘cashless 
policy’ has reduced the need for cash transactions.” 
Similarly, another bank manager commented that: 
“The bank relies on regulatory guidelines from the CBN for the management of liquidity 
levels in the bank. The guidelines specify the cash reserve ratio and liquidity ratio for banks 
operating in the country.”   
The reactions above showed that both regulators and DMBs play diverse roles in managing 
liquidity levels and liquidity risk. Some important issues were raised by the submissions. For 
example, they suggested that the CBN issues guidelines on cash reserve and liquidity ratios, 
which determine how much percentage of customer deposits DMBs, must keep with the 
CBN. In addition, the management of liquidity in the form of vault limits ensures DMBs do 
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not keep physical cash that is not covered by insurance. It was also suggested that liquidity 
has not been a problem in Nigerian DMBs as a result of the cashless policy championed by 
the CBN, as DMBs have at every turn been able to meet customer withdrawal demands. 
Equally, in line with the view that regulators play a massive role in the management of 
liquidity in DMBs, bank managers were asked to comment on their interaction with the CBN 
in the management of liquidity (deposits and withdrawals). The responses obtained present a 
consensus perspective concerning the relationship between DMBs and the CBN as regards 
deposits and withdrawals (liquidity management). An avowal that summarized all the views 
of all the fifteen interviewees declared that: 
“Banks have statutory deposits that they must maintain with the CBN. Banks must operate 
within the capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, cash reserve ratio, and NPL ratio set by the 
CBN. These are avenues in which the banking sector and the CBN interact on an ongoing 
basis. Withdrawals are legitimate as long as each bank maintains the statutory ratios. The 
CBN also make use of banks to manage liquidity in the economy by mopping or releasing 
funds from or into the economy by increasing or decreasing these ratios from time to time. 
The CBN also sells treasury bills and bonds to banks and the general public as a liquidity 
management strategy.” 
It is evident from the opinion above that the management of liquidity in the Nigerian banking 
sector by bank regulators is adequately pursued through various prudential guidelines and set 
ratios. Also, it can be deduced that cash reserve ratios and liquidity ratios are fine-tuned in 
accordance with liquidity management strategies. In brief, the response indicates that the 
CBN manages liquidity in the economy in general and in banks through various liquidity 
ratios and prudential guidelines.  
Furthermore, as presented in literature, central banks are the go-to institution in the event that 
banks run out of liquidity and are unable to perform their intermediation roles. In this 
instance, this study sought to find out from Nigerian DMBs how well the CBN has been 
playing the role of lender of last resort. Based on the premise that most of the reactions 
obtained in previous sections indicate that the CBN has been adequately performing its role 
as the lender of last resort. The submissions below validate the central role played by 
Nigerian regulators in liquidity management. Some reactions from bank managers are thus 
presented below: 
“The CBN is now alive to its responsibilities. I can authoritatively confirm that devoid of the 
timely intervention of the Central bank in 2009, a lot of customers would have lost their 
deposits and a number of banks would have gone under.” 
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An interesting deduction from the view above is that the CBN was previously not alive to its 
responsibilities of providing liquidity and protecting customer funds. However, as no bank 
has been allowed to fail since the 2005 banking consolidation reforms, the opinion that the 
CBN is adequately providing assistance and guidance to Nigerian banks can be upheld.                                     
Still more, another senior bank manager went further by explaining how the CBN plays the 
role of lender of last resort and how it intervened in 2009 to save eight DMBs in the banking 
sector. 
“In my opinion, the CBN has been playing the role of the lender of last resort well. First by 
providing the inter-bank window for banks in need to access short-term funds, and then by 
intervening to prevent eight banks which failed its distress test from going down. The 
intervention saved billions of depositor funds and jobs, in addition to saving the Nigerian 
economy from a major banking crisis.” 
Similarly, another interviewee asserted that: 
“I think the CBN has been doing well. This bank, in particular, has never required the injection 
of capital or liquidity from the CBN. Other Nigerian banks had issues in terms of their liquidity 
levels and had to be acquired by the so-called big Nigerian banks. The CBN monitors how 
banks operate and how often they make withdrawals from the inter-bank lending market. 
When a bank is always borrowing from other banks in the interbank lending market, the 
possibility exists that it has liquidity issues. This bank is a largely retail bank and hence it has 
not had liquidity issues as opposed to banks that rely on few big customers. In short, the 
bank does not suffer from low liquidity levels; instead, it normally has excess to invest in 
treasury bills.”  
Several areas of interest have been stressed by the above assertions. Foremost, the views 
above validate the opinion that the CBN adequately performs its role as the lender of last 
resort. Additionally, the excess liquidity is invested in treasury bills as a liquidity 
management strategy. But most importantly, the recurrent demand of funds by DMBs from 
the inter-bank market to cover liquidity shortfalls is an indication that a banks’ liquidity 
position is not in order and should be closely monitored. However, even though it is claimed 
that the CBN uses the withdrawal patterns of banks from the inter-bank market as an 
indication for dwindling liquidity, the downhill slide witnessed by some DMBs shows that 
either the CBN does not pay enough attention or the information from the inter-bank market 
reveals little information of no consequence.  
Finally, in order to corroborate the opinions obtained from interviewees from DMBs, views 
from the CBN were sought. Hence, the respondent from the CBN asserted that: 
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“The central bank has always performed its function as the lender of last resort by providing 
necessary liquidity to needing banks. The central bank steps in whenever a DMB is in distress 
and the bank has always been alive to its responsibilities.” 
Though the response obtained from the CBN was expected, the reaction depicts that both 
DMBs and regulators are in agreement that the CBN is adequately playing its role as the 
lender of last resort in the Nigerian banking sector.  
 
7.5 Financial Safety Nets 
 
Financial safety nets as offered in literature are strategies or measures adopted by bank 
regulators to eliminate the occurrence of bank failures and crisis in the banking sector. 
Financial safety nets are regulatory risk management methods spearheaded by bank 
regulators. Hence this study sought to ascertain how well Nigerian regulators have protected 
DMBs from distress and collapse. Therefore, the financial safety net approaches (bailouts and 
bridge banking mechanism) employed by Nigerian regulators are the focus of this section. 
Nigerian regulatory authorities injected tier II capital in banks that were diagnosed to be in 
distress in 2009 and for the first time employed the bridge bank nationalization technique to 
further prevent some banks from becoming distressed. On that account, this section starts 
with the examination of the bailout strategy and then briefly evaluates the bridge banking 
mechanism. 
7.5.1 Bank Bailouts and Bridge Banking 
 
Research Interview Questions Interviewee Institution 
Some Nigerian deposit money banks were bailed out by 
the CBN. Why did the CBN not allow them to fail? 
CBN/NDIC 
What is the present situation of the bailed out deposit 
money banks? 
CBN/NDIC 
Was the bailout strategy adopted by Nigerian regulators 
necessary? 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
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The bank examination/stress test jointly carried out by the CBN and NDIC in 2008 
discovered that up to eight (8) DMBs were highly illiquid and unhealthy. The regulators in 
their bid to prevent the banks from collapse injected a total of N620 billion to shore up capital 
in the distressed banks. Though the injected capital was in the form of Tier II capital (seven-
year convertible bonds), which the banks were expected to pay back in due course.  
It is, therefore, pertinent to uncover the reason behind the injection of bailout funds and why 
the CBN did not allow the distressed banks to fail. As such, the views of regulators were 
sought to deduce the reason for the intervention. Starting with the comment from the CBN, 
the interviewed bank regulation staff of the CBN opined that: 
“The CBN did not allow the banks to fail in order to protect depositor’s funds and enhance 
confidence in the banking system, which is crucial to promoting a sound financial system.” 
Equally, the interviewee from the NDIC stated that: 
“The decision to bail out the troubled banks was the best thing to do. The decision to save 
the banks from collapse was based on the intention of the CBN to promote confidence in the 
banking industry and protect depositor’s funds. Even though it was a decision of the 
management of the CBN to bailout the banks, the decision was a result of extensive research 
and analysis of stress tests results.”        
It can be inferred from the responses offered above that the injection of funds was undertaken 
to prevent panic in the financial system and prevent the collapse of the distressed DMBs. The 
views from Nigerian regulators highlight the importance of maintaining and promoting 
financial stability. In addition, opinion from the interviewee from NDIC implied that the 
decision to bail out the distressed DMBs was the product of research and in-depth analysis of 
the result of the 2008 bank examinations/stress test. It can be deduced that the bailout of 
DMBs was timely and necessary.  
Likewise, all bank managers interviewed agreed that the injection of capital into some banks 
by the regulators was a progressive move. Even though some of the bank managers indicated 
that their banks did not receive any bailouts because they were not troubled, they praised the 
timely intervention of the regulatory authorities. The bank managers working with banks that 
received capital injections were overtly satisfied with the intervention. They claimed that the 
timely intervention of the regulatory authorities not only saved the banks from collapse but 
also kept them in employment. Examples of submissions from bank managers are presented 
below. A bank manager from one of the bailed out DMBs commented that:  
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“The move by the CBN to bail out the banks was genius and timely. The intervention saved 
the entire Nigerian banking sector from collapse. Due to the intervention of the CBN, no 
depositor lost his or her funds.” 
Equally, another bank manager from another bailed out DMB in consensus with the above 
submission asserted that: 
“The bailout of some banks was necessary and this bank was a beneficiary. Apart from 
saving the bank from collapse, the bailout saved our jobs.” 
Another interviewee from a DMB that was not bailed out commented that: 
“Although the bank was not bailed out, the bailout strategy adopted by Nigerian regulators 
to bail out the eight troubled banks was crucial and should be commended. It also informed 
the banking public of the commitment of regulators towards safeguarding their deposits.” 
Equally, another interviewee from a DMB that was also not bailed out reported that: 
“The adoption of the bailout strategy was a good move because the number of distressed 
banks was too much to be ignored. In addition, one single bank failure would have likely led 
to bank runs in the banking sector.” 
In view of the reactions obtained from regulators and bank managers, the bailout of the eight 
(8) DMBs by the CBN was important to the stability of the Nigerian banking system. It can 
be deduced that the capital injection (bailout) was beneficial to all stakeholders in the banking 
industry in the sense that: 
 Bailed out DMBs remained in business and depositors continued to have access to 
their funds; 
 Shareholder funds were protected and the banks were afforded the opportunity to raise 
more capital; 
 Regulators were to be reimbursed from recapitalization proceeds (the bailout was 
more like a loan to unhealthy banks); 
 Numerous jobs were saved. 
 General confidence in the banking system was maintained.  
Most interestingly, the bailout specified that banks were expected to pay back the injected 
capital. And this may reduce the problem of moral hazard, due to the mandate to pay back the 
injected capital. As already mentioned, the CEOs and management teams of the bailed out 
banks were relieved of their jobs due to mismanagement that led to the bailouts. The punitive 
action ascribed to the management teams of banks that received the bailed out funds could be 
introduced as a recommended practice. 
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Conversely, it can also be inferred that the inability of regulators to adequately manage risk in 
Nigerian DMBs led to the bailout of the eight DMBs.  
Moreover, previous sections of this study have indicated that three (3) of the bailed-out 
DMBs were nationalized into bridge banks, while the others were allowed to continue 
operating. Though, some of them like Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental Bank merged with 
Ecobank International and Access Bank. In reaction to the condition of the bailed out banks, 
the interviewee from the CBN opined that: 
“The bailed out banks are providing banking services to the public and are meeting all 
prudential requirements of the CBN.” 
Still more, the interviewee from the NDIC presented a broader picture by asserting that: 
“Three of the bailed out banks that were nationalized into bridge banks are about to be 
bought over by other banks. A look at their financial books indicates that they are doing well. 
However, the bailout of the banks led to the sacking and blacklisting of the CEOs and their 
management teams.” 
The opinions conveyed above are in agreement with the assertions that the injection of capital 
was a success and the bailed out DMBs are healthy. In summary, it can be deduced from the 
submissions that the bailout exercise was timely and necessary, as it prevented the collapse of 
distressed DMBs. Though, this would be verified by the quantitative analysis of bank 
financial figures.  
In furtherance of the opinion expressed by the interviewee from NDIC, the situation of the 
three bridge banks were sought. Starting with submissions from the website of the Asset 
Management Corporation of Nigeria which (AMCON) which was tasked with overseeing the 
management of the bridge banks, the following was uncovered. The ownership of Mainstreet 
Bank and Enterprise Bank were officially transferred to Skye Bank Plc and Heritage Bank 
Ltd by AMCON during a divestment ceremony by the Governor of CBN on 28 January, 
2015. Submissions during the ceremony put forward that both DMBs have been restored to 
financial solvency. On that account, Mainstreet Bank had a profit before tax of N13bn at the 
end of December 2013, while Enterprise Bank posted a profit before tax of N3bn (AMCON, 
New Highlights January 28, 2015).   
The handing over of Mainstreet Bank and Enterprise Bank indicate the success of the bridge 
banking mechanism. Additionally, the opinion expressed during the divestment ceremony 
also suggests that both DMBs reported profits at the end of December, 2013. Therefore, in 
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line with the objective of employing the bridge banking mechanism, Nigerian regulators 
prevented the collapse of distressed DMBs.    
In conclusion, both the bailout strategy and bridge banking mechanism employed by Nigerian 
regulators were able to ensure no DMB collapsed after the 2005 banking reforms. The bridge 
banking mechanism seems more successful as its adoption led to the successful nursing of 
two out of the three bridge DMBs to health. Conversely, the bridge banking mechanism 
would probably not have been resorted to if the bailout strategy was a complete success. 
Therefore, the moral hazard problem which has always plagued the adoption of the bailout 
strategy came to light in the Nigerian banking sector as the risk adverse behaviour of bank 
executives was not curled by the injection of the bailout funds.   
 
7.6 Further Regulatory Initiatives  
 
In line with regulatory changes in reaction to the global financial crisis and the mandate of 
recent reforms in the Nigerian banking sector, several initiatives have been taken by both 
regulators and bank managements to improve the bank performance and promote financial 
stability.  
With regards to the participation of shareholders and investors in the management and 
supervision of banking institutions, this study sought the opinion of bank managers. Investors 
and shareholders are usually the most affected when banks fail because depositors are 
normally not covered by financial safety nets as the focus is typically bank customers. It is, 
therefore, imperative that they immerse themselves in the regulation of banks to safeguard 
their investments. The general view obtained from senior bank managers is that shareholders 
predominately interact with banks at annual general meetings although non-executive board 
members are large shareholders elected at general meetings to protect the interest of all 
shareholders in the day-to-day management. Reactions from senior bank managers are 
therefore offered below: 
“Shareholders contribute to the regulation of banks. Board members congregate when there 
are major decisions to be taken or serious issues to be deliberated upon. The bank’s board is 
made up of executive directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive directors are 
basically shareholders with large chunks of shareholdings. Important issues and decisions are 
brought to the attention of the board for thorough deliberation. Other issues outside the 
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purview of the directors are discussed at annual general meetings, where the agenda would 
have been set out and shareholders would have been invited to vote if required.” 
“Shareholders regulate the activities of the bank by approving or declining to ratify certain 
board resolutions at annual general meetings (AGMs). They also vote out errant board 
members as well as serve as whistleblowers to regulators should they notice activities 
inimical to the growth of the bank.” 
The above views agree that shareholders are involved in the management of banks and most 
importantly they are consulted when major decisions are to be made. One interesting view 
offered is that shareholders are expected to serve as whistleblowers to regulators should they 
notice activities that might hamper the growth of the bank. Therefore, even though 
shareholders have the power to regulate the activities of DMBs, the bone of contention is how 
well they have been using the power they have to ensure DMBs only engage in best practices. 
Evidence uncovered during the stress tests by regulators before the 2009 banking reforms is 
an indication that private monitoring by shareholders was not adequate as they did not report 
the mismanagement in the banking sector. In this regard, shareholders are as liable as bank 
executives for the mismanagement uncovered by regulators.                    
Along the same line, another bank manager offered a similar notion with a slight deviation 
that shareholders and investors do not directly contribute to bank regulation. The bank 
manager asserted that: 
“Shareholders and investors do not directly contribute to the regulation and supervision of 
banks. However, they play a role in the appointment of the directors of banks, who in turn 
are saddled with the responsibility of policy formulation, business decisions and day-to-day 
running of the bank through the management team.” 
Even though the above view is a slight deviation from the two previous, they all indicate that 
shareholders partake in the management of banks. The overriding deduction from the 
statement is that shareholders contribute in one way or another in the regulation and 
supervision of banks. 
Additionally, during the course of the interview sessions, a bank manager made an important 
contribution to the increased responsibilities of bank board members. The bank manager 
opined that: 
“Due to the level of non-performing loans in the bank, the policy on loan approval was 
revised such that any loan in excess of N100 million had to be approved by members of the 
board of directors. It is the belief of the bank that this will also improve corporate 
governance.”  
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The above is an indication that board members (both executive and non-executive) have a 
role to play in loan approvals. Also, a more rigorous and careful approach to the granting of 
large loans will ensure that less risky loans are approved. Most importantly, the submission is 
of the notion that corporate governance will be enhanced with the increased role of bank 
board members in the loan approval process.     
In conclusion, shareholders have a crucial responsibility of ensuring the survival of DMBs. 
The large sums of shareholder funds in the banking sector should be a motivation for 
increased regulation and supervision of DMBs. Therefore, owing to the fact that they are the 
most affected in the event of bank failures, it is imperative that shareholders voted to serve on 
bank boards do not align with bank executives. More so, for the reason that no shareholder 
reported the mismanagement that plagued the banking sector after the 2005 banking reforms. 
Consequent on the above, it can be opined that inadequate supervisory practices in the pre-
2009 banking reforms period contributed to the erosion of shareholders’ funds that led to the 
bailout of eight DMBs. Nonetheless, the views emanating from DMBs suggest that the 2009 
banking reforms and the new corporate governance guidelines have improved private 
monitoring practices and bank supervision in the Nigerian banking sector.              
 
7.6.1 Financial Stability and Banking Sector Development 
 
This section seeks to draw conclusions contingent on the general health and stability of the 
Nigerian banking industry. Cooperation between regulators and banks are also reviewed to 
ascertain collaborative efforts that aim to promote financial stability and bank performance.  
Research Interview Questions  Interviewee Institution 
Are there any regulatory committees or collaborations 
between the CBN and NDIC?  
CBN/NDIC 
Are Nigerian banks financially strong enough to compete 
internationally with other big global banks? 
CBN/NDIC 
Are Nigerian deposit money banks on the right path? Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
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As already suggested, regulatory authorities in the Nigerian banking sector do not operate in 
isolation. Opinions obtained throughout this study have indicated that the two main 
regulatory authorities (CBN and NDIC) collaborate to ensure DMBs are adequately regulated 
and supervised. To add to the already established notion that Nigerian regulators work 
together. The NDIC interviewee opined that: 
“The CBN and NDIC collaborate both at management and examiners level. They share 
information and meet on a regular basis.” 
To advance the above view, the interviewee from the CBN asserted that: 
“The CBN and NDIC collaborate regularly. There is also a committee of financial service 
regulators called the Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC), which 
fosters collaborations between regulators in the financial services industry.” 
In addition to the Risk Based Supervision (RBS) which has been expressed throughout this 
study as the foremost collaboration between the CBN and NDIC, the above submissions 
indicate that they also collaborate at management level. More so, the FSRCC exist to promote 
information sharing and cooperation between regulators.   
Moreover, expressed opinions by regulators and DMBs have indicated that the banking sector 
has gone through reforms and DMBs have fortified their internal risk management practices. 
To this end, the perception of regulators was sought to ascertain the status of Nigerian DMBs 
as compared to international banks. The interviewee from the NDIC suggested that: 
“Quite a few Nigerian banks are international banks. Some of them are traded on the London 
and South African stock exchanges and they have branches all over the continent of Africa. 
Although they are financially strong and still growing, no Nigerian DMB is recognised as a 
Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB). However, the likes of Zenith Bank, First Bank, 
and Guaranty Trust Bank are viewed as systemically important banks within Africa.” 
In line with the above, the interviewee from the CBN offered that: 
“Nigerian banks are strong enough to compete internationally. Some Nigerian banks are 
players in International markets and they have branches in other African countries and in 
Europe. Several Nigerian banks have also issued Eurobonds which were subscribed by both 
local and international investors.” 
In this instance, the reactions obtained indicate that though Nigeria DMBs are not Global 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIB), they are considered as big banks within Africa 
largely because of their presence in several African countries. Interestingly, the opinion that 
several Nigerian DMBs issued Eurobonds that were subscribed by local and international 
investors is an indication that investors believe in the Nigerian banking sector.  
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More so, the two reforms x-rayed in this study were initiated to set Nigerian DMBs on the 
path of growth and stability, hence this inquiry. Different bank managers have put various 
views forward, and the general perception is that Nigerian DMBs are doing well financially 
and the banking sector is developing. Several submissions are presented thus: 
“The Nigerian banking industry is heading in the right direction. The 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms placed Nigerian banks in healthy positions to compete globally. Nigerian banks have 
also adopted the IFRS, so they can appeal to investors outside the shores of Nigeria. 
Subjecting banks to adopt the IFRS has exposed them to international markets and by 
extension strengthened them to compete globally.” 
 The above assertion indicates that in addition to the two banking reforms reviewed in this 
study, the IFRS adopted in 2010 for the presentation of financial statements of Nigerian 
DMBs has improved financial disclosure. The fact that Nigerian DMBs have adopted the 
IFRS shows that their financial statements can be compared against those of other 
international banks. On that account, it can be suggested that Nigerian DMBs are heading in 
the right direction. 
Likewise, another bank manager commented on the developments being witnessed in the area 
of alternative delivery channels. He submitted that: 
“The Nigerian banking industry is growing, particularly in the area of alternative delivery 
channels, which has been aided by the cashless policy initiated by the Central Bank. The use 
of ATMs and Internet banking which customers previously neglected and were sceptical of 
using have witnessed increased patronage. Nigerian banks now have lots of internet and 
mobile banking applications available to depositors and more people are opening accounts 
because of the ease of banking.” 
This affirmation reveals that alternative delivery channels in the form of ATM transactions 
and internet banking are spearheading growth in the Nigerian banking industry. Most 
importantly, the view that more people are continuously embracing the use of alternative 
delivery channels for banking transactions is a positive sign. And in addition, the ease of 
banking has stimulated increased financial inclusion.  
Conversely, even as Nigerian DMBs are opined to be on the rise and growth, it was also 
inferred that the KYC guidelines of the CBN were being circumvented in order to promote 
the opening of individual deposit accounts. While hailing the achievements of his bank, one 
bank manager asserted that: 
“Apart from conventional banking, banks are creating outlets for people to open and operate 
accounts. For instance, the bank has various schemes were traders and women are afforded 
the opportunity to open and operate accounts with minimal or no major documentation.” 
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The desire of Nigerian DMBs to promote financial inclusion is commendable. Nonetheless, 
the drive to gain more customers while circumventing laid down rules and regulations is not a 
step in the right direction. It is unfortunate that all Nigerians are not captured in one unique 
national database. Even so, banks should not open accounts that sidestep the KYC guidelines. 
Besides encouraging the circumventing of the KYC guidelines, allowing customers to open 
accounts with little or no major documentation may allow problems like fraud and terrorism 
flourish. Fraudsters and terrorists might be able to gain access to banking services if account 
opening documentations are not properly handled in line with KYC guidelines and 
procedures. And if unethical practices of this nature are not checked, the desired progress 
forged by the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms might be derailed.   
 
7.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined various issues in the regulation and supervision of Nigerian DMBs 
with particular focus on the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms, and the global financial crisis.  
The submissions obtained throughout the chapter indicate that both reforms had positive 
effects on Nigerian DMBs and the banking sector as a whole, although the 2005 banking 
reforms was unable to shield DMBs from the adverse effects of the global financial crisis. 
The findings suggest that the global financial crisis to a large extent and the build-up of non-
performing loans because of the reckless granting of undeserving loan facilities led to the 
bailout of eight DMBs in 2009 and the downgrading of a national DMB to a regional DMB in 
2011. More so, even though the injection of bailout funds was able to ensure the continuous 
operation of the bailed-out DMBs, the adoption of the bridge banking mechanism suggest 
that capital injections (bailouts) do not guarantee improved efficiency and stability. 
Nonetheless, aside from ensuring the continuous operation of the eight bailed-out DMBs, the 
bailout strategy promoted confidence in the ability of Nigerian banking regulators. In like 
manner, the bridge banking mechanism also ensured no banking institution failed in the 
Nigerian banking sector after the 2005 banking reforms. Additionally, the study found that 
internal control practices have been improved through the centralization of loan approval 
processes, while the inclusion of board members in loan approval processes has also fortified 
private monitoring and supervision practices. To this end, even though the bailout strategy 
and the bridge banking mechanism had to be adopted, the fact that no Nigerian DMB 
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collapsed is commendable. Finally, the two banking reforms, regulatory initiatives and the 
financial safety nets techniques have been able to protect and safeguard the Nigerian banking 
sector even though the processes were not error free and without hitches.  
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The three previous chapters dwelled on the presentation of findings from each of the three 
analysis techniques employed to achieve the aims and objectives of this study. This chapter 
focuses on the discussion of the findings from the three adopted analysis techniques. Thus, 
the findings from the DEA window analysis, panel data regression analysis and content 
analysis are harmonised in this chapter. Most importantly, the findings of each method are 
discussed and where possible the results of one are employed to explain the other. The 
findings of this study are also examined against related findings from different studies to 
identify trends or discover new reactions. 
 
8.2 Effects of Nigerian Banking Reforms 
 
This section focuses on the discussion of the investigation results of regulatory changes 
brought about by the 2005 and 2009 Nigerian banking reforms. Recapitalisation was largely 
the standout element of both reforms. Therefore, the outcomes that highlight the effects of the 
reforms on the performance of the DMBs are discussed below. 
 
8.2.1 Bank Recapitalisation 
 
This study analysed the performance of Nigerian DMBs before, during, and after 
recapitalization to ascertain the level of effectiveness of banking reforms initiated 
recapitalizations.   
In view of the capital increase, the DEA efficiency scores submit that bank performance and 
efficiency levels increased immediately capital was injected. This was noticed in the increase 
in the average efficiency scores of DMBs in 2005 and 2006. Therefore, capital increases lead 
to increase in efficiency and bank performance. These results confirm the findings of 
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Obafemi et al. (2013) who suggested that the performance and efficiency of Nigerian DMBs 
improved after 2005 banking reforms. Obafemi et al. (2013) also commented that the 
Nigerian banking sector was inefficient before the 2005 banking reforms. Though the average 
efficiency score of Nigerian DMBs did not significantly increase immediately after the 2005 
banking reforms, the efficiency scores of most of the DMBs in the pre-2005 banking reforms 
period corroborate the findings of Obafemi et al. (2013). In like manner, the findings of this 
study are also consistent with that of Barros & Caporale (2012) who opined that the Nigerian 
banking sector benefited from the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms and it 
serves as a springboard for further growth.  
However, the results also show that increases in regulatory capital do not guarantee sustained 
bank efficiency, performance and stability. As some DMBs did not attain 100% efficiency 
levels and some that did attain 100% efficiency dropped after two years. This position 
indicates that although the efficiency levels and performance of Nigerian DMBs reacted 
positively to the recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking reforms, capital increases does 
not always translate into future bank efficiency, performance and stability. This assertion is in 
line with the study of Oladejo (2010) who opined that though there was an upsurge in the 
performance of Nigerian DMBs regarding increased profitability and liquidity, deep issues 
persisted in the banking sector which the consolidation and recapitalization exercise of the 
2005 banking reforms did not eliminate. Additionally, capital (equity) is viewed as a shock 
absorber which protects banking institutions from externalities. The position of this study 
aligns with that of Lui (2013) which opines that higher capital is not a solution to stability. 
This view also mirrors the submission of Ezike & Oke (2013) who suggested bank regulators 
look beyond capital regulation as the sole determinant of bank performance and concentrate 
on efficient and effective risk management and supervision.   
Also, this study found out that Tier I DMBs that recapitalised in line with the provisions of 
the 2009 banking reforms to continue operating outside the shores of Nigeria had the most 
presence on the efficiency frontier in the post-global financial crisis period. In line with the 
submissions of Obafemi et al. (2013), Nigerian DMBs reacted to the recapitalization mandate 
of the 2009 banking reforms. This outcome is contrary to the position held above because of 
the distress witnessed in some DMBs during the period the bank went through the global 
financial crisis. However, the efficiency levels of the eight bailed out DMBs in later years 
discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter confirm the assertion that capital injections 
(recapitalisation) does not guarantee sustained efficiency, performance, and stability.     
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8.2.2 Performance of Small and Medium Sized DMBs Vs Large DMBs 
 
Regarding the performance of small and medium sized DMBs (Tier II) and large DMBs (Tier 
I) in the Nigerian banking sector, this study found varied performance and efficiency levels in 
different periods. The results of this study show that small and medium DMBs were more 
efficient in periods leading to the 2005 banking reforms.  
The consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms scaled up the size of all the DMBs in 
the Nigerian-banking sector. Nonetheless, the gap between large and small DMBs surfaced 
again in 2009 in line with the provisions of the 2009 banking reforms that mandated DMBs 
with international operations to have regulatory capital of N100bn. On that account, the 
results of this study indicate that Tier I DMBs had superior efficiency scores in the post-2009 
banking reforms period in the Nigerian banking sector. This outcome is not consistent with 
the view expressed by Eriki & Osagie (2014) who asserted that small and medium sized 
Nigerian DMBs were more efficient when compared against large DMBs in 2009. The 
different submissions could be as a result of the difference in methodology. While Eriki & 
Osagie (2014) used the conventional DEA technique, this study employed the DEA window 
analysis. More so,  different inputs and outputs were used. However, DEA window analysis 
measures the performance of a particular DMU in three windows, hence providing more 
robust results. Thus, the results of this study should be more accurate. Nonetheless, the use of 
other inputs and outputs variables are recommended for future studies to ascertain if similar 
results are obtained.       
 
8.2.3 Performance of Foreign DMBs Vs Indigenous Nigerian DMBs 
 
Regarding the performance of foreign DMBs in the Nigerian-banking sector, the study found 
out that foreign DMBs performed better than only the large Indigenous Nigerian DMBs in the 
periods before the 2005 banking reforms. Nonetheless, the results, in general, do not show 
any clear difference in the performance of foreign and domestic DMBs in the pre-2005 
banking reforms period. Put differently, neither foreign nor domestic DMBs outperformed 
the other in periods before the 2005 banking reforms.  
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Progressively, domestic DMBs in general performed better than the foreign DMBs after the 
2005 banking reforms. Although the results show that foreign DMBs constantly featured on 
the efficiency frontier in the years after the 2005 banking reforms but mostly before the 
global financial crisis. However, the limited number of foreign banks in the Nigerian banking 
sector after the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms leads to the conclusion 
that Domestic DMBs were more efficient. Therefore, this study is in line with earlier studies 
on the efficiency of foreign-owned banks by Miller & Parkhe (2002), which suggested that 
domestically owned banks performed better because of their knowledge of the financial 
terrain. Contrary to this position, Tankoano (2013) who also adopted a three-year DEA 
window technique submitted that foreign Nigerian DMBs outperformed Nigerian DMBs. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the small number of DMBs used by Tankoano and the 
variables (two input and two output variables) are responsible for the dissimilarity in 
findings.     
Additionally, the efficiency level of foreign DMBs plummeted in the period the Nigerian 
banking sector went through the global financial crisis. For instance, the performance of 
Citibank which has its headquarters in the U.S was always present on the efficiency frontier 
in the windows before the global financial crisis. Therefore, these results are not consistent 
with the findings of Berger et al. (2005) who suggest that foreign banks from developed 
countries who may have access to superior technologies, particularly information 
technologies for collecting and evaluating quantitative information perform better than 
domestic banks. In essence, the results of this study are in agreement with that of Miller & 
Parkhe (2002).  
Furthermore, the performance of Citibank during the global financial crisis presents another 
dimension to the performance of foreign DMBs. This study therefore opines that foreign 
DMBs from countries where a financial crisis originates are more likely to suffer from the 
crisis. This is in tune with the interview submissions from regulators that are of the view that 
Nigerian DMBs were affected by the global financial crisis through reversal of capital 
inflows and through business associations with foreign DMBs.   
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8.2.4 Regulatory Reactions to the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The responses obtained from bank executives, and regulators suggest that the 2009 banking 
reforms were a reaction to the global financial crisis. Sanusi (2010) who suggested that 
Nigerian regulators intervened through the 2009 banking reforms in order to address the 
negative effects of the global financial crisis on bank capitals also echoed this view. 
Additionally, Sanusi (2012) submitted that corporate governance principles were also 
introduced in reaction to the global financial crisis and the unethical behaviours of some bank 
executives. In essence, the 2009 banking reforms can be viewed as a reactionary approach to 
banking regulation.   
In line with the above, the literature presented in this study highlighted initiatives adopted by 
both international and national regulatory agencies to curb the adverse effects of the global 
financial crisis and country-specific banking crisis. In the post-crisis period, the BIS reviewed 
and upgraded Basel II, resulting in Basel III, which focused on capital and liquidity rules. The 
IMF, on the other hand, concentrated on fostering international financial stability. For 
instance, the IMF took the lead in shaping the policy response to the Eurozone sovereign and 
banking debt crisis (Cabral, 2013). In like manner, the U.S enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 to enhance financial stability and 
facilitate the resolution of too-big-to-fail financial institutions, with the intention of protecting 
taxpayers from financial losses (Kane, 2012).       
The responses obtained from bank regulators and executives suggest that the capital increase 
of the 2005 banking reforms improved the capacity of DMBs to carry out banking activities 
like loan creation. This study also concluded that the inadequate loan granting process was 
responsible for the depletion of shareholder’s funds and liquidity, which led to the near 
collapse of some DMBs in 2009. In line with the literature from the regulatory authorities 
who blamed bank executives for engaging in related lending and granting of inadequately 
assessed loan facilities, this study echoes the assertions made by Ugwuanyi (2015) and 
Sanusi (2010).     
Although Ezeoha (2011) agreed that the bank executives engaged in imprudent lending 
following the availability of huge capital after the recapitalization exercise of the 2005 
banking reforms, the view that unsecured credits aided DMBs mitigate the level of non-
performing differs from the findings of this study.  However, it is likely that the view 
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expressed by Ezeoha (2011) accounts for the aggregate increase in the efficiency scores 
(Table 5.1) of DMBs during the global financial crisis.    
This study identified several regulatory improvements in reaction to the global financial 
crisis. With regards to banking supervision, Nigerian regulators adopted Risk-Based 
Supervision. Nigerian regulators adopted the principles of RBS as proposed by the Basel 
Committee on Supervision with the view of assessing the risk profile of banking institutions 
and giving priority to controlling the identified risks. RBS is a proactive form of regulation 
and the implication for its adoption is that regulators will pay ample attention to the issues 
that have the potential of derailing financial stability (Randle, 2009).  
In like manner, the law establishing an asset management agency to handle non-performing 
loans which was one of the elements of the 2005 banking reforms was finally enacted in 
2010. The establishment of an asset management agency was relegated to the background due 
to the attention accorded the consolidation and recapitalization exercise of the 2005 banking 
reforms. However, with the build-up of non-performing loans in the Nigerian banking sector 
following the global financial crisis, Nigerian regulators were forced to push forward the 
establishment of the asset management agency (AMCON).  
Additionally, reactions indicate that the credit bureau was revamped and Nigerian DMBs 
have started reaping the benefits of its usage. The responses show from bank executives 
denote that credit assessment process have been simplified because the profile of all Nigerian 
DMBs debtors can be obtained from the database of the credit bureau. To that end, highly 
indebted customers are denied loans facilities.      
Similarly, this study found that Nigerian DMBs initiated several changes to their credit risk 
management practices. The high rate of non-performing loans in the Nigerian banking sector 
necessitated this move. DMBs respondents uniformly suggested that loan approval processes 
were streamlined as branch managers are now exempted from granting all forms of loans. As 
such, regional bank managers are the first loan approval officers, while credit committees that 
involve executive and non-executive members are saddled with the task of reviewing and 
approving large loans.     
In summary, external and internal regulation of Nigerian DMBs was carried out in reaction to 
the episode of the global financial crisis and the imprudent activities of bank executives. 
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8.3. Financial Safety Nets 
 
This study was designed to determine the extent to which financial safety net strategies 
adopted by Nigerian regulators mitigated against the occurrence of bank failures. Apart from 
the merger and acquisition strategy employed to consolidate Nigerian DMBs during the 2005 
banking reforms, the bailout strategy and the bridge banking model are financial safety net 
strategies adopted to resolve troubled banking institutions within the period under review in 
this study.  
 
8.3.1 Bank Bailouts 
 
Findings from both the content analysis of interview responses and DEA window analysis 
indicated that no DMB failed in the Nigerian-banking sector after the 2005 banking reforms. 
However, Nigerian regulators relied on the bailout strategy to rescue eight DMBs in 2008. 
This study found that the bank bailout strategy was just a temporary fix as the efficiency 
levels of most of the rescued DMBs dwindled after two years of the capital injection. This 
leads to the conclusion that the bailout strategy did not solve the inherent problem that led to 
the erosion of shareholder funds and liquidity. To that end, bailout strategies are just 
temporary fixes and not permanent solutions to resolving distressed banks. More so, the 
bailout strategy did not dampen the risk-taking behaviour of the DMBs that received capital 
injections from Nigerian regulatory authorities.  
As mentioned in the literature review section of this study, various studies argue for and 
against the bailout of troubled banks (Gorton & Huang, 2004; Smith, 2011; Poczter, 2012). 
And although the main argument against bank bailouts is the creation of moral hazard (Dam 
& Koetter, 2012; Dell’Aricca & Ratnovski 2012), this study found that the bailout strategy 
adopted by Nigerian regulators was able to prevent the collapse of at least eight DMBs. The 
collapse of eight banks in the Nigerian banking sector could have adversely impacted the 
Nigerian economy because of the small number of banking institutions in the financial 
system. On that account, the advantage of the bailout strategy played out in the Nigerian 
banking sector as the distressed banks continued to operate with improved efficiency levels 
for at least one year after the capital injection.      
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In line with the above, this study confirms the submissions of De Caux et al. (2016) that 
bailouts prevent the collapse of troubled banks in the short-term but do not guarantee long-
term banking system efficiency and stability. Additionally, this study produced results which 
also corroborate the findings of Poczter (2012) that suggested the injection of capital saves 
banks from immediate collapse but creates long-term incentives to engage in further risk 
taking ventures.     
 
8.3.2 Bridge Banking Mechanism 
 
The results of this study also show that the bridge-banking mechanism was a better financial 
safety net strategy. The efficiency scores of the three bridge banks significantly improved 
after the model was adopted. To that end, the decision of Nigerian regulators to adopt the 
bridge-banking mechanism, which allows critical functions and viable operations of troubled 
banks to remain in effect until a permanent solution is found, and proved appropriate.  
The bridge-banking mechanism is one of the resolution techniques recommended by the 
Basel Committee. Contrary to legal and economic closure of troubled banking institutions 
that a bank’s licence is withdrawn and the legal entity ceases to exist or there is interruption 
or cessation of a bank’s operations, which may likely lead to severe disruptions and probably 
losses for the bank’s customers. The goal of resolution techniques is to ensure troubled or 
weak banks are resolved without severe systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers 
to loss (BCBC, 2015). On that account, the findings of this study show that Nigerian 
regulators were able to resolve three troubled banks without distorting confidence in the 
Nigerian banking sector, which could spur bank runs and panic.       
Furthermore, a bridge bank is designed to bridge the gap between the failure of a bank and 
time when the liquidator can gauge and offer the bank to a satisfactory third party (BCBC, 
2015). In line with the BCBC recommendation, the submissions obtained informed this study 
that the bridge banks were ready to be taken over by other healthy banks in the Nigerian 
banking sector. Hence, the bridge-banking mechanism was not only able to prevent the 
failure of the three DMBs, but it ensured they became attractive to potential acquirers.   
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8.4 Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the Performance of DMBs 
 
As mentioned in the literature review section of this study, the global financial crisis started 
in the second half of 2007 and affected several economies and financial institutions. To that 
end, this study set out to assess the extent to which the global financial crisis affected the 
performance of DMBs, in Nigeria. Submissions from the different analysis techniques used 
suggest that Nigerian DMBs were affected by the global financial crisis in different ways. 
The submissions of the interview responses and the efficiency scores of the DEA window 
analysis seem to vary to some extent. The interview responses clearly provide evidence that 
the Nigerian banking sector was adversely affected by the global financial crisis, while the 
average efficiency scores of DMBs showed improvements during the global financial crisis. 
However, a review of the individual performance of DMBs shows classes of DMBs that were 
adversely affected by the global financial crisis. Hence, the efficiency scores of Tier II banks 
that were eventually bailed out and those of foreign DMBs during the global financial crisis 
corroborate the interview responses obtained from bank regulators and bank managements 
that the Nigerian banking sector was adversely affected by the global financial crisis.      
Interview responses from both bank regulators and managements agreed that Nigerian DMBs 
were affected by the global financial crisis due to their relationship with foreign banks; 
trading with clients of foreign banks who had trading relationships with partners that were hit 
by the global financial crisis; trading with partners in countries that were affected by the 
crisis, and foreign investors that invested in the country. As a result, the global financial crisis 
led to reversal of capital inflows, decline in stock market capitalization, erosion of banks 
shareholder’s funds, and increase in the level of non-performing loans. Additionally, the 
submissions opine that DMBs were, therefore, unable to create new credits because of the 
adverse effect of the global financial crisis. This view is supported by the bailout strategy 
initiated by the Nigerian regulators to inject capital into eight DMBs in 2008.  
Nonetheless, as previously indicated, the DEA window analysis showed an increase in the 
average efficiency score of the entire banking sector during the period it went through the 
global financial crisis. This finding is consistent with that of Sahin et al. (2016) who found 
that the efficiency of Turkish banks improved during the global financial crisis. In particular, 
to studies that adopted DEA window analysis to ascertain the performance of Nigerian 
DMBs, the findings of this study differs from the submission of Tankoano (2013) who 
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reported a decrease in the efficiency scores of Nigerian DMBs during the global financial 
crisis. However, the number of input and output variables used and the small number of 
DMBs examined by Tankoano is likely responsible for the dissimilar results. More so, the 
findings of this study and that of Sahin et al. (2016) differ from the findings of Moradi-
Motlagh & Babacan (2015) which found that the global financial crisis adversely affected the 
efficiency levels of Australian banks. The empirical findings of Moradi-Motlagh & Babacan 
(2015) however support the qualitative analysis of submissions of this study, which opines 
that the global financial crisis adversely affected the Nigerian banking sector.     
To clarify the disconnect between the qualitative and quantitative findings of this study, the 
efficiency scores of the DEA window analysis indicated that various classes of banks were 
affected by the global financial crisis in different ways. The efficiency scores of Tier I DMBs 
account for the improvement in the average efficiency score of the Nigerian banking sector 
during the global financial crisis. While the study found that the efficiency scores of Tier II 
DMBs and foreign DMBs were less efficient than they were in periods before the global 
financial crisis. Sahin et al. (2016) also found that foreign-owned banks most especially 
improved during the global financial which is contrary to the findings of this study which 
showed that efficiency scores of foreign banks in Nigeria plunged a bit during the global 
financial crisis. In line with the findings of Sahin et al. (2016), Gulati & Kumar (2016) also 
suggested that foreign banks in India were not adversely affected by the global financial crisis 
due to notion that they adopted best-practices and they were the technology leaders of the 
Indian banking industry.     
To that end, this study contributes to literature in the sense that it empirically shows that 
financial crisis that occurs or originates in the country of foreign banks is likely to affect the 
foreign DMBs more than indigenous DMBs.       
 
8.5 Predicting Distress  
 
Pille & Paradi (2002) opined that the DEA was an adequate technique for detecting financial 
distress. To that end a variant of the DEA (i.e. DEA window analysis) was employed in this 
study to ascertain if the DEA could have predicted the financial distress in the Nigerian 
banking sector and  how far back it can be used to predict banking distress. The results 
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obtained indicate that the DEA window analysis was not able to predict banking distress in 
the Nigerian banking sector. DEA window analysis was however able to show the efficiency 
level of Nigerian DMBs. The results showed DMBs to be efficient in a particular year and 
inefficient in the next year. Therefore, this study has been unable to demonstrate that DEA 
window analysis can be used to predict financial distress in the Nigerian-banking sector. 
However, the findings of this study remain valid as detecting the efficiency of DMBs is the 
central reason for the use of DEA window analysis. While the use of the DEA window 
analysis for predicting banking distress is a secondary objective.    
On that account, the findings of this study is contrary to the previous studies of Avkiran & 
Lin (2012) who found that DEA could be used to identify distressed banks up to two years in 
advance. While the outcome of this study validates the suggestions of Kwon & Lee (2015) 
and Premachandra et al. (2011) that suggests DEA lacks predictive capacity and is relatively 
weak in predicting corporate failures. Also, the variant of the DEA model (window analysis) 
applied in the study is a poor banking distress prediction model in regards to the sample used. 
On that account, the predicative capacity of the DEA window analysis might be further 
ascertained by relying on a different set of input and output variables in future studies. 
 
8.6 Determinants of Bank Efficiency, Performance and Financial 
Stability 
 
8.6.1 Impact of Capital Adequacy  
 
This section dwells on the discussion of the impact of capital adequacy on bank efficiency 
and performance. This study found that capital adequacy is positive and statistically 
significant to efficiency in the entire sample period. This same positive and significant effect 
of capital adequacy was also diagnosed for the pre-2005 banking reforms period, 2005 
banking reforms & global financial crisis period, and 2009 banking reforms & post-global 
financial crisis period. This study produced results which corroborate the findings of Salim et 
al. (2016) and Sufian et al. (2016) who both reported that capital adequacy is positively 
reflected on bank efficiency. Therefore, the positive and significant relationship between 
capital adequacy and efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector provides support to the 
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argument that well-capitalised banks are less exposed to distress, as capital offers the 
necessary cushion to withstand shocks.   
However, although Capital adequacy also has a positive relationship with efficiency in the 
2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period (2005 – 2008), significance level 
plummeted to 10% in the period the period regulatory capital was increased from N2bn to 
N25bn. The DEA efficiency scores denote that the efficiency levels of Nigerian DMBs 
increased within this period. Therefore, it is possible that the episode of the global financial 
crisis stimulated the fall in the influence of capital adequacy on efficiency. Sanusi (2012) 
opined that the intention of the recapitalisation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms was to 
increase the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs. To that end, the regression results are consistent 
with the interview reactions that suggested the 2005 recapitalisation exercise led to an 
increase in the efficiency level of Nigerian DMBs before the global financial crisis. More so, 
the drop in the significant effect of capital adequacy on efficiency agrees with the interview 
submissions that the global financial crisis impacted on the capital levels of DMBs.    
Similarly, as reflected above, capital adequacy also had a positive and significant relationship 
with efficiency in the 2009 banking reforms & post-GFC period, though an improvement was 
noticed in the level of significance. The level of significance increased to 5% within this 
period. This improvement is likely due to the increase in capital levels for Nigerian DMBs 
with international operations from N25bn to N100bn. Moreover, it is possible that the 
increasing efficiency level of Nigerian DMBs is reflected in the slight positive movement in 
the influence of capital adequacy over efficiency.  A further explanation can also be derived 
from views expressed by the interview respondents which suggest improvements in DMB 
efficiency in the post-global financial crisis in reaction to the 2009 banking reforms.     
Regarding the impact of capital adequacy on bank performance, this study found insignificant 
relationships between capital adequacy and bank performance in all the periods examined. 
Even though the relationship was positive in the whole period, pre-2005 banking reforms 
period, and the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period and negative in the 
2009 reforms & post GFC (2009 – 2013), capital adequacy was not a determinant of bank 
performance. These submissions are contrary to the findings of Petria et al. (2015) and 
Naceur & Kandil (2009) who found positive and statistically significant impact of capital 
adequacy on bank performance. This result presents an interesting dilemma because the 
capital base of all Nigerian DMBs was increased from N2bn to N25bn in 2005 and from 
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N25bn to N100bn in 2009 for Nigerian DMBs with international operations. Moreover, the 
increase in capital did not prevent Nigerian DMBs from suffering from the adverse effect of 
the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, the interview submissions and obtained DEA 
windows efficiency scores suggest that Nigerian DMBs improved after the 2005 capital 
increase. Therefore, it can be argued that the adverse effect of the global financial crisis 
would have been worse in the Nigerian banking sector if it was not recapitalized in 2005.  
Similarly, capital was injected into eight DMBs in 2009 in line with the bailout strategy of 
Nigerian regulators.  In like manner, it is expected that this would influence bank 
performance, alongside the 2009 banking reforms but the regression results indicated 
otherwise. To that end, this study opines that though recapitalization might cushion the 
adverse effects of financial crisis and prevent the collapse of banking institutions, it is not 
guaranteed to influence bank performance. Hence, this study agrees with Lui (2013) who 
opined that better quality of capital is the key to enhanced shock absorption. 
 
8.6.2 Impact of Asset Quality  
 
Asset quality is the proxy for impaired loans to gross loans adopted in this study. Owing to 
opinions like those offered by Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) that suggest inefficiency mainly 
emerges from bad loans, this study examined the effect of asset quality (impaired loans) on 
efficiency. The whole sampled period, 2005 banking reforms & GFC period and 2009 
banking reforms & post GFC period show insignificant relationships between asset quality 
and efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector, thus suggesting that the level of impaired loans 
in the Nigerian banking sector within the period it went through the global financial crisis did 
not influence the efficiency level of Nigerian DMBs. These results contradict the interview 
responses and the views offered by regulatory agencies, which claimed that high levels of 
impaired loans contributed largely to the erosion of shareholder’s funds that led to the bailout 
of eight DMBs in 2009 and the downgrading of Wema Bank from a national bank to a 
regional bank in 2011. Nevertheless, it could conceivably be hypothesised that the small 
number of DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector, and the increase in the size and capital base 
of all DMBs watered down the influence of impaired loans on efficiency.      
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Therefore, the above results are not consistent with the findings of Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) 
and Sufian (2011) who both found impaired loans to have negative and significant influence 
over efficiency. Nonetheless, not all the periods examined indicated insignificant results, as 
the association between asset quality and efficiency in the pre-2005 banking reforms period is 
shown to be negative and significant. In view of the hypothesis offered in the previous 
paragraph, it is, therefore, likely that the large number of DMBs and their small size, in 
addition to the low capital base of Nigerian DMBs before the 2005 banking reforms made 
them vulnerable to the adverse effect of impaired loans and in general credit risk.    
Proceeding to discuss the effect of asset quality (impaired loans to gross loans) on bank 
performance, the reported findings suggest impaired loans has a negative and significant in 
the Nigerian banking sector in the whole and pre-2005 banking reforms period. The results of 
these periods are in accord with the studies of Ongore & Kusa (2013) and Petria et al. (2015) 
who also found asset quality to have a negative and statistically significant effect on bank 
performance. To that end, increases in the level of impaired loans in the Nigerian banking 
sector examined in the whole infers a plunge in the performance of Nigerian DMBs. 
Additionally, the above supports the reactions expressed by the interview respondents and 
regulatory assertions which held that the build-up of impaired loans in the Nigerian banking 
sector derailed bank performance.   
In reverse to the results reported for the whole period and the pre-2005 banking reforms 
period, the impact of asset quality on bank performance was found to be also negative but 
insignificant in the 2005 banking reforms & GFC period and 2009 banking reforms & post-
GFC period. Just as highlighted in the discussion of the effect of asset quality on efficiency 
during the period the Nigerian banking sector went through the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms, and the global financial crisis, asset quality also has an insignificant effect on bank 
performance in the same periods. Equally, these results also raise the possibility that the 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms that reduced the number of DMBs to 25 
with increased capital lessened the influence of impaired loans over banking performance.      
Furthermore, this study also sought to evaluate the impact of asset quality on financial 
stability.  The obtained results indicated a negative and insignificant relationship in the whole 
period and three sub-periods. The insignificant result is surprising given the build-up of 
impaired loans was highlighted as a major issue that degenerated to the bailout of eight 
DMBs in 2009. Moreover, these results are not consistent with the findings of Uhde & 
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Heimeshoff (2009) which reported an interesting positive impact of impaired loans on 
financial stability.  
 
8.6.3 Impact of Management Quality 
 
Clearly, efficient cost management is a prerequisite for improving the efficiency of any 
banking sector. This section centres on the discussion of the findings of the impact of 
management efficiency on bank efficiency, bank performance, and financial stability. 
Management efficiency is the adopted proxy for operating cost to income (cost to income 
ratio). The obtained negative and statistically significant impact on the quality of 
management on efficiency in the whole period, and the three sub-periods agrees with Sufian 
(2011) who also suggested cost has a negative and significant impact on efficiency. On the 
other hand, the outcome of this research is contrary to that of Das & Ghosh (2006) who found 
management quality to have consistently positive and significant impact on efficiency. On 
that account, this study is not in consonance with the ‘bad management hypotheses’ of Berger 
& DeYoung (1997). Therefore, the results observed indicate good senior management 
practices, which influence input usage, day-to-day operations, management of loan portfolios, 
and the efficient monitoring and control of operating expenses. More so, the results are an 
indication that Nigerian DMBs have more to gain if they improve their managerial practices.  
The proceeding view is further supported by the interview submissions that opine that the 
imprudent lending behaviour of bank executives led to the erosion of shareholders’ funds 
after the 2005 banking reforms, which forced regulators to bailout eight DMBs in 2009.  
In respect to the impact of management quality on bank performance, the obtained results for 
the whole period of 2000 – 2013 and the three sub-periods indicate negative and highly 
significant relationships. The findings of this study are in line with Petria et al. (2015) and 
Rashid & Jabeen (2016) who diagnosed a negative and significant impact of management 
quality on bank performance. To that end, the results of this study suggest that bank 
performance increases in the Nigerian banking sector when cost are appropriately managed 
and decreases when cost spiral out of hand. In like manner, the interview responses also 
suggest that bank regulators replaced DMB executives who were unable to manage cost and 
improve the performance of their institutions. Thus, those who were efficient in the 
management of resources kept their jobs. Nonetheless, not all studies are in agreement with 
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the findings of this study. For instance, Heffernan & Fu (2010) and Bilal et al. (2013) 
observed positive relationships between management quality and performance.   
Turning next to the effect of management quality on financial stability, the diagnosed results 
indicate a negative and significant relationship for all the periods examined. Hence, this study 
produced results that corroborate the findings of Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) who ascertained 
management quality has a negative and significant effect on financial stability. In like 
manner, Bourkis & Nabi (2013) also found management quality to be negatively related to 
financial stability but insignificant for the whole period, pre-crisis (1993 – 2006), crisis 
period (2007 – 2008), and post-crisis period (2009).  
Finally, the quality of management in the Nigerian banking sector was faulted by interview 
responses in this study. Therefore, corroborating the regression results, which suggest that 
when cost are managed properly, efficiency, performance, and financial stability increases. 
On that account, DMBs who were not cost effective and engaged in the granting of 
inadequately assessed and reviewed loan facilities had eroded shareholder’s funds, which led 
to the sacking of the management teams of six DMBs. Additionally, regulatory reports and 
interview reactions, indicated that eight inefficiently managed DMBs were bailed out in 
2009. On the other hand, DMBs that were efficiently managed had the opportunity to 
increase their capital to N100bn to operate outside the shores of Nigeria. As a result, the 
findings of the regression results obtained are in agreement with the interview and regulatory 
reports submissions.   
 
8.6.4 Impact of Earnings 
 
In view of the effect of earnings on efficiency, the results obtained shows that the earnings of 
Nigerian DMBs do not determine their efficiency in all the x-rayed periods. Therefore, 
earnings did not determine efficiency even when Nigerian DMBs were empowered during the 
2005 and 2009 banking reforms. As such, earnings did not influence efficiency when 
Nigerian DMBs went through the global financial crisis. As a result, the findings of this study 
are not consistent with those of Sufian (2011) who found a positive and significant 
relationship between earnings and efficiency. More so, interview submissions provide 
possible explanations to the insignificant effect of NIM (earnings) on efficiency. The high 
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rate of non-performing loans and the investment of earnings in risky ventures are possible 
explanations.        
Furthermore, in view of the findings of the impact of earning on the performance of Nigerian 
DMBs, this study found a positive and significant relationship in the whole period and pre-
2005 banking reforms period. These results reflect those of Daly & Zhang (2014) and 
Khrawish (2011) who also found earnings (NIM) to be significant and positively related to 
bank performance (ROA). As a result, the performance of Nigerian DMBs increases as net 
interest margin increases. This result might be explained by the interview responses that 
highlighted that Nigerian DMBs in general charge high-interest rates on loans. The results of 
the whole period are in line with the interview submissions, which suggest Nigerian DMBs, 
engaged in the haphazard granting of loans after the 2005 banking reforms due to the 
availability of liquidity. On that account, performance increases when loans are repaid with 
interest in line with contractual agreements.      
Conversely, the association between earnings and bank performance was found to be also 
positive but insignificant in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period and 
2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period.  Put differently, the net interest 
margin of Nigerian DMBs had no effect in the determination of bank performance after the 
2005 banking reforms. A possible explanation for this might be that reduced number of 
banking institutions and the increased capital base of DMBs rendered NIM inconsequential in 
the determination of bank performance.     
With respect to the effect of earnings on financial stability, a positive and significant 
relationship was uncovered in the four examined periods. These results are consistent with 
the findings of Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009), who found positive and significant associations 
between NIM and Z-Score. In line with submissions, these results may be explained by 
interview responses that opined that Nigerian DMBs charge high-interest rates. It can also be 
hypothesised that earnings from the high-interest rates watered down the adverse effect of the 
global financial crisis when some debtors were unable to make repayments.     
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8.6.5 Impact of Liquidity 
 
This section focuses on the impact of liquidity on bank efficiency, performance and financial 
stability. Starting with the impact of liquidity on bank efficiency, a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between liquidity and efficiency is diagnosed for the whole period 
(2000 – 2013) and the pre-2005 banking reforms period (2000 – 2004). These results are in 
line with the findings of Salim et al. (2016) who diagnosed liquidity to be negatively 
associated with efficiency. Just like in this study, Salim et al (2016) expected a positive 
association between liquidity and efficiency. The explanation to these results is that banking 
institutions engaged in activities that derailed efficiency anytime there was an increase in 
liquidity. In relation to reactions obtained from interview responses, bank executives engaged 
in the granting of haphazard loans facilities when liquidity levels increased. In contrary, 
Assaf et al. (2011) were able to find a positive and significant relationship between liquidity 
and efficiency.  
However, not all the periods examined suggest liquidity significantly impact efficiency. Thus, 
the effect of efficiency on liquidity during the period the Nigerian-banking sector went 
through the 2005 banking reforms, 2009 banking reforms, and the global financial crisis was 
insignificant and negative. On that account, liquidity most likely ceased being a determinant 
of efficiency when all DMBs had excess liquidity at their disposal. The above explanation is 
consistent with the reactions offered by interview respondents that liquidity greatly increased 
in the Nigerian banking sector after the 2005 banking reforms. Having liquidity was therefore 
not unique as all DMBs had excess liquidity at their disposal. Hence, the reason liquidity 
ceased to determine efficiency within the period of 2005 – 2013. The downside of excess 
liquidity as suggested by interview respondents is that DMBs engaged in the granting of 
poorly assessed loans.       
In relation to the effect of liquidity on bank performance, this study found that liquidity has a 
positive and significant effect on the performance of Nigerian DMBs in the whole period, 
pre-2005 banking reforms period, and the 2009 banking & post-global financial crisis period. 
However, the relationship between liquidity and performance was significant at 5% in the 
pre-2005 banking reforms and 10% significant in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global 
financial crisis period. These results are consistent with the findings of Ghosh (2015) and 
Flamini et al. (2009) who found liquid assets to be significant and positively related to bank 
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performance. These results, in essence, could imply that high liquidity levels may serve as a 
cushion for higher risks, which could translate to higher returns. Additionally, the regression 
results are consistent with the interview responses. The interview responses imply that the 
2005 banking reforms period is the only period all Nigerian DMBs had similar levels of 
liquidity. To that end, disparity in liquidity levels existed in the pre-2005 banking reforms 
period and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis. Considering the disparity in 
liquidity levels of these periods, the regression results imply that an increase in the level of 
liquidity translate to an increase in performance.      
In contrast, the findings of this study differ from the studies of Heffernan & Fu (2010) and 
Al-Jafari & Alchami (2014) who found liquidity to be negatively and slightly significantly 
related to bank performance. Hence, this study does not support the explanation attributed to 
the negative effect of liquidity, which opines that high levels of liquid assets would suggest 
lower lendable resources could dampen profitability.   
Equally, the impact of liquidity on bank performance is found to be positive but insignificant 
in the 2005 banking reforms and the global financial crisis period. The findings of a few 
studies also show insignificant relationships between liquidity and performance. For instance, 
Almumani (2013) and Ayaydin & Karakaya (2014) found liquidity to have an insignificant 
effect on bank performance. Therefore, the period liquidity was not a determinant of 
performance in the Nigerian banking sector, could be attributed to the general increase in 
liquidity assets in all DMBs due to the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms. 
Put differently, the general increase in liquidity assets meant no DMB could refer to its high 
liquidity profile as a unique advantage.   
Regarding the effect of liquidity on stability, positive and insignificant relationships were 
uncovered in the whole period, 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period, and 
2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. In view of related findings, 
Chiaramonte et al. (2015) also found that liquidity had a positive and insignificant effect on 
financial stability in whole period and when the European banking system was going through 
the global financial crisis. In contrast, to the findings of this study, Marques et al. (2013) 
found a negative and significant relationship between liquidity and financial stability.  
Conversely, the effect of liquidity on stability was found to be also positive but significant in 
the pre-2005 banking reforms period. This result may be explained by the fact that there were 
more DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector within this period and liquidity levels differed in 
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small and large DMBs. Hence, a possible explanation for this might be that DMBs with high 
levels of liquid assets were more likely to be stable with liquidity serving as a cushion.   
 
8.6.6 Effects of Sensitivity to Risk 
 
This section discusses the effects of the risk sensitivity of DMBs to efficiency, performance, 
and financial stability. As far as I know, efficiency and CAMELS studies make use of size to 
represent ‘S’. To that end, there are no DEA-related studies to compare the findings of this 
study. Hence, the obtained results of the effects of sensitivity to risk to efficiency are restated 
with possible explanations in line with the DEA window efficiency scores presented in 
chapter 5.    
This study shows that sensitivity to risk had a statistically significant and negative effect on 
efficiency in the whole study period and the pre-2005 banking reforms period. There were 
more DMBs in the Nigerian banking sector, which were relatively small. The large number of 
small-sized DMBs within this period, therefore, meant that they could easily fail. To that end, 
the Nigerian banking sector is stable when the vulnerability to risk reduces. More so, the 
negative and significant effect obtained in the whole period suggests in general that the 
Nigerian banking sector is more stable when it is less vulnerable to risk. This position is 
consistent with the study of Christopoulos et al. (2011) who opined that the Lehman Brothers 
bank had total securities to total assets ratio (close to 50%) before it failed.   
On the other hand, the effect of sensitivity to risk on efficiency is also negative but 
insignificant in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period and 2009 banking 
reforms & post global financial crisis period. In line with the previous submission throughout 
this chapter, the increase in capital base of all Nigerian DMBs and the reduction in the 
number of DMBs operating in the Nigerian-banking sector rendered their vulnerability to 
market risk insignificant to determine efficiency.  
In view of the effect of sensitivity to risk on bank performance in the Nigerian banking 
sector, the results obtained indicate a positive and insignificant association in the whole 
period and pre-2005 banking reforms period. The effect of sensitivity to market risk on bank 
performance is also insignificant but negative in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis period.   
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This study, however, found that the effect of sensitivity to market risk on bank performance 
for the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period is positive and significant. 
The effect of sensitivity to market on bank performance is, however, consistent with the 
findings of Mayes & Stremmel (2012) who reported a positive and significant relationship.  
This result was not expected, but the likely explanation is that DMBs who engaged in more 
risky ventures experienced improved their performances as the world recovered from the 
adverse effect of the global financial crisis.   
Equally, the proxy adopted for sensitivity to risk by Chiaramonte et al. (2015), and Stiroh 
(2004) is non-interest income to net operating revenue. On that account, it is impossible to 
compare findings. To that end, the results obtained in this section can only be corroborated by 
the interview reactions from Nigerian DMBs and regulators.  The findings of this study 
indicate that sensitivity to market risk has a positive and insignificant effect on stability in the 
whole period and 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. Equally, 
although also insignificant, the relationship between sensitivity to market risk and financial 
stability is negative in the pre-2005 banking reforms period. Simply put, the sensitivity of 
Nigerian DMBs to risk was not a determinant of financial stability within the entire sampled 
period, the pre-2005 banking period, and when the 2009 banking reforms was initiated. 
Therefore, sensitivity to risk was not a determinant of stability in the period the Nigerian 
banking sector was recovering from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis.   
Conversely, sensitivity to risk was diagnosed to have a positive and significant effect on 
financial stability in the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period. In like 
manner, this submission is not consistent with the findings of Christopoulos et al. (2011) who 
opined that high ratio of total securities to total assets makes banking institutions vulnerable 
like in the case of Lehman Brothers.  
 
8.6.7 Impact of Bank Size 
 
The size of Nigerian DMBs increased significantly in reaction to the recapitalisation and 
consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms. In like manner, the interview responses 
suggest that the banking model introduced by the 2009 banking reforms further led to the 
increase in the size of some banks. Therefore, the impact of size on efficiency, performance, 
302 
 
and financial stability is worth examining. However, literature provides ambiguous impact of 
size on efficiency, performance, and financial stability.   
Regarding this study, bank size is found to have a positive and highly significant effect on 
efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector for the whole period, pre-2005 banking reforms 
period, and the 2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period. The results above are 
consistent with the findings of Sufian (2011) and Berger Humphery (1997). In unison, these 
studies opine that the positive effect of size on efficiency indicates the presence of economies 
of scale. Hence suggesting larger DMBs took advantage of the scale economies through 
shared costs. Sanusi (2012) opined that the intention of the 2005 banking reforms was to 
promote efficiency and strengthen DMBs for growth. To that end, obtained interview 
responses opine that the size of banking institutions increased and the efficiency of DMBs 
also increased in reaction to the 2005 banking reforms. Therefore, the interview responses 
and the results of the DEA window analysis are in agreement with the regression results 
above.      
On the other hand, the effect of bank size on efficiency was also diagnosed to be positive but 
insignificant in the 2009 banking reforms & post-global financial crisis period. Therefore, the 
explanation that the global financial crisis perhaps dampened the effect of size on efficiency 
as size ceased to determine efficiency in 2009 is possible.  
In view of the effect of size on the performance of DMBs in Nigeria, this study found that 
size had a negative and significant effect on bank performance in the whole period and in the 
pre-2005 banking reforms period. The works of Lee & Hsieh, (2013), Macit (2012) and 
Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007) that showed size to have negative and significant effects on 
performance support the above findings. These studies opine that size may negatively affect 
performance when diversification increases costs and some unprofitable branches continue to 
survive off profitable ones.    
Furthermore, even though the relationship between size and bank performance in the 2005 
banking reforms & GFC period and 2009 banking reforms & post-GFC period was also 
negative, this study also found that there was no statistically significant correlation. 
Heffernan & Fu (2008) and Tan & Floros (2013) also reported insignificant relationships 
between size and performance.    
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Contrary to the findings of this study, Ben Naceur & Goaied (2008), Menicucci & Paolucci 
(2016), Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009), and Petria et al. (2015) established positive and 
significant relationships between size and bank performance. The explanation for the positive 
relationship between size and performance is associated with economies of scale and holds 
that banking institutions with vast amounts of assets normally control a larger portion of the 
banking market, thus improving profits through the allocation of fixed costs over a wider 
range of services (Menicucci & Paolucci, 2016; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al, 2009). This 
should put such privileged banking institutions in positions to negotiate lesser prices for 
inputs and acquire less expensive capital. More so, larger banks are more likely to benefit 
from higher product and loan diversification opportunities than smaller banks.            
Turning to the impact of bank size on financial stability, this study found bank size to have a 
positive and 5% significant effect on stability in the whole period. The positive coefficient 
diagnosed is consistent with the pre-crisis findings of keffala (2015). The explanation for 
these results also rest on the economies of scale advantage attributed to larger banks.  
Interestingly, all the three sub-periods examined in this study indicate a statistically 
significant and negative association between size and financial stability, although the 
significance level of each period differed. The pre-2005 banking reforms period and 2005 
banking reforms & global financial crisis period showed 1% significant levels, while that of 
the 2009 banking reforms & post-GFC period stood at 10%. These results are consistent with 
Fu et al. (2014) Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara (2011) and Carretta et al. (2015) who all 
found negative associations between bank size and financial stability. Possible explanations 
for the negative effect of size on financial stability include (1) large banks are more difficult 
to monitor (2) as bank size increases, transparency may decrease as a result of expansion 
across several geographic markets and business lines and the use of sophisticated  financial 
instruments like derivatives facilitate the establishment of complex corporate organizations. 
These improvements have the potential of reducing managerial efficiency, while internal 
control may increase operational risk, which could derail financial stability. More so, 
increasing banking institution complexity can render both market discipline and regulatory 
action ineffective (for instance, the adoption of bridge banking due to the failure of the 
bailout strategy) in preventing excessive risk exposure.      
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8.6.8 Impact of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth 
 
GDP captures upswings and downswings that manifest in business cycles. Therefore, GDP 
growth is expected to influence the efficiency, performance and stability of banking 
institutions. On that account, the effect of GDP on the efficiency of Nigerian DMBs was x-
rayed in this study.  
The results show that GDP has a positive and insignificant effect on efficiency for the whole 
period, pre-2005 banking reforms period, and the 2005 banking reforms & global financial 
crisis. While the effect of GDP on efficiency in the 2009 banking reforms & post global 
financial crisis period was also found to be insignificant but negative. On that premise, GDP 
had no influence over the determination of efficiency in the Nigerian banking sector. 
Contrary to the findings of this study, Alam (2012) found a positive relationship between 
GDP and efficiency. Increasing loan demands and decreasing loan default rates during 
periods of economic growth usually explain the positive coefficient of GDP on efficiency.  
Additionally, this study assessed the impact of GDP on bank performance. The findings 
arrived at showed the effect of GDP on bank performance to be negative and significant in 
the whole period. The findings of Rashid & Jabeen (2016) and Safarli & Gumush (2012) are 
in favour of this study as they also found that GDP has a negative and significant relationship 
with bank performance. It is perceived that inadequate investment and limited production in 
any economy is mainly responsible for the negative effect of GDP on performance. A 
possible explanation for the negative effect of GDP on bank performance is that during 
periods of good macroeconomic conditions, businesses and corporate organisations may 
generate enough internal funds that they rely less on bank borrowing. On account of this, 
banking institutions would be unable to lend at favourable terms and conditions, which may 
negatively affect bank performance. Conversely, other studies that are inconsistent with the 
position that GDP has a negative and significant effect on bank performance include Bilal et 
al. (2013) Petria et al. (2015), and Heffernan & Fu (2008) who all found positive and 
statistically significant associations between GDP and performance.   
On the other hand, the relationship between GDP and bank performance is found to be 
insignificant in all the three sub-periods. Although GDP has a negative effect on performance 
in the pre-2005 banking reforms period and 2009 banking reforms & post global financial 
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crisis period, while the effect of GDP on bank performance was found to be positive in the 
2005 banking reforms & global financial crisis period.  
This study also sought to find out the effects of GDP on financial stability. The results 
obtained indicate that GDP has a positive and statistically significant effect on stability in the 
whole period, the pre-2005 banking reforms period, and the 2009 banking reforms & post-
global financial crisis period. These findings are consistent with that of Demirguc-Kunt & 
Huizinga (1999) who also found positive and significant relationships between GDP and 
financial stability. Another explanation for this is that demand for loans tends to be higher 
during expansionary periods, thus allowing banks to charge higher interests that are easily 
repaid by businesses and corporate organisations, and thus promotes financial stability. 
Simply put, positive relationships indicate that good economic conditions are key to financial 
stability. 
Variance in the effect of GDP on stability is noticed in the 2005 banking reforms & post-
global financial crisis period, as the results indicate a negative and insignificant effect of 
GDP on financial stability. In like manner, Bourkis & Nabi (2013) and Uhde & Heimeshoff 
(2009) indicate negative and insignificant relationships between GDP growth and financial 
stability. 
 
8.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The findings of this section show the value of relying on more than one method of assessing a 
phenomenon. The multifaceted approach employed provided robust conclusions that can be 
validated and relied upon. To that end, this study suggests that recapitalization or high levels 
of capital adequacy enhance efficiency, performance and financial stability. However, 
imprudent lending and high levels of impaired loans are capable of derailing the laudable 
regulatory initiatives. More so, quality of management determines the extent to which 
banking inputs are utilised as efficient management is diagnosed to be vital.  On that account, 
high earnings accruing to banking institutions does not guarantee improved efficiency that 
will generate into financial stability. Though high liquidity levels serve as a cushion and 
promote financial stability, it affects efficiency adversely in instances when inadequately 
reviewed loans lead to a build-up of non-performing loans. Moreover, the efficiency of 
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DMBs is vulnerable to market risk, while performance is not always determined by the 
vulnerability of DMBs to risk, performance levels also improve in some instances. It can, 
therefore be assumed effective management of risk positions can translate into improved 
returns. More so, even though financial stability is vulnerable to risk, high capital and 
liquidity levels have the potential of ensuring stability.  The general impact of size on 
banking institutions continues to be ambiguous. DMBs respond positively to size, while size 
has an inverse impact on bank performance and financial stability. Additionally, the 
economic condition of the Nigerian economy does not influence the efficiency of DMBs, 
while Nigerian DMBs tend to engage in activities that impact negatively on their 
performance. Nevertheless, DMBs are more stable during periods of economic bliss.           
Given the reactions expressed throughout in this chapter, this study is of the opinion that 
though banking reforms were able to improve the general performance of Nigerian DMBs, it 
was not enough to prevent the erosion of shareholders’ funds during the global financial 
crisis. In like manner, the bailout strategy prevented the collapse of some DMBs but was not 
successful in dampening the risk-taking behaviour of the bank managements. On that 
account, regulators adopted the bridge-banking mechanism that proved to be a better 
resolution technique as the troubled DMBs were nursed back to health and two out of three 
have been acquired. To that end, it can be concluded that the Nigerian banking sector is better 
off because of the reforms and initiatives adopted by Nigerian regulators.     
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This closing chapter ends the study by providing an overall conclusion as to the results of the 
study. The chapter is broken down into sections that summarise the overall findings, the 
contribution of the study to theory and practice, the limitations of the study, areas for future 
research and policy recommendations to improve banking regulation and supervision.   
 
9.2 Summary of Findings  
 
A sound and stable banking sector is one of the basics of sustainable economic growth and 
development. In this regard and in a bid to ascertain how Nigerian banking reforms have 
influenced the performance of DMBs, this study qualitatively and quantitatively analysed the 
efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian DMBs over the period 2000 – 2013. 
Therefore, a summary of findings obtained from the three adopted analysis techniques that 
address the research questions are presented.  
The findings of this study indicate that both the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms improved the 
Nigerian banking sector. Starting with the 2005 banking reforms, the recapitalization and 
consolidation exercise produced bigger DMBs with increased branch network and improved 
technology usage. The reactions obtained highlighted that there was increased liquidity in the 
Nigerian banking sector following the 2005 banking reforms, which translated to increased 
loan creation. Additionally, as depicted in Table 5.1, the aggregate efficiency of Nigerian 
DMBs improved after the 2005 banking reforms. Therefore, leading to the assertion that the 
2005 banking reforms were a success because it was a proactive approach by Nigerian 
regulators to make Nigerian DMBs highly capitalised in order withstand economic shocks.  
In spite of the success ascribed to the 2005 banking reforms, this study found that it was 
unable to shield some DMBs from the adverse effect of the global financial crisis. It was also 
diagnosed that credit risk and liquidity risk management were not stressed in the 2005 
reforms as the activities of bank executives translated into high levels of non-performing 
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loans and eroded shareholders’ funds. Hence, the inability of the 2005 banking reforms to 
mitigate against credit and liquidity risk and the episode of the global financial crisis led 
Nigerian regulators to embark on the 2009 banking reforms. Nonetheless, the level of capital 
erosion in the Nigerian banking sector because of the global financial crisis would probably 
have been worse if Nigerian DMBs were not consolidated and regulatory capital increased 
from N2bn to N25bn.  
On that account, this study is of the view that the 2009 banking reforms is a reactionary 
approach to banking regulation. However, regulators were able to steady the Nigerian 
banking sector through the initiatives of the 2009 banking reforms. With increased regulatory 
capital large enough to withstand shocks, no DMBs failed after the 2005 banking reforms. To 
that end, the 2009 banking reforms further ensured no banking institution failed in the 
Nigerian banking sector. The downgrading of Wema Bank from a national bank to a regional 
development bank in line with the banking model put forward by the 2009 banking reforms 
was a way of preventing a bank failure. The 2009 banking reforms also revised the 
supervision strategy. Particularly, risk-based supervision was adopted as the preferred 
approach for monitoring and assessing risk in DMBs with the view of curbing the build-up of 
risk.  
Furthermore, the results of this study indicate improvements in the aggregate efficiency of 
Nigerian DMBs in the post-global financial crisis period. The upward trend of efficiency 
depicted in Table 5.1 and the increased number of DMBs on the efficiency frontier in the 
post-global financial crisis period shows that the Nigerian banking sector was on the path of 
recovery engineered by the 2009 banking reforms.  
This study also sought to ascertain the extent to which financial safety nets were able to 
mitigate the occurrence of bank failures and financial crisis in Nigeria. Apart from the 
consolidation exercise and the host of mergers and acquisitions that followed in the Nigerian 
banking sector. Nigerian regulators bailed out eight DMBs in 2009 and adopted the bridge-
banking mechanism to resolve three troubled DMBs. The bailout strategy adopted by 
Nigerian regulators prevented the failure of eight DMBs. On that account, this study opines 
that the bailout strategy did not only prevent the collapse of eight DMBs but upheld 
confidence in the Nigerian banking sector and the ability of Nigerian regulators. 
Nevertheless, in line with the consensus that bailouts create moral hazard, this study found 
that the bank executives of the bailed-out DMBs continued to engage in imprudent activities. 
309 
 
The inability of the bailout strategy to improve the condition of the bailed out DMBs is 
confirmed by their low-efficiency scores in subsequent years (post bailout). 
The adopted bridge banking mechanism was a more effective resolution technique. The study 
found that asides preventing the collapse of the three distressed DMBs, the bridge banking 
mechanism ensured they were nurtured back to health and made attractive for acquisition. On 
that account, two of the three bridge banks have been acquired, while negotiations are 
ongoing for the takeover of the last one. As such, the bridge banking mechanism has been 
successfully implemented in the Nigerian banking sector.  
The Nigerian banking sector was affected by the episode of the global financial crisis in 
several ways. Qualitatively, reversal of capital inflows, erosion of shareholders’ funds, 
inability to create new credit, and increase in the level of non-performing loans was 
highlighted as the avenue by which DMBs and the Nigerian banking sector were affected by 
the global financial crisis. Statistically, the DEA window efficiency scores of DMBs 
aggregately plummeted in the post-global financial crisis. However, downward movements in 
the efficiency scores of foreign DMBs and the eight DMBs that were bailed-out in 2009 was 
noticed during the global financial crisis. Therefore, the Nigerian banking sector was 
adversely affected by the episode of the global financial crisis.                              
Additionally, this study found that the primary business of DMBs determined the extent to 
which they were affected by the global financial crisis. DMBs that concentrated on retail 
banking were affected less than DMBs with huge exposures to corporate organisations that 
operated in the oil and gas sector. 
More so, this study has shown that regulatory responses and internal control practices have 
been overhauled in reaction to the global financial crisis. The 2009 banking reforms, the 
improvement to the code of corporate governance for banks and other financial institutions, 
adoption of risk-based supervision, rejuvenation of the credit bureau, and the establishment of 
AMCON have been identified as regulatory responses to the global financial crisis. In like 
manner, credit risk management practices of Nigerian DMBs were fortified in reaction to 
losses that accrued due to imprudent practices that led to the erosion of shareholders’ funds 
and liquidity levels. The loan approval processes of DMBs have been streamlined. For 
instance, branch managers use to approve overdrafts before the global financial crisis; 
however only regional heads have the power to approve such now. Equally, executive and 
310 
 
non-executive board members are also members of the credit review committee of DMBs, 
thus enhancing the private monitoring of DMBs.   
This study has indicated the inadequacy of the DEA window analysis to predict banking 
distress. DEA window efficiency scores were able to show the efficiency level of banking 
institutions but were unable to predict future performance. Although some reviewed studies 
used DEA to predict financial distress, this study was unable to confirm such claims. To that 
end, this study is of the opinion that DEA and DEA window analysis is better suited for the 
evaluation of banking efficiency and performance.  
The panel data regression analysis revealed that recapitalization or high levels of capital 
adequacy enhance efficiency, performance and financial stability. However, high levels of 
impaired loans are capable of derailing regulatory initiatives. Moreover, earnings accruing to 
banking institutions do not guarantee improved efficiency that will generate into financial 
stability. Liquidity serves as a cushion for the absorption of losses and promotes financial 
stability; it impacts efficiency adversely in instances when inadequately reviewed loans lead 
to a build-up of non-performing loans. Likewise, the efficiency of DMBs is vulnerable to 
market risk, while performance is not always determined by the vulnerability of DMBs to 
market risk. Effective management of risk positions was diagnosed to translate into improved 
returns. More so, financial stability was identified to be vulnerable to market risk, while high 
capital and liquidity levels have the potential of ensuring stability.  The impact of size on 
banking institutions continues to be ambiguous. DMBs respond positively to size, while size 
has an inverse impact bank performance and financial stability. Economic conditions were 
found to have no impact on the efficiency of DMBs. Nevertheless, DMBs are more stable 
during periods of economic harmony.   
The findings outlined above lead to the contributions this study has made to theory and 
practice.  
 
9.3 Contributions of the Study 
 
The main contributions of this study to literature and practice are as follows:  
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 This study appears to be the first attempt to thoroughly examine any banking sector 
using DEA window analysis, panel data regression, and content analysis of interview 
responses from both bank executives and regulators. The multifaceted approach for 
the examination of bank efficiency, performance, and financial stability provide 
robust conclusions that explained, confirmed and complemented the research 
findings. Therefore, the methods used can be applied to banking studies elsewhere in 
the world.  
 In particular to the Nigerian banking sector, this study provided deeper insight into the 
activities of Nigerian regulators given the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the 
episode of the global financial crisis. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the 
first comprehensive assessment of the Nigerian banking sector to rely on three 
exclusive analysis techniques within the period of 2000 – 2013.      
 This study contributes to the growing body of literature on the global financial crisis. 
Following the episode of the global financial crisis that started in the second half of 
2007, various studies have been carried out to order to ascertain the extent to which 
financial systems have been affected with a view of preventing future occurrences. In 
that regard, this study evaluated the impact of the crisis on the Nigerian-banking 
sector and ascertained that Nigerian DMBs were adversely affected. The findings of 
the study showed that the global financial crisis affected countries in different ways. 
For instance, the global financial crisis started in the U.S through mortgaged backed 
securities, while it took root in Nigeria in the form of reversal of capital inflows and 
the build-up of non-performing loans. To that end, this study presents a dimension 
that has not been exploited.   
 This study provided deeper insight into the workings of DMBs that are not 
highlighted in financial statements. The study identified risky behaviours carried out 
by DMBs that flout KYC guidelines. In a bid to increase financial inclusion and 
increase profits, DMBs engage in marketing promotions that allow individuals with 
little or no proper identification to open accounts. These activities are not captured by 
financial statements and reports. Therefore, underlining the importance of qualitative 
investigations.            
 Choosing appropriate financial safety nets that do not encourage moral hazard has 
been a major issue. On that account, this study contributes to the literature on banking 
resolution in view that the Nigerian banking sector is amongst the few to have 
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adopted the bridge banking model after the global financial crisis to nurse distressed 
DMBs to health. The successful adoption of the bridge banking model in the Nigerian 
banking sector serves as a reference for regulators contending with troubled banks.  
 In like manner, the study also adds to the debate on bailout strategies and moral 
hazard. The findings of this study confirm the view that bailouts encourage risk taking 
and do not deter bank executives from abandoning behaviours that plunge banks into 
distress.       
 This study contributes to DEA studies in emerging economies. The DEA window 
analysis technique adopted in this study is a variant of the DEA frontier analysis, 
which as indicated in literature, has only been employed in a limited amount of 
studies in Nigeria and other African studies. On that account, its adoption adds to the 
growing body of DEA studies centred on the banking sector of emerging economies.  
 Additionally, this study further confirms the suitability of the DEA window approach 
for the evaluation of bank efficiency and performance. For instance, the performance 
of troubled DMBs corroborated the stress test submission of Nigerian regulators that 
led to the bailout of eight DMBs in 2008.   
 This study adds to the debate on financial distress prediction. Following the host of 
bankruptcies and corporate failures that plagued the banking sector of world 
economies and the desire to come up with models for predicting financial distress, 
various studies have evaluated different models. On that account, this study assessed 
the viability of employing the DEA window analysis model to predict financial 
distress and found it to be a weak predictive model.    
This study has gone some way towards enhancing the understanding of recent happenings in 
the Nigerian-banking sector as it relied on interview responses that is scarcely used in 
assessing performance and stability of financial institutions. Consequently, the findings of 
this study are robust as information not highlighted in financial statements and regulatory 
documents are examined alongside financial data. 
 
9.4 Directions for Further Studies  
 
The empirical and theoretical issues that may be investigated for further dialogue and 
examination are stipulated as follows:  
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 It was ascertained during the study that literature on bridge banking adoption is 
limited. In that regard, the Nigerian case could serve as a reference. Therefore, the 
step-by-step process followed by Nigerian regulators and the appointed executive 
teams of the three bridge banks should be examined.    
 The effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) reversals on the performance of DMBs 
should be investigated. The responses obtained in this study indicated that there were 
capital reversals in Nigerian DMBs due to the global financial crisis. As a result, 
studies should be directed at findings ways of preventing capital flight during periods 
of financial crisis.   
 Reactions obtained suggest that the NDIC deposit insurance pay-out in the event of a 
bank failure is inadequate. Therefore, appropriate frameworks for ascertaining deposit 
insurance adequacy should be investigated. 
 Regarding methodological extensions, comparisons could be undertaken with other 
frontier analysis techniques, such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The SFA 
might identify a different set of efficient DMUs, which may or may not be consistent 
with the DEA window analysis results from this study. Therefore, a SFA study would 
confirm whether analytical methods other than DEA window analysis would offer 
additional value to the available information on the efficiency results that this study 
provides.  
 More so, the inputs and outputs variables used in this study can be substituted with 
other variables like investments, personnel expenses, price of labour, price of capital. 
In the same vein, this study adopted the intermediation approach for variable 
selection, so the use of the production approach, or the value-added approach are also 
worth considering to ascertain if they will produce similar or more accurate results.        
 Annual financial information was utilised to examine the efficiency of Nigerian 
DMBs, however quarterly data could be used to ascertain if the DEA window analysis 
can be relied upon to predict banking distress.  
 In like manner, the CAMELS bank-specific proxies can be substituted with related 
proxies to find out if the determinants of efficiency, performance, and financial 
stability will remain the same.   
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9.5 Policy Recommendations 
 
Following the findings of the investigations carried out, recommendations that should 
improve the regulation and supervision of banking institutions are presented thus: 
 The results of this study especially the DEA window technique indicate that the 
performance of banks can change for better or worse within one year. To that end, this 
study recommends that the performance of banks be examined regularly and 
preferably on a quarterly basis to increase its predictability ability. Increasing 
surveillance will ensure imprudent and unethical behaviour that erodes liquidity and 
shareholders’ funds are spotted early. Hence, ensuring recourse to financial safety 
nets and resolution technique are circumvented.   
 The assessment of bank performance by regulators should not be based only on 
financial figures. In line with the strategy adopted in this study, the review of bank 
performance should be both qualitative and quantitative.   
 Banking regulation should be proactive and not reactive. Proactive regulations are 
usually better thought out. This allows regulators ample time to assess and review 
frameworks and strategies. Put differently; supervisors should assess and act promptly 
to address unsafe and unsound banking practices that could derail financial stability.   
 Regarding financial safety nets, even though the position of this study does not 
support the adoption of bailout strategies because it cannot be unshackled from the 
moral hazard it encourages. This study suggests that the adoption of the bailout 
strategy requires careful balancing. Whether it succeeds depends on the details and 
conditions in which it is employed. Conditions and penalties should be attached to 
prevent bank executives from engaging in additional risky activities. Banking 
institutions should also be directed to refund bailout funds when they become 
profitable.  
 Regulation should encourage the diversification of portfolios. Banking institutions 
with interests in several sectors allocate risk in that the bottom line of the institution 
does not suffer when there is a crisis in one sector. For instance, Nigerian DMBs are 
highly geared to the oil and gas sector to the extent that they suffer huge losses 
anytime global oil prices fall.  
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DMBs should establish internal control frameworks that assist in fashioning adequate 
operational procedures, which control the build-up of risk. More so, the internal control 
processes should be in line with regulatory guidelines. 
 
9.6 Research Limitations and Constraints  
 
Some limitations and constraints identified during the study are presented below. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these limitations and constraints have in no way 
diminished the findings of this study, but rather serve as lessons for future research. 
 Obtaining access to interview respondents from Nigerian DMBs and regulatory 
agencies was a herculean task. Numerous visits, emails, and phone calls had to be 
made; this had an effect on the period intended for data collection.  
 Primary data collection was limited in scope as responses were solicited from only 
DMBs that that survived the consolidation exercise of the 2005 banking reforms and 
the mergers and acquisitions that transpired after that. It is possible that reactions from 
employees and bank executives of DMBs that ceased to exist would have offered 
contrary submissions. However, this can only be ascertained through further studies, 
which will factor in the cost of locating former employees and executives.  
 The generalisability of these results is subject to certain limitations because it is 
predominantly centred on the Nigerian banking sector. The Nigerian banking sector is 
regulated by guidelines prescribed by Nigerian regulators that have no jurisdiction 
outside the borders of Nigerian. On that account, the scope of analysis could not be 
extended to DMBs in other jurisdictions.     
 Evaluation of research findings against related studies proved problematic because 
different variables are adopted as proxies for CAMELS, for instance, some studies 
employed Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio as the proxy for capital adequacy, while 
others use equity to total assets ratio.      
 The adoption of three different analysis techniques was time-consuming as principles 
governing their adoption had to be learnt and perfected in other to arrive at robust 
conclusions.  
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9.7 Final Conclusion 
 
This study was able to qualitatively and quantitatively examine the performance of the 
Nigerian-banking sector in relation to the 2005 and 2009 banking reforms and the global 
financial crisis. The study outlined the strategy that provided acceptable answers to the 
research questions. The content analysis of interview responses, DEA window analysis, and 
panel data regression facilitated the determination of the robust research findings. To that 
end, highlighting recommendations to improve banking regulation and supervision, and 
recommendations for further research concludes the study.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions for Regulators (CBN&NDIC) 
 
 Where the objectives of the 2005 banking reforms achieved? 
 If the 2005 banking reforms was a success, why did regulators embark on the 2009 
banking reforms? 
 What was the main rationale for the 2009 banking reforms? 
 Where the objectives of the 2009 banking reforms achieved? 
 How were Nigerian deposit money banks (DMBs) affected by the global financial 
crisis? 
 How has the Central Bank of Nigeria and Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
improved risk management in commercial banks? 
 How often do the CBN and NDIC engage in on-site bank examination of commercial 
banks? 
 How well has the CBN been playing the role of lender of last resort? 
 Some Nigerian deposit money banks were bailed out by the CBN. Why did the CBN 
not allow them to fail? 
 What is the present situation of the bailed out deposit money banks? 
 Was any compensation paid to depositors of the banks that failed after the 2005 
banking consolidation reforms? 
 Why are the deposits in Nigerian deposit money banks not explicitly (100%) covered 
by the Deposit Insurance Scheme? 
 Who contributes to the deposit insurance fund and how much do they contribute? 
 How do the CBN and NDIC promote confidence in Nigerian deposit money banks? 
 Why is Nigeria not a member of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)? 
 Is the NDIC a member of the International Association of Deposit Insurers? 
 Do the CBN and NDIC use guidelines from the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) and the International Association of Deposit Insurance (IADI) to design 
regulations and prudential guidelines for Nigerian deposit money banks? 
 Are there any regulatory committees or collaborations between the CBN and NDIC? 
 Are Nigerian banks financially strong enough to compete internationally with other 
big global banks? 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions for Senior DMB Managers 
 
 How successful was the 2005 banking consolidation reforms? 
 What impact did the 2005 banking consolidation reforms have in your bank? 
 What was the effect of the 2009 banking reforms on your bank? 
 How was your bank affected by the global financial crisis that started in the second 
half of 2007? 
 Do you think Nigerian Deposit Money Banks were affected by derivative transactions 
during the global financial crisis? 
 What documents does your bank make available to supervisors when they come for 
on-site inspections or examinations? 
 Can you explain your bank’s loan approval process? 
 How do you treat non-performing loans in your bank? 
 How does your bank treat excess liquidity? 
 What do branches do to maintain liquidity levels and in the event they run out of 
physical cash, what is done to pay depositors? 
 Can you please explain the relationship of your bank with the CBN in terms of 
deposits and withdrawals? 
 How well has the CBN been playing the role of lender of last resort? 
 What are the responsibilities of internal auditors and compliance officers in the day-
to-day running of the bank? 
 How does the bank deal with staff fraud and fraud in general? 
 Was the bailout strategy adopted by Nigerian regulators necessary? 
 How well has the NDIC been managing deposit insurance contributions? And how 
does the bank interact with the NDIC? 
 How do the CBN and NDIC promote confidence in Nigerian deposit money banks? 
 What does your bank do to reassure customers that their deposits are safe? 
 Do shareholders and investors contribute in any way in regulating the activities of 
Nigerian deposit money banks? 
 Are Nigerian deposit money banks on the right path? 
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Appendix 4: Information Sheet 
 
 
  
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
Research Title:  
Banking Regulation and Supervision in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Effects of Banking 
Reforms on Bank Performance and Financial Stability 
Researcher: Shitnaan Emmanuel Wapmuk 
PhD Student 
Salford Business School 
University of Salford 
Greater Manchester 
United Kingdom 
M5 4WT 
 
Outline of Research: The purpose of this study is to assess the efficiency, performance, and 
stability of Nigerian deposit money banks in relation to the last two financial reforms initiated 
by Nigerian banking regulators. The study focuses on the extent to which Nigerian banking 
reforms have enhanced or impeded the performance and efficiency of deposit money banks. 
In broad terms, the study also aims to examine the strategies adopted by Nigerian bank 
regulators in resolving troubled banks and improving financial stability. On that account, this 
study seeks to achieve the following research objectives: 
1. To examine the Nigerian banking sector prior and after the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms, in order to determine whether the reforms improved the banking sector.    
2. To ascertain how statistical models can be used to predict bank distress in the 
Nigerian banking sector. 
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3. To investigate if the combination of statistical models will unearth dimensions 
neglected by individual models in the estimation of bank efficiency, performance and 
financial stability.    
4. To establish if banking regulation and supervision stimulated stability in the Nigerian 
banking sector.  
5. To determine the extent to which the global financial crisis derailed the performance 
of individual deposit money banks and the Nigerian banking sector in the whole.  
6. To explore whether changes in banking regulation and supervision in reaction to the 
global financial crisis enhanced efficiency, performance and stability of the Nigerian 
banking sector. 
This research sets out to obtain information from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), and all twenty-one (21) deposit money banks 
(DMBs) in Nigeria. Participants will include Bank regulation and supervision staff of the 
CBN and NDIC, and risk management/compliance officers of the commercial banks. The 
study will investigate the implementation of banking regulations and the last two banking 
reforms in Nigeria. 
All collected data will be treated confidentially and any reference to any participants will be 
made anonymously. Information collected will be used for the production of a PhD thesis. 
Additionally, all data collected will be disposed on completion of the research in line with the 
University of Salford retention and disposal of data policy. 
Kindly treat this letter as a formal application to interview some staff in your organisation.  
Any queries relating to this research should be addressed to: 
Dr Tony Syme 
Salford Business School 
University of Salford 
Greater Manchester 
M5 4WT 
Email: R.A.Syme@salford.ac.uk 
Tel: (+44) (0) 1612952534    
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Appendix 5: Invitation to Participate in Research 
 
Research Title: Banking Regulation and Supervision in Nigeria: An Analysis of the 
Effects of Banking Reforms on Bank Performance and Financial Stability 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am Mr Shitnaan Emmanuel Wapmuk, a PhD student at the University of Salford in the 
Business School. You are invited to participate in the above-titled research. The purpose of 
this study is to assess the efficiency, performance, and stability of Nigerian deposit money 
banks with regards to the last two financial reforms initiated by Nigerian banking regulators. 
The study focuses on the extent to which Nigerian banking reforms have enhanced or 
impeded the performance and efficiency of deposit money banks. In broad terms, the study 
also aims to examine the strategies adopted by Nigerian bank regulators in resolving troubled 
banks and improving financial stability. 
 The study seeks to obtain the views of bank regulators and supervisors, and senior managers 
of deposit money banks in Nigeria to achieve the following research objectives: 
1. To examine the Nigerian banking sector prior and after the 2005 and 2009 banking 
reforms, with the view of determining whether the reforms improved the banking 
sector.    
2. To ascertain how statistical models can be used to predict bank distress in the 
Nigerian banking sector. 
3. To investigate if the combination of statistical models will unearth dimensions 
neglected by individual models in the estimation of bank efficiency, performance and 
financial stability.    
4. To establish if banking regulation and supervision stimulated stability in the Nigerian 
banking sector.  
5. To determine the extent to which the global financial crisis derailed the performance 
of individual deposit money banks and the Nigerian banking sector in the whole.  
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6. To explore whether changes in banking regulation and supervision in reaction to the 
global financial crisis enhanced efficiency, performance and stability of the Nigerian 
banking sector. 
 
Participation 
Participants are under no obligation to take part in this research and are free to withdraw their 
consent at any time. 
 
Duration of Response to Interviews 
The interviews sessions will last for about 1 hour -1 hour 30 minutes. 
 
Risk and Benefits 
Participation in this study does not pose any risk to your safety or well-being. And there will 
be no compensation for participating in the research study. However, your participation in 
this study will assist the researcher in assessing the performance of Nigerian deposit banks 
concerning regulatory initiatives of Nigerian regulators. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information and data obtained during this research will be kept confidential and in a 
secure place. Information about participants will not be made public, and nobody outside the 
research team will have access to any information. And the final written thesis will ensure 
participants remain anonymous. 
 
Results of the Study 
The results obtained from the study will be used for the production of a PhD thesis and only 
related journal publications. 
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This letter seeks your permission to be involved in this research. Please indicate by signing 
the attached consent form. 
If you have any concerns regarding this research, please contact: 
Dr Tony Syme 
Salford Business School 
University of Salford 
Greater Manchester 
M5 4WT 
Email: R.A.Syme@salford.ac.uk 
Tel: (+44) (0) 1612952534    
 
Thank you in advance for taking part in this research 
Shitnaan Emmanuel Wapmuk 
PhD Student 
Salford Business School 
University of Salford 
Greater Manchester 
United Kingdom 
M5 4WT 
Email: s.e.wapmuk@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Mobile Phone: +44 (0) 7901058861 
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Appendix 6: Informed Consent Form 
 
NAME: 
POSITION: 
ORGANISATION: 
ADDRESS: 
DATE: 
Anonymity –   Requested  /  Not Requested 
I, the above named participant, acknowledge that I have been recruited to participate in this 
research study conducted by Shitnaan Emmanuel Wapmuk from Salford University Business 
School, Greater Manchester, United Kingdom titled: Banking Regulation and Supervision 
in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Effects of Banking Reforms on Bank Performance and 
Financial Stability. 
I have confirmed that the researcher has obtained the approval of my employees in order for 
me to participate in this research. Furthermore, I accept that there are no hazards or risks 
associated with this research. 
I understand that my responses and inputs will be treated with confidentiality by the 
researcher. 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time 
and without needing to provide reasons for my withdrawal. 
I also understand that I may provide the information anonymously and will indicate so above, 
in which case the researcher will allocate a random reference to me and only the researcher 
will know the name of the original source. 
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Finally, I give my full consent and understand that the information I am giving can be used as 
data for the purpose of the research conducted by the researcher.  
 
Participant’s Signature: ………………………………………………… 
Date: ……………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 7:  89 Legacy Nigerian Deposit Money Banks 
 
Bank of the North Ltd Habib Nigeria Bank Limited EIB International Bank Plc Wema Bank Plc 
Chartered Bank Ltd MBC International Bank Limited First Atlantic Bank Limited  
 
Zenith Bank Limited 
Equity Bank of Nigeria Ltd  New Nigeria Bank Limited First Interstate Bank (Nigeria.) 
Limited 
Cooperative Bank 
FBN (Merchant Bankers) Limited Reliance Bank 
 
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc Prudent Bank 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc Standard Chartered Bank Lion Bank of Nigeria Plc  
 
SGBN 
Intercontinental Bank Plc Trust Bank of Africa Limited  
 
New Universal Bank Limited Intercity Bank Plc 
IMB International Bank Plc Assurance Bank Access Bank Liberty Bank Limited 
New Africa Merchant Bank 
Limited 
Cooperative Development Bank Societe Bancaire (Nig.) Ltd Afribank International 
Limited (Merchant Bankers) 
Stanbic Bank Nigeria Limited Devcom Bank Limited Midas Bank Lead Merchant Bank 
Limited 
Platinum Bank Equatorial Trust Bank Limited Standard Trust Bank Limited Regent Bank Plc 
Triumph Bank Plc United Bank for Africa Plc Continental Trust Bank ACB International Bank 
Global Bank Plc Centre Point Bank Metropolitan Bank Gulf Bank 
Trade Bank  Ecobank Nigeria Plc Bond Bank Guardian Express Bank Plc 
International Trust Bank Plc Gateway Bank All states Trust Bank Plc Citizens International Bank 
Limited 
First Interstate Bank Oceanic Bank International 
(Nigeria) Limited 
City Express Bank Limited Afex Bank of Nigeria Plc 
Fountain Trust Bank Plc Afribank Nigeria Plc Fidelity Bank Plc Omega Bank 
FSB International Bank Plc Nigerian International Bank 
Limited 
First City Monument Bank 
Limited 
Fortune International Bank 
Ltd 
Inland Bank (Nig) Plc Eagle Bank Limited NBM Bank Limited Indo-Nigeria Bank Ltd 
Investment Banking & Trust 
Company Limited (IBTC) 
Hallmark Bank Plc Nigerian-American Bank 
Limited 
Magnum Trust Bank 
Limited 
Manny Bank Nigeria Plc National Bank of Nigeria Ltd Union Bank of Nigeria Plc Capital Bank International 
(CBI) Limited 
NAL Bank Plc Tropical Commercial Bank Plc Universal Trust Bank of Nigeria 
Limited 
 
Pacific Merchant Bank Limited Broad Bank Diamond Bank Plc  
Trans International Bank Plc Marina International Bank 
(Merchant Bankers) 
African International Bank Ltd  
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Appendix 8: 25 Deposit Money Banks after the 2005 Banking Reforms 
 
Access Bank Intercontinental Bank Plc Union Bank of Nigeria Plc 
Afribank Nigeria Plc  Citi Bank Nigeria Plc Unity Bank Plc 
Diamond Bank Plc  Oceanic Bank International Plc  Wema Bank Plc 
EcoBank Nigeria Plc Platinum Bank Plc Zenith Bank Plc 
Equitorial Trust Bank Skye Bank Plc  
First City Monument Bank Plc Spring Bank Plc  
Fidelity Bank Plc  Stanbic Bank Nigeria Ltd  
First of Nigeria Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank Plc  
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc United Bank of Africa Plc  
IBTC-Chartered Bank Plc Sterling Bank Plc  
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Appendix 9: Deposit Money Bank with Interview Respondents 
 
Access Bank Guaranty Trust Bank Plc Wema Bank Plc 
Diamond Bank Plc Skye Bank Plc Zenith Bank Plc 
First City Monument Bank Plc United Bank of Africa Plc Enterprise Bank  
Fidelity Bank Plc Sterling Bank Plc Keystone Bank 
First of Nigeria Bank Plc Unity Bank Plc Mainstreet Bank 
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Appendix 10: CCR Outcome 
 
Windows 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
Years 
2000 - 
2002 
2001 - 
2003 
2002 - 
2004 
2003 - 
2005 
2004 - 
2006 
2005 - 
2007 
2006 – 
2008 
2007 - 
2009 
2008 - 
2010 
2009 - 
2011 
2010 - 
2012 
2011 – 
2013 
No. of Banks 
 
75 73 70 62 40 29 24 23 23 25 24 20 
No. of DMUs 
 
187 186 163 127 89 72 65 64 63 63 61 60 
Efficient DMUs 17 8 7 10 8 6 5 13 8 9 8 16 
Inefficient DMUs 
 
170 178 156 117 81 66 60 51 55 54 53 44 
Efficient DMUs 
9.09% 4.3% 4.29% 7.87% 8.99% 8.33% 7.69% 20.31% 12.7% 14.29% 13.11% 26.67% 
% of Inefficient 
DMUs 
90.9% 95.7% 95.71% 92.13% 91.01% 91.67% 92.31% 79.68% 87.3% 85.71% 86.89% 73.33% 
Average 
Efficiency Score 
68.57% 58.6% 66.31% 69.77% 63.22% 67.56% 72.92% 82.56% 77.39% 73.84% 73.23% 81.9% 
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Appendix 11: DEA Window Analysis BCC & CCR Results 
        Access Bank                                                                    CCR Efficiency Scores 
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 79.34 62.23 64.04            68.54 
Window 2  60 60.86 39.68           53.51 
Window 3   66.66 51.16 62.36          60.06 
Window 4    57.55 68.25 74.46         66.75 
Window 5     65.42 69.94 73.97        76.16 
Window 6      71.08 93.13 91.27       85.16 
Window 7       86.18 88.68 70.98      81.95 
Window 8        85.26 97.94 100     94.40 
Window 9         95.9 100 92.87    96.26 
Window 10          100 93.87 66.54   86.80 
Window 11           100 77.36 66.37  81.24 
Window 12            77.25 78.23 76.69 77.39 
Annual Mean 79.34 61.12 63.85 49.46 65.34 71.82 84.42 88.4 88.27 100 95.58 73.72 72.3 76.69  
                                                                                                          BCC Efficiency Scores 
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 79.34 62.29 64.34            68.66 
Window 2  60 60.86 43.13           54.66 
Window 3   66.66 51.16 65.49          61.10 
Window 4    57.55 68.25 75.1         66.97 
Window 5     65.42 72.09 100        79.17 
Window 6      73.77 98.17 100       90.65 
Window 7       86.18 96.31 99.76      94.08 
Window 8        85.26 100 100     95.09 
Window 9         99.61 100 93.55    97.72 
Window 10          100 94.03 74.7   89.58 
Window 11           100 85.27 70.08  85.12 
Window 12            77.87 78.23 83.28 79.79 
Annual Mean 79.34 61.15 63.95 50.61 66.39 73.65 94.78 93.86 99.79 100 95.86 79.28 74.16 83.28  
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         CitiBank Nigeria                                                                              CCR Efficiency Scores 
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 62.23 64.04            75.42 
Window 2  88.13 72.4 95.34           85.29 
Window 3   83.53 100 86.44          89.99 
Window 4    100 85.18 100         95.06 
Window 5     79.84 100 100        93.28 
Window 6      100 100 85.25       95.08 
Window 7       100 87.19 94.2      93.80 
Window 8        100 100 100     100 
Window 9         95.77 87.18 84.64    89.20 
Window 10          87.18 84.64 64.67   78.83 
Window 11           84.64 64.88 83.75  77.76 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean 100 75.18 73.32 98.45 83.82 100 100 90.81 96.66 91.45 84.64 76.52 91.88 100  
 
                   BCC Efficiency Scores 
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 100 100            100 
Window 2  100 95.25 100           98.25 
Window 3   94.59 100 86.44          93.68 
Window 4    100 85.18 100         95.06 
Window 5     79.84 100 100        93.28 
Window 6      100 100 89.17       96.39 
Window 7       100 88 97.2      95.07 
Window 8        100 100 100     100 
Window 9         95.77 87.18 84.64    89.20 
Window 10          87.18 84.64 64.67   78.83 
Window 11           84.64 64.88 83.75  77.76 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean 100 100 96.61 100 83.82 100 100 92.39 97.66 91.45 84.64 76.52 91.88 100  
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         Diamond Bank                                                                              CCR Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 53.58 61.68 57.1            57.45 
Window 2  49.58 49.56 76.17           58.44 
Window 3   59.05 77.73 68.7          68.49 
Window 4    77.08 67.79 85.11         76.66 
Window 5     47.35 65.89 76.72        63.32 
Window 6      65.89 76.72 58.71       67.11 
Window 7       72.61 61.33 83.84      72.59 
Window 8        68.46 92.34 86.22     82.34 
Window 9         89.96 86.22 86.73    87.64 
Window 10          86.39 88.13 86.52   87.01 
Window 11           88.81 93.36 90.74  90.97 
Window 12            100 96.15 83.49 93.21 
Annual Mean 53.58 55.63 55.24 76.99 61.28 72.30 75.35 62.83 88.71 86.27 87.89 93.29 93.45 83.49  
 
 
                                                                                                                  BCC Efficiency Scores         
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 55.58 62.76 68.87            62.40 
Window 2  61.32 61.82 77.43           66.86 
Window 3   65.63 78.32 75.31          73.09 
Window 4    77.08 72.62 96.92         82.21 
Window 5     55.91 80.25 88.67        74.94 
Window 6      80.86 88.05 78.09       82.23 
Window 7       82.63 71.89 98.46      84.33 
Window 8        68.46 94.02 86.22     82.90 
Window 9         93.32 86.22 86.73    88.76 
Window 10          87.68 88.93 90.67   89.09 
Window 11           93.44 98.45 94.67  95.52 
Window 12            100 96.52 83.63 93.38 
Annual Mean 55.58 62.04 65.44 77.61 67.94 86.01 85.93 72.81 95.27 86.71 89.7 96.37 95.60 83.63  
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Ecobank Nigeria                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores  
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 50.51 60.99 54.91            55.47 
Window 2  33.69 36.77 51.88           40.78 
Window 3   41.71 58.76 55.04          51.84 
Window 4    57.86 53.62 79.35         63.61 
Window 5     42.69 69.47 73.97        62.04 
Window 6      69.91 73.97 85.87       76.58 
Window 7       74.89 85.17 61.4      73.82 
Window 8        82.83 67.76 89.89     80.16 
Window 9         65.02 90.43 82.04    79.16 
Window 10          90.43 84.08 72.04   82.18 
Window 11           87.95 80.65 61.93  76.84 
Window 12            80.6 71.8 77.86 76.75 
Annual Mean 50.51 47.34 44.46 56.17 50.45 72.91 74.28 84.62 64.73 90.25 84.69 77.76 66.87 77.86  
 
                                                              
                                                                                                                       BCC Efficiency Scores   
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 50.71 63.29 57.7            57.23 
Window 2  34.59 37.93 56.14           42.89 
Window 3   41.71 58.76 58.12          52.86 
Window 4    57.86 53.62 86.58         66.02 
Window 5     42.69 82.42 89.71        71.61 
Window 6      82.66 90.65 100       91.10 
Window 7       87.01 97.32 70.94      85.09 
Window 8        84.99 69.1 90.15     81.41 
Window 9         65.02 90.43 82.04    79.16 
Window 10          90.43 84.08 79.27   84.59 
Window 11           87.95 88.09 70.14  82.06 
Window 12            83.77 75.17 79.02 79.32 
Annual Mean 50.71 48.94 45.78 57.59 51.48 83.89 89.12 94.10 68.35 90.34 84.69 83.71 72.66 79.02  
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Enterprise Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 18.85   18.85 
Window 11           0 18.85 74.02  46.44 
Window 12            30.76 100 68.51 66.42 
Annual Mean          0 0 22.82 87.01 68.51  
 
                                                                  BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 18.85   18.85 
Window 11           0 18.85 74.02  46.44 
Window 12            30.76 100 68.51 66.42 
Annual Mean            22.82 87.01 68.51  
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        Fidelity Bank                                                                           CCR Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.59 39.81 50.26            49.55 
Window 2  37.27 46.99 46.92           43.73 
Window 3   53.68 53.18 57.97          54.94 
Window 4    55.01 61.82 78.63         65.15 
Window 5     50.55 62.88 63.35        58.93 
Window 6      62.88 63.35 53.48       59.90 
Window 7       65.57 62.62 100      76.06 
Window 8        78.32 100 67.13     81.82 
Window 9         100 67.13 73.37    80.17 
Window 10          68.36 76.24 65.57   70.06 
Window 11           78.81 69.71 71.05  73.19 
Window 12            74.34 84.16 82.45 80.32 
Annual Mean 58.59 38.54 50.31 51.70 56.78 68.13 64.09 64.81 100 67.54 76.14 69.87 77.61 82.45  
                                                          
 
BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.59 39.81 50.26            49.55 
Window 2  37.27 46.99 49.35           44.54 
Window 3   53.68 53.18 59.87          55.58 
Window 4    55.01 62.52 82.83         66.79 
Window 5     50.55 62.88 63.35        58.93 
Window 6      62.88 63.35 71.67       65.97 
Window 7       65.57 67.57 100      77.71 
Window 8        78.32 100 67.13     81.82 
Window 9         100 67.13 73.37    80.17 
Window 10          68.36 76.24 69.69   71.43 
Window 11           78.81 72.01 88.52  79.78 
Window 12            75.62 100 95.23 90.28 
Annual Mean 58.59 38.54 50.31 52.51 57.65 69.53 64.09 72.52 100 67.54 76.14 72.44 94.26 95.23  
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         First Bank of Nigeria                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.78 69.92 100            80.23 
Window 2  46.02 76.88 100           74.30 
Window 3   83.18 100 79.2          87.46 
Window 4    100 83.69 76.95         86.88 
Window 5     78.63 70.71 100        83.11 
Window 6      70.71 100 52.55       74.42 
Window 7       100 52.54 69.68      74.07 
Window 8        62.42 81.79 96.56     80.26 
Window 9         80.3 91.99 83.13    85.14 
Window 10          92.03 84.66 89.01   88.57 
Window 11           92.21 94.78 90.59  92.53 
Window 12            100 94.72 89.24 94.65 
Annual Mean 70.78 57.97 86.69 100 80.51 72.79 100 55.84 77.26 93.53 86.67 94.60 92.66 89.24  
                                                        
 
                        BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 80.72 78.12 100            86.28 
Window 2  77.95 100 100           92.65 
Window 3   100 100 100          100 
Window 4    100 100 100         100 
Window 5     100 100 100        100 
Window 6      100 100 73.91       91.30 
Window 7       100 69.3 100      89.77 
Window 8        96.26 100 93.48     98.75 
Window 9         100 100 100    100 
Window 10          100 100 100   100 
Window 11           100 100 100  100 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean 80.72 78.04 100 100 100 100 100 79.82 100 97.83 100 100 100 100  
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         First City Monument Bank                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 82.2 0 80.06            81.13 
Window 2  0 74.45 66.34           70.40 
Window 3   88.35 73.23 58.52          73.37 
Window 4    67.93 57.73 63.59         63.08 
Window 5     50.8 61.23 70.98        61 
Window 6      61.45 70.99 75.1       69.18 
Window 7       94.69 76.66 91.67      87.67 
Window 8        82.06 100 93.48     91.85 
Window 9         94.58 93.48 99.01    95.69 
Window 10          93.81 100 84.46   92.76 
Window 11           100 89.88 72.44  87.44 
Window 12            100 80.65 83.59 88.08 
Annual Mean 82.2 0 80.95 69.17 55.68 62.09 78.89 77.94 95.42 93.59 99.67 91.45 76.55 83.59  
                                                    
 
BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 82.2 0 92.63            87.42 
Window 2  0 88.18 70.01           79.1 
Window 3   91.87 73.23 58.52          74.54 
Window 4    67.93 57.73 63.59         63.08 
Window 5     50.8 61.23 91.94        67.99 
Window 6      61.45 80.18 91.92       77.85 
Window 7       96.07 81.25 100      92.44 
Window 8        82.06 100 93.48     91.85 
Window 9         100 93.48 99.01    97.50 
Window 10          93.81 100 84.46   92.76 
Window 11           100 89.88 76.13  88.67 
Window 12            100 80.65 83.83 88.16 
Annual Mean 82.2 0 90.89 70.39 55.68 62.09 89.40 85.08 100 93.59 99.67 991.45 78.39 83.83  
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         Guaranty Trust Bank                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 65.17 74.47 67.66            69.1 
Window 2  56.97 55.25 62.14           58.12 
Window 3   61.2 68.5 71.31          67 
Window 4    65.32 75.92 85.77         75.67 
Window 5     57.2 63.27 57.58        59.35 
Window 6      63.27 57.58 52.61       57.82 
Window 7       67.87 69.02 87.54      74.81 
Window 8        71.94 100 100     90.65 
Window 9         100 100 83.48    94.49 
Window 10          100 85.91 85.43   90.45 
Window 11           99.18 97.15 89.28  95.2 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean 65.17 65.72 61.37 65.32 68.14 70.77 61.01 64.52 95.85 100 89.52 94.19 94.64 100  
     
 
                BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.69 80.23 76.64            74.52 
Window 2  73.74 75.78 90.82           80.11 
Window 3   72.47 87.23 100          86.57 
Window 4    74.05 89.39 100         87.81 
Window 5     87.55 99.05 95.61        94.07 
Window 6      94.89 77.7 83.26       85.28 
Window 7       73.06 75.11 100      82.72 
Window 8        74.74 100 100     91.58 
Window 9         100 100 99.74    99.91 
Window 10          100 95.24 100   98.41 
Window 11           100 100 99.09  99.7 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean 66.69 76.99 74.96 84.03 92.31 97.97 82.12 77.7 100 100 98.33 100 99.55 100  
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         Keystone Bank                                                                           CCR Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 29.96   29.96 
Window 11           0 34.81 42.74  38.78 
Window 12            36.59 64.57 58.13 53.1 
Annual Mean            33.79 53.66 58.13  
 
                                                                                           BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 29.96   29.96 
Window 11           0 34.81 42.74  38.78 
Window 12            36.59 64.83 58.13 53.18 
Annual Mean            33.79 53.79 58.13  
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         Mainstreet Bank                                                                           CCR Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 37.16   37.16 
Window 11           0 37.16 70.45  53.81 
Window 12            68.09 100 100 89.36 
Annual Mean            47.47 85.23 100  
 
                                                                                          BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10          0 0 37.16   37.16 
Window 11           0 37.16 70.45  53.81 
Window 12            68.09 100 100 89.36 
Annual Mean            47.47 85.23 100  
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         Skye Bank (Prudent Bank - 2000 – 2004)                               CCR Efficiency Scores          
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 74.4 79.52            76.96 
Window 2  56.59 51.15 53.83           53.86 
Window 3   100 59.6 60.49          73.36 
Window 4    59.45 58.77 54.92         57.71 
Window 5     46.32 47.55 62.62        52.16 
Window 6      47.55 62.62 43.92       51.36 
Window 7       62.62 43.91 52.4      52.98 
Window 8        61.71 76.69 81.1     73.17 
Window 9         71.35 79.55 88.14    79.68 
Window 10          81 88.89 89.88   86.59 
Window 11           99.01 100 100  99.67 
Window 12            100 100 85.43 95.14 
Annual Mean  65.5 76.89 57.63 55.19 50.01 62.62 49.85 66.81 80.55 92.01 96.63 100 85.43  
 
                                                                                           BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 79.82 100            89.91 
Window 2  70.15 100 55.48           75.21 
Window 3   100 59.6 61.66          73.75 
Window 4    59.45 58.77 54.92         57.71 
Window 5     46.32 47.55 83.77        59.21 
Window 6      47.55 83.77 61.53       64.28 
Window 7       70.47 50.45 73.96      64.96 
Window 8        61.71 80 81.1     74.27 
Window 9         73.75 79.55 88.24    80.51 
Window 10          81.13 89.06 94.75   88.31 
Window 11           99.88 100 100  99.96 
Window 12            100 100 85.43 95.14 
Annual Mean  74.99 100 58.17 55.58 50.01 79.34 57.7 75.9 80.59 92.39 98.25 100 85.43  
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         Stanbic IBTC Bank                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 79.06 100 100            93.02 
Window 2  100 100 81.61           93.87 
Window 3   100 99.32 80.74          93.35 
Window 4    100 94.07 100         98.02 
Window 5     100 100 100        100 
Window 6      100 100 63.51       87.84 
Window 7       100 99.35 81.08      93.48 
Window 8        100 96.51 79.28     91.93 
Window 9         90.69 82.22 96.12    89.68 
Window 10          82.22 97.61 100   93.28 
Window 11           99.04 100 76.16  91.73 
Window 12            100 95.96 84.22 94.04 
Annual Mean 79.06 100 100 93.64 91.6 100 100 87.62 89.43 81.24 97.59 100 86.06 84.22  
 
                                                                                           BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 79.06 100 100            93.02 
Window 2  100 100 100           100 
Window 3   100 100 85.57          95.19 
Window 4    100 97.86 100         99.29 
Window 5     100 100 100        100 
Window 6      100 100 100       100 
Window 7       100 100 100      100 
Window 8        100 100 94.91     98.30 
Window 9         90.69 82.22 100    90.97 
Window 10          82.22 100 100   94.07 
Window 11           100 100 81.92  92.05 
Window 12            100 90.46 99.45 96.64 
Annual Mean 79.06 100 100 100 94.48 100 100 100 96.9 86.45 100 100 86.19 99.45  
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         Standard Chartered Bank                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 78.78 45.56 0            62.17 
Window 2  30.24 0 46.81           38.53 
Window 3   0 54.92 48.19          51.56 
Window 4    56.54 46.42 87.7         63.55 
Window 5     45.16 83.38 86.02        71.52 
Window 6      83.38 86.02 73.08       80.83 
Window 7       88.18 82.41 79.21      83.27 
Window 8        100 98.34 100     99.45 
Window 9         82.89 98.74 100    93.88 
Window 10          98.74 100 100   99.58 
Window 11           100 100 81.92  93.97 
Window 12            100 95.96 84.22 93.39 
Annual Mean 78.78 37.9  52.76 46.59 84.82 86.74 85.16 86.81 99.16 100 100 88.94 84.22  
 
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 78.78 51.76 0            65.27 
Window 2  30.24 0 49.08           39.66 
Window 3   0 54.92 48.19          51.56 
Window 4    56.54 46.42 87.7         63.55 
Window 5     45.16 83.38 100        76.18 
Window 6      83.38 100 97.18       93.52 
Window 7       100 100 85.13      95.04 
Window 8        100 98.34 100     99.45 
Window 9         82.89 98.74 100    93.88 
Window 10          98.74 100 100   99.58 
Window 11           100 100 81.92  93.97 
Window 12            100 95.96 84.22 93.39 
Annual Mean 78.78 41  53.51 46.59 84.82 100 99.06 88.79 99.16 100 100 88.94 84.22  
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         Sterling Bank                                                         CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 57.78 63.97 100            73.91 
Window 2  60.89 77.71 69.18           69.26 
Window 3   82.95 73.89 74.9          77.25 
Window 4    78.85 70.14 61.74         70.24 
Window 5     70.14 42.82 56.67        56.54 
Window 6      42.82 56.67 46.67       48.72 
Window 7       56.67 46.67 55.84      53.06 
Window 8        59.78 66.95 71.48     66.07 
Window 9         64.09 73.13 58.3    65.17 
Window 10          73.13 59.54 65.49   66.05 
Window 11           64.15 65.39 63.25  64.26 
Window 12            66.05 67.79 78.17 70.67 
Annual Mean 57.78 62.43 86.89 73.97 71.73 49.13 56.67 51.04 62.29 72.58 60.66 65.64 65.52 78.17  
 
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 57.51 63.97 100            73.83 
Window 2  60.89 89.35 76.8           75.68 
Window 3   89.72 78.14 81.05          82.97 
Window 4    80.46 70.14 61.88         70.83 
Window 5     70.14 42.82 66.75        59.9 
Window 6      42.82 66.75 60.95       56.84 
Window 7       62.63 54.65 63.7      60.33 
Window 8        59.78 66.95 73.88     66.87 
Window 9         64.09 73.13 58.3    65.17 
Window 10          73.13 59.54 65.49   66.05 
Window 11           64.15 65.39 63.25  64.26 
Window 12            66.05 67.79 78.18 70.67 
Annual Mean 57.51 62.43 93.02 78.47 73.78 49.17 65.38 58.46 64.91 73.38 60.66 65.64 65.52 78.18  
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         Stanbic Bank Nigeria                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 82.74 63.25 59.18            68.39 
Window 2  62.78 58.77 77.36           66.3 
Window 3   67.03 90.89 63.3          73.74 
Window 4    80.61 58.62 63.85         67.69 
Window 5     51.21 57.53 100        69.58 
Window 6      59.52 100 0       79.26 
Window 7       100 0 0      100 
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 82.74 63.02 61.66 82.95 57.71 60.3 100         
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 82.74 63.25 59.18            68.39 
Window 2  62.78 58.77 77.36           66.3 
Window 3   67.03 90.89 63.3          73.74 
Window 4    80.61 58.62 63.85         67.69 
Window 5     51.21 57.53 100        69.58 
Window 6      58.52 100 0       79.26 
Window 7       100 0 0      100 
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 82.74 63.02 61.66 82.95 57.71 59.97 100         
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         Union Bank of Nigeria                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 60.21 68.96            64.59 
Window 2  28.35 39.02 48.72           38.7 
Window 3   46.2 53.25 70.23          56.56 
Window 4    54.62 62.97 62.56         60.05 
Window 5     58.5 53.95 65.19        59.21 
Window 6      53.95 65.19 57.44       58.86 
Window 7       75.05 57.9 58.25      63.73 
Window 8        65.03 72.78 69.23     69.01 
Window 9         60.3 69.23 51.79    60.44 
Window 10          70.2 52.51 37.78   53.50 
Window 11           53.49 39.34 39.38  44.04 
Window 12            55.17 69.41 83.67 69.42 
Annual Mean  44.28 51.39 52.2 63.9 56.82 68.48 60.12 63.78 69.55 52.6 44.1 54.4 83.67  
 
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 65.35 73.7            69.53 
Window 2  59.56 71.59 79.82           70.32 
Window 3   67.79 76.92 96.33          80.35 
Window 4    58.87 74.24 80.54         71.22 
Window 5     74.02 71.05 92.09        79.05 
Window 6      72.1 91.26 82.49       81.95 
Window 7       89.13 76.87 73.24      79.75 
Window 8        100 100 69.23     89.74 
Window 9         69.97 69.23 55.95    65.05 
Window 10          70.58 57.69 37.78   55.35 
Window 11           61.76 39.34 39.38  46.83 
Window 12            56.79 82.7 90.05 76.51 
Annual Mean  62.46 71.03 71.87 81.54 74.56 90.83 86.45 81.07 69.68 58.47 44.64 61.04 90.04  
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         United Bank of Africa                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 59.71 40.46 48.64            49.6 
Window 2  25.05 33.74 53.41           37.4 
Window 3   42.31 63.12 82.88          62.77 
Window 4    69.18 76.91 86.24         77.44 
Window 5     76.91 86.24 40.16        67.77 
Window 6      86.24 40.96 52.67       59.96 
Window 7       52.24 54.7 56.93      54.62 
Window 8        67.49 72.76 64.15     68.13 
Window 9         64.04 56.4 59.39    59.94 
Window 10          57.82 62.04 51.7   57.19 
Window 11           66.13 57.09 56.14  59.79 
Window 12            59.8 65.68 71.52 65.67 
Annual Mean 59.71 32.76 41.56 61.9 78.9 86.24 44.45 58.29 64.58 59.46 62.52 56.2 60.91 71.52  
 
 
                                                                                                           BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 62.21 46.67 61.54            56.81 
Window 2  45.16 61.15 83.87           63.39 
Window 3   58.88 82.82 96.41          79.37 
Window 4    85.18 90.49 100         91.89 
Window 5     89.45 100 100        96.48 
Window 6      100 73.88 100       91.29 
Window 7       66.45 73.62 86.29      75.45 
Window 8        77.95 94.78 100     90.91 
Window 9         86.28 71.36 74.52    77.39 
Window 10          74.76 68.34 60.56   67.89 
Window 11           74.42 61.97 100  78.8 
Window 12            64.78 96.37 100 87.05 
Annual Mean 62.21 45.92 60.52 83.96 92.12 100 80.11 83.86 89.12 82.04 72.43 62.44 98.19 100  
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         Unity Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6      0 0 83.86       83.86 
Window 7       0 86.22 69.96      78.09 
Window 8        86.79 64.5 66.89     72.73 
Window 9         51.5 68.06 100    73.19 
Window 10          68.06 100 58.56   75.54 
Window 11           100 59.58 76.86  78.81 
Window 12            79.94 90.78 93.89 88.2 
Annual Mean        85.62 61.99 67.67 100 66.03 83.82 93.89  
 
 
                                                                                   BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6      0 0 100       100 
Window 7       0 100 87.25      93.63 
Window 8        88.55 86.02 68.63     81.07 
Window 9         54.02 68.06 100    74.03 
Window 10          68.06 100 58.56   75.54 
Window 11           100 59.58 76.86  78.81 
Window 12            79.94 90.78 94.22 88.31 
Annual Mean        96.18 75.76 68.25 100 66.03 83.82 94.22  
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         Wema Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 77.09 87.26 81.71            82.02 
Window 2  78 53.09 52.29           61.13 
Window 3   63.21 59.91 82.92          68.68 
Window 4    64.9 91.13 95.1         83.71 
Window 5     64.18 71.44 95.8        77.14 
Window 6      71.44 95.8 67.75       78.33 
Window 7       92.74 68.08 0      80.41 
Window 8        85.61 0 85.61     85.61 
Window 9         0 85.61 57.3    71.46 
Window 10          85.68 57.56 39.22   60.82 
Window 11           59.88 40.56 51.6  50.68 
Window 12            48.63 63.77 60.12 57.55 
Annual Mean 77.09 82.63 66 59 79.41 79.33 94.78 73.81  85.63 58.25 42.8 57.69 60.12  
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 78.5 90.26 81.71            83.49 
Window 2  80.51 61.36 67.17           69.68 
Window 3   63.93 65.15 100          76.36 
Window 4    66.86 100 100         88.95 
Window 5     71.93 100 100        90.64 
Window 6      100 100 97.59       99.20 
Window 7       100 82.93 0      91.47 
Window 8        85.61 0 85.61     85.61 
Window 9         0 85.61 57.3    71.46 
Window 10          85.68 57.56 39.22   60.82 
Window 11           59.88 40.56 51.6  50.68 
Window 12            48.76 63.77 60.12 57.55 
Annual Mean 78.5 85.39 69 66.39 90.64 100 100 88.71  85.63 58.25 42.85 57.69 60.12  
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         Zenith Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.61 55.39 70.58            62.53 
Window 2  43.16 44.2 50.55           45.97 
Window 3   53.2 65.28 72.52          63.67 
Window 4    78.81 70.03 91.8         80.21 
Window 5     68.79 79.58 71.21        73.19 
Window 6      79.58 71.21 53.31       68.03 
Window 7       73.39 53.21 63.94      63.51 
Window 8        57.85 65.42 74.14     65.8 
Window 9         58.19 74.07 70.05    67.44 
Window 10          74.7 70.92 68.49   71.37 
Window 11           79.61 80.45 71.58  77.21 
Window 12            88.28 81.11 84.31 84.57 
Annual Mean 61.61 49.28 55.99 64.88 70.45 83.65 71.94 54.79 62.52 74.3 73.53 79.07 76.35 84.31  
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.49 65.18 74.2            69.96 
Window 2  54.94 54.13 80.42           63.16 
Window 3   55.92 73.81 83.69          71.14 
Window 4    88.3 82.01 100         90.10 
Window 5     79.01 100 100        93 
Window 6      97.27 97.02 76.83       90.37 
Window 7       86.13 74.96 100      87.03 
Window 8        97.18 100 100     99.06 
Window 9         100 100 100    100 
Window 10          100 95.72 100   98.57 
Window 11           100 100 100  100 
Window 12            100 100 100 100 
Annual Mean  70.49 60.06 61.42 80.84 81.57 99.09 94.38 82.99 100 100 98.57 100 100 100  
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        Oceanic Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 68.32 93.27 63.43            75.01 
Window 2  59.16 44.31 37.09           46.85 
Window 3   57.61 52.35 53.27          54.41 
Window 4    86.34 66.8 89.55         80.90 
Window 5     65.07 73.76 52.79        63.87 
Window 6      73.76 52.79 79.32       68.62 
Window 7       67.53 70.82 68.09      68.81 
Window 8        83.03 77.08 100     86.7 
Window 9         77.08 100 46.93    74.67 
Window 10          100 47.72 0   73.86 
Window 11           50.99 0 0  50.99 
Window 12            0 0 0  
Annual Mean 68.32 76.22 55.12 58.59 61.71 79.02 57.7 77.72 74.08 100 48.55     
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 68.32 93.27 63.43            75.01 
Window 2  75.99 52.49 53.34           60.61 
Window 3   57.61 53.34 60.94          57.3 
Window 4    96.06 76.58 100         90.88 
Window 5     71.42 100 100        90.47 
Window 6      89.77 78.86 100       89.54 
Window 7       73.84 95.39 100      89.74 
Window 8        88.88 87.07 100     91.98 
Window 9         85.67 100 46.93    77.53 
Window 10          100 47.72 0   73.86 
Window 11           51.33 0 0  51.33 
Window 12            0 0 0  
Annual Mean 68.32 84.63 57.84 67.58 69.65 96.59 84.23 94.76 90.91 100 48.66     
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         Intercontinental Bank                                                      CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 60.86 51.78 58.77            57.14 
Window 2  45.88 43.36 44.92           44.72 
Window 3   49.92 53.68 0          51.8 
Window 4    48.8 0 68.14         58.47 
Window 5     0 57.22 83.47        70.35 
Window 6      57.22 83.47 71.79       70.83 
Window 7       79.66 72.05 65.3      72.34 
Window 8        85.46 68.96 73.79     76.07 
Window 9         64.5 73.79 39.62    59.3 
Window 10          73.82 39.86 0   56.84 
Window 11           40.48 0 0  40.48 
Window 12            0 0 0  
Annual Mean 60.86 48.83 50.68 49.13  60.86 82.2 76.43 66.25 73.8 39.99     
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.38 59.88 60.02            62.09 
Window 2  59.9 54.74 71.46           62.03 
Window 3   55.85 68.44 0          62.15 
Window 4    62.13 0 100         81.07 
Window 5     0 100 100        100 
Window 6      96.3 100 100       98.77 
Window 7       96.54 100 100      98.85 
Window 8        100 100 74.34     91.45 
Window 9         100 74.34 44.87    73.07 
Window 10          74.34 44.61 0   59.48 
Window 11           48.4 0 0  48.4 
Window 12                
Annual Mean 66.38 59.89 56.87 67.34  98.77 98.85 100 100 74.34 45.96     
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         First Interstate Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 93.12 57.52 81.68            77.44 
Window 2  45.49 58.57 0           52.03 
Window 3   63.88 0 0          63.88 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 93.12 51.51 68.04             
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores    Summary Measures  
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 93.12 57.52 81.68            77.44 
Window 2  45.49 58.57 0           52.03 
Window 3   63.88 0 0          63.88 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 93.12 51.51 68.88             
 
 
 
 
 
384 
 
 
         International Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 79.87            79.87 
Window 2  0 77.41 73.61           75.51 
Window 3   82.91 77.78 0          80.35 
Window 4    76.99 0 0         76.99 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   80.06 76.13            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 79.87            79.87 
Window 2  0 77.41 73.61           75.51 
Window 3   82.91 77.78 0          80.35 
Window 4    76.99 0 0         76.99 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   80.06 76.13            
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         FSB International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 73.96 82.27 62.54            72.92 
Window 2  79.02 59.62 57.82           65.49 
Window 3   65.55 63.08 64          64.21 
Window 4    59.79 63.31 0         61.55 
Window 5     43.77 0 0        43.77 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 73.96 80.65 62.57 60.23 57.03           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 75 87.8 69.32            77.37 
Window 2  87.8 69.32 64.83           73.98 
Window 3   71.67 68.73 69.16          69.85 
Window 4    61.68 62.22 0         61.95 
Window 5     44.85 0 0        44.85 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 75 87.8 70.1 65.08 58.74           
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         Fountain Trust Bank                                                    CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 59.8 39.28 37            45.36 
Window 2  39.28 37 43.1           39.79 
Window 3   54.28 55.52 0          54.9 
Window 4    61.24 0 0         61.24 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 59.8 39.28 42.76 53.29            
 
                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 59.8 39.28 37            45.36 
Window 2  39.28 37 45.06           40.45 
Window 3   54.28 55.52 0          54.9 
Window 4    61.24 0 0         61.24 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 59.8 39.28 42.76 53.94            
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         lnland Bank                                                                  CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 73.48 77.33            75.41 
Window 2  70.17 75.69 0           72.93 
Window 3   81.93 0 0          81.93 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  71.83 78.32             
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 73.83 78.77            76.3 
Window 2  70.18 78.6 0           74.39 
Window 3   81.93 0 0          81.93 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  72.01 79.77             
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         Manny Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 87.29 60.07            82.45 
Window 2  81.7 58 74.39           71.36 
Window 3   71.01 78.97 100          83.33 
Window 4    82.36 100 0         91.18 
Window 5     69.94 0 0        69.94 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 84.5 63.03 78.57 89.98           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 89.06 60.17            83.08 
Window 2  81.7 58 74.39           71.36 
Window 3   71.01 78.97 100          83.33 
Window 4    82.36 100 0         91.18 
Window 5     69.94 0 0        69.94 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 85.38 63.06 78.57 89.98           
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         Trade Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 57.34 56.88 0            57.11 
Window 2  52.52 0 0           52.52 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 57.34 54.7              
 
                                                                               BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 57.34 56.88 0            57.11 
Window 2  52.52 0 0           52.52 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 57.34 54.7              
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         Triumph Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 80.39 74.55 55.39            70.11 
Window 2  73.77 55.04 0           64.41 
Window 3   76.92 0 0          76.92 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 80.39 74.16 62.45             
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 80.39 74.55 55.39            70.11 
Window 2  73.77 55.04 0           64.41 
Window 3   76.92 0 0          76.92 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 80.39 74.16 62.45             
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         Bank PHB (Platinum Bank 2000 – 2004)                                  CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 44.41 40.2            42.31 
Window 2  42.52 40.2 52.63           45.12 
Window 3   53.23 58.61 50.83          54.22 
Window 4    60.7 46.93 89.08         65.57 
Window 5     40.9 71.99 61.64        58.18 
Window 6      71.99 61.98 73.4       69.12 
Window 7       80.36 93.16 74.25      82.59 
Window 8        91.7 92.18 69.79     84.56 
Window 9         88.15 55.28 0    71.72 
Window 10          55.28 0 0   55.28 
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  43.47 44.54 57.31 46.22 77.69 67.99 86.09 84.86 60.12      
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 44.41 41.27            42.84 
Window 2  42.52 41.27 54.18           45.99 
Window 3   53.23 58.61 50.83          54.22 
Window 4    60.7 46.93 93.14         66.92 
Window 5     40.9 72.05 82.62        65.19 
Window 6      72.05 72.14 100       81.4 
Window 7       82.63 100 100      94.21 
Window 8        98.81 100 100     99.6 
Window 9         100 95.12 0    97.56 
Window 10          95.12 0 0   95.12 
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  43.47 45.26 57.83 46.22 79.08 79.13 99.6 100 96.75      
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         New Africa Merchant Bank                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.56 85.59 0            72.08 
Window 2  83.26 0 0           83.26 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 58.56 84.43              
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.56 85.59 0            72.08 
Window 2  83.26 0 0           83.26 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 58.56 84.43              
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         FBN Merchant Bankers                                                   CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 68.3 82.12 69.07            73.16 
Window 2  82.12 69.07 0           75.6 
Window 3   76.27 0 0          76.27 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 68.3 82.12 71.47             
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 68.3 83.27 72.28            74.62 
Window 2  83.27 72.28 0           77.78 
Window 3   76.27 0 0          76.27 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 68.3 83.27 73.61             
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         IMB International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 69.4 59.3 0            64.35 
Window 2  55.66 0 0           55.66 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 69.4 57.48              
 
                                                            BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 69.4 59.3 0            64.35 
Window 2  55.66 0 0           55.66 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 69.4 57.48              
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         Chartered Bank                                                                              CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 54.2 55.42 71.65            60.42 
Window 2  41.89 57.52 60.36           53.26 
Window 3   65.76 69.06 71          68.61 
Window 4    89.01 97.11 88.43         91.52 
Window 5     55.53 55.31 0        55.42 
Window 6      55.31 0 0       55.31 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 54.2 48.66 64.98 72.81 74.55 66.35          
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 54.2 55.42 72.08            60.57 
Window 2  42.72 65.98 93.49           67.40 
Window 3   67.98 83.63 97.88          83.16 
Window 4    91.63 100 93.98         95.2 
Window 5     55.53 55.31 0        55.42 
Window 6      55.31 0 0       55.31 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 54.2 49.07 68.68 89.58 84.47 68.2          
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         Equity Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 65.41 0 57.36            61.39 
Window 2  0 51.73 68.56           60.15 
Window 3   58.45 79.99 0          69.22 
Window 4    73.96 0 0         73.96 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 65.41  55.85 74.17            
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 65.85 0 61.07            63.46 
Window 2  0 55.62 78.77           67.2 
Window 3   58.45 84.18 0          71.32 
Window 4    74.27 0 0         74.27 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 65.85  58.38 79.07            
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         Bank of the North                                                                              CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 77.86 0 85.26            81.56 
Window 2  0 83.99 0           83.99 
Window 3   91.03 0 0          91.03 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 77.86  86.76             
 
                                                                                  BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 0 100            100 
Window 2  0 100 0           100 
Window 3   100 0 0          100 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100  100             
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         Lion Bank                                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3   0 0 58.02          58.02 
Window 4    0 53.2 79.6         66.4 
Window 5     48.07 57.54 0        52.81 
Window 6      57.54 0 0       57.54 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean     53.1 64.89          
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3   0 0 58.02          58.02 
Window 4    0 53.2 79.6         66.4 
Window 5     48.07 57.54 0        52.81 
Window 6      57.54 0 0       57.54 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean     53.1 64.89          
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         Trans International Bank                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.38 71.36 68.91            66.22 
Window 2  39.83 56.92 58.22           51.66 
Window 3   61.71 62.91 68.64          64.42 
Window 4    70.84 67.25 0         69.05 
Window 5     53.98 0 0        53.98 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 58.38 55.6 62.51 63.99 63.29           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.38 71.36 68.91            66.22 
Window 2  39.83 56.92 60.5           52.42 
Window 3   61.71 62.91 69.25          64.62 
Window 4    70.85 67.25 0         69.05 
Window 5     53.98 0 0        53.98 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 58.38 55.6 62.51 64.75 63.49           
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         Societe Generale Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 40.58 36.75 0            38.67 
Window 2  36.75 0 0           36.75 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 40.58 36.75              
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 40.58 39.95 0            40.27 
Window 2  39.95 0 0           39.95 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 40.58 39.95              
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         Intercity Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 84.49 76.97 81.09            80.85 
Window 2  55.77 70.17 67.12           64.35 
Window 3   78.24 73.98 0          76.11 
Window 4    71.64 0 0         71.64 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 84.49 66.37 76.5 70.91            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 84.49 76.97 81.09            80.85 
Window 2  55.77 72.38 71.49           66.55 
Window 3   78.29 75.21 0          76.75 
Window 4    71.64 0 0         71.64 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 84.49 66.37 77.25 72.78            
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         Habib Nigeria Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 58.61 79.65 78.72            72.33 
Window 2  44.14 55.71 59.55           53.13 
Window 3   63.95 70.93 71.69          68.86 
Window 4    71.55 70.13 0         70.84 
Window 5     52.5 0 0        52.5 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 58.61 61.9 66.13 67.34 64.77           
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.53 89.3 88.94            79.92 
Window 2  49.53 63.72 71.34           61.53 
Window 3   65.45 73.26 77.12          71.94 
Window 4    71.72 72.11 0         71.92 
Window 5     53.55 0 0        53.55 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.53 69.42 72.7 72.11 67.59           
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         MBC International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 65.9 69.07 60.17            65.05 
Window 2  69.07 60.17 0           64.62 
Window 3   88.95 0 0          88.95 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 65.9 69.07 69.76             
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.32 74.59 65.88            68.93 
Window 2  74.59 65.88 0           70.24 
Window 3   88.95 0 0          88.95 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 66.32 74.59 73.57             
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         NNB International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 39.35            39.35 
Window 2  0 37.43 28.66           33.05 
Window 3   43.49 46.22 45.64          45.12 
Window 4    53.07 50.42 0         51.75 
Window 5     50.45 0 0        50.45 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   40.09 42.65 48.84           
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores         
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 39.56            39.35 
Window 2  0 37.43 30.04           33.74 
Window 3   43.49 46.22 45.64          45.12 
Window 4    53.07 50.42 0         51.75 
Window 5     50.45 0 0        50.45 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   40.16 43.11 48.84           
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         Reliance Bank                                                                              CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 43.53            43.53 
Window 2  0 38.75 37.35           38.05 
Window 3   44.51 45.42 0          44.97 
Window 4    51.53 0 0         51.53 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   42.26 44.77            
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 43.53            43.53 
Window 2  0 38.75 37.35           38.05 
Window 3   44.51 45.42 0          44.97 
Window 4    51.53 0 0         51.53 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   42.26 44.77            
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         Assurance Bank                                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 100 0            100 
Window 2  100 0 58.19           79.1 
Window 3   0 65.81 0          65.81 
Window 4    68.78 0 0         68.78 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  100  64.26            
 
                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 100 0            100 
Window 2  100 0 58.21           79.11 
Window 3   0 65.81 0          65.81 
Window 4    68.78 0 0         68.78 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  100  64.27            
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         Cooperative Development Bank                                              CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 71.28 87.04 83.53            80.62 
Window 2  81.84 69.74 81.02           77.53 
Window 3   73.09 84.36 0          78.73 
Window 4    87.7 0 0         87.7 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 71.28 84.44 75.45 84.36            
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 71.28 87.83 100            86.37 
Window 2  81.84 69.74 82.18           77.92 
Window 3   73.09 84.36 0          78.73 
Window 4    87.7 0 0         87.7 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 71.28 84.84 80.94 84.75            
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         DevCom Bank                                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 55.11 0 0            55.11 
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 55.11               
 
                                                                             BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 55.11 0 0            55.11 
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 55.11               
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         Equitorial Trust Bank                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 74.79 80.33 83.77            79.63 
Window 2  62.47 54.35 64.22           60.35 
Window 3   58.98 68.68 61.55          63.07 
Window 4    71 64.19 72.54         69.24 
Window 5     52.26 60.76 45.63        52.88 
Window 6      60.76 45.63 41.04       49.14 
Window 7       45.63 49.01 0      47.32 
Window 8        68.0 0 40.92     54.46 
Window 9         0 41.28 58.64    49.96 
Window 10          41.28 58.91 0   50.1 
Window 11           62.28 0 0  62.28 
Window 12                
Annual Mean 74.79 71.4 65.7 67.97 59.33 64.69 45.63 52.68  41.16 59.94     
 
                                                                           BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 74.79 80.68 87.47            80.97 
Window 2  69.23 60.67 75.53           68.48 
Window 3   61.55 76.26 69.93          69.25 
Window 4    75.33 69.3 80.18         74.94 
Window 5     52.26 65.13 50.73        56.04 
Window 6      65.13 50.73 47.77       54.54 
Window 7       48.1 51.02 0      49.56 
Window 8        68.2 0 40.92     54.46 
Window 9         0 41.28 58.64    49.96 
Window 10          41.28 58.91 0   50.1 
Window 11           62.28 0 0  62.28 
Window 12                
Annual Mean 74.79 74.96 69.9 75.71 63.83 70.15 49.85 55.66  41.16 59.94     
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         Centre-Point Merchant Bank                                              CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 62.1 100 0            81.05 
Window 2  100 0 0           100 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 62.1 100              
 
                                                                             BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 62.1 100 0            81.05 
Window 2  100 0 0           100 
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 62.1 100              
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         Gateway Bank                                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 60.62 75.41 70.14            68.72 
Window 2  61.17 60.28 68.64           63.36 
Window 3   65.01 72.94 0          68.98 
Window 4    71.56 0 0         71.56 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 60.62 68.29 65.14 71.05            
 
                                                            BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 60.62 75.41 70.14            68.72 
Window 2  61.17 60.28 70.57           64.01 
Window 3   65.01 72.94 0          68.98 
Window 4    71.56 0 0         71.56 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 60.62 68.29 65.14 71.69            
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         Afribank Nigeria                                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 48.25 51.09 60.73            53.36 
Window 2  42.35 54.28 46.84           47.82 
Window 3   60.58 53.09 51.81          55.16 
Window 4    51.93 50.04 59.97         53.98 
Window 5     41.97 48.56 53.07        47.87 
Window 6      48.56 53.07 81.03       60.89 
Window 7       56.27 86.67 0      71.47 
Window 8        86.78 0 100     93.39 
Window 9         0 100 27.19    63.6 
Window 10          100 27.5 0   63.75 
Window 11           28.96 0 0  28.96 
Window 12                
Annual Mean 48.25 46.72 58.53 50.62 48.06 52.36 54.14 84.83  100 27.88     
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 48.4 56.22 81.23            61.95 
Window 2  51.51 77.37 68.41           65.76 
Window 3   74.14 64.93 62.66          67.24 
Window 4    59.44 58.06 68.39         61.96 
Window 5     54.78 63.8 62.54        60.37 
Window 6      64.3 62.75 100       75.68 
Window 7       61.18 100 0      80.59 
Window 8        90.38 0 100     95.19 
Window 9         0 100 27.19    63.6 
Window 10          100 27.5 0   63.75 
Window 11           28.96 0 0  28.96 
Window 12                
Annual Mean 48.4 53.87 77.58 64.26 58.5 65.5 62.16 96.79  100 27.88     
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         Hallmark Bank                                                                            CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 52.63 62.63 63.12            59.46 
Window 2  56.49 57.19 65.18           59.62 
Window 3   61.87 72.05 0          66.96 
Window 4    78.34 0 0         78.34 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 52.63 59.56 60.73 71.86            
 
                                                                             BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 52.63 63.77 67.81            61.4 
Window 2  62.98 67.81 87.38           72.72 
Window 3   68.55 82.4 0          75.48 
Window 4    87.78 0 0         87.78 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 52.63 63.38 68.06 85.85            
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         National Bank of Nigeria                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 100 57.91            85.97 
Window 2  100 57.91 55.26           71.06 
Window 3   78.06 73.42 80.47          77.32 
Window 4    81.93 100 0         90.97 
Window 5     100 0 0        100 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 100 64.63 70.2 93.49           
 
                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 100 58.92            86.31 
Window 2  100 58.92 58.71           72.54 
Window 3   78.06 73.42 80.47          77.32 
Window 4    81.93 100 0         90.97 
Window 5     100 0 0        100 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 100 65.3 71.35 93.49           
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         Broad Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 31.52 54.94            43.23 
Window 2  23.76 47.71 69.11           46.86 
Window 3   59.92 80.46 52.91          64.43 
Window 4    71.24 44.41 0         57.83 
Window 5     44.41 0 0        44.41 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  27.64 54.19 73.6 47.24           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 31.52 54.94            43.23 
Window 2  23.76 47.71 69.31           46.93 
Window 3   59.92 80.46 52.91          64.43 
Window 4    71.24 44.41 0         57.83 
Window 5     44.41 0 0        44.41 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  27.64 54.19 73.67 47.24           
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         Marina International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 78.8 81.95 75.1            78.62 
Window 2  71.76 60.14 33.91           55.27 
Window 3   63.68 37.96 65.66          55.77 
Window 4    36.6 63.96 64.16         54.91 
Window 5     51.75 51.42 0        51.59 
Window 6      51.42 0 0       51.42 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 78.8 76.86 66.31 36.16 60.46 55.67          
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 78.8 81.95 78.56            79.77 
Window 2  71.76 60.14 33.91           55.27 
Window 3   63.68 37.96 65.66          55.77 
Window 4    36.6 63.96 64.16         54.91 
Window 5     51.75 51.42 0        51.59 
Window 6      51.42 0 0       51.42 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 78.8 76.86 67.46 36.16 60.46 55.67          
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         Lead Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 94.76 100 100            98.25 
Window 2  87.51 89.51 81.36           86.13 
Window 3   94.56 88.11 88.96          90.54 
Window 4    100 96.57 0         98.29 
Window 5     76.21 0 0        76.21 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 94.76 93.76 94.69 89.82 87.25           
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 94.76 100 100            98.25 
Window 2  87.51 89.51 81.36           86.13 
Window 3   94.56 88.11 88.96          90.54 
Window 4    100 96.57 0         98.29 
Window 5     76.21 0 0        76.21 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 94.76 93.76 94.69 89.82 87.25           
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         Regent Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Windows 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 57.73            57.73 
Window 2  0 50.33 30.64           40.49 
Window 3   60.58 38.54 49.13          49.42 
Window 4    31.15 45.77 55.52         44.15 
Window 5     38.39 47.28 0        42.84 
Window 6      47.28 0 0       47.28 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   56.21 33.44 44.43 50.03          
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 57.73            57.73 
Window 2  0 50.33 30.64           40.49 
Window 3   60.58 38.54 49.13          49.42 
Window 4    31.15 45.77 55.52         44.15 
Window 5     38.39 47.28 0        42.84 
Window 6      47.28 0 0       47.28 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   56.21 33.44 44.43 50.03          
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         Gulf Bank                                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.51 75.26 93.55            76.77 
Window 2  50.49 78.24 76.78           68.50 
Window 3   83.06 80.3 0          81.68 
Window 4    82.45 0 0         82.45 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.51 62.88 84.95 79.84            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.51 75.26 93.55            76.77 
Window 2  50.49 78.24 81.77           70.17 
Window 3   83.06 82.8 0          82.93 
Window 4    82.45 0 0         82.45 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.51 62.88 84.95 82.34            
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         Guardian Express Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 57.65            57.65 
Window 2  0 35.62 49.62           42.62 
Window 3   46.28 62.09 0          54.19 
Window 4    55.89 0 0         55.89 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   46.52 55.87            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 57.65            57.65 
Window 2  0 35.62 49.62           42.62 
Window 3   46.28 62.09 0          54.19 
Window 4    55.89 0 0         55.89 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   46.52 55.87            
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         Citizens International Bank                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 53.43 50.6 51.02            51.68 
Window 2  39.1 44.59 44.87           42.85 
Window 3   49.39 48.47 0          48.93 
Window 4    54.47 0 0         54.47 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 53.43 44.85 48.33 49.27            
 
                                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 53.43 51.51 56.12            53.69 
Window 2  42.97 55.26 59.5           52.58 
Window 3   56.17 55.93 0          56.05 
Window 4    62.05 0 0         62.05 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 53.43 47.24 55.85 59.16            
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         EIB International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.6 80.36 0            70.98 
Window 2  72.16 0 57.28           64.72 
Window 3   0 77.34 0          77.34 
Window 4    71.5 0 0         71.5 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.6 76.26  68.71            
 
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 62.69 91.83 0            77.26 
Window 2  80.11 0 68.63           74.37 
Window 3   0 77.83 0          77.83 
Window 4    71.5 0 0         71.5 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 62.69 85.97  72.65            
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         First Atlantic Bank                                                                             CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 85.54 80.19 74.88            80.2 
Window 2  73.83 53.65 60.52           62.67 
Window 3   58.76 70.9 54.43          61.36 
Window 4    75.84 60.51 0         68.18 
Window 5     44.81 0 0        44.81 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 85.54 77.01 62.43 69.09 53.25           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 85.54 80.19 80.92            82.22 
Window 2  73.83 53.65 62.55           63.34 
Window 3   58.76 70.9 54.43          61.36 
Window 4    75.84 60.51 0         68.18 
Window 5     44.81 0 0        44.81 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 85.54 77.01 64.44 69.76 53.25           
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         NUB International Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 100 23.68            61.84 
Window 2  100 14.96 35.87           50.28 
Window 3   22.52 42.39 46.58          37.16 
Window 4    42.79 52.08 0         47.44 
Window 5     49.78 0 0        49.78 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  100 20.39 40.35 49.48           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 100 23.68            61.84 
Window 2  100 14.96 35.87           50.28 
Window 3   22.52 42.39 46.58          37.16 
Window 4    42.79 52.08 0         47.44 
Window 5     49.78 0 0        49.78 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  100 20.39 40.35 49.48           
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         Standard Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.45 60.7 60.09            60.75 
Window 2  49.15 45.95 41.35           45.48 
Window 3   51.16 46.97 49.4          49.18 
Window 4    61.58 71.75 0         66.67 
Window 5     44.1 0 0        44.1 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.45 54.93 52.4 49.97 55.08           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.73 71.49 73.71            68.98 
Window 2  73.46 76.05 74.56           74.69 
Window 3   67.15 72.42 87.4          75.66 
Window 4    70 82.67 0         76.34 
Window 5     50.65 0 0        50.65 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.73 72.48 72.3 72.33 73.57           
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         Continental Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 64.79 62.37 80.82            69.33 
Window 2  52.59 80.82 0           66.71 
Window 3   87.81 0 0          87.81 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 64.79 57.48 83.15             
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 64.79 62.37 91.49            72.88 
Window 2  52.59 91.49 0           71.04 
Window 3   92.29 0 0          92.29 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 64.79 57.48 91.76             
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         Metropolitan Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 36.06 0 71.97            54.02 
Window 2  0 54.31 62.67           58.49 
Window 3   58.3 69.74 0          64.02 
Window 4    75.79 0 0         75.79 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 36.06  61.53 69.4            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 36.06 0 71.97            54.02 
Window 2  0 54.31 62.72           58.52 
Window 3   58.3 69.74 0          64.02 
Window 4    75.79 0 0         75.79 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 36.06  61.53 69.42            
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         Bond Bank                                                                  CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3   0 0 61.23          61.23 
Window 4    0 56.64 0         56.64 
Window 5     56.64 0 0        56.64 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean     58.17           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3   0 0 61.23          61.23 
Window 4    0 56.64 0         56.64 
Window 5     56.64 0 0        56.64 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean     58.17           
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         All States Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 41.47 63.37 0            52.42 
Window 2  27.42 0 22.67           25.05 
Window 3   0 31.88 42.59          37.24 
Window 4    30.65 39.62 50.24         40.17 
Window 5     31.42 35.99 0        33.71 
Window 6      35.99 0 0       35.99 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 41.47 45.4  28.4 37.88 40.74          
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 48.89 82.54 0            65.72 
Window 2  39.34 0 33.48           36.41 
Window 3   0 34.13 48.55          41.34 
Window 4    30.65 40.43 59.46         43.51 
Window 5     31.42 48.79 0        40.11 
Window 6      48.79 0 0       48.79 
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 48.89 60.94  32.75 40.13 52.35          
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         City Express Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 54.61 65.3 65.28            61.73 
Window 2  59.1 61.68 62.39           61.06 
Window 3   67.45 68.13 0          67.79 
Window 4    62.86 0 0         62.86 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 54.61 62.2 64.8 64.46            
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 54.61 65.3 65.39            61.77 
Window 2  59.1 62.2 63.05           61.45 
Window 3   67.45 68.13 0          67.79 
Window 4    62.86 0 0         62.86 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 54.61 62.2 65.01 64.68            
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         NBM Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.62 56.28 61.52            62.81 
Window 2  54.43 60.08 65.8           60.1 
Window 3   63.03 74.45 0          68.74 
Window 4    69.05 0 0         69.05 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 70.62 55.36 61.54 69.77            
 
                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.62 56.28 61.67            62.86 
Window 2  54.43 60.08 68.59           61.03 
Window 3   63.03 74.45 0          68.74 
Window 4    69.05 0 0         69.05 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 70.62 55.36 61.59 70.7            
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         Universal Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.1 56.49 69.83            62.47 
Window 2  56.49 61.07 51.07           56.21 
Window 3   71.46 56.05 0          63.76 
Window 4    52.71 0 0         52.71 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.1 56.49 67.45 53.28            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 61.11 82.15 71.72            71.66 
Window 2  82.14 70.28 56.21           69.54 
Window 3   76.16 59.36 0          67.76 
Window 4    53.04 0 0         53.04 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 61.11 82.15 72.72 56.2            
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         African Express Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 93.14 43.21            68.18 
Window 2  57.48 37.74 0           47.61 
Window 3   61.65 0 0          61.65 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  75.31 47.53             
 
                                                                                              BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 93.14 51.67            72.41 
Window 2  57.48 37.74 0           47.61 
Window 3   61.65 0 0          61.65 
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean  75.31 50.35             
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         Omega Bank                                                                 CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.86 51.94 0            59.4 
Window 2  48.19 0 43.04           45.62 
Window 3   0 55.66 0          55.66 
Window 4    51.1 0 0         51.1 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 66.86 50.07  49.93            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 67.08 53.33 0            60.21 
Window 2  52.12 0 48.28           50.2 
Window 3   0 55.66 0          55.66 
Window 4    51.1 0 0         51.1 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 67.08 52.73  51.68            
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         Fortune International Bank                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 71.5 85.08 100            85.53 
Window 2  70.79 100 89.72           86.84 
Window 3   100 93.57 0          96.79 
Window 4    100 0 0         100 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 71.5 77.94 100 94.43            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 71.5 85.08 100            85.53 
Window 2  71.53 100 93.39           88.31 
Window 3   100 93.7 0          96.85 
Window 4    100 0 0         100 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 71.5 78.31 100 95.7            
 
 
 
 
 
 
436 
 
         Indo-Nigerian Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 86.75 84.62            90.46 
Window 2  75.7 56.29 71.54           67.84 
Window 3   60.07 77.39 88.17          75.21 
Window 4    80.81 84.95 0         82.88 
Window 5     62.11 0 0        62.11 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 81.23 66.99 76.58 78.41           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 100 86.75 86.24            91 
Window 2  75.7 56.29 71.54           67.84 
Window 3   60.07 77.39 88.17          75.21 
Window 4    80.81 84.95 0         82.88 
Window 5     62.11 0 0        62.11 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 100 81.23 65.53 76.58 78.41           
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         Magnum Trust Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 53.27            53.27 
Window 2  0 52.95 48.16           50.56 
Window 3   64.03 53.77 0          58.9 
Window 4    56.57 0 0         56.57 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   56.75 52.83            
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 0 0 54.32            54.32 
Window 2  0 54.32 48.42           51.37 
Window 3   64.03 53.77 0          58.9 
Window 4    56.57 0 0         56.57 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean   57.56 52.92            
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         Capital Bank International                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 53.96 65.15 59.08            59.4 
Window 2  61.57 54.13 60.53           58.74 
Window 3   61.37 65.74 55          60.7 
Window 4    60.5 51.29 0         55.9 
Window 5     43.28 0 0        43.28 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 53.96 63.36 58.19 62.26 49.86           
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 55.07 66.51 59.38            60.32 
Window 2  63.34 55.35 62.27           60.32 
Window 3   61.37 65.74 55          60.7 
Window 4    60.5 51.29 0         55.9 
Window 5     43.28 0 0        43.28 
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 55.07 64.93 58.7 62.84 49.86           
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         Co-operative Bank                                                                               CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.61 54.63 84.05            68.43 
Window 2  53.76 79.34 87.68           73.59 
Window 3   95.72 100 0          97.86 
Window 4    100 0 0         100 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 66.61 54.2 86.37 95.89            
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 66.61 55.6 84.67            68.96 
Window 2  55.34 82.65 98.18           78.72 
Window 3   95.72 100 0          97.86 
Window 4    100 0 0         100 
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 66.61 55.47 87.68 99.39            
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         FinBank                                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6      0 0 60.01       60.01 
Window 7       0 64.64 50.89      57.77 
Window 8        81.14 70.59 0     75.87 
Window 9         68.96 0 0    68.96 
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean        68.6 63.48       
 
                                                                                 BCC Efficiency Scores       
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1                
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6      0 0 96.76       96.76 
Window 7       0 94.54 66.68      80.61 
Window 8        89.75 70.59 0     80.17 
Window 9         68.96 0 0    68.96 
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean        93.68 68.74       
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         Peak Merchant Bank                                                                CCR Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.83 0 0            70.83 
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 70.83               
 
                                                                                BCC Efficiency Scores        
Window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Window 1 70.83 0 0            70.83 
Window 2                
Window 3                
Window 4                
Window 5                
Window 6                
Window 7                
Window 8                
Window 9                
Window 10                
Window 11                
Window 12                
Annual Mean 70.83               
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Appendix 12: CAMEL(S) Proxies used in Literature 
Author Capital Adequacy Asset Quality Management Quality Earnings Liquidity Bank 
Size/Sensitivity to 
Risk 
(Chiaramonte, 
Croci, & Poli, 
2015) 
 Equity to Total 
Assets Ratio 
 Impaired Loans to 
Gross Loans Ratio 
 Cost to 
Income 
Ratio 
 Return on 
Average 
Assets 
(ROAA) 
 Net Loans to 
Deposit & 
Short Term 
Funding 
 Non-
Interest 
Income to 
Net 
Operating 
Revenue 
Ratio  
(Nurazi & 
Evans, 2005) 
 Equity Capital- 
Fixed 
Assets/Total Loan 
+ Securities 
 Equity 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
 Earnings Before 
Income 
Tax/Productive 
Assets 
 Off-Balance Sheet 
Activities/Equity 
Capital  
 Net 
Income/Total 
(ROA) 
 Net Income 
– Interest 
Expense/Tot
al Assets 
 Earning After 
Tax/Operating 
Income or 
Sales 
 Operating 
Expense/Oper
ating Income 
 Total 
Loan/Total 
Deposits 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
 Cash/Total 
Assets 
 Cash & 
Bank/Total 
Deposit 
 Growth in 
Loan 
 Market 
Price per 
Ordinary 
Equity 
Share/Ear
ning Per 
Share 
 Bank 
Size* 
Natural 
Logarithm 
of Total 
Assets  
(Koetter et al., 
2007) 
 Total Capital 
Reserves/Total 
Assets  
 Securities to Risk-
Weighted Assets 
 Loan Loss 
Provision/Total 
Customer Credits  
 Stochastic 
Frontier 
Analysis  
 Operating 
Returns/Risk 
Weighted 
Assets 
 Cash & Inter-
Bank 
Assets/Risk 
Weighted 
Assets 
 
(W.-K. Wang, 
Lu, & Wang, 
2013) 
 Total Capital 
Reserves/Total 
Assets 
 Impaired 
Assets/Total Loans 
 Loan Loss 
 Cost to 
Income 
Ratio  
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Net Interest 
 Cash & Inter 
Bank 
Assets/Risk-
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 Equity/Total 
Assets 
Provision/Total 
Customer Credits 
 Non-Interest 
Expense/Tot
al Assets 
margin (NIM) Weighted 
Assets 
 Deposits/Total 
Liabilities  
(Ongore & 
Kusa, 2013) 
 Total 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Total 
operating 
Revenue/Tot
al Profit 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Customer 
Deposits 
 
(Sahut & Mili, 
2011) 
 Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Equity/Total 
Loans 
 Equity + Loan 
Loss 
reserve/Loans 
 Loan Loss 
Reserve/Gross Loans 
 Loans Growth 
 DEA 
Efficiency 
Scores 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Net Interest 
Income/Total 
Revenue 
 Loan Loss 
Provision 
 Personnel 
Expenses 
 Deposits/Total 
Assets 
 Bank Size 
* Log of 
Total 
Assets 
(Bhatia & 
Mahendru, 
2015) 
 Capital Adequacy 
ratio 
 Debt Equity Ratio 
 Non-performing 
Loans/Net Advances 
 Total 
Investments/Total 
assets 
 Total 
Expenses/ 
Total Income 
 Operating 
Expenses/To
tal Expenses 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Spread to 
Total Assets 
 Government 
Securities/Tota
l Investments 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Bank Size 
* Log of 
Total 
Assets 
(Wong, Deng, 
Tseng, Lee, & 
Hooy, 2014) 
 Total 
Assets/Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
 Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds/Total 
 Loan Loss 
Provision/Total Net 
Loans 
 Loan Loss 
Provision/Gross 
loans 
 Total Risk 
Weighted 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Total Net 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
 Demand 
Liabilities/Tot
al Deposits 
 Gross 
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Assets 
 Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds/Total Net 
Loans 
 Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds/Total 
Deposits 
 Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds/Contingent 
Liabilities 
 Total 
Shareholders’ 
Funds/Total Risk 
Weighted Assets 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
(Karapinar & 
Dogan, 2015) 
 Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
 Equity/Total 
Liabilities 
 Equity/Loans 
 Paid-Up 
Capital/Equity 
 Loans/Total Assets 
 Immovable 
Assets/Total Assets 
 Non-Performing 
Loans (Gross)/Total 
Loans 
 Non-Performing 
Loan Reserves/Total 
Loans 
 Bearing Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Non-
Performing 
Loans/Total 
Loans 
 Net Income 
Per Branch 
 Net Income 
Per 
Employee 
 Non-Interest 
Income/Total 
Assets 
 Non-Interest 
Income/Non-
Interest 
Expenses 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Non-Interest 
Income/Non-
Interest 
Expenses 
 Total Interest 
Income/Bearin
g Assets 
 Total Interest 
Expenses/Cost
ly Liabilities 
 Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Foreign 
Liabilities 
 Deposits/Equit
y 
 Foreign 
Money Liquid 
Assets/FM 
Liabilities 
 Securities 
Portfolio/
Total 
Assets 
 Bearing 
Assets/Co
stly 
Liabilities 
 Net 
Interest 
Income/T
otal Assets 
 Foreign 
Currency 
Total 
Assets/FM 
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Total 
Liabilities   
(Hadriche, 
2015) 
 Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Liquid 
Assets/Deposit 
& Short Term 
Funding 
 Net 
Loans/Deposit 
& Short Term 
Funding 
 
(Christopoulos
, Mylonakis, & 
Diktapani, 
2011) 
 Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Management 
Expenses/Sal
es 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
 Circulating 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Securities/
Total 
Assets 
(Mayes & 
Stremmel, 
2012) 
 Leverage Ratio 
 Risk-Based 
Capital Ratio 
 Gross Revenue 
Ratio 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Efficiency 
Ratio 
(Provided by 
the FDIC) 
 Net Operating 
Income/Asset 
Ratio 
 Loan to 
Deposit Ratio 
 Total 
Volatile 
Liabilities/
Total 
Assets 
(Boyacioglu, 
Kara, & 
Baykan, 2009) 
 Shareholder’s 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Shareholder’s 
Equity/Total 
Loans 
 Shareholder’s 
Equity + Net 
Profit/Total 
Assets + Off 
Balance Sheet 
Commitments 
 Permanent 
Assets/Total Assets 
 Total Loans/Total 
Loans 
 Loans under Follow-
Up/ Total Loans 
 Specific 
Provision/Total 
Loans 
 Specific 
Provision/Loans 
under Follow-Up  
 Personnel 
Expenses/Av
erage Assets 
 Net 
Profit/Average 
Assets 
 Net 
Profits/Averag
e 
Shareholder’s 
Equity 
 Interest 
Income/Total 
Operating 
Income 
 Non-Interest 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
 Trading 
Securities/
Total 
Assets 
 FX 
Assets/FX 
Liabilities 
 Net 
Interest 
Income/A
verage 
Assets 
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Expenses/Tota
l Operating 
Income 
 Net on 
Balance 
Sheet 
Position/T
otal 
Sharehold
er’s 
Equity  
(W.-k. Wang, 
Lu, & Lin, 
2012) 
 Total 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Annual Asset 
Growth Ratio 
 Gross Impaired 
Assets/Total Loans 
 Overhead/To
tal Assets 
 Gross 
Impaired 
Assets/Total 
Loans 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
 
(Otchere, 
2009) 
 Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
 Loan Loss 
provisions/Total 
Loans 
 Impaired 
Assets/Total Loans 
 Net Impaired 
Assets/Total Loans 
 Cost to 
Income 
Ratio 
 Expense to 
Asset Ratio 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
Labour (Employment 
levels) 
Proxy used  
 Growth in 
Staff Levels 
 
(Maghyereh & 
Awartani, 
2014) 
 Tier 1 
Capital/Risk 
Weighted Assets 
 Total Capital 
Ratio (Tier 1 + 
Tier 2 
Capital/Risk 
Weighted Assets) 
 Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Net Loans/Total 
Assets 
 Loan Loss 
Provisions/Total 
Loans 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 DEA – 
Efficiency 
Score 
 Net Interest 
margin (NIM) 
 ROAE (Return 
on Average 
Equity) 
 ROAA(Return 
on Average 
Assets) 
 Interbank 
Ratio 
(Deposits due 
from 
banks/Deposit
s due to banks 
 Liquid 
Assets/Deposit
s & Short 
Term Funds 
 Included 
Size as a 
Non-
CAMEL 
Variable – 
Natural 
log of 
Total 
Assets 
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(Mekonnen, 
Kedir, & 
Shibru, 2015) 
 Capital/Risk 
Weighted Assets 
 Loan Loss 
provision/Total 
Assets 
 Total Non-
Interest 
Income/Total 
Non-Interest 
Expense 
 Net Income 
After Tax & 
Provision/(Inte
rest Income + 
Non-Interest 
Income) 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Deposits 
 
(Kobayashi, 
2015) 
 Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
 Disclosed Non-
Performing 
Loans/Total Assets 
 Return on 
Equity 
(ROE) 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Cash + Due 
from 
Banks/Total 
Assets 
 Control 
Variable – 
Size – 
Natural 
Log of 
Total 
Assets 
(Wheelock, 
2005) 
 Total 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Real Estate 
Loans/Total Loans  
 Commercial & 
Industrial 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Other Real Estate 
Owned/Total Assets 
 Income Earned, but 
not Collected on 
Loans/Total Assets 
  Net Income 
after 
Taxes/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
 (Federal Funds 
Sold – Federal 
Funds 
Purchased)/To
tal Assets 
 Miscellan
eous 
factor: 
Size – Log 
of Total 
Assets 
(Roman & 
Sargu, 2013) 
 Total Capital 
Ratio 
 Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans 
 Loan Loss 
Provisions/Net 
Interest Revenues 
 Total Loans/Total 
Assets  
 Operating 
Expenses/To
tal Assets  
 Interest 
Expenses/De
posits 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 Cost to 
Income Ratio  
 Liquid 
Assets/Deposit
s & Short 
Term Funding 
 Net 
Loans/Deposit
s & Short 
Term Funding  
Size – Total 
Assets/Total 
Sector Assets 
(Liu & Hung, 
2006) 
 Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
 Non-Performing 
Loans Ratio 
 Employee 
Productivity 
Ratio 
  Liquid 
Reserve Ratio  
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(Oshinsky & 
Olin, 2006) 
 Tangible Equity 
Capital 
 Capital 
Injections: 
From BHC 
Outside 
 Past-Due Loans (30 
– 89 days) 
 Past-Due Loans (90 
+ Days) 
 Nonaccrual Loans 
and Leases 
 Other Real Estate 
Owned 
 Allowance for Loan 
Loss 
 Efficiency 
Ratio  
 Total Interest 
Income 
 Total Non-
Interest 
Income 
 Total Interest 
Expense 
 Loan-Loss 
Provision 
 Loan Charge-
Offs 
 Expenses on 
Premises 
 Salaries 
 Other Non-
Interest 
Expense 
 Volatile 
Liabilities 
 Loans + 
Securities > 
Five Years 
 
(Ozkan-Gunay 
& Ozkan, 
2007) 
 Shareholders’ 
Equity + Total 
Income/Deposit + 
Non-Deposit 
Funds 
 Net Working 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
 FX 
Position/Sharehol
ders’ Equity 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Permanent 
Assets/Total Assets 
 FX Assets/FX 
Liabilities 
  Net 
Income/Avera
ge Total 
Assets 
 Net 
Income/Avera
ge 
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Deposit 
+ Non-Deposit 
Funds 
 FX Liquid 
Assets/FX 
Liabilities  
 
(Dincer, 
Gencer, 
Orhan, & 
Sahinbas, 
2011) 
 Shareholder’s 
Equity/ (Loan + 
Market + 
principle Amount 
Subject to 
Operational Risk) 
 Financial Assets 
(net)/Total Assets 
 Total Loans and 
Receivables/Total 
Assets 
 Permanent 
 Interest 
Expenses/To
tal Expenses 
 Interest 
Incomes/Tot
al Incomes 
 Net profit 
(losses)/Total 
Assets 
 Net Profit 
(Losses)/Total 
Shareholders’ 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Short 
Term 
 Total 
Assets/Sec
tor Assets 
 Total 
Loans & 
Receivabl
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 Shareholder’s 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Shareholder’s 
Equity/(Deposit + 
Non-Deposit 
Sources) 
Assets/Total Assets  Total 
Incomes/Tot
al Expenses 
Equity Liabilities 
 Liquid 
Assets/Deposit 
& Non 
Deposit 
Sources 
es/Sector 
Loans and 
Receivabl
es  
 Total 
Deposits/S
ector 
Deposits 
(Erol, Baklaci, 
Aydogan, & 
Tunc, 2014) 
 Shareholders’ 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 On-balance Sheet 
FX 
Position/Sharehol
ders’ Equity 
 Loans under Follow-
Up (Net)/Total 
Loans and 
Receivables 
 Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Loans under 
Follow-Up 
(Net)/Total 
Loans and 
Receivables 
 Other 
Operating 
Expenses/To
tal Assets 
 
 Earnings 
Availability to 
Common 
Stockholders/
Total Assets 
 Earnings 
availability to 
Common 
Stockholders/
Total Equity 
 Income before 
Taxes/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Income/Total 
Expense 
 TC Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 FX Liquid 
Assets/FX 
Liabilities 
 On-
balance-
Sheet FX 
Position/S
hareholder
s’ Equity 
 FX 
Assets/FX 
liabilities  
(Dunn, 
Intintoli, & 
McNutt, 2015) 
 Tier 1 Risk-Based 
Capital Ratio 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
 Efficiency 
Ratio  
 Operating 
return/Average 
Total Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Averag
e Total Assets 
 Core 
Deposits/Aver
age Total 
Assets 
 Beta 
(Muhmad & 
Hashim, 2015) 
 Total 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
 Non-performing 
Loans/Total Assets 
 Loan Loss 
 Interest 
Expenses/To
tal Loans 
 Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
 Net Interest 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Deposits 
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 Total 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Equity/Total 
Loans 
Provision/Total 
Loans 
 Total Loans/Total 
Assets 
 Operating 
Profit/Net 
Income 
 Personnel 
Expenses/To
tal Non-
interest 
Expenses 
Income/Total 
Assets 
 Interest 
Expenses/Tota
l Assets 
 Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 
 Total 
Loans/Total 
Deposits 
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Appendix 13: Regression Analysis Results (STATA Output) 
 
Model 1 Fixed Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
Model 1 Random Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(75, 280) =     2.92             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .54721038   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.332778
     sigma_u    11.359155
                                                                              
       _cons     74.65133   9.468395     7.88   0.000     56.01306    93.28961
         GDP     .3183778   .3323953     0.96   0.339    -.3359332    .9726889
    SIZENLTA     5.419862   .9682359     5.60   0.000     3.513916    7.325808
        TSTA    -.2544979   .0767114    -3.32   0.001    -.4055022   -.1034936
      LADSTF    -.1519913    .040339    -3.77   0.000    -.2313976    -.072585
         NIM    -.3693838   .2716472    -1.36   0.175    -.9041138    .1653463
         CIR     -.320012   .0674723    -4.74   0.000    -.4528294   -.1871946
        ILGL     .0354828   .0696301     0.51   0.611    -.1015821    .1725478
         ETA     .6793619   .1278057     5.32   0.000     .4277799    .9309439
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1169                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(8,280)           =     21.84
       overall = 0.4927                                        max =        14
       between = 0.3987                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.3842                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       364
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .35921116   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.332778
     sigma_u    7.7363221
                                                                              
       _cons     72.50271   7.701389     9.41   0.000     57.40826    87.59715
         GDP     .0217872   .3180743     0.07   0.945    -.6016269    .6452013
    SIZENLTA     5.595221   .6966897     8.03   0.000     4.229734    6.960707
        TSTA    -.2451553   .0662336    -3.70   0.000    -.3749707   -.1153399
      LADSTF    -.1591946    .035804    -4.45   0.000    -.2293691   -.0890201
         NIM    -.2124282   .2157126    -0.98   0.325    -.6352171    .2103607
         CIR     -.312632   .0599003    -5.22   0.000    -.4300344   -.1952296
        ILGL     .0988578   .0597908     1.65   0.098      -.01833    .2160457
         ETA     .7683932   .1112514     6.91   0.000     .5503444    .9864419
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    253.53
       overall = 0.5009                                        max =        14
       between = 0.4571                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.3794                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       364
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 1 Hausman-Test Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
 
 
 
Model 1 Fixed Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0300
                          =       17.01
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .3183778     .0217872        .2965907        .0965163
    SIZENLTA      5.419862     5.595221       -.1753588         .672387
        TSTA     -.2544979    -.2451553       -.0093426        .0387008
      LADSTF     -.1519913    -.1591946        .0072033        .0185826
         NIM     -.3693838    -.2124282       -.1569556        .1651068
         CIR      -.320012     -.312632         -.00738        .0310559
        ILGL      .0354828     .0988578        -.063375        .0356849
         ETA      .6793619     .7683932       -.0890313         .062908
                                                                              
                FixedFEMod~1 RandomREMo~1    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FixedFEModel1 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(70, 134) =     3.17             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .66074829   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    9.5979424
     sigma_u    13.394766
                                                                              
       _cons     102.7369   17.85821     5.75   0.000      67.4165    138.0573
         GDP     .4198611   .4343411     0.97   0.335      -.43919    1.278912
    SIZENLTA     1.959702    3.99568     0.49   0.625    -5.943057    9.862461
        TSTA    -.1961705   .1175626    -1.67   0.098    -.4286888    .0363479
      LADSTF    -.3793326   .0743945    -5.10   0.000    -.5264719   -.2321933
         NIM    -.4211286   .3419533    -1.23   0.220    -1.097453    .2551954
         CIR    -.3586149   .1014698    -3.53   0.001    -.5593046   -.1579253
        ILGL     .1391857   .1071636     1.30   0.196    -.0727651    .3511366
         ETA     .7075548    .219427     3.22   0.002     .2735664    1.141543
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0344                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(8,134)           =      5.66
       overall = 0.2780                                        max =         5
       between = 0.1863                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       213
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 1 Random Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
 
Model 1 Hausman-Test Pre- 2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004)  
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .53115342   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    9.5979424
     sigma_u    10.215809
                                                                              
       _cons     81.06965   10.38175     7.81   0.000     60.72178    101.4175
         GDP     .0459169   .3957548     0.12   0.908    -.7297481     .821582
    SIZENLTA     6.301526   1.538882     4.09   0.000     3.285374    9.317679
        TSTA    -.2233474   .0999226    -2.24   0.025     -.419192   -.0275028
      LADSTF    -.3297408   .0627114    -5.26   0.000     -.452653   -.2068287
         NIM    -.3217775   .2589753    -1.24   0.214    -.8293598    .1858048
         CIR     -.341746   .0813164    -4.20   0.000    -.5011232   -.1823688
        ILGL     .2049168   .0822639     2.49   0.013     .0436825    .3661511
         ETA     .8718805   .1799381     4.85   0.000     .5192083    1.224553
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     77.40
       overall = 0.3443                                        max =         5
       between = 0.3100                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2370                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       213
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2284
                          =       10.55
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .4198611     .0459169        .3739442        .1789704
    SIZENLTA      1.959702     6.301526       -4.341824        3.687452
        TSTA     -.1961705    -.2233474        .0271769        .0619391
      LADSTF     -.3793326    -.3297408       -.0495918        .0400227
         NIM     -.4211286    -.3217775       -.0993511        .2233021
         CIR     -.3586149     -.341746       -.0168689        .0606941
        ILGL      .1391857     .2049168       -.0657311        .0686781
         ETA      .7075548     .8718805       -.1643257        .1255807
                                                                              
                FEPreModel1  REPreModel1     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FEPreModel1 .
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Model 1 Fixed Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
Model 1 Random Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 40) =     1.58              Prob > F = 0.0950
                                                                              
         rho    .53795058   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.563964
     sigma_u    11.398662
                                                                              
       _cons     89.79196   60.27772     1.49   0.144    -32.03385    211.6178
         GDP     .7540805   3.560874     0.21   0.833    -6.442715    7.950876
    SIZENLTA     1.978573     3.2186     0.61   0.542     -4.52646    8.483607
        TSTA     .0094922   .2004311     0.05   0.962    -.3955941    .4145785
      LADSTF    -.1579673   .1450596    -1.09   0.283    -.4511437     .135209
         NIM     .8669124   1.642929     0.53   0.601    -2.453571    4.187396
         CIR    -.4100226   .2686998    -1.53   0.135    -.9530852    .1330399
        ILGL    -.1109631   .2714813    -0.41   0.685    -.6596472     .437721
         ETA     .4500391   .3061616     1.47   0.149    -.1687365    1.068815
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1129                        Prob > F           =    0.1671
                                                F(8,40)            =      1.56
       overall = 0.1976                                        max =         4
       between = 0.2682                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.2381                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
. 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.563964
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     65.50887   39.50865     1.66   0.097    -11.92667    142.9444
         GDP     2.088509   3.542086     0.59   0.555    -4.853851    9.030869
    SIZENLTA     6.773419   1.893756     3.58   0.000     3.061725    10.48511
        TSTA    -.1790884   .1442858    -1.24   0.215    -.4618834    .1037066
      LADSTF    -.1389736   .0980235    -1.42   0.156    -.3310961    .0531489
         NIM    -.4886381   .8837116    -0.55   0.580    -2.220681    1.243405
         CIR    -.4802177   .1620126    -2.96   0.003    -.7977565   -.1626789
        ILGL    -.0476982   .1267071    -0.38   0.707    -.2960396    .2006432
         ETA     .4868737   .2657954     1.83   0.067    -.0340756    1.007823
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     47.19
       overall = 0.4206                                        max =         4
       between = 0.7618                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1753                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 1 Hausman-Test 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
 
Model 1 Fixed Effects 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0006
                          =       27.44
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .7540805     2.088509       -1.334428         .365318
    SIZENLTA      1.978573     6.773419       -4.794846        2.602513
        TSTA      .0094922    -.1790884        .1885807        .1391194
      LADSTF     -.1579673    -.1389736       -.0189937        .1069284
         NIM      .8669124    -.4886381         1.35555        1.385016
         CIR     -.4100226    -.4802177         .070195         .214363
        ILGL     -.1109631    -.0476982       -.0632649        .2400987
         ETA      .4500391     .4868737       -.0368346        .1519465
                                                                              
                FE2005Refo~1 RE2005Refo~1    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE2005ReformsModel1 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(17, 51) =     2.52              Prob > F = 0.0056
                                                                              
         rho    .73186851   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.7809162
     sigma_u    14.507162
                                                                              
       _cons     234.6699   70.40995     3.33   0.002     93.31608    376.0238
         GDP    -1.135838   .7459502    -1.52   0.134    -2.633395    .3617198
    SIZENLTA    -14.68028   8.865049    -1.66   0.104    -32.47761    3.117047
        TSTA    -.5480561   .2303599    -2.38   0.021    -1.010523   -.0855894
      LADSTF    -.1206314   .1144987    -1.05   0.297    -.3504971    .1092344
         NIM    -.9435209   .8605285    -1.10   0.278    -2.671104    .7840621
         CIR     -.257172   .1531122    -1.68   0.099    -.5645576    .0502136
        ILGL    -.2000518   .1558023    -1.28   0.205     -.512838    .1127344
         ETA     .0993344   .4816893     0.21   0.837    -.8676973    1.066366
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7826                        Prob > F           =    0.1071
                                                F(8,51)            =      1.76
       overall = 0.0004                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0204                                        avg =       4.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.2164                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        18
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        77
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 1 Random Effects 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
Model 1 Hausman-Test 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .33511769   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.7809162
     sigma_u    6.2339903
                                                                              
       _cons     94.74581   23.72349     3.99   0.000     48.24862     141.243
         GDP    -.8218882   .6864072    -1.20   0.231    -2.167222    .5234452
    SIZENLTA     2.244473   2.590449     0.87   0.386    -2.832714     7.32166
        TSTA    -.2561767   .1571319    -1.63   0.103    -.5641497    .0517962
      LADSTF    -.0054197   .0915589    -0.06   0.953    -.1848718    .1740324
         NIM    -.2154229   .6854868    -0.31   0.753    -1.558952    1.128107
         CIR    -.2638647   .1173352    -2.25   0.025    -.4938375   -.0338919
        ILGL    -.1213454   .1417583    -0.86   0.392    -.3991866    .1564958
         ETA     .6947237   .3225832     2.15   0.031     .0624723    1.326975
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0303
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     16.98
       overall = 0.2849                                        max =         5
       between = 0.3560                                        avg =       4.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.1350                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        18
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        77
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3962
                          =        8.39
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP     -1.135838    -.8218882       -.3139496        .2920392
    SIZENLTA     -14.68028     2.244473       -16.92475        8.478129
        TSTA     -.5480561    -.2561767       -.2918794        .1684495
      LADSTF     -.1206314    -.0054197       -.1152117        .0687527
         NIM     -.9435209    -.2154229       -.7280981        .5202087
         CIR      -.257172    -.2638647        .0066927        .0983656
        ILGL     -.2000518    -.1213454       -.0787065        .0646447
         ETA      .0993344     .6947237       -.5953893        .3577216
                                                                              
                FE2009Model1 RE2009Model1    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE2009Model1 .
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Model 2 Fixed Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
Model 2 Random Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(75, 277) =     2.42             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .48138962   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1931038
     sigma_u    1.1494921
                                                                              
       _cons     9.151517   1.096791     8.34   0.000     6.992412    11.31062
         GDP    -.0647164   .0389733    -1.66   0.098    -.1414379     .012005
    SIZENLTA    -.4171961   .1118301    -3.73   0.000     -.637341   -.1970512
        TSTA     .0030354   .0088931     0.34   0.733    -.0144713    .0205421
      LADSTF     .0143768     .00472     3.05   0.003     .0050852    .0236684
         NIM     .1367167   .0313956     4.35   0.000     .0749124    .1985209
         CIR    -.0876312   .0078475   -11.17   0.000    -.1030795   -.0721829
        ILGL    -.0393854   .0082014    -4.80   0.000    -.0555303   -.0232405
         ETA     .0070292   .0151031     0.47   0.642    -.0227022    .0367606
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0251                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(8,277)           =     33.51
       overall = 0.5812                                        max =        14
       between = 0.5305                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4918                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       361
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .34467822   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1931038
     sigma_u    .86528234
                                                                              
       _cons     9.000937   .8744836    10.29   0.000      7.28698    10.71489
         GDP    -.0672932   .0366516    -1.84   0.066    -.1391289    .0045426
    SIZENLTA    -.3534223    .078618    -4.50   0.000    -.5075107   -.1993339
        TSTA      .007496   .0075264     1.00   0.319    -.0072555    .0222475
      LADSTF     .0143927   .0040978     3.51   0.000     .0063612    .0224243
         NIM     .1278992   .0244054     5.24   0.000     .0800656    .1757329
         CIR    -.0906558   .0068303   -13.27   0.000     -.104043   -.0772686
        ILGL     -.034772   .0068553    -5.07   0.000    -.0482082   -.0213358
         ETA      .004076   .0128411     0.32   0.751     -.021092    .0292441
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    372.02
       overall = 0.5875                                        max =        14
       between = 0.5506                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4896                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       361
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 2 Hausman-Test Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
 
Model 2 Fixed Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004)  
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8745
                          =        3.80
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP     -.0647164    -.0672932        .0025768        .0132507
    SIZENLTA     -.4171961    -.3534223       -.0637738        .0795311
        TSTA      .0030354      .007496       -.0044606        .0047372
      LADSTF      .0143768     .0143927       -.0000159        .0023422
         NIM      .1367167     .1278992        .0088174          .01975
         CIR     -.0876312    -.0906558        .0030246        .0038639
        ILGL     -.0393854     -.034772       -.0046134        .0045019
         ETA      .0070292      .004076        .0029532        .0079504
                                                                              
                FixedModel2  RandomModel2    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FixedModel2 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(70, 132) =     2.23             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .64984734   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2708119
     sigma_u    1.7312438
                                                                              
       _cons     13.98927   2.366028     5.91   0.000     9.309028     18.6695
         GDP    -.0268486   .0579185    -0.46   0.644    -.1414171    .0877199
    SIZENLTA    -1.488879   .5303043    -2.81   0.006    -2.537873   -.4398843
        TSTA     .0056431   .0156897     0.36   0.720    -.0253926    .0366788
      LADSTF     .0163263   .0099022     1.65   0.102    -.0032612    .0359138
         NIM     .1112449   .0454003     2.45   0.016     .0214385    .2010512
         CIR    -.1046233    .013772    -7.60   0.000    -.1318658   -.0773809
        ILGL    -.0467786   .0146801    -3.19   0.002    -.0758173   -.0177399
         ETA     .0210053   .0311451     0.67   0.501    -.0406028    .0826134
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4475                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(8,132)           =     15.65
       overall = 0.4138                                        max =         5
       between = 0.3574                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4868                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 2 Random Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
Model 2 Hausman-Test Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 -2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho     .3021495   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2708119
     sigma_u    .83620162
                                                                              
       _cons     9.488972   1.230189     7.71   0.000     7.077845     11.9001
         GDP    -.0565274   .0519073    -1.09   0.276    -.1582638    .0452091
    SIZENLTA    -.3208737    .168278    -1.91   0.057    -.6506925    .0089451
        TSTA     .0013948   .0121945     0.11   0.909    -.0225061    .0252957
      LADSTF     .0173577     .00763     2.27   0.023     .0024031    .0323123
         NIM     .1176386   .0299126     3.93   0.000     .0590109    .1762662
         CIR    -.1051483   .0097182   -10.82   0.000    -.1241955    -.086101
        ILGL    -.0303865   .0098341    -3.09   0.002    -.0496611    -.011112
         ETA     .0104015   .0226454     0.46   0.646    -.0339825    .0547856
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    209.03
       overall = 0.5446                                        max =         5
       between = 0.5652                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4656                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       211
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.4885
                          =        7.45
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP     -.0268486    -.0565274        .0296788         .025694
    SIZENLTA     -1.488879    -.3208737       -1.168005        .5028968
        TSTA      .0056431     .0013948        .0042483        .0098721
      LADSTF      .0163263     .0173577       -.0010314        .0063116
         NIM      .1112449     .1176386       -.0063937         .034153
         CIR     -.1046233    -.1051483        .0005249        .0097584
        ILGL     -.0467786    -.0303865       -.0163921        .0108993
         ETA      .0210053     .0104015        .0106038        .0213824
                                                                              
                FEPreModel2  REPreModel2     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FEPreModel2 .
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Model 2 Fixed Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
Model 2 Random Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 40) =     1.78              Prob > F = 0.0504
                                                                              
         rho     .6836107   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .6643182
     sigma_u    .97649422
                                                                              
       _cons     5.522494   3.790583     1.46   0.153    -2.138561    13.18355
         GDP     .2776125   .2239267     1.24   0.222    -.1749603    .7301852
    SIZENLTA    -.2929243   .2024027    -1.45   0.156    -.7019954    .1161468
        TSTA    -.0094091   .0126042    -0.75   0.460    -.0348831    .0160649
      LADSTF     .0026019   .0091221     0.29   0.777    -.0158346    .0210384
         NIM     .0958165   .1033161     0.93   0.359    -.1129932    .3046261
         CIR    -.0748115   .0168973    -4.43   0.000    -.1089622   -.0406608
        ILGL     -.011078   .0170722    -0.65   0.520    -.0455821    .0234262
         ETA     .0275386   .0192531     1.43   0.160    -.0113733    .0664505
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2328                         Prob > F           =    0.0003
                                                F(8,40)            =      4.84
       overall = 0.6565                                        max =         4
       between = 0.6488                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4918                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .01962989   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .6643182
     sigma_u    .09400265
                                                                              
       _cons     2.644002   2.564935     1.03   0.303    -2.383179    7.671182
         GDP     .1948125   .2279947     0.85   0.393    -.2520489    .6416738
    SIZENLTA     .0615207   .1236224     0.50   0.619    -.1807748    .3038162
        TSTA     .0045121   .0093576     0.48   0.630    -.0138285    .0228527
      LADSTF     .0112851    .006388     1.77   0.077    -.0012352    .0238055
         NIM     .1899304   .0579934     3.28   0.001     .0762654    .3035953
         CIR      -.07296   .0105497    -6.92   0.000     -.093637   -.0522831
        ILGL    -.0394424   .0082851    -4.76   0.000    -.0556809   -.0232039
         ETA     .0339613   .0171687     1.98   0.048     .0003112    .0676114
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    233.28
       overall = 0.7873                                        max =         4
       between = 0.8899                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4016                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 2 Hausman-Test 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
Model 2 Fixed Effects 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0015
                          =       25.05
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .2776125     .1948125           .0828               .
    SIZENLTA     -.2929243     .0615207        -.354445        .1602634
        TSTA     -.0094091     .0045121       -.0139212        .0084439
      LADSTF      .0026019     .0112851       -.0086832         .006512
         NIM      .0958165     .1899304       -.0941139        .0855043
         CIR     -.0748115      -.07296       -.0018515        .0131993
        ILGL      -.011078    -.0394424        .0283644         .014927
         ETA      .0275386     .0339613       -.0064227        .0087129
                                                                              
                FE2005Refo~2 RE2005Refo~2    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE2005ReformsModel2 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(17, 50) =     2.30              Prob > F = 0.0116
                                                                              
         rho    .89525038   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1054394
     sigma_u    3.2316994
                                                                              
       _cons    -19.96609   8.943326    -2.23   0.030    -37.92929   -2.002892
         GDP     .0567113   .1024537     0.55   0.582     -.149073    .2624957
    SIZENLTA     3.138902   1.116286     2.81   0.007     .8967756    5.381029
        TSTA     .0275365   .0316994     0.87   0.389    -.0361336    .0912066
      LADSTF     .0145546   .0150715     0.97   0.339    -.0157174    .0448266
         NIM     .1462632   .1089672     1.34   0.186    -.0726038    .3651302
         CIR    -.0413502    .020491    -2.02   0.049    -.0825077   -.0001927
        ILGL     .0001228   .0197575     0.01   0.995    -.0395613     .039807
         ETA     .0741466   .0740455     1.00   0.321    -.0745781    .2228712
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8179                        Prob > F           =    0.0438
                                                F(8,50)            =      2.19
       overall = 0.0003                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0561                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.2597                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        18
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        76
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 2 Random Effects 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
Model 2 Hausman-Test 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .30583067   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1054394
     sigma_u    .73374092
                                                                              
       _cons     4.538067   3.009514     1.51   0.132    -1.360472    10.43661
         GDP    -.0116692   .0929203    -0.13   0.900    -.1937896    .1704513
    SIZENLTA    -.1256043   .3267807    -0.38   0.701    -.7660828    .5148741
        TSTA     .0583249   .0201835     2.89   0.004     .0187659     .097884
      LADSTF     .0218216   .0118293     1.84   0.065    -.0013634    .0450067
         NIM     .0754139   .0883148     0.85   0.393    -.0976799    .2485078
         CIR    -.0687367   .0154082    -4.46   0.000    -.0989362   -.0385372
        ILGL    -.0027058   .0187184    -0.14   0.885    -.0393932    .0339816
         ETA    -.0142398   .0470054    -0.30   0.762    -.1063686    .0778891
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     42.80
       overall = 0.5605                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7931                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1247                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        18
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        76
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1609
                          =       11.79
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .0567113    -.0116692        .0683805        .0431576
    SIZENLTA      3.138902    -.1256043        3.264506        1.067384
        TSTA      .0275365     .0583249       -.0307884        .0244433
      LADSTF      .0145546     .0218216        -.007267        .0093391
         NIM      .1462632     .0754139        .0708493        .0638305
         CIR     -.0413502    -.0687367        .0273865        .0135082
        ILGL      .0001228    -.0027058        .0028286        .0063231
         ETA      .0741466    -.0142398        .0883863        .0572121
                                                                              
                FE2009Model2 RE2009Model2    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE2009Model2 .
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Model 3 Fixed Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
 
 
Model 3 Random Effects Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(75, 281) =     3.22             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .56725473   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.5916277
     sigma_u     1.822277
                                                                              
       _cons     3.655123   1.455104     2.51   0.013     .7908353     6.51941
         GDP     .1775406   .0494664     3.59   0.000     .0801689    .2749123
    SIZENLTA     .2992459   .1465872     2.04   0.042     .0106976    .5877942
        TSTA     .0115297   .0117892     0.98   0.329    -.0116767    .0347361
      LADSTF     .0071273   .0061401     1.16   0.247    -.0049591    .0192136
         NIM     .1627404   .0401787     4.05   0.000     .0836509    .2418299
         CIR    -.0503317   .0102361    -4.92   0.000    -.0704809   -.0301825
        ILGL    -.0122739    .010637    -1.15   0.250    -.0332122    .0086643
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0677                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,281)           =      9.13
       overall = 0.1602                                        max =        14
       between = 0.0720                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1854                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       364
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .36696042   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.5916277
     sigma_u    1.2118132
                                                                              
       _cons     6.754265   1.180479     5.72   0.000      4.44057    9.067961
         GDP     .1560915   .0482774     3.23   0.001     .0614695    .2507134
    SIZENLTA    -.0630499   .1087441    -0.58   0.562    -.2761844    .1500847
        TSTA     .0110157   .0102959     1.07   0.285    -.0091638    .0311952
      LADSTF    -.0008498   .0055125    -0.15   0.877    -.0116541    .0099544
         NIM     .1407639   .0327218     4.30   0.000     .0766304    .2048974
         CIR    -.0571877    .009172    -6.24   0.000    -.0751644   -.0392109
        ILGL    -.0142409   .0092515    -1.54   0.124    -.0323736    .0038918
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =     82.71
       overall = 0.2433                                        max =        14
       between = 0.2225                                        avg =       4.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1670                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       364
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 3 Hausman-Test Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
 
Model 3 Fixed Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0018
                          =       22.82
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .1775406     .1560915        .0214491        .0107804
    SIZENLTA      .2992459    -.0630499        .3622958        .0982981
        TSTA      .0115297     .0110157         .000514        .0057429
      LADSTF      .0071273    -.0008498        .0079771        .0027042
         NIM      .1627404     .1407639        .0219765        .0233156
         CIR     -.0503317    -.0571877         .006856        .0045445
        ILGL     -.0122739    -.0142409        .0019669        .0052492
                                                                              
                    FE1          RE1         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE1 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(70, 134) =     2.99             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .61259174   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2284088
     sigma_u    1.5446997
                                                                              
       _cons     5.407689   2.286069     2.37   0.019     .8862418    9.929136
         GDP     .0887176   .0547897     1.62   0.108     -.019647    .1970821
    SIZENLTA    -.9238919   .5099852    -1.81   0.072    -1.932554    .0847699
        TSTA     .0017831   .0150453     0.12   0.906    -.0279739    .0315401
      LADSTF     .0214022   .0094204     2.27   0.025     .0027703    .0400341
         NIM     .2087306   .0408959     5.10   0.000     .1278457    .2896155
         CIR    -.0127947   .0129261    -0.99   0.324    -.0383603     .012771
        ILGL     -.014257   .0140246    -1.02   0.311    -.0419952    .0134811
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0571                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,134)           =      5.53
       overall = 0.3769                                        max =         5
       between = 0.4041                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2241                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       212
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 3 Random Effects Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
 
 
Model 3 Hausman-Test Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .45022398   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2284088
     sigma_u    1.1116405
                                                                              
       _cons      8.44099   1.229373     6.87   0.000     6.031463    10.85052
         GDP     .1201503   .0497224     2.42   0.016     .0226962    .2176045
    SIZENLTA      -1.1319   .1703324    -6.65   0.000    -1.465746    -.798055
        TSTA    -.0081968   .0125612    -0.65   0.514    -.0328164    .0164227
      LADSTF     .0185444   .0078278     2.37   0.018     .0032021    .0338867
         NIM     .1583687   .0307353     5.15   0.000     .0981287    .2186087
         CIR    -.0389238   .0101603    -3.83   0.000    -.0588376     -.01901
        ILGL     -.014999   .0103336    -1.45   0.147    -.0352526    .0052545
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =    106.15
       overall = 0.4588                                        max =         5
       between = 0.5108                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1944                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        71
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       212
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0587
                          =       13.61
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .0887176     .1201503       -.0314327        .0230129
    SIZENLTA     -.9238919      -1.1319        .2080083        .4806992
        TSTA      .0017831    -.0081968          .00998        .0082811
      LADSTF      .0214022     .0185444        .0028578         .005241
         NIM      .2087306     .1583687        .0503619         .026978
         CIR     -.0127947    -.0389238        .0261291        .0079909
        ILGL      -.014257     -.014999         .000742        .0094818
                                                                              
                    FE1          RE1         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Model 3 Fixed Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
Model 3 Random Effects 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 41) =     1.07              Prob > F = 0.4155
                                                                              
         rho    .59004474   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.7381419
     sigma_u    2.0852564
                                                                              
       _cons     26.64045   9.110694     2.92   0.006     8.241032    45.03987
         GDP    -.9963381   .5605918    -1.78   0.083    -2.128476    .1357999
    SIZENLTA    -1.093624   .5055687    -2.16   0.036    -2.114641   -.0726075
        TSTA     -.016593   .0329079    -0.50   0.617    -.0830518    .0498658
      LADSTF    -.0205024   .0236308    -0.87   0.391    -.0682259     .027221
         NIM    -.2136722   .2675922    -0.80   0.429    -.7540856    .3267412
         CIR     -.017827   .0442021    -0.40   0.689     -.107095    .0714409
        ILGL    -.0818485    .042933    -1.91   0.064    -.1685534    .0048565
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1990                        Prob > F           =    0.2935
                                                F(7,41)            =      1.26
       overall = 0.1291                                        max =         4
       between = 0.1226                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1771                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .00688479   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.7381419
     sigma_u    .14472078
                                                                              
       _cons      18.9703   5.517951     3.44   0.001     8.155312    29.78528
         GDP    -.7508095   .5231722    -1.44   0.151    -1.776208    .2745891
    SIZENLTA     -.878364   .2636202    -3.33   0.001     -1.39505   -.3616779
        TSTA     .0442497   .0211017     2.10   0.036      .002891    .0856083
      LADSTF     .0063516    .014805     0.43   0.668    -.0226656    .0353689
         NIM     .3059684    .130307     2.35   0.019     .0505713    .5613655
         CIR    -.0742703   .0236171    -3.14   0.002     -.120559   -.0279815
        ILGL    -.0301423   .0190365    -1.58   0.113    -.0674532    .0071687
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =     78.90
       overall = 0.5492                                        max =         4
       between = 0.7381                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0582                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        26
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Model 3 Hausman-Test 2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
 
 
Model 3 2009 Fixed Effects Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0553
                          =       13.78
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP     -.9963381    -.7508095       -.2455286        .2013803
    SIZENLTA     -1.093624     -.878364       -.2152601        .4313978
        TSTA      -.016593     .0442497       -.0608427        .0252516
      LADSTF     -.0205024     .0063516        -.026854        .0184182
         NIM     -.2136722     .3059684       -.5196406        .2337213
         CIR      -.017827    -.0742703        .0564432        .0373638
        ILGL     -.0818485    -.0301423       -.0517062        .0384819
                                                                              
                    FE1          RE1         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE1 .
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 52) =     6.50              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .92454822   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e      1.03647
     sigma_u    3.6281628
                                                                              
       _cons     29.15004   6.221762     4.69   0.000     16.66516    41.63492
         GDP      .105335    .085796     1.23   0.225    -.0668273    .2774974
    SIZENLTA      -3.5892   .7984493    -4.50   0.000    -5.191406   -1.986995
        TSTA     .0024412   .0270226     0.09   0.928    -.0517837    .0566662
      LADSTF    -.0011145    .013424    -0.08   0.934    -.0280519    .0258228
         NIM     .1028567   .1013595     1.01   0.315    -.1005359    .3062493
         CIR    -.0290979   .0177193    -1.64   0.107    -.0646542    .0064584
        ILGL     .0018299   .0183786     0.10   0.921    -.0350495    .0387093
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8150                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,52)            =      9.97
       overall = 0.0738                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0040                                        avg =       4.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.5730                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        19
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        78
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Model 3 Random Effects 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
Model 3 Hausman-Test 2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .56876887   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e      1.03647
     sigma_u    1.1903361
                                                                              
       _cons     8.865865   3.832134     2.31   0.021     1.355021    16.37671
         GDP     .2552415   .0872061     2.93   0.003     .0843208    .4261623
    SIZENLTA    -.7176028   .4365846    -1.64   0.100    -1.573293    .1380873
        TSTA     .0097538   .0242049     0.40   0.687    -.0376869    .0571945
      LADSTF     .0064762   .0135115     0.48   0.632    -.0200058    .0329583
         NIM     .2509151    .096816     2.59   0.010     .0611593     .440671
         CIR    -.0474244   .0168476    -2.81   0.005    -.0804452   -.0144037
        ILGL    -.0118456   .0188096    -0.63   0.529    -.0487117    .0250205
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =     47.02
       overall = 0.3326                                        max =         5
       between = 0.2983                                        avg =       4.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.4318                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups   =        19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        78
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       33.22
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP       .105335     .2552415       -.1499065               .
    SIZENLTA       -3.5892    -.7176028       -2.871598        .6685171
        TSTA      .0024412     .0097538       -.0073125        .0120144
      LADSTF     -.0011145     .0064762       -.0075908               .
         NIM      .1028567     .2509151       -.1480584        .0300067
         CIR     -.0290979    -.0474244        .0183265        .0054891
        ILGL      .0018299    -.0118456        .0136755               .
                                                                              
                    FE1          RE1         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FE1 .
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Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Model 1 & Model 2 
Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004) 
 
2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008) 
 
    Mean VIF        1.29
                                    
         ETA        1.14    0.877779
        TSTA        1.16    0.862205
         GDP        1.18    0.849310
         CIR        1.23    0.815715
         NIM        1.28    0.782503
        ILGL        1.34    0.745860
      LADSTF        1.42    0.705785
    SIZENLTA        1.60    0.623464
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
    Mean VIF        1.27
                                    
         GDP        1.12    0.893250
      LADSTF        1.14    0.876270
        ILGL        1.17    0.855466
         CIR        1.17    0.852965
        TSTA        1.19    0.841463
         NIM        1.23    0.815760
    SIZENLTA        1.53    0.653186
         ETA        1.63    0.614294
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
    Mean VIF        1.53
                                    
      LADSTF        1.05    0.951892
         GDP        1.19    0.839396
        TSTA        1.23    0.813460
        ILGL        1.39    0.717512
         CIR        1.69    0.592282
         NIM        1.78    0.562328
         ETA        1.91    0.524079
    SIZENLTA        2.01    0.496625
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
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2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013)  
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Model 3  
Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
Pre-2005 Banking Reforms Period (2000 – 2004)  
 
 
    Mean VIF        1.54
                                    
         NIM        1.11    0.899041
    SIZENLTA        1.29    0.776783
         CIR        1.37    0.728915
      LADSTF        1.49    0.672027
        ILGL        1.62    0.618739
        TSTA        1.63    0.612323
         ETA        1.68    0.595422
         GDP        2.10    0.477269
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
    Mean VIF        1.29
                                    
         GDP        1.14    0.876008
        TSTA        1.15    0.866666
         CIR        1.17    0.856407
         NIM        1.25    0.799592
        ILGL        1.33    0.754091
      LADSTF        1.38    0.722851
    SIZENLTA        1.59    0.630757
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
    Mean VIF        1.14
                                    
         GDP        1.08    0.928704
    SIZENLTA        1.09    0.918477
      LADSTF        1.14    0.876540
         CIR        1.14    0.874297
         NIM        1.16    0.863172
        ILGL        1.17    0.856395
        TSTA        1.18    0.846642
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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2005 Banking Reforms & GFC Period (2005 – 2008)  
 
 
2009 Banking Reforms & Post-GFC Period (2009 – 2013)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Mean VIF        1.38
                                    
      LADSTF        1.05    0.952518
         GDP        1.15    0.870194
        TSTA        1.16    0.865053
        ILGL        1.38    0.727199
         CIR        1.57    0.636588
         NIM        1.68    0.594086
    SIZENLTA        1.70    0.586543
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
    Mean VIF        1.48
                                    
         NIM        1.07    0.931050
    SIZENLTA        1.36    0.736465
         CIR        1.36    0.734604
      LADSTF        1.47    0.682268
        TSTA        1.59    0.628575
        ILGL        1.70    0.589042
         GDP        1.83    0.547273
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Appendix 14: Model Extension Regression Results  
 
Extension Model 4 Fixed Effects 
 
Extension Model 4 Random Effects 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(75, 278) = 3.08                     Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .55362906   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     10.18811
     sigma_u    11.346322
                                                                              
       _cons     82.85949   10.20613     8.12   0.000     62.76838    102.9506
        DUM2    -3.179111   3.906147    -0.81   0.416     -10.8685    4.510273
        DUM1     4.121203   2.728411     1.51   0.132    -1.249766    9.492173
         GDP     .2240118   .3329389     0.67   0.502    -.4313898    .8794134
    SIZENLTA     5.004084   1.373848     3.64   0.000     2.299617     7.70855
        TSTA    -.2634961   .0759454    -3.47   0.001    -.4129973   -.1139949
      LADSTF    -.2321002   .0491908    -4.72   0.000    -.3289339   -.1352664
         NIM    -.2522492   .2743995    -0.92   0.359     -.792414    .2879156
         CIR    -.3185632   .0672587    -4.74   0.000    -.4509642   -.1861622
        ILGL     .0336174   .0688376     0.49   0.626    -.1018918    .1691266
         ETA     .5854406    .137104     4.27   0.000     .3155468    .8553345
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1025                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(10,278)         =      18.97
     overall = 0.4904                                         max =         14
     between = 0.3996                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.4056                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        364
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .36713355   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     10.18811
     sigma_u    7.7597838
                                                                              
       _cons     79.43233   8.249794     9.63   0.000     63.26304    95.60163
        DUM2    -3.339273   3.498616    -0.95   0.340    -10.19643    3.517888
        DUM1     3.297087   2.509637     1.31   0.189    -1.621711    8.215885
         GDP    -.0892677   .3220628    -0.28   0.782    -.7204992    .5419637
    SIZENLTA     5.336766     1.0048     5.31   0.000     3.367393    7.306139
        TSTA    -.2436148   .0659573    -3.69   0.000    -.3728886   -.1143409
      LADSTF    -.2243172   .0439003    -5.11   0.000    -.3103602   -.1382741
         NIM     -.158621   .2187505    -0.73   0.468    -.5873642    .2701222
         CIR    -.3140275   .0597964    -5.25   0.000    -.4312262   -.1968288
        ILGL     .0899301   .0594784     1.51   0.131    -.0266455    .2065056
         ETA      .709265   .1248043     5.68   0.000     .4646531    .9538768
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     266.01
     overall = 0.5007                                         max =         14
     between = 0.4492                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.4007                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        364
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, re
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Extension Model 4 Hausman-Test 
 
 
Extension Model 5 Fixed Effects 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0045
                          =       25.46
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        DUM2     -3.179111    -3.339273        .1601617        1.737145
        DUM1      4.121203     3.297087        .8241163         1.07049
         GDP      .2240118    -.0892677        .3132795        .0844031
    SIZENLTA      5.004084     5.336766       -.3326822        .9369284
        TSTA     -.2634961    -.2436148       -.0198813        .0376477
      LADSTF     -.2321002    -.2243172        -.007783        .0221922
         NIM     -.2522492     -.158621       -.0936282        .1656602
         CIR     -.3185632    -.3140275       -.0045357        .0307917
        ILGL      .0336174     .0899301       -.0563127        .0346545
         ETA      .5854406      .709265       -.1238243        .0567574
                                                                              
                   BCCF1        BCCR1        Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman BCCF1 .
F test that all u_i=0: F(75, 275) = 2.46                     Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .48912428   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1871314
     sigma_u    1.1615844
                                                                              
       _cons     8.522203   1.195376     7.13   0.000     6.168952    10.87545
        DUM2    -1.002195   .4577851    -2.19   0.029    -1.903404    -.100987
        DUM1    -.4995517   .3193063    -1.56   0.119    -1.128147    .1290436
         GDP    -.0794127   .0393914    -2.02   0.045    -.1569598   -.0018656
    SIZENLTA    -.1848908   .1605599    -1.15   0.251    -.5009734    .1311919
        TSTA      .004516   .0088877     0.51   0.612    -.0129805    .0220125
      LADSTF     .0092172   .0057855     1.59   0.112    -.0021723    .0206067
         NIM     .1277031   .0319977     3.99   0.000     .0647116    .1906945
         CIR    -.0850018   .0079027   -10.76   0.000    -.1005593   -.0694442
        ILGL    -.0382266   .0081779    -4.67   0.000    -.0543259   -.0221273
         ETA     .0164196   .0164082     1.00   0.318     -.015882    .0487212
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0463                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(10,275)         =      27.56
     overall = 0.5845                                         max =         14
     between = 0.5147                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.5005                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        361
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, fe
474 
 
Extension Model 5 Random Effects 
 
Extension Model 5 Hausman-Test 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .34672094   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1871314
     sigma_u    .86484737
                                                                              
       _cons     8.733161    .943547     9.26   0.000     6.883843    10.58248
        DUM2    -.7647671   .4027736    -1.90   0.058    -1.554189    .0246547
        DUM1    -.3861712   .2887989    -1.34   0.181    -.9522068    .1798643
         GDP    -.0818743   .0374252    -2.19   0.029    -.1552262   -.0085223
    SIZENLTA    -.2108086   .1145761    -1.84   0.066    -.4353736    .0137565
        TSTA     .0089055   .0075491     1.18   0.238    -.0058904    .0237015
      LADSTF     .0101201   .0050337     2.01   0.044     .0002541     .019986
         NIM     .1207781   .0248953     4.85   0.000     .0719842     .169572
         CIR    -.0891692   .0068661   -12.99   0.000    -.1026265    -.075712
        ILGL    -.0342618    .006859    -5.00   0.000    -.0477052   -.0208185
         ETA     .0145861    .014594     1.00   0.318    -.0140176    .0431898
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     377.07
     overall = 0.5903                                         max =         14
     between = 0.5372                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.4983                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        361
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8592
                          =        5.45
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        DUM2     -1.002195    -.7647671       -.2374283        .2175789
        DUM1     -.4995517    -.3861712       -.1133805        .1362046
         GDP     -.0794127    -.0818743        .0024615        .0122899
    SIZENLTA     -.1848908    -.2108086        .0259178        .1124802
        TSTA       .004516     .0089055       -.0043895        .0046906
      LADSTF      .0092172     .0101201       -.0009029         .002852
         NIM      .1277031     .1207781         .006925        .0201016
         CIR     -.0850018    -.0891692        .0041675        .0039129
        ILGL     -.0382266    -.0342618       -.0039648        .0044534
         ETA      .0164196     .0145861        .0018335        .0074996
                                                                              
                   ROAF2        ROAR2        Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman ROAF2 .
475 
 
Extension Model 6 Fixed Effects 
 
Extension Model 6 Random Effects 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(75, 279) = 2.19                     Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .49003463   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4924116
     sigma_u    1.4629574
                                                                              
       _cons       7.0341   1.463822     4.81   0.000     4.152563    9.915638
        DUM2      1.85244   .5494644     3.37   0.001     .7708175    2.934062
        DUM1     2.283274   .3671856     6.22   0.000     1.560468     3.00608
         GDP     .1601101    .047055     3.40   0.001     .0674822     .252738
    SIZENLTA    -.4609717   .1976738    -2.33   0.020    -.8500932   -.0718502
        TSTA     .0041344     .01112     0.37   0.710    -.0177554    .0260241
      LADSTF     .0020006   .0071926     0.28   0.781     -.012158    .0161593
         NIM     .2017043   .0381811     5.28   0.000     .1265447     .276864
         CIR    -.0536653   .0096719    -5.55   0.000    -.0727045    -.034626
        ILGL    -.0164988   .0100186    -1.65   0.101    -.0362204    .0032227
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1418                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,279)          =      12.59
     overall = 0.3925                                         max =         14
     between = 0.3869                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.2889                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        364
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, fe
                                                                              
         rho    .21183304   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4924116
     sigma_u    .77370671
                                                                              
       _cons      9.50604   1.067859     8.90   0.000     7.413075    11.59901
        DUM2     3.129705    .452193     6.92   0.000     2.243423    4.015987
        DUM1     2.986574   .3135593     9.52   0.000     2.372009    3.601139
         GDP     .1511895   .0455378     3.32   0.001      .061937    .2404421
    SIZENLTA    -.9249543   .1239854    -7.46   0.000    -1.167961   -.6819473
        TSTA     .0025095    .009227     0.27   0.786    -.0155752    .0205941
      LADSTF     .0053545   .0061555     0.87   0.384    -.0067101    .0174191
         NIM     .1701593    .028604     5.95   0.000     .1140966    .2262221
         CIR    -.0608499   .0081455    -7.47   0.000    -.0768147   -.0448851
        ILGL    -.0211127   .0082342    -2.56   0.010    -.0372514   -.0049741
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     206.06
     overall = 0.4407                                         max =         14
     between = 0.5480                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.2721                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         76
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        364
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP DUM1 DUM2, re
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Extension Model 6 Hausman-Test 
 
 
 
Extension Model 7 Fixed Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0071
                          =       22.63
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        DUM2       1.85244     3.129705       -1.277265        .3121419
        DUM1      2.283274     2.986574       -.7033006        .1910648
         GDP      .1601101     .1511895        .0089206        .0118524
    SIZENLTA     -.4609717    -.9249543        .4639825        .1539563
        TSTA      .0041344     .0025095        .0016249        .0062062
      LADSTF      .0020006     .0053545       -.0033539        .0037206
         NIM      .2017043     .1701593         .031545        .0252905
         CIR     -.0536653    -.0608499        .0071846        .0052152
        ILGL     -.0164988    -.0211127        .0046139         .005707
                                                                              
                  ZscoreF3     ZscoreR3      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman ZscoreF3 .
F test that all u_i=0: F(65, 99) = 3.01                      Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .73278931   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.967101
     sigma_u    18.161616
                                                                              
       _cons     93.46961   27.81073     3.36   0.001     38.28708    148.6521
         GDP     .5481511   .5321167     1.03   0.305    -.5076838    1.603986
    SIZENLTA    -5.715153   5.299865    -1.08   0.283    -16.23124    4.800929
        TSTA    -.1405102   .1726336    -0.81   0.418    -.4830528    .2020324
      LADSTF    -.1218164   .0992424    -1.23   0.223     -.318735    .0751021
         NIM    -.3973887   .5191754    -0.77   0.446    -1.427545    .6327679
         CIR     .0944822   .1585316     0.60   0.553    -.2200789    .4090434
        ILGL    -.2340869    .140845    -1.66   0.100    -.5135539      .04538
         ETA     .4488691   .2461095     1.82   0.071    -.0394656    .9372038
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5032                        Prob > F          =     0.2212
                                                F(8,99)           =       1.37
     overall = 0.0000                                         max =          5
     between = 0.0240                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.0994                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        173
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Extension Model 7 Random Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
Extension Model 7 Hausman-Test Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
 
 
 
         rho    .45522772   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    10.967101
     sigma_u    10.025331
                                                                              
       _cons     62.44921   13.69073     4.56   0.000     35.61587    89.28255
         GDP     -.043774   .4867693    -0.09   0.928    -.9978242    .9102762
    SIZENLTA     4.741855    1.72438     2.75   0.006     1.362132    8.121579
        TSTA    -.3449944   .1318076    -2.62   0.009    -.6033326   -.0866562
      LADSTF    -.0980504   .0782217    -1.25   0.210    -.2513621    .0552612
         NIM    -.1857345   .3349493    -0.55   0.579     -.842223     .470754
         CIR    -.0892016   .1154753    -0.77   0.440     -.315529    .1371257
        ILGL    -.0260894   .1033713    -0.25   0.801    -.2286935    .1765146
         ETA     .5497936   .1898168     2.90   0.004     .1777595    .9218277
                                                                              
     DEAWBCC        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0146
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      19.05
     overall = 0.1715                                         max =          5
     between = 0.2105                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.0343                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         66
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        173
. xtreg DEAWBCC ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       35.69
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .5481511     -.043774         .591925        .2149508
    SIZENLTA     -5.715153     4.741855       -10.45701        5.011495
        TSTA     -.1405102    -.3449944        .2044842         .111486
      LADSTF     -.1218164    -.0980504        -.023766        .0610773
         NIM     -.3973887    -.1857345       -.2116542        .3966763
         CIR      .0944822    -.0892016        .1836839        .1086174
        ILGL     -.2340869    -.0260894       -.2079975        .0956643
         ETA      .4488691     .5497936       -.1009245        .1566508
                                                                              
                  FEMBCCL1     REMBCCL1      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FEMBCCL1 .
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Extension Model 8 Fixed Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
Extension Model 8 Random Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(64, 98) = 2.16                      Prob > F = 0.0003
                                                                              
         rho    .63737066   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.5370401
     sigma_u    2.0377447
                                                                              
       _cons      12.0856    3.91628     3.09   0.003     4.313867    19.85733
         GDP    -.0087542   .0752955    -0.12   0.908    -.1581757    .1406674
    SIZENLTA    -.8112397   .7427803    -1.09   0.277    -2.285263    .6627837
        TSTA    -.0281321   .0246521    -1.14   0.257    -.0770533    .0207891
      LADSTF     -.000061   .0140945    -0.00   0.997    -.0280311    .0279091
         NIM    -.0748812   .0732973    -1.02   0.309    -.2203372    .0705749
         CIR    -.0702619   .0222287    -3.16   0.002     -.114374   -.0261498
        ILGL    -.0193648   .0200138    -0.97   0.336    -.0590815    .0203518
         ETA     .0555053   .0344983     1.61   0.111    -.0129555    .1239661
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1366                        Prob > F          =     0.0188
                                                F(8,98)           =       2.44
     overall = 0.2109                                         max =          5
     between = 0.1918                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.1661                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         65
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        171
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
                                                                              
         rho     .3812403   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.5370401
     sigma_u    1.2064896
                                                                              
       _cons     7.936109   1.793722     4.42   0.000     4.420478    11.45174
         GDP    -.0920381   .0660348    -1.39   0.163    -.2214639    .0373878
    SIZENLTA     .0176089   .2228921     0.08   0.937    -.4192517    .4544694
        TSTA    -.0266594   .0176843    -1.51   0.132    -.0613201    .0080012
      LADSTF     .0061797    .010541     0.59   0.558    -.0144802    .0268397
         NIM     .0376941    .043595     0.86   0.387    -.0477505    .1231387
         CIR    -.0811452   .0150835    -5.38   0.000    -.1107084    -.051582
        ILGL    -.0043918   .0136143    -0.32   0.747    -.0310753    .0222917
         ETA      .075935    .025226     3.01   0.003     .0264929    .1253771
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =      62.94
     overall = 0.3998                                         max =          5
     between = 0.4420                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.1376                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         65
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        171
. xtreg ROA ETA ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
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Extension Model 8 Hausman-Test Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
 
 
Extension Model 9 Fixed Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0360
                          =       16.48
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP     -.0087542    -.0920381        .0832839        .0361777
    SIZENLTA     -.8112397     .0176089       -.8288485         .708549
        TSTA     -.0281321    -.0266594       -.0014726        .0171752
      LADSTF      -.000061     .0061797       -.0062408        .0093564
         NIM     -.0748812     .0376941       -.1125753        .0589234
         CIR     -.0702619    -.0811452        .0108833         .016328
        ILGL     -.0193648    -.0043918        -.014973        .0146698
         ETA      .0555053      .075935       -.0204297        .0235326
                                                                              
                  FEMROA1      REMROA1       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FEMROA1 .
F test that all u_i=0: F(65, 99) = 4.54                      Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .83357279   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1529693
     sigma_u    2.5803424
                                                                              
       _cons     1.375225   2.887686     0.48   0.635     -4.35457     7.10502
         GDP     .1822222   .0564718     3.23   0.002     .0701698    .2942746
    SIZENLTA     .1757892    .548035     0.32   0.749    -.9116311     1.26321
        TSTA     .0127086   .0184005     0.69   0.491    -.0238019    .0492192
      LADSTF      .017797   .0103107     1.73   0.087    -.0026616    .0382557
         NIM     .0339383   .0546469     0.62   0.536    -.0744931    .1423696
         CIR     .0090723    .016374     0.55   0.581    -.0234173    .0415619
        ILGL    -.0517266   .0149921    -3.45   0.001    -.0814742   -.0219791
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4327                        Prob > F          =     0.0005
                                                F(7,99)           =       4.11
     overall = 0.0027                                         max =          5
     between = 0.0127                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.2250                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        172
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, fe
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Extension Model 9 Random Effects Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013) 
 
 
Extension Model 9 Hausman-Test Lagged Whole Period (2000 – 2013)  
                                                                              
         rho    .66848181   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.1529693
     sigma_u    1.6372268
                                                                              
       _cons     8.650198   1.661659     5.21   0.000     5.393405    11.90699
         GDP      .213851   .0533389     4.01   0.000     .1093087    .3183932
    SIZENLTA     -.968107     .23003    -4.21   0.000    -1.418958   -.5172565
        TSTA    -.0013255   .0157981    -0.08   0.933    -.0322893    .0296383
      LADSTF     .0080049   .0092612     0.86   0.387    -.0101466    .0261565
         NIM     .0351769   .0420225     0.84   0.403    -.0471856    .1175395
         CIR    -.0237135   .0139334    -1.70   0.089    -.0510225    .0035955
        ILGL    -.0404108   .0124823    -3.24   0.001    -.0648756    -.015946
                                                                              
      ZScore        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)      =      43.07
     overall = 0.3232                                         max =          5
     between = 0.2881                                         avg =        2.6
     within  = 0.1427                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: BankID                          Number of groups  =         66
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        172
. xtreg ZScore ILGL CIR NIM LADSTF TSTA SIZENLTA GDP, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0058
                          =       19.91
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         GDP      .1822222      .213851       -.0316288        .0185482
    SIZENLTA      .1757892     -.968107        1.143896        .4974219
        TSTA      .0127086    -.0013255        .0140341        .0094338
      LADSTF       .017797     .0080049        .0097921        .0045322
         NIM      .0339383     .0351769       -.0012387        .0349342
         CIR      .0090723    -.0237135        .0327858        .0086005
        ILGL     -.0517266    -.0404108       -.0113159         .008304
                                                                              
                 FEMZscore1   REMZscore1     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman FEMZscore1 .
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